波逸提

Seven: The Animal Chapter 第七 有生物品
61 六十一
Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive an animal of life, it is to be confessed.
如果任何比丘故意剥夺动物的生命，波逸提。
There are five factors for the full offense here. 这里的完整违犯有五个因素。
1) Object: a living animal. 1）对象：活著的动物。
2) Perception: One perceives it to be a living animal. 2）感知：认为它是一个活著的动物。
3) Intention: One knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wants to cause its death. 3）意图：明知、有意识、故意、有目的地想要导致其死亡。
4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing it to die. 4）努力：为了使其死亡所做的一切。
5) Result: It dies as a result of one’s action. 5）结果：由于自己的行动而导致其死亡。
Object 对象
Animal here covers all common animals. As the Commentary notes, whether the animal is large or small makes no difference in terms of the penalty, although the size of the animal is one of the factors determining the moral gravity of the act. 动物在此处涵盖所有常见动物。如《义注》所述，动物的大小对惩罚没有影响，但动物的大小是决定行为道德严重程度的因素之一。
Apparently, this factor does not include beings too small to be seen with the naked eye, inasmuch as the classes of medicine allowed in Mv.VI include a number of anti-bacterial and anti-viral substances—some mineral salts and the decoctions made from the leaves of some trees, for example, can be antibiotic. The Commentary’s example of the smallest extreme to which this rule extends is a bed bug egg. The four “Things Not To Be Done” taught to every new bhikkhu immediately after his full Acceptance (Mv.I.78.4) say that one should not deprive an animal of life “even if it is only a black or white ant.” 显然，这一因素并不包括肉眼无法看见的微小生物，因为《大品》.六中允许的药物种类包括许多抗菌和抗病毒物质——例如，一些矿物盐和用某些树木的叶子制成的汤剂就具有抗生素作用。《义注》中举的一个例子，是臭虫卵，说明了这条戒条延伸到的最小极限。每位新比丘在受完整具足戒后都会立即被教导的四件「不可做之事」（《大品》.一.78.4），其中说，不应剥夺动物的生命，「即使它只是一只黑蚂蚁或白蚂蚁」。
On the other end of the spectrum, Pr 3 imposes a pārājika for deliberately killing a human being, and a thullaccaya for deliberately killing a peta, yakkha, or nāga. 另一方面，《波罗夷》三规定，故意杀害人类犯《波罗夷》，故意杀害饿鬼、夜叉或龙则犯《偷兰遮》。
Perception 感知
If one is in doubt as to whether something is a living animal, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it actually is. If one perceives an inanimate object to be a living animal, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one perceives an object to be inanimate, then regardless of whether it actually is, it is not grounds for an offense. Thus, for example, if—with murderous intent—one steps on a spot of dirt thinking it to be a bed bug egg, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. If one steps on bed bug eggs thinking them to be spots of dirt, there is no penalty. 如果怀疑某物是否为活著的动物，无论它是否真的是，都构成《突吉罗》。如果将无生命物体视为活著的动物，也构成《突吉罗》。如果将某物视为无生命，无论它是否真的是，都不构成犯戒。因此，例如，如果怀著杀意踩到一处泥土，认为那是臭虫卵，则惩罚为《突吉罗》。如果踩到臭虫卵，认为它们是泥土，则不受惩罚。
Intention 意图
Intention, in the Vibhaṅga, is described as “having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously”—the same phrase used to define intention under Pr 3. The Commentary to this rule refers back to the Commentary to that rule, where having willed means having willed, having planned, with a murderous intention. Having made the decision means “having summoned up a reckless mind-state, ‘crushing’ through the power of an attack.” Knowingly means knowing that, “This is a living being.” Consciously means being aware that one’s action is depriving the animal of life. 意图，在《经分别》中，被描述为「有意愿，明知且有意识地做出决定」──与《波罗夷》三中对意图的定义的措辞相同。本戒条的《义注》引用了该戒条的《义注》，其中有意愿是指有意愿、有计划、有谋杀意图。做出决定是指「鼓起不顾一切的心态，以攻击的力量『粉碎』」。明知是指知道「这是一个生物」。有意识是指知道自己的行为正在剥夺动物的生命。
All of this indicates that this factor is fulfilled only when one acts on a clear and consciously made decision to deprive the animal of life. Thus, for example, if one is sweeping a walk, trying carefully not to kill any insects, and yet some ants happen to die, one does not commit an offense even if one knew that there was the possibility that some might die, because one’s purpose in acting was not to cause their death. 所有这些都表明，只有当根据清晰且有意识的决定采取行动，剥夺动物的生命时，这一因素才会得到满足。因此，例如，如果正在清扫人行道，小心翼翼地不杀死任何昆虫，然而却碰巧死了一些蚂蚁，即使知道有可能造成一些蚂蚁死亡，也不会构成犯戒，因为行为的目的并非是要导致它们死亡。
Motive, here, is irrelevant to the offense. Even the desire to kill an animal to “put it out of its misery” fulfills the factor of intention all the same. 此处，动机与犯戒无关。即使只是想「结束痛苦」而杀死动物，也同样构成意图的因素。
Effort 努力
The Vibhaṅga is silent on what ways of taking life would fall under this rule. The Commentary says that explanations for this rule may be inferred from its discussion to Pr 3. Thus the four ways of taking life listed in the Vibhaṅga to that rule would apply here as well: 《经分别》并没有说哪些杀生方式符合这条戒条。《义注》说，这条戒条的解释可以从其对《波罗夷》三的讨论中推论出来。因此，该戒条的《经分别》中所列举的四种杀生方式也适用于此：
using one’s own person (e.g., hitting with the hand, kicking, using a knife or a club);
使用自己的身体（例如，用手打、踢、使用刀或棍棒）；
throwing (hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun);
投掷（投掷石头、射箭或枪）；
using a stationary device (setting a trap, placing poison in food);
使用固定装置（设置陷阱、在食物中放置毒药）；
commanding.
命令。
Mv.V.10.10 discusses a case of this last instance, in which a depraved bhikkhu tells a layman that he has use for a certain calf’s hide, and the layman kills the calf for him. Because the bhikkhu did not give a specific command that the calf be killed, and yet the Buddha said that his action did come under this rule, we can conclude that there is no room for kappiya-vohāra in this context. Whatever one says in hopes of inciting someone else to kill an animal would fulfill this factor. This rule thus differs from Pr 3, under which commanding covers only clear imperatives. 《大品》.五.10.10 讨论了最后一个方式的案例：一位堕落的比丘告诉一位居士，他需要一头小牛的皮，于是这位居士为他宰杀了这头小牛。由于这位比丘并没有明确下令宰杀这头小牛，而佛陀却说他的行为确实符合这条戒条，因此我们可以得出结论，在这种脉络下，不存在 kappiya-vohāra 的空间。任何希望煽动他人杀动物的言论都符合此因素。因此，这条戒条与《波罗夷》三不同，该戒条下的命令只涵盖明确的命令。
Two other ways of taking life, listed in the Commentary to Pr 3, would apparently also apply here: 《波罗夷》三的《义注》中列出了另外两种杀生的方式，显然也适用于此：
using magical formulae;
使用咒语；
using psychic powers.
使用神通。
Result 结果
Only if the animal dies does one incur the pācittiya here. The Vibhaṅga here mentions no penalty for the case where one tries to kill an animal but the animal does not die. However, under Pr 3—in its discussion of a pitfall arranged with the intent of causing the death of any living being falling into it—it assigns the following penalties: if an animal falls into the pitfall, a dukkaṭa; if it experiences pain as a result, another dukkaṭa; if it dies, a pācittiya. Thus it seems reasonable to extrapolate from this specific example to make these penalties general: For a bhikkhu making an intentional effort to kill an animal, there is a dukkaṭa for the first effort that touches the animal’s body; another dukkaṭa if the animal experiences pain because of one’s effort; and the full offense if, as a result, it dies. 只有动物死亡，才会在此犯《波逸提》。《经分别》在此并未提及试图杀死动物但动物未死的情况的惩罚。然而，在《波罗夷》三中——在其讨论中，安排意图让任何生物掉入其中而死亡的陷阱时——规定了以下惩罚：如果动物掉入陷阱，则犯一次《突吉罗》；如果动物因此遭受痛苦，则犯另一次《突吉罗》；如果动物死亡，则犯一次《波逸提》。因此，似乎可以合理地从这个具体例子推断而使这些惩罚具普遍性：对于有意杀死动物的比丘，第一次触及动物身体的努力犯一次《突吉罗》；如果动物因该努力而遭受痛苦，则犯另一次《突吉罗》；如果因此导致动物死亡，则构成完全违犯。
Non-offenses 不犯
There is no offense in killing an animal— 杀死动物并无犯戒——
unintentionally—e.g., accidentally dropping a load that crushes a cat to death;
无意地—例如，意外掉落负载，将猫咪压死；
unthinkingly—e.g., absent-mindedly rubbing one’s arm while it is being bitten by mosquitoes;
不假思索地—例如，在被蚊子叮咬时心不在焉地揉搓手臂；
unknowingly—e.g., walking into a dark room and, without realizing it, stepping on an insect; or
不知不觉地—例如，走进一个黑暗的房间，没有意识到踩到了一只昆虫；或者
when one’s action is motivated by a purpose other than that of causing death—e.g., giving medicine to a sick dog whose system, it turns out, cannot withstand the dosage.
当行动不是出于导致死亡的目的时—例如，给一只病狗喂药，结果这只狗的身体却无法承受该剂量。
Still, the Commentary states that if one notices even bed bug eggs while cleaning a bed, one should be careful not to damage them. Thus, “out of compassion, one’s duties are to be done carefully.” Or, in the words of the Sub-commentary: “One’s duties in looking after one’s dwelling are to be done with mindfulness well-established so that such creatures do not die.” 尽管如此，《义注》指出，即使在清洁床舖时发现臭虫卵，也应小心谨慎，以免损坏它们。因此，「出于慈悲，应谨慎履行职责」。或者，用《复注》的话来说：「看管住所时，应以扎实的正念履行职责，以免这些生物死亡。」
Summary: Deliberately killing an animal—or having it killed—is a pācittiya offense. 摘要：故意杀害动物或令其被杀是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。
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62 六十二
Should any bhikkhu knowingly make use of water containing living beings, it is to be confessed.
如果任何比丘明知而使用含有生物的水，波逸提。
This rule is similar to Pc 20, differing only in the factor of effort and in the fact that intention is not a factor for an offense. So here the factors for the full offense are three: object, perception, and effort. 这条戒条与《波逸提》二十相似，差异仅在于努力因素，以及意图并非构成犯戒的因素。因此，此处构成完全违犯的因素有三：对象、感知和努力。
Object: 对象：
Water containing living creatures. This includes things like mosquito larvae, but not beings too small to be seen. 含有生物的水。这包括蚊子幼虫之类的生物，但不包括肉眼看不见的生物。
Perception 感知
One knows that they are there—either from having sensed their presence on one’s own or from having been told of their presence—and that they will die from the factor of effort, defined below. 知道它们的存在——无论是自己感觉到它们的存在，还是被告知它们的存在——并且它们会因为下面定义的努力因素而死亡。
If one is in doubt as to whether water contains living beings, or if one perceives living beings in the water when there actually aren’t, then to use it in a way that would cause their death if they were there is to incur a dukkaṭa. 如果怀疑水中是否有生物，或者认为水中有生物，但实际上没有，那么以会导致生物死亡的方式使用水就会犯《突吉罗》。
Effort 努力
The Vibhaṅga does not go into detail on this factor, while the Commentary defines it with examples: drinking the water, using it to wash one’s bowl, using it to cool hot porridge, dipping it out of a tank or pond to bathe with it, making waves in a pool so that the water will splash over its banks. The Sub-commentary suggests that this rule covers only cases in which one is using water for one’s own personal consumption, but this does not fit with the fact that, under this rule, the Commentary explains how one should go about cleaning out a dirty pool. (Place eight to ten potfuls of water containing no living beings in another place that will hold the water, and then dip the water from the pool into it.) The Commentary to Pr 3 states that using water to put out a fire—even an approaching wildfire that threatens one’s dwelling—would also come under this rule. 《经分别》没有详细说明这一点，而《义注》则举例说明：饮水、用它来洗碗、用它来凉热粥、从水箱或池塘中舀水并以之沐浴、在水池中掀起波浪使水溅到岸边。《复注》认为这条戒条只涵盖个人用水的情况，但这与《义注》在这条戒条下解释如何清理脏水池的事实不符。（将八到十壶没有生物的水放在另一个可以盛水的地方，然后将水池中的水舀入其中。）《波罗夷》三的《义注》指出，用水灭火——即使是即将威胁到住所的野火——也属于这条戒条。
From all of this, it would appear that this rule covers all cases of using water containing living beings that are not covered by Pc 20. 从所有这些来看，这条戒条似乎涵盖了所有使用含有生物的水的情况，而这些情况并未被《波逸提》二十所涵盖。
Unlike that rule, though, the Vibhaṅga does not include the act of getting other people to make use of water containing living beings under the factor of effort here, although the Commentary and K/Commentary do. On the surface, the commentaries’ position seems reasonable. However, the compilers of the Vibhaṅga may have been taking into account the fact that, unlike telling a person to pour water on the ground, telling a person simply to use water containing living beings is not an order that, if carried out, would automatically doom those beings to death. For example, if one told another bhikkhu to drink water containing living beings, he would be the one responsible for deciding whether to strain the water first (see below). If he did, no damage would be done. If he didn’t, the offense under this rule would be his. Thus the Vibhaṅga seems correct in not including the act of getting other people to use such water under this rule. In fact, this distinction between this rule and Pc 20 may be one of the reasons why this topic is covered by two separate rules. 然而，与那条戒条不同的是，《经分别》并未将让别人使用含有生物的水的行为纳入此处的努力因素，而《义注》和 K/《义注》则将其纳入。表面上看，注释书的立场似乎合理。然而，《经分别》的编纂者可能考虑到了这样一个事实：与告诉一个人将水倒在地上不同，仅仅告诉一个人使用含有生物的水，并不意味著这个命令如果被执行，就会自动导致这些生物死亡。例如，如果告诉另一个比丘喝含有生物的水，他有责任决定是否先滤水（见下文）。如果他这样做了，就不会造成损害。如果他不这样做，他就会犯下这条戒条下的罪行。因此，《经分别》并未将让别人使用这种水的行为纳入这条戒条似乎是正确的。事实上，本戒条与《波逸提》二十之间的差异可能是此主题由两个独立戒条涵盖的原因之一。
The K/Commentary claims that intention is also a factor here, and—as under Pc 20—it states that the intention has to be non-murderous—the implication being that if it were murderous, the case would come under Pc 61. However, unlike the non-offense clauses to Pc 20, the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here make no exception for a bhikkhu who uses water containing living beings either unthinkingly or unintentionally. The only exemptions deal with what one knows or does not know about the water. This means that if one knows the water contains living beings that would die from using it, then even if one spills the water accidentally, one’s action would incur a penalty all the same. K/《义注》声称意图也是此处的一个因素，并且——与《波逸提》二十一样——它规定意图必须是非杀害性的——言下之意是，如果意图是杀害性的，则该情况属于《波逸提》六一的范畴。然而，与《波逸提》二十的不犯条款不同，此处《经分别》的不犯条款并未豁免比丘不加思索地或无意地使用含有生物的水。唯一的豁免取决于对水的了解。这意味著，如果知道水中含有生物，而使用水会导致生物会死亡，那么即使不小心将水洒了，该行为仍然同样会受到惩罚。
Result is not a factor here. Whether the living beings actually die is of no consequence in determining the offense. 结果在这里不是一个因素。生物是否真的死亡与判定犯戒无关。
Non-offenses 不犯
There is no offense in using water— 使用水并没有犯戒——
if one does not know that it contains living beings;
如果不知道其中有生物的话；
if one knows that it does not contain living beings; or
如果知道其中不包含生物；或者
if one knows that the living beings it contains will not die from the use one has in mind.
如果知道其中所包含的生物不会因为想要的用途而死亡。
Water strainers 滤水器
Cv.V.13.1 gives permission for one to use a water strainer to remove dirt and living beings from water before using it, and such strainers eventually became one of a bhikkhu’s eight basic requisites. According to Cv.V.13.2, one must take a water strainer along when going on a journey. If one has no strainer, one may determine the corner of one’s outer robe as a strainer and use it to filter water. 《小品》.五.13.1 允许在使用水之前使用滤水器，去除水中的污垢和生物，这种滤水器最终成为比丘的八项基本必需品之一。根据《小品》.五.13.2 ，在旅行时必须携带滤水器。如果没有滤水器，可以决意外衣的一角当作滤水器，用它来过滤水。
Summary: Using water knowing that it contains living beings that will die from that use is a pācittiya offense. 摘要：明知水中含有会因使用而造成死亡的生物，却仍使用水，是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。
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(未完待续)