波逸提

Seven: The Animal Chapter

第七有生物品

61	六十一
Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive an animal of life, it is to be confessed.	如果任何比丘故意剥夺动物的生命，波逸提。
There are five factors for the full offense here.	这里的完整违犯有五个因素。
1) Object: a living animal.	1）对象：活著的动物。
2) Perception: One perceives it to be a living animal.	2）感知：认为它是一个活著的动物。
3) Intention: One knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wants to cause its death.	3）意图：明知、有意识、故意、有目的地想要导致其死亡。
4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing it to die.	4）努力：为了使其死亡所做的一切。
5) Result: It dies as a result of one’s action.	5）结果：由于自己的行动而导致其死亡。
Object	对象
Animal here covers all common animals. As the Commentary notes, whether the animal is large or small makes no difference in terms of the penalty, although the size of the animal is one of the factors determining the moral gravity of the act.	动物在此处涵盖所有常见动物。如《义注》所述，动物的大小对惩罚没有影响，但动物的大小是决定行为道德严重程度的因素之一。
Apparently, this factor does not include beings too small to be seen with the naked eye, inasmuch as the classes of medicine allowed in Mv.VI include a number of anti-bacterial and anti-viral substances—some mineral salts and the decoctions made from the leaves of some trees, for example, can be antibiotic. The Commentary’s example of the smallest extreme to which this rule extends is a bed bug egg. The four “Things Not To Be Done” taught to every new bhikkhu immediately after his full Acceptance (Mv.I.78.4) say that one should not deprive an animal of life “even if it is only a black or white ant.”	显然，这一因素并不包括肉眼无法看见的微小生物，因为《大品》.六中允许的药物种类包括许多抗菌和抗病毒物质——例如，一些矿物盐和用某些树木的叶子制成的汤剂就具有抗生素作用。《义注》中举的一个例子，是臭虫卵，说明了这条戒条延伸到的最小极限。每位新比丘在受完整具足戒后都会立即被教导的四件「不可做之事」（《大品》.一.78.4），其中说，不应剥夺动物的生命，「即使它只是一只黑蚂蚁或白蚂蚁」。
On the other end of the spectrum, Pr 3 imposes a pārājika for deliberately killing a human being, and a thullaccaya for deliberately killing a peta, yakkha, or nāga.	另一方面，《波罗夷》三规定，故意杀害人类犯《波罗夷》，故意杀害饿鬼、夜叉或龙则犯《偷兰遮》。

Perception	感知
If one is in doubt as to whether something is a living animal, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it actually is. If one perceives an inanimate object to be a living animal, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one perceives an object to be inanimate, then regardless of whether it actually is, it is not grounds for an offense. Thus, for example, if—with murderous intent—one steps on a spot of dirt thinking it to be a bed bug egg, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. If one steps on bed bug eggs thinking them to be spots of dirt, there is no penalty.	如果怀疑某物是否为活著的动物，无论它是否真的是，都构成《突吉罗》。如果将无生命物体视为活著的动物，也构成《突吉罗》。如果将某物视为无生命，无论它是否真的是，都不构成犯戒。因此，例如，如果怀著杀意踩到一处泥土，认为那是臭虫卵，则惩罚为《突吉罗》。如果踩到臭虫卵，认为它们是泥土，则不受惩罚。
Intention	意图
Intention, in the Vibhaṅga, is described as “having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously”—the same phrase used to define intention under Pr 3. The Commentary to this rule refers back to the Commentary to that rule, where having willed means having willed, having planned, with a murderous intention. Having made the decision means “having summoned up a reckless mind-state, ‘crushing’ through the power of an attack.” Knowingly means knowing that, “This is a living being.” Consciously means being aware that one’s action is depriving the animal of life.	意图，在《经分别》中，被描述为「有意愿，明知且有意识地做出决定」──与《波罗夷》三中对意图的定义的措辞相同。本戒条的《义注》引用了该戒条的《义注》，其中有意愿是指有意愿、有计划、有谋杀意图。做出决定是指「鼓起不顾一切的心态，以攻击的力量『粉碎』」。明知是指知道「这是一个生物」。有意识是指知道自己的行为正在剥夺动物的生命。
All of this indicates that this factor is fulfilled only when one acts on a clear and consciously made decision to deprive the animal of life. Thus, for example, if one is sweeping a walk, trying carefully not to kill any insects, and yet some ants happen to die, one does not commit an offense even if one knew that there was the possibility that some might die, because one’s purpose in acting was not to cause their death.	所有这些都表明，只有当根据清晰且有意识的决定采取行动，剥夺动物的生命时，这一因素才会得到满足。因此，例如，如果正在清扫人行道，小心翼翼地不杀死任何昆虫，然而却碰巧死了一些蚂蚁，即使知道有可能造成一些蚂蚁死亡，也不会构成犯戒，因为行为的目的并非是要导致它们死亡。
Motive, here, is irrelevant to the offense. Even the desire to kill an animal to “put it out of its misery” fulfills the factor of intention all the same.	此处，动机与犯戒无关。即使只是想「结束痛苦」而杀死动物，也同样构成意图的因素。
Effort	努力
The Vibhaṅga is silent on what ways of taking life would fall under this rule. The Commentary says that explanations for this rule may be inferred from its discussion to Pr 3. Thus the four ways of taking life listed in the Vibhaṅga to that rule would apply here as well:	《经分别》并没有说哪些杀生方式符合这条戒条。《义注》说，这条戒条的解释可以从其对《波罗夷》三的讨论中推论出来。因此，该戒条的《经分别》中所列举的四种杀生方式也适用于此：
using one’s own person (e.g., hitting with the hand, kicking, using a knife or a club);	使用自己的身体（例如，用手打、踢、使用刀或棍棒）；
throwing (hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun);	投掷（投掷石头、射箭或枪）；
using a stationary device (setting a trap, placing poison in food);	使用固定装置（设置陷阱、在食物中放置毒药）；
commanding.	命令。
Mv.V.10.10 discusses a case of this last instance, in which a depraved bhikkhu tells a layman that he has use for a certain calf’s hide, and the layman kills the calf for him. Because the bhikkhu did not give a specific command that the calf be killed, and yet the Buddha said that his action did come under this rule, we can conclude that there is no room for kappiya-vohāra in this context. Whatever one says in hopes of inciting someone else to kill an animal would fulfill this factor. This rule thus differs from Pr 3, under which commanding covers only clear imperatives.	《大品》.五.10.10 讨论了最后一个方式的案例：一位堕落的比丘告诉一位居士，他需要一头小牛的皮，于是这位居士为他宰杀了这头小牛。由于这位比丘并没有明确下令宰杀这头小牛，而佛陀却说他的行为确实符合这条戒条，因此我们可以得出结论，在这种脉络下，不存在 kappiya-vohāra 的空间。任何希望煽动他人杀动物的言论都符合此因素。因此，这条戒条与《波罗夷》三不同，该戒条下的命令只涵盖明确的命令。
Two other ways of taking life, listed in the Commentary to Pr 3, would apparently also apply here:	《波罗夷》三的《义注》中列出了另外两种杀生的方式，显然也适用于此：
using magical formulae;	使用咒语；
using psychic powers.	使用神通。

Result	结果
Only if the animal dies does one incur the pācittiya here. The Vibhaṅga here mentions no penalty for the case where one tries to kill an animal but the animal does not die. However, under Pr 3—in its discussion of a pitfall arranged with the intent of causing the death of any living being falling into it—it assigns the following penalties: if an animal falls into the pitfall, a dukkaṭa; if it experiences pain as a result, another dukkaṭa; if it dies, a pācittiya. Thus it seems reasonable to extrapolate from this specific example to make these penalties general: For a bhikkhu making an intentional effort to kill an animal, there is a dukkaṭa for the first effort that touches the animal’s body; another dukkaṭa if the animal experiences pain because of one’s effort; and the full offense if, as a result, it dies.	只有动物死亡，才会在此犯《波逸提》。《经分别》在此并未提及试图杀死动物但动物未死的情况的惩罚。然而，在《波罗夷》三中——在其讨论中，安排意图让任何生物掉入其中而死亡的陷阱时——规定了以下惩罚：如果动物掉入陷阱，则犯一次《突吉罗》；如果动物因此遭受痛苦，则犯另一次《突吉罗》；如果动物死亡，则犯一次《波逸提》。因此，似乎可以合理地从这个具体例子推断而使这些惩罚具普遍性：对于有意杀死动物的比丘，第一次触及动物身体的努力犯一次《突吉罗》；如果动物因该努力而遭受痛苦，则犯另一次《突吉罗》；如果因此导致动物死亡，则构成完全违犯。
Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense in killing an animal—	杀死动物并无犯戒——
unintentionally—e.g., accidentally dropping a load that crushes a cat to death;	无意地—例如，意外掉落负载，将猫咪压死；
unthinkingly—e.g., absent-mindedly rubbing one’s arm while it is being bitten by mosquitoes;	不假思索地—例如，在被蚊子叮咬时心不在焉地揉搓手臂；
unknowingly—e.g., walking into a dark room and, without realizing it, stepping on an insect; or	不知不觉地—例如，走进一个黑暗的房间，没有意识到踩到了一只昆虫；或者
when one’s action is motivated by a purpose other than that of causing death—e.g., giving medicine to a sick dog whose system, it turns out, cannot withstand the dosage.	当行动不是出于导致死亡的目的时—例如，给一只病狗喂药，结果这只狗的身体却无法承受该剂量。
Still, the Commentary states that if one notices even bed bug eggs while cleaning a bed, one should be careful not to damage them. Thus, “out of compassion, one’s duties are to be done carefully.” Or, in the words of the Sub-commentary: “One’s duties in looking after one’s dwelling are to be done with mindfulness well-established so that such creatures do not die.”	尽管如此，《义注》指出，即使在清洁床舖时发现臭虫卵，也应小心谨慎，以免损坏它们。因此，「出于慈悲，应谨慎履行职责」。或者，用《复注》的话来说：「看管住所时，应以扎实的正念履行职责，以免这些生物死亡。」
Summary: Deliberately killing an animal—or having it killed—is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：故意杀害动物或令其被杀是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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62	六十二
Should any bhikkhu knowingly make use of water containing living beings, it is to be confessed.	如果任何比丘明知而使用含有生物的水，波逸提。
This rule is similar to Pc 20, differing only in the factor of effort and in the fact that intention is not a factor for an offense. So here the factors for the full offense are three: object, perception, and effort.	这条戒条与《波逸提》二十相似，差异仅在于努力因素，以及意图并非构成犯戒的因素。因此，此处构成完全违犯的因素有三：对象、感知和努力。
Object:	对象：
Water containing living creatures. This includes things like mosquito larvae, but not beings too small to be seen.	含有生物的水。这包括蚊子幼虫之类的生物，但不包括肉眼看不见的生物。

Perception	感知
One knows that they are there—either from having sensed their presence on one’s own or from having been told of their presence—and that they will die from the factor of effort, defined below.	知道它们的存在——无论是自己感觉到它们的存在，还是被告知它们的存在——并且它们会因为下面定义的努力因素而死亡。
If one is in doubt as to whether water contains living beings, or if one perceives living beings in the water when there actually aren’t, then to use it in a way that would cause their death if they were there is to incur a dukkaṭa.	如果怀疑水中是否有生物，或者认为水中有生物，但实际上没有，那么以会导致生物死亡的方式使用水就会犯《突吉罗》。
Effort	努力
The Vibhaṅga does not go into detail on this factor, while the Commentary defines it with examples: drinking the water, using it to wash one’s bowl, using it to cool hot porridge, dipping it out of a tank or pond to bathe with it, making waves in a pool so that the water will splash over its banks. The Sub-commentary suggests that this rule covers only cases in which one is using water for one’s own personal consumption, but this does not fit with the fact that, under this rule, the Commentary explains how one should go about cleaning out a dirty pool. (Place eight to ten potfuls of water containing no living beings in another place that will hold the water, and then dip the water from the pool into it.) The Commentary to Pr 3 states that using water to put out a fire—even an approaching wildfire that threatens one’s dwelling—would also come under this rule.	《经分别》没有详细说明这一点，而《义注》则举例说明：饮水、用它来洗碗、用它来凉热粥、从水箱或池塘中舀水并以之沐浴、在水池中掀起波浪使水溅到岸边。《复注》认为这条戒条只涵盖个人用水的情况，但这与《义注》在这条戒条下解释如何清理脏水池的事实不符。（将八到十壶没有生物的水放在另一个可以盛水的地方，然后将水池中的水舀入其中。）《波罗夷》三的《义注》指出，用水灭火——即使是即将威胁到住所的野火——也属于这条戒条。
From all of this, it would appear that this rule covers all cases of using water containing living beings that are not covered by Pc 20.	从所有这些来看，这条戒条似乎涵盖了所有使用含有生物的水的情况，而这些情况并未被《波逸提》二十所涵盖。
Unlike that rule, though, the Vibhaṅga does not include the act of getting other people to make use of water containing living beings under the factor of effort here, although the Commentary and K/Commentary do. On the surface, the commentaries’ position seems reasonable. However, the compilers of the Vibhaṅga may have been taking into account the fact that, unlike telling a person to pour water on the ground, telling a person simply to use water containing living beings is not an order that, if carried out, would automatically doom those beings to death. For example, if one told another bhikkhu to drink water containing living beings, he would be the one responsible for deciding whether to strain the water first (see below). If he did, no damage would be done. If he didn’t, the offense under this rule would be his. Thus the Vibhaṅga seems correct in not including the act of getting other people to use such water under this rule. In fact, this distinction between this rule and Pc 20 may be one of the reasons why this topic is covered by two separate rules.	然而，与那条戒条不同的是，《经分别》并未将让别人使用含有生物的水的行为纳入此处的努力因素，而《义注》和 K/《义注》则将其纳入。表面上看，注释书的立场似乎合理。然而，《经分别》的编纂者可能考虑到了这样一个事实：与告诉一个人将水倒在地上不同，仅仅告诉一个人使用含有生物的水，并不意味著这个命令如果被执行，就会自动导致这些生物死亡。例如，如果告诉另一个比丘喝含有生物的水，他有责任决定是否先滤水（见下文）。如果他这样做了，就不会造成损害。如果他不这样做，他就会犯下这条戒条下的罪行。因此，《经分别》并未将让别人使用这种水的行为纳入这条戒条似乎是正确的。事实上，本戒条与《波逸提》二十之间的差异可能是此主题由两个独立戒条涵盖的原因之一。
The K/Commentary claims that intention is also a factor here, and—as under Pc 20—it states that the intention has to be non-murderous—the implication being that if it were murderous, the case would come under Pc 61. However, unlike the non-offense clauses to Pc 20, the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here make no exception for a bhikkhu who uses water containing living beings either unthinkingly or unintentionally. The only exemptions deal with what one knows or does not know about the water. This means that if one knows the water contains living beings that would die from using it, then even if one spills the water accidentally, one’s action would incur a penalty all the same.	K/《义注》声称意图也是此处的一个因素，并且——与《波逸提》二十一样——它规定意图必须是非杀害性的——言下之意是，如果意图是杀害性的，则该情况属于《波逸提》六一的范畴。然而，与《波逸提》二十的不犯条款不同，此处《经分别》的不犯条款并未豁免比丘不加思索地或无意地使用含有生物的水。唯一的豁免取决于对水的了解。这意味著，如果知道水中含有生物，而使用水会导致生物会死亡，那么即使不小心将水洒了，该行为仍然同样会受到惩罚。
Result is not a factor here. Whether the living beings actually die is of no consequence in determining the offense.	结果在这里不是一个因素。生物是否真的死亡与判定犯戒无关。

Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense in using water—	使用水并没有犯戒——
if one does not know that it contains living beings;	如果不知道其中有生物的话；
if one knows that it does not contain living beings; or	如果知道其中不包含生物；或者
if one knows that the living beings it contains will not die from the use one has in mind.	如果知道其中所包含的生物不会因为想要的用途而死亡。
Water strainers	滤水器
Cv.V.13.1 gives permission for one to use a water strainer to remove dirt and living beings from water before using it, and such strainers eventually became one of a bhikkhu’s eight basic requisites. According to Cv.V.13.2, one must take a water strainer along when going on a journey. If one has no strainer, one may determine the corner of one’s outer robe as a strainer and use it to filter water.	《小品》.五.13.1 允许在使用水之前使用滤水器，去除水中的污垢和生物，这种滤水器最终成为比丘的八项基本必需品之一。根据《小品》.五.13.2 ，在旅行时必须携带滤水器。如果没有滤水器，可以决意外衣的一角当作滤水器，用它来过滤水。
Summary: Using water knowing that it contains living beings that will die from that use is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：明知水中含有会因使用而造成死亡的生物，却仍使用水，是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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63	六十三
Should any bhikkhu knowingly agitate for the reviving of an issue that has been rightfully dealt with, it is to be confessed.	如果任何比丘明知地鼓动重新提起已经得到正确处理的诤事，波逸提。
Issues	诤事
An issue (adhikaraṇa) is a matter that, once arisen, must be dealt with formally in a prescribed manner. The Vibhaṅga lists four sorts:	诤事（adhikaraṇa）是指一旦发生，必须以规定的方式正式处理的事情。《经分别》列出了四种类型：
1) dispute-issues (vivādādhikaraṇa) concerning Dhamma and Vinaya (see Sg 10), which the Community must deal with by declaring which side is right and which wrong;	1）言诤（vivādādhikaraṇa）是有关法与律的争议问题（见《僧残》十），僧团必须透过宣告哪一方是对的、哪一方是错的来处理这些问题；
2) accusation-issues (anuvādādhikaraṇa) concerning offenses (see Sg 8 & 9; Ay 1 & 2), which the Community must deal with by judging them true or false;	2）教诫诤/觅诤（anuvādādhikaraṇa）有关犯戒的指控问题（见《僧残》八、九；《不定》一、二），僧团必须透过判断其真否来处理这些问题；
3) offense-issues (āpattādhikaraṇa), in other words, the commission of offenses, which are to be dealt with by the offender’s undergoing the prescribed penalties (confession, penance, or expulsion from the Community); and	3）犯罪诤/犯诤（āpattādhikaraṇa），换言之即犯下的罪行，应透过对犯戒者进行规定的惩罚（发露忏悔、摩那埵、或驱逐出僧团）来处理；
4) duty-issues (kiccādhikaraṇa)—Community transactions, such as giving ordination and holding the Pāṭimokkha recitation—which the Community must deal with by performing them properly.	4）事诤（kiccādhikaraṇa）——僧伽羯磨，例如授具足戒和持诵《波罗提木叉》——僧团必须借由妥善履行来处理这些事务。
An issue rightfully dealt with is one that has been handled properly in accordance with the procedures given in the Vinaya. Some of these procedures are discussed under Pc 79 & 80, the Adhikaraṇa-samatha rules, and in BMC2, Chapters 12-22. If an issue has been dealt with improperly, it may be reopened for reconsideration, but once it has been dealt with properly it is considered closed for good.	妥善处理的诤事是依照律藏规定的程序适当地处理的诤事。其中一些程序在《波逸提》七九和八十，灭诤戒条，以及《佛教比丘戒律第二册》第十二至二十二章中进行了讨论。如果诤事处理不当，可以重新审理，但一旦适当地处理，则视为永久了结。
The factors for an offense under this rule are three.	本戒条下犯戒的因素有三。
1) Object: an issue that has been dealt with properly.	1）对象：已妥善处理的诤事。
2) Perception: One knows that it was dealt with properly, either because one was directly involved or one has been told of the matter.	2）感知：知道诤事已经妥善处理，要不是因为直接参与其中，就是因为被告知了这件事。
3) Effort: One says—in the presence of another bhikkhu—that it was dealt with improperly. The Vibhaṅga gives the following examples of statements that would fulfill this factor: “The issue was not carried out.” “It was poorly carried out.” “It should be carried out again.” “It was not settled.” “It was poorly settled.” “It should be settled again.”	3）努力：在另一位比丘面前说此事处理不当。《经分别》列举了以下符合此因素的陈述的例子：「此事未被执行。」「它被执行得不好。」「它应被重新执行。」「它未被解决。」「它被解决得不好。」「它应被重新解决。」
Pv.IX.3 contains a short discussion of this rule, making the point that one is subject to this rule regardless of whether one was involved in dealing with the issue the first time around.	《附随》.九.3 包含此戒条的简短讨论，指出无论是否第一次时即参与处理该问题，都必须遵守此戒条。

Perception	感知
If the transaction dealing with the issue was invalid but one perceives it as valid, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one is in doubt about the validity of the transaction, then it is grounds for a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it was actually valid or not. What this last point means in practice is that if one is in doubt about the transaction, one may declare one’s doubt, but to state baldly that the issue needs to be reopened is to incur a dukkaṭa.	若处理该诤事的羯磨无效，但认为其有效，则构成《突吉罗》。如果对羯磨的有效性存有疑问，则无论该羯磨是否真的有效，都构成《突吉罗》。最后一点在实践中意味著，如果对羯磨存有疑问，可以声明自己的疑问，但直言不讳地表示需要重新讨论该诤事，则构成《突吉罗》。
Further action	进一步行动
The Commentary to Cv.IX.3 states that in committing this offense one is subject to having one’s Pāṭimokkha canceled (see BMC2, Chapter 15). This would provide an opportunity for the Community to look into one’s attitude to see if one is still insistent on having the issue revived. If one continues to make a concerted effort to reopen an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, one is considered a maker of strife, and as such is subject to an act of censure, banishment, or suspension, depending on the gravity of the case (see BMC2, Chapter 20).	《小品》.九.3 的《义注》指出，犯此戒者，其《波罗提木叉》将被取消（参见《佛教比丘戒律第二册》第十五章）。这将为僧团提供一个机会，审视其态度，看看其是否仍坚持重新提起此事。如果其明知此事已得到妥善处理，却仍继续试图重新提起，则将被视为挑起纷争，并根据情况的严重程度受到呵责、驱出或举罪的处分（参见《佛教比丘戒律第二册》第二十章）。

Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense in agitating to have an issue re-opened if one perceives it to have been improperly dealt with: e.g., dealt with not in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Vinaya, dealt with by an incomplete group, or—in the case of an accusation or similar acts—performed against someone who did not deserve it. This allowance holds regardless of whether, in actuality, the issue was properly dealt with. For example: A Community has performed a censure transaction against Bhikkhu X. One honestly believes that X did not deserve the act, and says so to a fellow bhikkhu. In this case, one commits no offense even if it turns out that X did in fact deserve censure.	如果认为诤事处理不当，例如，处理方式不符合律藏的戒条和程序，或由不完整的团体处理，或——在指控或类似行为的情况下——针对不应得之者，则鼓动重新审理该诤事并无犯戒。无论诤事实际上是否得到妥善处理，此开缘仍适用。例如：僧团对比丘 X 进行了呵责羯磨。自己真诚地认为 X 不该受此处分，并向一位比丘同侪如此说。在这种情况下，即使事实证明 X 确实应受呵责，也不构成犯戒。
Summary: Agitating to re-open an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：在明知诤事已经妥善处理的情况下，仍鼓动重新提之，是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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64	六十四
Should any bhikkhu knowingly conceal (another) bhikkhu’s serious offense, it is to be confessed.	若任何比丘明知地隐瞒（另一位）比丘的严重罪行，波逸提。
Here there are four factors for the full offense.	此处构成完全违犯的因素有四。
1) Object: a serious offense committed by another bhikkhu.	1）对象：另一位比丘所犯下的严重罪行。
2) Perception: One perceives the offense as serious—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by the bhikkhu, or from having been told by others.	2）感知：察觉该罪行是严重的—无论是自己知道，被比丘告知，或被他人告知。
3) Intention: One wants to hide the offense from other bhikkhus, one’s motive being either (a) fear that they will charge him with the offense or interrogate him about it (steps in the formal inquiry into the offense) or (b) fear that they will jeer, scoff, or make him feel abashed (steps in his enemies’ informal reaction to the news). In other words, this factor is fulfilled if one wants to prevent a Community transaction from being carried out against the offender or simply to protect him from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus who may dislike him.	3）意图：想对其他比丘隐瞒该罪行，动机若非是（a）担心他们会指控他犯下罪行或审问他（这涉及到对罪行的正式调查）；则是（b）担心他们会嘲笑、嘲讽他或让他感到羞愧（这涉及到他的敌人对这一消息的非正式反应）。换句话说，如果想阻止针对犯戒者执行的僧伽羯磨，或者仅仅想保护他免受其他可能不喜欢他的比丘的嘲笑，此因素就成立了。
4) Effort: One sees a bhikkhu suitable to be informed of the matter but abandons one’s duty to report the offense.	4）努力：看到一位适合告知此事的比丘，但却放弃了报告罪行的义务。
Object & perception	对象及感知
Serious offense, according to the Vibhaṅga, means a pārājika or a saṅghādisesa. As under Pc 9, the Commentary states that, despite what the Vibhaṅga actually says here, its compilers meant to include only saṅghādisesa offenses under this definition. But, as was also the case under Pc 9, this explanation clearly contradicts the Vibhaṅga, so it cannot stand.	严重罪行，根据《经分别》，是指《波罗夷》或《僧残》。正如《波逸提》九之下，《义注》指出，尽管《经分别》在此实际上如此解释，但其编纂者本意是仅将《僧残》罪纳入此定义。然而，正如《波逸提》九之下的案例，这种解释显然与《经分别》相矛盾，因此站不住脚。
Another bhikkhu’s non-serious offenses are grounds for a dukkaṭa here, as are the misdeeds—serious or not—of an unordained person. None of the texts explicitly define the term unordained person here, but because bhikkhus have no responsibility to tell other bhikkhus of the misdeeds of lay people, the sense of the rule would seem to require that it cover only bhikkhunīs, female trainees, male novices, and female novices. (Again, none of the texts state explicitly whether a bhikkhunī counts as ordained or unordained in the context of this rule, but because the Vibhaṅga defines serious offenses as the four pārājikas and the thirteen saṅghādisesas, and because the bhikkhunīs have different numbers of these two classes of rules, it would appear that a bhikkhunī would count as an unordained person here.) According to the Commentary, a breach of any of the first five precepts would count as serious for an unordained person (presumably meaning a novice or female trainee), whereas any other misdeed would count as not serious.	另一位比丘的非严重罪行，以及未受具足戒者的不端行为（无论轻重），构成《突吉罗》。所有文献均未在此明确定义「未受具足戒者」一词，但由于比丘没有责任告知其他比丘在家众的不端行为，因此本戒条的意义似乎要求其仅涵盖比丘尼、学法女（式叉摩那）、沙弥和沙弥尼。（同样，没有文献明确指出，在这一戒条的脉络下，比丘尼是否算作受具足戒者或未受具足戒者，但是因为《经分别》将严重罪行定义为四《波罗夷》和十三《僧残》，并且因为比丘尼在这两类戒条上的数量不同，所以似乎比丘尼在这里算作未受具足戒者。）根据《义注》，对于未受具足戒的人来说（大概是指沙弥或学法女），违反前五戒中的任何一条都将被视为严重的，而任何其他不端行为则不被视为严重的。
As for a bhikkhu’s offenses, the Vibhaṅga states that only a serious offense that one perceives to be serious is grounds for a pācittiya. All other possible combinations of object and perception—a serious offense about which one is in doubt, a serious offense that one perceives to be non-serious, a non-serious offense that one perceives to be serious, a non-serious offense about which one is in doubt, and a non-serious offense that one perceives to be non-serious—are grounds for a dukkaṭa.	至于比丘的罪行，《经分别》指出，只有当严重罪行被认为是严重时，才构成《波逸提》。其他所有对象与感知的组合—严重罪行但对之存疑，严重罪行认为非严重，非严重罪行认为严重，非严重罪行但对之存疑，非严重罪行被认为非严重—都构成《突吉罗》。

Effort & intention	努力及意图
The K/Commentary defines the factor of effort here as if it were a simple act of mind—one decides that, “I won’t tell any bhikkhu about this”—but this goes against the principle that the commentaries themselves derive from the Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 2 and apply to all the rules: that the mere arising of a mind state is never sufficient for an offense. It would seem better to argue from the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses to this rule and say that this factor is fulfilled if one comes to this decision when seeing a bhikkhu who is suitable to tell and yet decides not to tell him.	K/《义注》将此处的努力因素定义为如同一种简单的心念行为—决定「我不会告诉任何比丘这件事」—但这违背了注释书本身源自《波罗夷》二的《Vinīta-vatthu》并适用于所有戒条的原则：即仅仅产生一种心理状态并不足以构成犯戒。更好的做法似乎是从本戒条的《经分别》的不犯条款论证，如果在看到一位适合告知的比丘却决定不告诉他时，做出这样的决定，那么这个因素就成立了。
None of the texts define suitable bhikkhu here, but—following the Commentary to Cv.III—it would probably mean one who is of common affiliation and in good standing, i.e., neither suspended or undergoing penance or probation. Because of the way in which the factor of intention is worded here, a suitable bhikkhu in this case—unlike the case in which a bhikkhu needs to report his own saṅghādisesa offense—would not have to be on congenial terms with either the bhikkhu who committed the offense that needs to be reported or the bhikkhu responsible for reporting it. If the only bhikkhu available to be told is uncongenial, one must be scrupulously honest with oneself about any disinclination to inform him of the offense. If one’s only fear is that he will jeer at the offender or initiate a Community transaction to look into the offense, one is duty bound to tell him. If one feels that telling him will lead to strife in the Community or retaliation from the original offender—as the non-offense clauses note—one may wait and tell a more suitable bhikkhu.	此处，没有任何文献对合适的比丘进行定义，但根据《小品》.三的《义注》，它可能指共同羯磨且品行良好者，即既没有被举罪，也没有正在接受摩那埵或别住。由于此处对意图因素的表述方式，在这种情况下，合适的比丘—与比丘需要报告他自己的《僧残》罪的情况不同—不必与犯下需要报告罪行的比丘或负责报告罪行的比丘关系融洽。如果唯一可以报告的比丘不和蔼可亲，则必须严格诚实地面对自己，不要不愿告诉他罪行。如果唯一的担心是他会嘲笑犯戒者或发起僧伽羯磨来调查罪行，则有义务告诉他。如果觉得告诉他会导致僧团的冲突或原始犯戒者的报复—正如不犯条款所指出的那样—可以等待并告诉一位更合适的比丘。
Because the non-offense clauses also state that there is no offense in not reporting the offense if one’s motive is not to hide it, one need not inform the first suitable bhikkhu one meets if one is planning to inform a more appropriate bhikkhu, such as a senior member of the Community, a Vinaya expert, or the offender’s mentor or preceptor.	因为不犯条款还规定，如果动机不是隐瞒罪行，那么不报告罪行也不算犯戒，所以如果打算通知更合适的比丘，例如僧团的资深成员、律藏专家或犯戒者的导师或戒师，那么不需要通知遇到的第一个合适的比丘。
Apparently, once one has told a suitable bhikkhu, one is absolved of the responsibility of having to tell anyone else. However, none of the texts discuss the question of what one’s duty is if, after informing another bhikkhu, one realizes that he wants to conceal the offense. A responsible course of action, if none of the dangers listed in the non-offense clauses apply, would be to find and inform a more responsible bhikkhu, but this is a matter of one’s conscience and not of the rules.	显然，一旦告知了合适的比丘，就无需再告知他人。然而，所有文献均未探讨过，如果告知了其他比丘后，意识到对方有意隐瞒罪行，自己的职责是什么。如果不犯条款中列出的所有风险均不适用，那么负责任的做法是找到并告知一位更负责任的比丘，但这关乎自己的良心，而非戒条。
The Commentary says that if, out of a desire to hide the original offense, one neglects to inform a suitable bhikkhu but then later changes one’s mind and tells either him or yet another bhikkhu, one has committed the offense all the same.	《义注》说，如果为了隐藏原来的罪行而忽略了告知合适的比丘，但后来又改变主意并告诉他或另一个比丘，那么仍然犯了戒。
It also says that if one tells Bhikkhu X, asking him to help hide Bhikkhu Y’s offense, this also fulfills the factors of effort and intention here. If X then abandons his responsibility to tell, he too commits the corresponding offense under this rule. Regardless of how many co-conspirators would end up trying to keep the original offense secret enough to prevent a formal inquiry into it, all of them would be guilty of the offense here.	它也指出，如果告知比丘 X ，请他协助隐瞒比丘 Y 的罪行，也满足此处的努力和意图的因素。如果 X 随后放弃了他的告知责任，他也犯了此戒条下的相应罪行。无论有多少同谋最终试图隐瞒原来的罪行，以阻止对其的正式调查，他们所有人都犯了此处的罪行。

Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense in not telling another bhikkhu—	不告诉其他比丘并没有犯戒——
if one thinks that telling will lead to strife or a split in the Community;	如果认为告知会导致僧团内的冲突或分裂；
if, seeing that the bhikkhu who has committed the offense is violent by nature, one feels that he might create “dangers to life” or “dangers to the celibate life”;	如果看到犯了戒的比丘生性残暴，觉得他可能会造成「生命危险」或「梵行生活危险」；
if one sees no suitable bhikkhu to tell;	如果没有看到合适的比丘可以告知；
if one has no desire to hide the offense; or	如果不想隐瞒罪行；或者
if one feels that the wrong-doer’s own behavior will betray him and thus there is no need to tell.	如果觉得做错事的人自己的行为会背叛他，因此没有必要说出来。
Summary: Not informing another bhikkhu of a serious offense that one knows a third bhikkhu has committed—out of a desire to protect the third bhikkhu either from having to undergo the penalty or from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus—is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：如果知道第三个比丘犯了严重罪行，而没有告知另一个比丘——出于保护第三个比丘免受惩罚或免受其他比丘嘲笑的欲望——是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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65	六十五
Should any bhikkhu knowingly give full Acceptance (ordination) to an individual less than twenty years old, the individual is not accepted and the bhikkhus are blameworthy; and as for him (the preceptor), it is to be confessed.	若任何比丘明知地为未满二十岁的人授具足戒，则该人不得具足戒，且比丘们应受呵责；至于他（戒师），波逸提。
The origin story here tells how the group of seventeen came to be ordained.	这里的起源故事讲述了十七群是如何被授予具足戒的。
“Now at that time in Rājagaha, a group of seventeen boys were friends, with the boy Upāli as their leader. Then the thought occurred to Upāli’s parents, ‘By what means could Upāli, after our death, live pleasantly and not suffer?… If he studies writing, his fingers will hurt…. If he studies calculation, his breast will hurt…. If he studies money changing, his eyes will hurt. Now, these Sakyan-son monks are of pleasant virtue and conduct. Having eaten good meals, they lie down in beds sheltered from the wind. If Upāli went forth among the Sakyan-son monks, he would live pleasantly after our death and not suffer.’	「其时，在王舍城，有十七群男孩为友，以男孩优波离为首。优波离的父母心想：『我们死后，优婆离如何才能生活安乐，不受痛苦？……如果他学书法，手指会痛……学算术，胸口会痛……学金钱兑换，眼会痛。这些沙门释子品行端正，吃饱饭后，睡卧在避风的床上。如果优波离在沙门释子中出家，我们死后，他就能生活安乐，不受痛苦。』
“The boy Upāli heard his parents’ conversation. So he went to the boys… and said, ‘Come, masters, let’s go forth among the Sakyan-son monks.’	男孩优婆离听到了父母的谈话。于是他走到男孩们面前……说：『来吧，大德们，我们去沙门释子中出家吧。』
“‘If you go forth, master, so will we.’	「『大德，您若前去出家，我们亦然。』
“So each of the boys, having gone to his parents, said, ‘Permit us to go forth from home into homelessness.’ Then the parents of the boys gave their permission, (thinking,) ‘All these boys are unanimous in their desire. Their motives are noble.’	「于是，每位男孩都去见自己的父母，说：『请允许我们从家出离而入无家。』男孩们的父母也同意了，（心想）『这些男孩的愿望一致，他们的动机高尚。』
“(The boys) having gone to the bhikkhus, asked for the Going-forth. The bhikkhus gave them the Going-forth and full Acceptance. Then, waking up in the last watch of the night, the boys (now bhikkhus) cried out, ‘Give us porridge! Give us a meal! Give us food!’	「（男孩们）去见比丘们，请求出家。比丘们给他们出家和授予具足戒。然后，在后夜时分醒来，男孩们（现在成了比丘）喊道：『给我们粥！给我们饭！给我们食物！』
“The bhikkhus said, ‘Wait, friends, until the night turns light. If there is porridge, you will drink it. If there is a meal, you will eat it. If there is food, you will eat it. But if there is no porridge or meal or food, then you will eat having gone for alms.’	「比丘们说：『朋友们，等到天明，如果有粥，你们就喝。如果有饭，你们就吃。如果有食物，你们就吃。但如果没有粥、饭或食物，你们就托钵来吃。』
“But even then, those (new) bhikkhus cried out as before, ‘Give us porridge! Give us a meal! Give us food!’ And they wet the bedding and soiled it.”	「但即便如此，那些（新来的）比丘们还是像以前一样喊叫：『给我们粥！给我们饭！给我们食物！』他们弄湿了寝具，弄脏了寝具。」
The Buddha, in rebuking the bhikkhus who had given full Acceptance to the seventeen boys, painted a picture of the bhikkhus’ life very different from that imagined by Upāli’s parents:	佛陀在呵责那些授予具足戒给这十七群男孩的比丘们时，描绘了比丘们的生活，与优波离父母所想像的截然不同：
“Bhikkhus, how can these worthless men knowingly give full Acceptance to an individual less than 20 years old? An individual less than 20 years old is not resistant to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, the touch of gadflies and mosquitoes, wind and sun and creeping things; or to abusive, hurtful language. He is not the sort who can endure bodily feelings that, when they arise, are painful, sharp, stabbing, fierce, distasteful, disagreeable, deadly.’”	「比丘们，这些无用之人怎能明知地授予具足戒给一个不到二十岁的人？不到二十岁的人无法抵御寒冷、炎热、饥饿、口渴，牛蝇蚊虫，风吹日晒和爬虫的触碰；也无法抵御辱骂和伤害性的言语。他无法忍受身体上那些生起的痛苦、尖锐、刺痛、凶猛、令人厌恶、不快、致命的感受。』」
The factors for the full offense here are three.	此处构成完全违犯的因素有三。
1) Object: a man less than 20 years old.	1）对象：不到二十岁的男子。
2) Perception: One knows that he is less than 20 years old—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by the man, or from having been told by others.	2）感知：知道他不到20岁—要嘛是自己知道，要嘛是那位男子告知，要嘛是被别人告知。
3) Effort: One acts as the preceptor in his full Acceptance as a bhikkhu.	3）努力：在授予具足戒为比丘的过程中，作为戒师。
Object	对象
As Mv.I.75 makes clear, a person’s age for the purpose of this rule is counted from the time he becomes a fetus in his mother’s womb. Because this is difficult—if not impossible—to date with any accuracy, the usual practice in calculating a person’s age is to add six months to the number of years since his birth, to allow for the possibility of his having been born prematurely. As the Commentary notes, a baby born after seven months in the womb may survive, but one born after only six months in the womb won’t.	正如《大品》.一.75 所明确指出的，就本戒条而言，一个人的年龄是从其在母亲子宫内变成胎儿时开始计算的。由于很难（甚至不可能）准确地确定年龄，因此计算年龄的常见做法是在其出生年份上加六个月，以考虑到早产的可能性。正如《义注》所指出的，在子宫内七个月后出生的婴儿可能存活，但在子宫内仅六个月后出生的婴儿则无法存活。

Perception	感知
If one is in doubt as to whether an individual is less than 20, but goes ahead and ordains him anyway, one incurs a dukkaṭa regardless of his actual age. If one perceives him as less than 20 when he is actually 20 or older, he is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one perceives him as 20 or older, then regardless of his actual age he is not grounds for an offense.	如果怀疑个人是否不满20岁，但仍继续为其授予具足戒，则无论其实际年龄如何，均构成《突吉罗》。如果认为他不满20岁，但实际上他已满20岁或以上，则构成《突吉罗》。如果认为他已满20岁或以上，则无论其实际年龄如何，均不构成犯戒。
Effort	努力
There is a dukkaṭa for every step in arranging the Acceptance of an individual one knows to be less than 20 years old, beginning with the act of searching out a group to join in the transaction, looking for robes and a bowl for him to use, etc., all the way to the second proclamation in the Acceptance transaction. Once the third and final proclamation has been made, the preceptor incurs a pācittiya, and all other bhikkhus in the group who know that the individual is less than 20 years old, a dukkaṭa.	在安排授具足戒予一位已知未满20岁的个人时，从寻找参与羯磨的团体的行动开始，寻找袈裟和钵供他使用等等，一直到授予具足戒的羯磨中第二次宣告，每一步都犯《突吉罗》。一旦第三次也是最后一次宣告完成，戒师犯《波逸提》，而团体中所有知道此人未满20岁的比丘犯《突吉罗》。
In any case, if the individual is really less than 20 years old when he is accepted, then—regardless of whether he or anyone else knows of the fact—he does not count as a bhikkhu and is only a novice. The Commentary notes here that if he continues in this state for long enough to become a preceptor or teacher in another person’s Acceptance, that person counts as rightly accepted only as long as there are enough true bhikkhus in the group accepting him, not counting the improperly accepted “bhikkhu” in question. (See BMC2, Chapter 14 for more details on this issue.)	无论如何，如果一个人在受具足戒时确实不满20岁，那么——无论他本人或他人是否知晓该事实——他都不算比丘，而只是一名沙弥。《义注》在此指出，如果他保持这种状态足够长的时间，以至于在另一个人的受具足戒中成为戒师或导师，那么只有在授予他具足戒的团体中有足够多的真正比丘（不包括那个被不适当地授予具足戒的「比丘」）时，该人才算被正确地受具足戒。（有关此问题的更多详情，请参阅《佛教比丘戒律第二册》第十四章。）
The Commentary adds that if one is less than 20 when being accepted, without knowing the fact, it does not act as an obstacle to one’s qualifying for heaven or the transcendent states; but if one ever finds out the truth that one was improperly accepted, one should immediately arrange for a proper Acceptance.	《义注》还说，如果在被授予具足戒时未满 20 岁，而他不知道这一事实，这并不妨碍他获得天界或超越境界的资格；但是，如果发现自己被不适当地授予具足戒，就应该立即安排适当的具足戒仪式。
Summary: Acting as the preceptor in the full Acceptance of a person one knows to be less than 20 years old is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：在受具足戒的仪式中为明知未满 20 岁的人担任戒师，是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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66	六十六
Should any bhikkhu knowingly and by arrangement travel together with a caravan of thieves, even for the interval between one village and the next, it is to be confessed.	如果任何比丘明知且约定与盗贼商队一起旅行，即使只是从一个村庄到下一个的间隔，波逸提。
Here the full offense has three factors.	这里的完全违犯有三个因素。
1) Object: a caravan of thieves.	1）对象：盗贼商队。
2) Perception: One knows that it is a caravan of thieves—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by one of the thieves, or from having been told by others.	2）感知：知道这是盗贼商队——无论是自己知道，或是被盗贼之ㄧ告知，或是被别人告知。
3) Effort: (a) Having made an arrangement together with the caravan to travel together, (b) one actually travels together with them as arranged (c) from one village to another.	3）努力：（a）与商队约定一起旅行，（b）按照约定，真的与他们一起旅行，（c）从一个村庄到另一个。
Object	对象
A caravan of thieves, according to the Vibhaṅga, is any group that has committed a theft, is on its way to commit a theft, is planning to evade a tax, or is planning to “rob the king,” which the Commentary translates as planning to cheat the government in one way or another. At present this would include any person or group of people smuggling or trading in contraband goods.	盗贼商队，根据《经分别》，是指任何犯有盗窃罪、正在行窃途中、计划逃税或计划「抢劫国王」的团体。《义注》将「抢劫国王」翻译为计划以某种方式欺骗政府。目前，这包括任何走私或贩卖违禁品的个人或团体。
None of the texts mention the minimum number of thieves needed to form a “group,” but because the Vibhaṅga consistently uses plural forms to describe the thieves, it would appear that at least two thieves are needed to fulfill this factor.	没有任何文献提到组成「团体」所需的盗贼的最低数量，但是由于《经分别》始终使用复数形式来描述盗贼，因此似乎至少需要两个盗贼才能满足这一因素。
Perception	感知
If one is in doubt as to whether a group would count as a caravan of thieves, there is a dukkaṭa for traveling with them regardless of whether they actually are a caravan of thieves or not. If one perceives them to be a caravan of thieves when they actually aren’t, they are grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one does not perceive them to be a caravan of thieves, then regardless of whether they are or aren’t, they are not grounds for an offense.	如果怀疑某个团体是否构成盗贼商队，那么无论他们是否真的构成盗贼商队，与他们同行都会构成《突吉罗》。如果认为他们是盗贼商队，但实际上并非如此，构成了《突吉罗》。如果不认为他们是盗贼商队，那么无论他们是否为盗贼商队，都不构成犯戒。
Making an arrangement	约定
According to the Vibhaṅga, both the bhikkhu and the thieves must give their verbal assent to the arrangement for this part of the factor to be fulfilled. If the bhikkhu proposes the arrangement but the thieves do not give their verbal assent, then even if they later travel together as he proposed, he incurs a dukkaṭa. If they propose the arrangement but he does not give his verbal assent, then even if they later travel together as proposed, he incurs no penalty. As under Pc 27, verbal assent expressed by writing would fulfill this factor as well.	根据《经分别》，比丘和盗贼都必须口头同意该安排，才能满足这部分条件。如果比丘提出安排，但盗贼未口头同意，那么即使他们后来按照比丘的提议一起旅行，他犯《突吉罗》。如果他们提出安排，但他并未口头同意，那么即使他们后来按照提议一起旅行，他也不会受到惩罚。根据《波逸提》二七，书面表示的口头同意也同样满足这项条件。
As mentioned under Pc 27, a statement or set of statements mentioning both sides of the arrangement in connection with the journey—“We’ll go”; “Let’s go”; “You and I will go together”—would count as verbal assent here, whereas a statement or set of statements mentioning only one’s own plans with regard to the journey—“I’ll go”—would not. Thus if a bhikkhu states, “I’m going to cross the border tomorrow,” and a group of thieves says, “Let’s go together,” then if he says nothing more on the topic, he has not expressed verbal assent.	如《波逸提》二七所述，一句或几句陈述，提及双方关于旅程的安排——「我们去吧」、「一起去吧」、「你和我一起去」——在此可视为口头同意，而一句或几句陈述，仅提及个人关于旅程的计划——「我会去」——则不视为口头同意。因此，如果一位比丘说「我明天要穿过边境」，而一群盗贼们说：「我们一起去吧」，那么，如果他没有再谈及此事，则他并未表达口头同意。
According to the Commentary, the defining feature of the arrangement is that it specifies the time at which they will leave together. But as we noted under Pc 27, many examples of arrangements in the Vibhaṅga do not explicitly mention a time frame for leaving, so the Commentary’s stipulation here cannot stand. Any expressed agreement to go together would fulfill this factor, regardless of whether the time frame is explicitly stated.	根据《义注》，安排的决定特征是明确规定了他们一起出发的时间。但正如我们在《波逸提》二七中指出的那样，《经分别》中许多安排的例子并没有明确提及出发的时间段，因此《义注》的规定在此不成立。任何明确表示同意一起出行的协议都将满足这一因素，无论是否明确规定了时间段。
The texts do not address the case in which another person initiates the arrangements for a bhikkhu to travel together with a caravan of thieves, say, as part of a larger group. However, as under Pc 27, the examples of arrangements given in the Vibhaṅga suggest that as long as the bhikkhu and the thieves do not address each other—directly or through an intermediary—about traveling together, there would be no offense in joining the group.	文献并未提及由他人主动安排比丘与盗贼商队同行（例如，作为更大团体的一部分）的情况。然而，正如《波逸提》二七所述，《经分别》中列举的安排示例表明，只要比丘与盗贼之间没有直接或透过中间人就同行事宜进行沟通，加入该团体就不构成犯戒。

Going as arranged	依约定而行
The two parties must travel together as specified in the arrangement for this sub-factor to be fulfilled. If the arrangement is minimal or spur-of-the-moment, with no time frame explicitly specified, then simply leaving together at any time would fulfill this sub-factor. If a time frame is explicitly specified, then this sub-factor is fulfilled only if they leave within the time frame. If they happen to start out earlier or later than arranged, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. As under Pc 27, the Commentary suggests that “earlier“ or “later” here involve fairly substantial amounts of time, i.e., going one day later than arranged, or going before the meal when the arrangement was to go after the meal. However, if they leave from a different spot than the one they had arranged or go by a different route, that does not absolve the bhikkhu from the offense.	双方必须依约定一同出行，此子因素才算成立。如果约定的内容很少或只是临时起意，没有明确约定时间，那么随时一起出发都算成立。如果明确约定了时间，那么只有在约定时间内出发才算成立。如果他们出发的时间早于或晚于约定时间，比丘不会受到惩罚。正如《波逸提》二七所述，《义注》指出，这里的「早于」或「晚于」指的是相当长的时间，例如，比约定时间晚一天出发，或者约定在饭后出发，而他们却在饭前出发。但是，如果他们的出发地点与约定不同，或者他们走了不同的路线，这并不能免除比丘的罪行。
From one village to another	从一个村庄到另一个
There is a pācittiya for every village-to-village interval one passes. In an area where there are no villages—i.e., says the Sub-commentary, where villages are farther than half a yojana (8 km. or 5 miles) apart—there is a pācittiya for every half-yojana one travels together with the thieves as arranged.	每经过村庄到村庄间隔，就犯一次《波逸提》。在没有村庄的地方——也就是，《复注》说，村庄之间的距离超过半由旬（8公里或5英里）——则每经过半由旬，按照约定与盗贼同行，就犯一次《波逸提》。
None of the texts mention cases of traveling long distances within a large city, but it would seem that in such cases—arguing from the Great Standards—one would incur the full penalty in traveling from one administrative district to the next.	没有任何文献提到在大城市内长途旅行的情况，但似乎在这种情况下——从《四大教示》来看——从一个行政区到下一个的旅行会招致全额惩罚。
Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense—	不犯戒—
if the bhikkhu and thieves happen to travel together without having made an arrangement;	如果比丘和盗贼未经约定而一起旅行；
if the thieves propose an arrangement, but the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent;	如果盗贼提出安排，但比丘没有口头同意；
if the bhikkhu leaves not as specified in the arrangement (§); or	如果比丘没有依照约定离开（§）；或者
if there are dangers (and the bhikkhu must join the caravan for his safety).	如果有危险（比丘必须加入商队以确保其安全）。
A peculiarity of the third non-offense clause here, is that—unlike its parallels in Pc 27 & 28—all the major Asian editions of the Canon express it in the singular (he leaves) rather than the plural (they leave). Only the PTS edition puts it in the plural. In the following rule, all the major editions, including the PTS, put the parallel clause in the singular. None of the commentaries call attention to these disparities, and apparently they make no difference in practice.	这里第三条不犯条款的一个特点是——与《波逸提》二七和二八中的相对应条款不同——所有主要的亚洲版本《圣典》都将其表达为单数（他离开），而不是复数（他们离开）。只有PTS版本将其表示为复数。在以下戒条中，所有主要版本，包括PTS版本，都将相对应条款表达为单数。所有注释书都没有提及这些差异，而且显然它们在实践中也没有任何区别。
Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a group of thieves from one village to another—knowing that they are thieves—is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：与一群盗贼约定同行从一个村庄到另一个——明知他们是盗贼——是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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67	六十七
Should any bhikkhu, by arrangement, travel together with a woman, even for the interval between one village and the next, it is to be confessed.	如果任何比丘与女人相约同行，即使只是在一个村庄和下一个之间的间隔，波逸提。
“Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, going through the Kosalan districts on his way to Sāvatthī, passed by the gate of a certain village. A woman, leaving the village after quarreling with her husband, saw the bhikkhu and said, ‘Where are you going, venerable sir?’	「其时，有一位比丘，途经拘萨罗国，前往舍卫城。他经过一个村庄的门前。一位女人与丈夫吵架后，正要离开村庄。她看见比丘，便说：『大德，您要去哪里？』
“‘I’m going to Sāvatthī, sister.’	「『我要去舍卫城，姊妹。』
“‘Then I’m going with you.’	「『那我跟你一起去。』
“‘As you wish, sister.’	「『如你所愿，姊妹。』
“Then the woman’s husband, leaving the village, asked people, ‘Have you seen such-and-such a woman?’	「然后，女人的丈夫离开村庄，问人们说：『你们见过某某女人吗？』
“‘She’s going along with a monk.’	「『她和一位出家人一起去。』
“So the man, having caught up with them, seized the bhikkhu, gave him a good thrashing, and set him free. The bhikkhu went and sat fuming under a certain tree. The woman said to the man, ‘That bhikkhu didn’t abscond with me. I was the one who went with him. He’s innocent. Go and ask his forgiveness.’	「于是那人追上他们，抓住比丘，狠狠地揍了他一顿，然后把他放了。比丘走到一棵树下，怒气冲冲地坐著。那女人对那人说：『那比丘没有跟我一起逃走。是我跟他一起去的。他是无辜的。去向他求原谅吧。』
“So the man asked the bhikkhu for his forgiveness.”	「于是那人向比丘请求原谅。」
Object	对象
A female human being, experienced enough to know what is properly and improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd, is grounds for a pācittiya here. Paṇḍakas, female yakkhas and petas, and animals in the form of a female human being are all grounds for a dukkaṭa. Woman here also includes women. In other words, the inclusion of one or more extra women in the travel arrangement is not a mitigating factor; and, in fact, there is an offense for every woman included in the travel arrangement. The inclusion of men in the travel arrangement, however, is a controversial issue at present, and is discussed below.	一位女性人类，有足够经验，能够分辨哪些话是恰当的，哪些话是不恰当的，哪些是淫秽的，哪些不是淫秽的，在此构成了《波逸提》。黄门、雌夜叉和饿鬼，以及化身为女性人类的动物，都构成《突吉罗》。此处的女人也包括女人们。换句话说，在旅行安排中额外包含一名或多名女性，并不能成为减轻惩罚的因素；事实上，旅行安排中每包含一名女性，都犯一次罪行。然而，在旅行安排中包含男性目前是一个有争议的问题，下文将对此进行讨论。
Perception as to whether the person is actually a woman is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).	对于该人是否确实是女性的感知并不是减轻惩罚的因素（参见《波逸提》四）。
Similarly, if one travels by arrangement with a paṇḍaka, not knowing that that’s what he is, one still incurs a dukkaṭa.	同样地，如果与黄门相约同行，却不知道他是什么人，那么仍然犯《突吉罗》。

Effort	努力
Effort here is defined in a parallel way to its definition under the preceding rule: (a) Having made an arrangement together with the woman to travel together, (b) one actually travels together with her as arranged (c) from one village to another. See the preceding rule for explanations and for the allotment of offenses.	此处「努力」的定义与上一条戒条中的定义类似：（a）与女人约定一同出行，（b）实际上与其如约定一同出行（c）从一个村庄到另一个。有关解释及罪行划分，请参阅上一条戒条。
Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense—	不犯戒——
if the bhikkhu and woman happen to travel together without having made an arrangement;	如果比丘与女人未经约定而同行；
if the woman proposes an arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent;	如果女人提出安排，而比丘没有口头同意；
if either party leaves (or, apparently, both leave together) not as specified in the arrangement (§); or	若任何一方离开（或显然双方一起离开），但未依约定所述（§）；或者
if there are dangers.	如果有危险。
Current practice	目前实践
In the time of the Buddha, long-distance travel was mostly by foot, and the question of prior arrangement was what made the difference between whether one was traveling together with someone else or simply happened to be walking along the road at the same time. At present, when one is taking public transport—buses, subways, trains, and airplanes—this is still the factor determining whether one is traveling together with someone else or simply happens to be on the bus, etc., at the same time. This rule thus forbids a bhikkhu from traveling together with a woman, by prior arrangement, on the same public transport.	在佛陀时代，长途出行大多靠步行，事先安排决定了是与他人同行，还是刚好与他人同时在路上行走。如今，当搭乘大众运输工具——公车、地铁、火车和飞机——这仍然是决定与他人同行，还是刚好与他人同时在公车等交通工具上的因素。因此，这条戒条禁止比丘与女性事先安排搭乘同一大众运输工具同行。
Private transport, though—such as automobiles, trucks and vans—is an area that different Communities treat in differing ways. Some treat it under Pc 44 rather than here, saying that a bhikkhu may sit in an automobile with a woman as long as a knowledgeable man is present. This holds regardless of whether the automobile is sitting still or traveling any number of miles, and regardless of whether the woman or the man is driving.	然而，对于私人交通工具——例如汽车、卡车和货车——不同的僧团对此有不同的处理方式。有些僧团根据《波逸提》四四而非本戒条处理此事，说只要有一位知识渊博的男人在场，比丘可以与女人同坐一辆车。无论汽车是静止不动还是行驶了多少英里，也无论驾驶的是男人还是女人，这都适用。
Other Communities treat private transport under this rule, but say that the prior arrangement is implicitly with the driver of the transport. If the driver is a woman, there is a pācittiya in riding with her from one village to the next. If the driver is a man, there is no offense, regardless of whether a woman is riding along.	其他僧团则依据此戒条处理私人交通工具，但认为事先的约定默认是与交通工具的司机达成的。如果司机是女人，那么与她同乘从一个村庄到下一个就犯《波逸提》。如果司机是男人，则无论是否有女性同行，均不构成犯戒。
The Commentary would not agree with this second interpretation, for it states explicitly when discussing Mv.V.10.3 that a bhikkhu may ride in a cart driven by a woman or a man. At any rate, though, this is another area where the wise policy is to follow the practice of the Community in which one belongs, as long as one is careful to adhere to the Vibhaṅga by not entering verbally into any arrangement with a woman to go traveling together.	《义注》并不认同第二种解释，因为它在讨论《大品》.五.10.3时明确指出，比丘可以乘坐由女人或男人驾驶的马车。无论如何，在这方面，明智之举是遵循其所属僧团的做法，只要谨慎遵守《经分别》，不与女人口头约定一起出行。
Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a woman from one village to another is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：与女人从一个村庄到另一个村庄约定同行是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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68	六十八
Should any bhikkhu say the following: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when engaged in are not genuine obstructions,” the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “Do not say that, venerable sir. Do not slander the Blessed One, for it is not good to slander the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not say anything like that. In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts, and when engaged in they are genuine obstructions. [The Sri Lankan and Burmese recensions read: In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts as obstructive, and when engaged in they are genuine obstructions.] ” And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times for the sake of relinquishing that. If while being rebuked up to three times he relinquishes that, that is good. If he does not relinquish (that), it is to be confessed.	若有比丘说：「据我理解世尊所教导的佛法，世尊所说的那些障碍行为，去从事时并非真正的障碍」，比丘们应当这样劝诫他：「具寿，不要这样说。不要诽谤世尊，因为诽谤世尊是不好的。世尊不会说这样的话。朋友，世尊以各种方便描述了障碍行为，而当从事这些行为时，它们确实是障碍。[斯里兰卡和缅甸版本为：朋友，世尊以各种方便把障碍行为描述为障碍，而当从事这些行为时，它们确实是阻碍。]」若那位比丘被比丘们如此劝诫后仍执迷不悟，比丘们应当责备他三次，以劝其舍弃。若他被责备三次后舍弃之，则很好；若他仍不舍弃（之），波逸提。
Obstructions	障碍
The Vibhaṅga does not define obstruction in the context of this rule, although the origin story makes clear that it refers at the very least to the sexual act. The Commentary defines obstruction as anything that acts as an obstacle to the attainment of heaven or emancipation. It lists five major categories:	《经分别》并未在此戒条的脉络中定义障碍，尽管其起源故事明确表明，它至少指的是性行为。《义注》将障碍定义为任何阻碍证得天界或解脱的事物，并列出了五大类：
1) Actions, i.e., the five ānantariya/ānantarika-kamma: patricide, matricide, the murder of an arahant, the wounding of a Buddha, the creation of a schism in a Saṅgha;	1）行为，即五种无间业（ānantariya/ānantarika-kamma）：弑父、弑母、杀阿罗汉、出佛身血、破和合僧；
2) Defilements, i.e., firmly held wrong views (the Sub-commentary lists determinism, fatalism, annihilationism, etc.);	2）烦恼，即根深蒂固的错误观点（《复注》列出了决定论、宿命论、断灭论等）；
3) Fruits of past actions, e.g., birth as a common animal (see the story of the nāga at Mv.I.63—BMC2, Chapter 14);	3）过去行为的果报，例如，出生为普通动物（参见《大品》.一.63 中龙的故事—《佛教比丘戒律第二册》第十四章）；
4) Verbal abuse, i.e., reviling a Noble One—although this is an obstruction only so long as one has not asked forgiveness; and finally, for a bhikkhu,	4）言语辱骂，即辱骂圣者—虽然这只有在没有请求宽恕的情况下才构成障碍；最后，对比丘而言，
5) Intentional transgressions of the Buddha’s ordinances, although these are obstacles only as long as one has not undergone the penalty called for in the relevant rule.	5）故意违反佛陀的戒律，虽然这些只有在还没有受到相关戒条所规定的惩罚前才构成障碍。
The Commentary does not say from where it derives this list. The first three categories—without explanations—are found in AN 6:86. AN 6:87 provides the examples for the first category. The statement in the Nidāna to the Pāṭimokkha that an intentional lie is an obstruction may have provided the Commentary with an example of the fifth category. (AN 3:88 states that arahants may intentionally commit offenses, but that they willingly undergo rehabilitation for them.) As for the fourth category, the primary reference in the Canon is to the case of the bhikkhu Kokālika, who spreads lies about Sāriputta and Moggallāna, comes down with a horrible disease, and then dies, reappearing in hell because he continued to harbor animosity toward them (SN 6:10). Thus reviling here would seem to mean spreading lies impelled by animosity.	《义注》并未说明此列表的来源。前三类—未加解释—见于《增支部》6:86经。《增支部》6:87经提供了第一类的例子。《波罗提木叉》的序诵中关于故意说谎是障碍的陈述，可为《义注》提供了第五类的例子。（《增支部》3:88经指出，阿罗汉可能故意犯戒，但他们愿意为犯戒改过恢复清净。）至于第四类，《圣典》中的主要参考的是拘迦梨迦比丘的案例。他散播关于舍利弗和目犍连的谎言，染上重病，最终死去，并因继续怀有对他们的仇恨而堕入地狱（《相应部》6:10经）。因此，此处的辱骂似乎是指出于仇恨而散播谎言。
The Commentary notes that this training rule deals with a bhikkhu who holds to the view that the fifth category is not an obstacle, the most common example being the bhikkhu who believes that there is nothing wrong in a bhikkhu’s having sexual intercourse in defiance of Pr 1.	《义注》指出，这条学处针对的是认为第五类不是障碍的比丘，最常见的例子是认为比丘违反《波罗夷》一进行性交并没有什么错的比丘。
There are many ways one might rationalize such an idea, and the Commentary gives an entertaining description of one of them:	有很多方法可用来解释这种想法，《义注》中对其中一种方法进行了有趣的描述：
“There is the case where a bhikkhu… having gone into seclusion, reasons as follows: ‘There are people living the household life, enjoying the five pleasures of the senses, who are stream-winners, once-returners, and non-returners. As for bhikkhus, they see pleasurable forms cognizable via the eye, hear… smell… taste… feel (pleasurable) tactile sensations cognizable via the body. They use soft carpets and clothing. All this is proper. Then why shouldn’t the sight, sound, smell, taste, and feel of a woman be proper? They too are proper!’ Thus… comparing a mustard seed with Mount Sineru, he gives rise to the evil view, ‘Why did the Blessed One—binding the ocean, as it were, with great effort—formulate the first pārājika training rule? There is nothing wrong with that act.’”	「有这样的情形，比丘……去到僻静处后，这样思惟：『有人过著居家生活，享五根之乐，他们有入流者、一还者、不还者。至于比丘，他们看到眼睛可感知的愉悦形态，听到……闻到……尝到……感受到身体可感知的（愉悦的）触觉。他们使用柔软的地毯和衣物。这一切都是适当的。那么，女人的色、声、香、味、触为何就不适当呢？它们也同样适当！』于是……他将芥菜籽比作须弥山，生起恶见：『世尊为何要像束缚大海一般，费尽心力制定第一条《波罗夷》学处呢？这种行为并没有错。』」
Simply holding such a view is not enough to bring a bhikkhu under the purview of this rule, but if he asserts it to others, the Vibhaṅga states that other bhikkhus have the duty of reprimanding him up to three times in the manner described in the rule. If, having learned of his assertion, they do not reprimand him, they each incur a dukkaṭa, for if he goes unreprimanded, he may continue with his assertions as he likes without incurring a penalty.	仅仅持有这种观点并不足以使一位比丘受到此戒条的约束，但如果他向他人宣扬这种观点，《经分别》指出，其他比丘有义务按照戒条所述的方式责备他，最多三次。如果得知他的言论后，他们没有责备他，则他们各自都犯《突吉罗》，因为如果他不受责备，他就可以继续随意发表这种言论而无需承担任何惩罚。
If, after being reprimanded, he relinquishes his view, he incurs no penalty. But if he doesn’t, he incurs a dukkaṭa. He should then be taken into the midst of the Community to be admonished and rebuked as described under Sg 10, the only difference here being that the penalty is a dukkaṭa in each of the preliminary stages, and a pācittiya after the third formal rebuke. (The formula for the rebuke is given in Appendix VIII.) Unlike the Vibhaṅga to the parallel saṅghādisesa rules, the Vibhaṅga here does not say that the penalties incurred in the preliminary stages are annulled when the full penalty is incurred.	若受训诫后，他放弃己见，则不受惩罚；若不放弃，则犯《突吉罗》。此时应将其带到僧团中，按照《僧残》十所述接受训诫和呵责，唯一区别在于，此处的惩罚是在每个预备阶段都是一次《突吉罗》，在第三次正式呵责后是一次《波逸提》。（呵责的公式在附录八。）与相对应《僧残》戒条的《经分别》不同，此处的《经分别》并未规定，在遭受最终惩罚之后，预备阶段所受的惩罚会被免除。
Perception is not a mitigating factor here. If the rebuke transaction is properly carried out, then one’s offense is a pācittiya regardless of whether one regards it as such. If the transaction is improperly carried out, then again—regardless of how one perceives its validity—one incurs a dukkaṭa (§), probably for one’s unwillingness to relinquish one’s view after being reprimanded. In other words, a pattern similar to the one set out under Sg 10, rather than the one under Pc 4, holds here.	在此，感知并非减轻惩罚的因素。若呵责羯磨执行得当，则不论当事人是否认为其为如此，皆为《波逸提》罪。若呵责羯磨执行不当，同样—无论当事人如何看待其有效性—亦会犯《突吉罗》（§），这可能是因为在受到责备后仍不愿放弃己见。换言之，此处的模式与《僧残》十所述模式相似，而非《波逸提》四所述模式。

Further action

进一步行动

If a bhikkhu penalized under this rule persists in asserting his evil view, he is subject to an act of suspension, under which he is not allowed to commune or affiliate with bhikkhus in any Community until he sees the error of his ways and relinquishes his view (see BMC2, Chapter 20). As is the case under Sg 10-13, a Community preparing to impose this rule on a stubborn bhikkhu should also be prepared to impose a suspension transaction on him immediately in case he refuses to respond to the formal rebuke.

若比丘因违反此戒条而受罚，仍执取恶见，则应处以举罪处分，不得与任何僧团的比丘交往或羯磨，直至他体认自己的错误，放弃了他的观点。（参见《佛教比丘戒律第二册》第二十章）。如同《僧残》十至十三之下的情况，若僧团准备对顽固不化的比丘施以此戒条，则应做好立即对其处以举罪的准备，以防其拒绝回应正式的呵责。

Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense for the bhikkhu if he has not been reprimanded or if, after being reprimanded, he relinquishes his view.	如果比丘还未受到训诫，或是受到训诫后放弃了自己的观点，则不犯戒。
Summary: Refusing—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community—to relinquish the evil view that there is nothing wrong in intentionally transgressing the Buddha’s ordinances is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：在僧团会议上正式诃责的第三次羯磨文之后，拒绝放弃「故意违反佛陀戒律没有错」恶见，是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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69	六十九
Should any bhikkhu knowingly commune, affiliate, or lie down in the same dwelling with a bhikkhu professing such a view who has not acted in compliance with the rule, who has not abandoned that view, it is to be confessed.	若任何比丘明知一位比丘持有未遵守戒律而行的观点，且未放弃该观点，而仍与之交流、共羯磨或在同一住处躺下，波逸提。
This rule reinforces the suggestion made under the preceding rule, that a bhikkhu who refuses to respond to the rebuke imposed by that rule should immediately be suspended. There are three factors for the full offense here.	这条戒条强化了前一条戒条的建议，比丘若拒绝回应前一条戒条所施加的呵责，应立即被举罪。构成完全违犯共有三个要素。
1) Object: a bhikkhu who has been suspended by a Community transaction and has not yet been restored.	1）对象：因僧团羯磨而被举罪且尚未恢复的比丘。
2) Perception: One knows that he has been suspended and has not yet been restored—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by the bhikkhu, or from having been told by others.	2）感知：知道他已经被举罪且还没有恢复──要嘛是自己知道的，要嘛是比丘告诉的，要嘛是别人告诉的。
3) Effort: One communes with him, affiliates with him, or lies down in the same dwelling with him.	3）努力：与他交流，与他共羯磨，或与他在同一住处躺下。
Object	对象
According to Cv.I.25-35, a bhikkhu may be suspended for any one of three reasons:	根据《小品》.一.25-35 ，比丘可能因以下三个原因之一而被举罪：
He refuses to relinquish an evil view, as in the preceding rule;	他拒绝放弃恶见，正如前一条戒条所述；
he refuses to see an offense (i.e., he admits to having performed an action forbidden by the rules, but refuses to concede that it is an offense); or	他拒绝承认自己犯了戒（即，他承认自己做了戒条禁止的事情，但拒绝承认这是犯戒）；或者
he refuses to make amends for an offense (again, he admits to having performed an action forbidden by the rules, but refuses to undergo the attendant penalty).	他拒绝弥补自己的犯戒（再次，他承认自己做了戒条禁止的事情，但拒绝接受相应的惩罚）。
Once a bhikkhu has been suspended, it is his duty to change his ways and reject the view or position that led to his suspension, so that he may be restored to normal status.	比丘一旦被举罪，就有责任改变自己的行为，摒弃导致他被举罪的观点或立场，以便恢复正常状态。
According to the Vibhaṅga, the factor of object here is fulfilled by a bhikkhu who has been suspended for the first of these three reasons and has yet to be restored. However, because the rules governing the way in which a suspended bhikkhu is to be treated by other bhikkhus are the same for all three cases (see Cv.I.27, Cv.I.31, Cv.I.33), the Commentary argues that a bhikkhu suspended for either of the other two reasons would fulfill this factor as well. The Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses add, though, that if the bhikkhu was suspended for holding an evil view and has come to relinquish that view, he does not fulfill this factor even if the Community has yet to restore him to normal status. This allowance would apparently apply to bhikkhus suspended for other reasons as well.	根据《经分别》，此处的对象因素是指因上述三种原因中的第一种而被举罪且尚未恢复的比丘。然而，由于戒条中其他比丘对待被举罪比丘的方式在所有三种情况下都是相同的（参见《小品》.一.27、《小品》.一.31、《小品》.一.33），因此《义注》认为，因后两种原因中的任何一种而被举罪的比丘也符合这一因素。然而，《经分别》的不犯条款补充道，如果比丘因持有恶见而被举罪，并且已经舍弃了这种恶见，即使僧团尚未恢复其正常状态，他也不符合这一要素。显然，这一开缘也适用于因其他原因而被举罪的比丘。

Perception	感知
There is no offense in communing, etc., with a suspended bhikkhu if one perceives him as unsuspended; a dukkaṭa for communing, etc., with an unsuspended bhikkhu if one perceives him as suspended; and a dukkaṭa for communing, etc., with a bhikkhu if one is in doubt as to whether he has been suspended. This last penalty holds regardless of whether he has actually been suspended.	与一位被举罪的比丘交流等，若认为其未被举罪，则不犯戒；与一位未被举罪的比丘交流等，若认为其被举罪，则犯《突吉罗》；与一位对其是否被举罪存疑的比丘交流等，犯《突吉罗》。最后一种的惩罚，无论比丘是否实际已被举罪，均适用。
None of the texts mention the matter, but a similar principle would also seem to apply to one’s perception of the transaction whereby the bhikkhu was suspended. Thus, there would be no offense in communing, etc., with him if one perceived a valid transaction as invalid; a dukkaṭa for communing, etc., with him if one perceived an invalid transaction as valid; and a dukkaṭa for communing, etc., with him if one was in doubt as to the transaction’s validity, regardless of whether it was actually valid or not.	文献中并未提及此事，但类似的原则似乎也适用于对比丘被举罪的羯磨的感知。因此，如果认为有效的羯磨是无效的，则与其交流等并不犯戒；如果认为无效的羯磨是有效的，则与其交流等犯《突吉罗》；如果对羯磨的有效性存疑，无论该羯磨实际上是否有效，与他交流等都犯《突吉罗》。
Effort	努力
Effort here covers any one of three sorts of action:	努力在此处涵盖以下三种行动中的任何一种：
1) One communes with the bhikkhu. Communion takes one of two forms: sharing material objects, i.e., giving material objects to the bhikkhu or receiving them from him; or sharing Dhamma, i.e., reciting Dhamma for him or getting him to recite Dhamma. The penalties for sharing Dhamma are, if one recites line-by-line or gets the other to recite line-by-line, a pācittiya for each line; if syllable-by-syllable, a pācittiya for each syllable.	1）与该比丘交流。交流有两种形式：一是分享物质，即给予该比丘物质或接受其物质；二是分享佛法，即为比丘背诵佛法或让他背诵佛法。分享佛法的惩罚是：如果逐行背诵或让他人逐行背诵，每行犯一次《波逸提》；如果逐音节，每个音节犯一次《波逸提》。
2) One affiliates with the bhikkhu, i.e., one participates in a transaction of the Community along with him. An example would be sitting in the same assembly with him to listen to the Pāṭimokkha.	2）与比丘共羯磨，即与他参与僧团的羯磨。例如，与他坐在同一众中聆听《波罗提木叉》。
3) One lies down in the same dwelling with him. “Same dwelling” here, unlike Pc 5 & 6, means one with the same roof. Thus, as the K/Commentary notes, if one is lying under the same roof with the bhikkhu, one falls under this factor even if one is lying in a room that is not connected by any entrance with the one he is lying in. And, we might add, one falls under this factor regardless of whether the dwelling is walled or not. Whether one lies down first, the suspended bhikkhu lies down first, or both lie down at the same time, is not an issue here. As under Pc 5, if both parties get up and then lie down again, one incurs another pācittiya.	3）与他在同一住处躺下。此处「同一住处」与《波逸提》五和六不同，指的是同一屋顶。因此，正如 K/《义注》所指出的，如果与该比丘在同一屋顶躺下，即使所躺下的房间与他躺下的房间没有任何入口相连，也适用此因素。而且，我们还可补充，无论住处是否有围墙，都适用此因素。无论是自己先躺下、被举罪的比丘先躺下，还是两人同时躺下，在此都无关紧要。正如根据《波逸提》五，如果双方起身后又躺下，则犯另一次《波逸提》。
These three actions touch on only a few of the observances a suspended bhikkhu must follow, but they are the only ones that entail a pācittiya for a regular bhikkhu who has dealings with him while he is suspended. For further details, see Cv.I.25-35 and BMC2, Chapter 20.	这三项行为只涉及被举罪比丘须遵守的一些规定，但却是在他被举罪时，唯一会为与其打交道的正常比丘带来《波逸提》的规定。更多详情，请参阅《小品》.一.25-35 及《佛教比丘戒律第二册》第二十章。

Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense in communing, affiliating, or lying down in the same dwelling with another bhikkhu if one knows that—	与另一位比丘交往、共羯磨或在同一住处躺下并不犯戒，前提是如果知道——
he has not been suspended;	他未被举罪；
he was suspended but has been restored; or	他曾被举罪但已经恢复；或者
he has abandoned the evil view that led to his suspension.	他已经摒弃了导致他被举罪的恶见。
The Vibhaṅga states explicitly that the first of these three exemptions holds regardless of whether one’s perception is correct, and the same principle would seem to apply to the remaining two as well.	《经分别》明确指出，这三个豁免中的第一个与感知是否正确无关，同样的原则似乎也适用于其余两个。
Summary: Communing, affiliating, or lying down under the same roof with a bhikkhu who has been suspended and not been restored—knowing that such is the case—is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：明知比丘已被举罪且尚未恢复，仍与其交往、共羯磨或在同一屋顶躺下，是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。

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70	七十
And if a novice should say the following: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when engaged in are not genuine obstructions,” the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “Do not say that, friend novice. Do not slander the Blessed One, for it is not good to slander the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not say anything like that. In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts, and when engaged in they are genuine obstructions. [The Sri Lankan and Burmese recensions read: In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts as obstructive, and when engaged in they are genuine obstructions.]” And should that novice, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “From this day forth, friend novice, you are not to claim the Blessed One as your teacher, nor are you even to have the opportunity the other novices get—that of sharing dwellings two or three nights with the bhikkhus. Away with you! Get lost!” Should any bhikkhu knowingly befriend, receive services from, commune with, or lie down in the same dwelling with a novice thus expelled, it is to be confessed.	如果沙弥说：「据我理解世尊所教导的佛法，世尊所说的那些障碍行为，当从事时并非真正的障碍」，比丘们应当这样劝诫他：「沙弥朋友，不要这样说。不要诽谤世尊，因为诽谤世尊是不好的。世尊不会那样说。朋友，世尊以各种方便描述了障碍行为，而当从事这些行为时，它们确实是障碍。[斯里兰卡和缅甸版本为：朋友，世尊以各种方便把障碍行为描述为障碍，而当从事这些行为时，它们确实是阻碍。]」如果那位沙弥在被比丘们如此劝诫后仍执迷不悟，比丘们就应当这样劝诫他：「沙弥朋友，从今天起，你不可称世尊为你的老师，也不可享有其他沙弥所拥有的机会——与比丘们同住两三晚。走开！消失吧！」若任何比丘明知与被驱摈的沙弥交朋友、接受其服务、与其交流、或与其在同一住处躺下，波逸提。
The factors for the full offense here are three.	此处完全违犯的因素有三。
1) Object: a novice who has been expelled and has not relinquished his evil view.	1）对象：被驱摈但仍未放弃恶见的沙弥。
2) Perception: One perceives that he has been expelled and has not relinquished his evil view—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by him (§), or from having been told by others.	2）感知：感知到他已被驱摈，但仍未放弃恶见——无论是自己知道的，或是被他告知（§），或是别人告知的。
3) Effort: One befriends him, receives services from him, communes with him, or lies down in the same dwelling with him.	3）努力：与他交朋友，接受他的服务，与他交流，或与他在同一住处躺下。
Object	对象
According to the Commentary, there are three types of expulsion: expulsion from affiliation (this applies only to bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, and refers to the act of suspension discussed under the preceding rule); expulsion from one’s status; and expulsion as a punishment. Novices are subject to the latter two.	根据《义注》，驱摈有三种：羯磨驱摈（仅适用于比丘和比丘尼，指的是前一条戒条中讨论的举罪）；身份驱摈；以及作为惩罚的驱摈。沙弥只受后两种驱摈的约束。
1) Mv.I.60 lists ten grounds for expelling a novice from his status as a novice: He breaks any of his first five precepts; he speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha; he holds to wrong views (such things as eternalism, fatalism, or annihilationism, says the Commentary); or he rapes a bhikkhunī.	1）《大品》.一.60 列出了十种驱摈沙弥身份的理由：他违反了前五条戒律中的任何一条；他诋毁佛、法、或僧；他持有邪见（如永恒论、宿命论或断灭论，《义注》中如此说道）；或者他强奸了比丘尼。
The Commentary to Mv.I.60 states that a novice who breaks any of his first five precepts has cut himself off from the Triple Refuge, from his teacher, and from his right to a dwelling in a monastery. He is still a novice, though, and if he sees the error of his ways and is determined to restrain himself in the future, he may take the Triple Refuge from his teacher again and so be restored to his former status. (The Commentary adds that a novice who knowingly drinks alcohol in defiance of the fifth precept may be restored to his status as a novice but may never ordain as a bhikkhu in this lifetime. Not all Communities share this view, as it is not supported by the Canon.) If, however, a novice breaks any of these precepts habitually and is not determined to restrain himself in the future, he is to be expelled from his status as a novice.	《大品》.一.60 的《义注》指出，沙弥若违犯了前五条戒律中的任何一条，便断绝了三皈依、与导师断绝关系以及在寺院居住的权利。然而，他仍然是沙弥，如果他能认出自己行为的错误，并决心今后克制他自己，便可再次从导师处受三皈依，恢复他之前的身份。（《义注》也补充道，若沙弥明知故犯地违反第五条戒律饮酒，可以恢复他的沙弥身份，但此生不得受具足戒成为比丘。并非所有僧团都认同此观点，因为此观点并未得到《圣典》的支持。）但是，如果沙弥经常违反这些戒律中的任何一条，并且不下定决心在今后约束自己，那么他将被驱摈沙弥的身份。
As for the novice who holds to wrong views or who speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha, the bhikkhus are to instruct him to show him the error of his ways. If he abandons his views, he is to undergo punishment for an appropriate period (see Mv.I.57-58) and then be allowed to confess his error, so as to return to his former status. If he does not change his ways, he is to be expelled from his status as a novice.	至于持有邪见或诋毁佛、法、僧的沙弥，比丘们应当教导他，指出他行为的错误。如果他放弃他的见解，就应当受适当期限的惩罚（参见《大品》.一.57-58），之后允许他忏悔错误，恢复他之前的身份。如果他不改变他的行为，就应当驱摈他的沙弥身份。
And as for the novice who rapes a bhikkhunī: The Commentary notes that this comes under the breaking of the third precept, but is listed separately because a novice who has sexual intercourse with anyone but a bhikkhunī may be reinstated if he sees the error of his ways, whereas one who has raped a bhikkhunī may not—and furthermore, he can never be ordained as a novice or a bhikkhu in this lifetime. (See BMC2, Chapter 14.)	至于强奸比丘尼的沙弥：《义注》指出，这属于违反第三条戒，但单独列出，因为与比丘尼以外的任何人发生性关系的沙弥，如果看见行为的错误，可以恢复身份；而强奸比丘尼的沙弥则不能恢复身份——而且，他此生永远无法受戒成为沙弥或比丘。（参见《佛教比丘戒律第二册》第十四章。）
Except in the last case, a novice who has been expelled from his status as a novice may be reordained as a novice if he sees his errors and can convince the bhikkhus that he will mend his ways in the future.	除了最后一种情况外，被驱摈身份的沙弥，如果能够认识到自己的错误，并能说服比丘们他将来会改过自新，就可以重新受戒为沙弥。
2) The second form of expulsion—expulsion as punishment—is the one mentioned in this rule: A novice comes to think that there is nothing wrong with any novice’s having sexual intercourse or breaking any of his other precepts. If he asserts this view, the bhikkhus are to instruct him to show him that it is evil, but if they cannot sway him, they are to expel him in the form described in the rule: He has no right to claim the Buddha as his teacher and loses his right to live in the same dwellings with the bhikkhus, although he retains his status as a novice. This form of expulsion lasts as long as he has yet to relinquish his view. If and when he does relinquish it, he is to be reinstated. The Commentary doesn’t say how, but we can reason from the pattern mentioned above that he should take the Triple Refuge from his teacher again.	2）第二种驱摈——做为惩罚的的驱摈——如本戒条所述：沙弥认为任何沙弥发生性行为或违反自己的其他戒律并无不妥。如果他坚持这种观点，比丘们应当教导他，让他明白这是邪恶的，如果比丘们无法改变他的想法，则应当按照戒条中描述的方式驱摈他：他无权称佛陀为他的导师，也丧失了与比丘们在同一住处生活的权利，虽然他保留沙弥身份。这种驱摈持续到他放弃这种观点为止。如果他最终放弃了这种观点，就应该让他恢复。《义注》中没有说明具体如何恢复，但我们可以根据上述模式推断，他应当再次从他的导师受三皈依。
The Commentary states that the factor of object under this rule is fulfilled only by a novice who has undergone the second form of expulsion and has yet to relinquish his evil view.	《义注》指出，只有经受了第二种形式的驱摈但尚未放弃恶见的沙弥才满足此戒条下的对象因素。

Perception	感知
There is no offense in befriending, etc., an expelled novice if one does not know that he has been expelled; a dukkaṭa for befriending, etc., a novice who has not been expelled but whom one perceives as expelled; and a dukkaṭa for befriending, etc., a novice if one is in doubt about the matter. This last penalty holds regardless of whether he has actually been expelled or not.	若不知晓某沙弥已被驱摈，与其交朋友等行为并无犯戒；若与某沙弥交朋友等行为，而该沙弥未被驱摈，但认为其已被驱摈，则犯《突吉罗》；若对某沙弥是否已被驱摈存有疑问，与其交朋友等行为犯《突吉罗》。最后这个处罚，不论该沙弥是否已被驱摈，均适用。
Effort	努力
Effort here is fulfilled by any one of four sorts of action:	努力在此可以透过以下四种行动中的任何一种来满足：
1) Befriending a novice means making friendly overtures to him with the thought of supplying him with material requisites or instruction in the Dhamma, as a mentor would.	1）与沙弥交朋友意味著友好地向他示好，并打算像导师一样为他提供物质必需品或佛法指导。
2) Receiving services from him means to accept the services a mentor normally receives from his student—the Vibhaṅga mentions accepting powder, clay (soap) for washing, tooth-wood, or water for rinsing the mouth or washing the face (§).	2）接受其服务意味著接受导师通常从弟子那里获得的服务——《经分别》提到接受粉末、用于洗涤的黏土（肥皂）、齿木或用于漱口或洗脸的水（§）。
3 & 4) Communing and lying down in the same dwelling are defined as under the preceding rule.	3 和 4）交流和在同一住处躺下的定义与前一条戒条相同。
Non-offenses	不犯
There is no offense in befriending, etc., a novice if one knows that he has not been expelled, or if one knows that he has relinquished the view that led to his expulsion in the first place. As under the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga states explicitly that the first exemption holds regardless of whether one’s perception is correct, and the same principle would seem to apply to the second one as well.	若知道沙弥未被驱摈，或知道他已舍弃了当初导致他被驱摈的见解，那么与他交朋友等行为并无犯戒。如前一条戒条所述，《经分别》明确指出，第一种豁免无论认知是否正确都适用，而同样的原则似乎也适用于第二种豁免。
Summary: Befriending, receiving services from, communing, or lying down under the same roof with an expelled novice—knowing that he has been expelled—is a pācittiya offense.	摘要：与已被驱摈的沙弥交朋友、接受其服务、与其交流或在一个屋簷下躺下，而且明知其已被驱摈，是《波逸提》（《单堕》）罪。