波羅夷

This term, according to the Parivāra, derives from a verb meaning to lose or be defeated. A bhikkhu who commits any of the four following offenses has surrendered to his own mental defilements to such an extent that he defeats the purpose of his having become a bhikkhu in the first place. The irrevocable nature of this defeat is illustrated in the Vibhaṅga with a number of similes: “as a man with his head cut off… as a withered leaf freed from its stem… as a flat stone that has been broken in half cannot be put together again… as a palmyra tree cut off at the crown is incapable of further growth.” A bhikkhu who commits any of these offenses severs himself irrevocably from the life of the Saṅgha and is no longer considered a bhikkhu.

根據《附隨》，這個術語源自於一個動詞，意思是「失去」或「被擊敗」。比丘若犯下列四條戒中的任何一種，就已經屈服於自己的心理煩惱，以致他違背了自己成為比丘的初衷。《經分別》中用許多比喻說明了這種擊敗的不可挽回的性質：「就像一個人的頭被砍掉了……就像一片枯萎的葉子脫離了莖……就像一塊被碎成兩半的扁平石頭無法再拼湊起來……就像一棵被砍掉樹冠的糖棕無法進一步生長一樣。” 犯下任何這些戒的比丘不可挽回地從僧團生活中斷絕，並且不再被視為比丘。

1	一
Should any bhikkhu—participating in the training and livelihood of the bhikkhus, without having renounced the training, without having declared his weakness—engage in sexual intercourse, even with a female animal, he is defeated and no longer in affiliation.	如果任何比丘——參加比丘的訓練和生活，沒有放棄訓練，沒有表明自己的弱點——進行性交，即使是與雌性動物，也是波羅夷，不共住。
As we noted in the Introduction, the first formulation of this rule followed on Ven. Sudinna’s having had sex with one of his former wives. His motives, by worldly standards, were relatively noble: He was complying with his parents’ desire that he provide them with an heir. However, in the incident leading to the second formulation of this rule—in which the Buddha added the phrase “even with a female animal”—the instigator’s motives were considerably less so.	正如我們在引言中指出的，這條戒條的最初制定是在須提那尊者與他的前妻們之一發生了性關係。按照世俗的標準，他的動機相對崇高：他遵守父母的願望，為他們提供一個繼承人。然而，在導致第二次制定這條戒條的事件中——佛陀在其中添加了「即使是與雌性動物」這句話——犯戒者的動機卻遠非如此。
“Now at that time, a certain bhikkhu living in the Great Wood at Vesālī, having befriended a monkey with food (§), engaged in sexual intercourse with it. Then, dressing (§) early in the morning and carrying his bowl and outer robe, the bhikkhu went into Vesālī for alms. A number of bhikkhus wandering on a tour of the lodgings went to the bhikkhu’s dwelling. The monkey saw them coming from afar and, on seeing them, went up to them and wiggled its rear and wiggled its tail and offered its rear and made a sign (§). The thought occurred to the bhikkhus, ‘Undoubtedly this bhikkhu is engaging in sexual intercourse with this monkey.’ So they hid off to one side. “Then the bhikkhu, having gone for alms in Vesālī, returned bringing almsfood. The monkey went up to him. The bhikkhu, having eaten a portion of the almsfood, gave a portion to the monkey. The monkey, having eaten the almsfood, offered its rear to the bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu engaged in sexual intercourse with it (§). “Then the bhikkhus said to the bhikkhu, ‘Hasn’t a training rule been formulated by the Blessed One? How can you engage in sexual intercourse with this monkey?’ “‘It’s true, friends, that a training rule has been formulated by the Blessed One, but that’s with regard to a human female, not to a female animal.’”	「當時，有一位比丘住在毘舍離大林裡，以食物與一隻猴子結交（§），並與它交合。然後，比丘一大早穿好衣服，帶著鉢和外衣，到毘舍離去托缽。眾多比丘巡行房舍，來到了該比丘的住處。猴子遠遠地看見他們來了，一見他們，就走到他們面前，搖著臀部，搖著尾巴，把臀部拱了出來，做了個淫相（§）。比丘們心想：「毫無疑問，這位比丘正在與這隻猴子交合。」於是他們躲到一邊。「然後，比丘在毘舍離托缽之後，帶著托缽食物回來了。猴子向他走來。比丘吃完一部分缽食後，將一部分給予猴子。猴子吃完缽食後，將它的屁股示現給比丘，比丘就與它交合（§）。「然後，諸比丘對該比丘說：『世尊不是制定了學處嗎？你怎麼能和這隻猴子交合呢？ “‘朋友們，確實有一條學處是由世尊制定的，但那是針對人類女性，而不是針對雌性動物。’” 律藏-經分別-波羅夷-獼猴品
The full offense here is composed of four factors: effort, object, knowledge, and consent.	這裡完整的違犯由四個因素組成：努力、對象、知悉和同意。

Effort	努力
The term sexual intercourse refers to all kinds of sexual intercourse involving genitals (literally, the “urine path” (passāva-magga)—i.e., a woman’s vagina or a man’s penis); the anus (vacca-magga); or the mouth (mukha). The Vibhaṅga summarizes the various possible combinations of these orifices, and concludes that all of them—except for mouth-to-mouth penetration, which is treated under Derived Offenses, below—fulfill the factor of effort here. Unfortunately, the Vibhaṅga’s summary is couched in technical terminology, using magga (path) to mean either the genitals or the anal orifice, and amagga (not-path) to mean the mouth. The Commentary, in discussing the summary, mistakenly classifies the mouth as a magga as well, and so has to invent a different meaning for amagga: a wound bordering on one of the three maggas. Because the Commentary’s discussion of this point is based on a misunderstanding, there is no need to pursue it in further detail.	性交一詞是指所有類型的性交，涉及生殖器（字面意思是「尿道」（passāva-magga），即女性的陰道或男性的陰莖）；肛門（vacca-magga）；或嘴（mukha）。《經分別》總結了這些孔穴的各種可能的組合，並得出結論：除了口對口的插入（在下面的衍生違犯中處理）之外，所有這些孔穴都滿足了這裡的努力因素。不幸的是，《經分別》的總結是用技術術語表達的，使用 magga （道）來表示生殖器或肛門，使用 amagga （非道）來表示嘴。《義註》在討論總結時，錯誤地將嘴也歸類為道，因此必須為「非道」發明一個不同的意義：與三道之一接壤的傷口。由於《義註》對這一點的討論是基於誤解，因此無需進一步追究。
The Vibhaṅga states that sexual intercourse has been performed when, in any of the possible combinations covered by this rule, one organ enters the other even if just to “the extent of a sesame seed.” This means that a bhikkhu engaging in genital, oral, or anal intercourse is subject to this rule regardless of which role he plays. The question of whether there is a covering, such as a condom, between the organs is irrelevant, as are the questions of whether the bhikkhu is actively or passively involved, and whether any of the parties involved reaches orgasm.	《經分別》指出，當在該戒條涵蓋的任何可能的組合中，一個器官進入另一個器官時，即使只是達到“芝麻籽的程度”，也代表發生了性交。這意味著比丘進行性交、口交或肛交時，無論他扮演什麼角色，都隸屬於這條戒條。器官之間是否有覆蓋物（例如保險套）的問題不相干，比丘是主動參與還是被動參與，以及參與的任何一方是否達到性高潮的問題都是不相干的。

Object	對象
The full penalty under this rule applies to any voluntary sexual intercourse with a human being, a “non-human” being (a yakkha, nāga, or peta), or a common animal, whether female, male, neuter, or hermaphrodite.	這條戒條下的全額懲罰適用於與人類、「非人類」（夜叉 yakkha 、龍 nāga 或亡者及鬼 peta ）或普通動物（無論是雌性、雄性、中性或雌雄同體）的任何自願性交。
Performing sexual intercourse with a dead body—even a decapitated head—also entails the full penalty if the remains of the body are intact enough for the act to be accomplished.	如果屍體的殘骸夠完整以完成性交，與屍體（即使是與被斬首的頭）進行性交也將受到全額懲罰。
In addition, the Vinīta-vatthu lists two examples of “self-intercourse”: A bhikkhu with a supple back takes his penis into his mouth, and a bhikkhu with an unusually long penis inserts it into his anus. Both cases carry the full penalty.	此外，《Vinīta-vatthu》還列舉了兩個「自我性交」的例子：一個背部柔軟的比丘將陰莖放入口中，一個陰莖異常長的比丘將其插入肛門。兩種情況均需受到全額懲罰。

Knowledge & consent	知悉 & 同意
For sexual intercourse to count as an offense, the bhikkhu must know that it is happening and give his consent. Thus if he is sexually assaulted while asleep or otherwise unconscious and remains oblivious to what is happening, he incurs no penalty. If, however, he becomes conscious during the assault or was conscious right from the start, then whether he incurs a penalty depends on whether he gives his consent during any part of the act.	將性交算做犯戒，比丘必須知道它正在發生並給予他的同意。因此，如果他在睡覺或失去知覺時遭到性侵犯，並且對發生的事情渾然不覺，他不會受到懲罰。然而，如果他在襲擊過程中變得清醒，或者從一開始就清醒了，那麼他是否受到懲罰取決於他在行為的任何部分是否表示同意。
Strangely enough, neither the Canon nor the Commentary discusses the factor of consent in any detail, except to mention by way of passing that it can apply to the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out. From the examples in the Vinīta-vatthu, it would appear that consent refers to a mental state of acquiescence, together with its physical or verbal expression. Mere physical compliance does not count, as there are cases where bhikkhus forced into intercourse comply physically but without consenting mentally and so are absolved of any offense. However, there is also a case in which a woman invites a bhikkhu to engage in sexual intercourse, saying that she will do all the work while he can avoid an offense by doing nothing. The bhikkhu does as she tells him to, but when the case comes to the Buddha’s attention, the Buddha imposes a pārājika on the act without even asking the bhikkhu whether he consented or not. The assumption is that complying with a request like this indicates consent, regardless of whether one makes any physical or verbal movement at all.	奇怪的是，《聖典》和《義註》都沒有詳細討論同意因素，只是順便提到它可以適用於插入、完全插入、留在原處或拔出的階段。從《Vinīta-vatthu》中的例子來看，同意看來是指一種默許的心理狀態，連同其身體或言語表達。僅僅身體上的順從並不算數，因為在某些情況下，比丘被迫進行性交，但沒有心理上的同意，因此沒有犯任何戒。然而，也有一種情況，女人邀請比丘發生性行為，說她會做所有的工作，他什麼都不做就可以避免犯戒。比丘照她的吩咐去做，但當這件事引起佛陀的注意時，佛陀甚至沒有詢問比丘是否同意，就認定該行為犯《波羅夷》。前提是，遵守這樣的請求就表明同意，無論一個人是否做出任何身體或口頭動作。
Taken together, these cases imply that if one is sexually assaulted, one is completely absolved from an offense only if (1) one does not give one’s mental consent at any time during the act or (2) one does feel mental consent during at least part of the act but puts up a struggle so as not to express that consent physically or verbally in any way. (As the Commentary notes, drawing a general principle from the Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 2, mere mental consent without physical expression is not enough to count as a factor of an offense, for there is no offense simply in the arising of a thought or mental state.) If one puts up no struggle and feels mental consent, even if only fleetingly during the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out, one incurs the full penalty. This would seem to be the basis for the Commentary’s warning in its discussion of the Vinīta-vatthu case in which a bhikkhu wakes up to find himself being sexually assaulted by a woman, gives her a kick, and sends her rolling. The warning: This is how a bhikkhu still subject to sensual lust should act if he wants to protect his state of mind.	總而言之，這些案例意味著，如果一個人受到性侵犯，只有在以下情況下才可以完全免除犯戒：（1）一個人在行為過程中的任何時候都沒有心理上同意，或者（2）一個人至少在行為過程中的某部份確實感到心理上的同意，但奮力掙扎避免以任何方式透過身體或口頭表達同意。（如《義註》中所指出的，從《波羅夷》二的《Vinīta-vatthu》中得出一條一般原則，僅在心理上同意而沒有身體表達，不足以算作犯戒的一個因素，因為僅僅在想法或心理狀態中產生並不構成犯戒。）如果一個人沒有做出任何掙扎並感到精神上同意，即使只是在插入、完全插入、留在原處或拔出階段短暫地發生，也會受到全額懲罰。這似乎是《義註》在討論《Vinīta-vatthu》的例子時發出警告的基礎，在該案例中，一名比丘醒來，發現自己遭到一名女人的性侵犯，踢了她一腳，然後讓她滾出去。警告：如果一個比丘仍然受制於色欲，他想要保護他的心境，就應該這樣做。
The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu with “impaired faculties”—one who feels neither pleasure nor pain during intercourse—engages in intercourse under the assumption that his impairment exempts him from the rule. The case is brought to the Buddha, who states, “Whether this worthless man did or didn’t feel [anything], it is a case involving defeat.” From this ruling it can be argued that a bhikkhu indulging in intercourse as part of a tantric ritual incurs the full penalty even if he doesn’t feel pleasure in the course of the act.	《Vinīta-vatthu》中記載了一個案例，一位「官能受損」的比丘——在性交時既感覺不到快樂也感覺不到痛苦——認為他的缺陷使他不受戒條約束而進行性交。這個案例被提交給佛陀，佛陀說：“無論這個愚癡人有沒有（任何）感覺，這都是一個《波羅夷》的案例。” 從這個裁決可以看出，一個比丘在密宗儀式中沉溺於性交，即使他在行為過程中沒有感到快樂，也會受到全額懲罰。

Derived offenses	衍生違犯
Two thullaccaya offenses are directly related to this rule. The first is for mouth-to-mouth penetration— i.e., the act of inserting any part of one’s mouth into the mouth of another person, or consenting to the insertion of another person’s mouth in one’s own—regardless of whether the other person is a man, a woman, or a common animal. When this act occurs under the influence of lust, as in an intense kiss, the thullaccaya here would be incurred in addition to whatever penalty is assigned for lustful bodily contact under Sg 2.	兩種《偷蘭遮》罪與此戒條直接相關。第一種是口對口插入－即將一個人的嘴的任何部分插入另一個人的嘴裡，或同意另一個人的嘴插入自己的嘴裡的行為－無論對方是否是一個男人，女人，或普通的動物。當這種行為在性欲的影響下發生時，例如在激烈的接吻中，除了根據《僧殘》二對出於性欲的身體接觸所規定的懲罰之外，還會犯《偷蘭遮》。
The second thullaccaya is for the unlikely case of a bhikkhu who attempts intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse. To attempt intercourse with any other part of a dead body or with any part of an insentient object, such as an inflatable doll or mannequin, incurs a dukkaṭa. (If this led to an ejaculation, however, the case would be treated under Sg 1.)	第二種《偷蘭遮》是針對一個不太可能發生的情況，即比丘試圖與屍體腐爛的嘴巴、肛門或生殖器性交。試著與屍體的任何其他部分或無知覺物體的任何部位（例如充氣娃娃或人體模型）進行性交，都會犯《突吉羅》。（但是，如果這導致射精，則該情況將根據《僧殘》一進行處理。）
The Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being’s body apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the saṅghādisesa rules—either Sg 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sg 2 for lustful bodily contact. As we shall see below, the penalties assigned in the latter case are as follows: if the partner is a woman, a saṅghādisesa; if a paṇḍaka (see Sg 2), a thullaccaya; if a man or a common animal, a dukkaṭa. We can infer from the Vibhaṅga’s ruling here that if a bhikkhu has an orgasm while attempting intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse, with any other part of a dead body, or with any part of an insentient object, the case would come under Sg 1.	《經分別》指出，如果比丘試圖與除三孔穴之外的眾生身體的任何部位發生性交，這種情況就屬於《僧殘》戒條－若非《僧殘》一代表故意射精，則為《僧殘》二代表出於性欲的身體接觸。正如我們將在下面看到的，後一種情況的懲罰如下：如果對象是女人，《僧殘》；如果是黃門 paṇḍaka （參見《僧殘》二），《偷蘭遮》；如果是男人或普通動物，《突吉羅》。在此我們可以從《經分別》的裁決中推斷出，如果一個比丘在嘗試與屍體腐爛的嘴、肛門或生殖器，或與屍體的任何其他部分，或與無知覺物體的任何部分性交時獲得性高潮，該情況屬於《僧殘》一。
The Commentary disagrees with the Vibhaṅga on these points, however, saying that the derived offenses under this rule can include only dukkaṭa and thullaccaya penalties. In its explanation of Sg 1, it sets forth a system of eleven types of lust in which the lust for the pleasure of bringing about an ejaculation, lust for the pleasure of bodily contact, and lust for the pleasure of intercourse are treated as completely separate things that must be treated under separate rules. Thus, it says, if a bhikkhu aiming at intercourse takes hold of a woman’s body, it is simply a preliminary to intercourse and thus entails only a dukkaṭa, rather than a saṅghādisesa for lustful bodily contact. Similarly, if he has a premature ejaculation before beginning intercourse, there is no offense at all.	然而，《義註》在這些觀點上不同意《經分別》，稱此戒條衍生的違犯只能包括《突吉羅》和《偷蘭遮》懲罰。在對《僧殘》一的解釋中，它提出了十一種性欲的系統，其中對射精快感的性欲，對身體接觸快感的性欲，和對性交快感的性欲被視為完全不同的事情，必須根據不同的戒條處理。因此，它說，如果一個以性交為目的的比丘抓住了一個女人的身體，這只是性交的一個預備行動，因此只犯《突吉羅》，而不是出於性欲身體接觸的《僧殘》。同樣地，如果他在開始性交之前出現早洩，也沒有任何犯戒。
These are fine academic distinctions and are clearly motivated by a desire to draw neat lines between the rules, but they lead to practical problems. As the Commentary itself points out, if a bhikkhu commits an act that falls near the borderline between these rules but cannot later report precisely which type of lust he was feeling in the heat of the moment, there is no way his case can be judged and a penalty assigned. At any rate, though, there is no basis in the Canon for the Commentary’s system, and in fact it contradicts not only the Vibhaṅga’s ruling mentioned above, but also its definition of lustful under Sg 2, 3, & 4, which is exactly the same for all three rules and places no limits on the type of lust involved. All of this leads to the conclusion that the Commentary’s neat system for classifying lust is invalid, and that the Vibhaṅga’s judgment holds: If a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being’s body apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the saṅghādisesa rules—either Sg 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sg 2 for lustful bodily contact—rather than here.	這些都是很好的學術區別，顯然是出於希望在戒條之間劃清界線的動機，但它們會導致實際問題。正如《義註》本身指出的那樣，如果比丘所犯下的行為接近這些戒條的邊緣，但後來無法準確地報告他在一時衝動中感受到哪種類型的欲望，那麼他的情況就無法判斷並給予懲罰。但，無論如何，《義註》的系統在《聖典》中是沒有任何依據的，事實上，它不僅與上述《經分別》的裁決相矛盾，而且也與在《僧殘》二、三、四中對性欲的定義相矛盾，這個定義在所有三個戒條都是相同的，並且對所涉及的性欲類型沒有限制。這一切都得出這樣的結論：《義註》對性欲進行分類的簡潔工整系統是無效的，而《經分別》的判斷是成立的：如果比丘試圖與除三孔穴之外的眾生身體的任何部分進行交合，那麼這種情況就屬於《僧殘》戒條的範疇－若非《僧殘》一代表故意射精，則為《僧殘》二代表出於性欲的身體接觸－而不是這裡。

Blanket exemptions	總括性豁免
In addition to bhikkhus who do not know they are being assaulted or do not give their consent when they do know, the Vibhaṅga states that there are four special categories of bhikkhus exempted from a penalty under this rule: any bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, or the first offender(s) (in this case, Ven. Sudinna and the bhikkhu with the monkey) whose actions prompted the Buddha to formulate the rule. The Commentary defines as insane anyone who “goes about in an unseemly way, with deranged perceptions, having cast away all sense of shame and compunction, not knowing whether he has transgressed major or minor training rules.” It recognizes this as a medical condition, which it blames on the bile. A bhikkhu under the influence of a severe psychosis-inducing drug would apparently fall under this exemption, but one under the influence of a more common intoxicant would not. As for spirit possession, the Commentary says that this can happen either when spirits frighten one or when, by distracting one with sensory images, they insert their hands into one’s heart by way of one’s mouth (!). Whatever the cause, it notes that insane and possessed bhikkhus are exempt from penalties they incur only when their perceptions are deranged (“when their mindfulness is entirely forgotten and they don’t know what fire, gold, excrement, and sandalwood are”) and not from any they incur during their lucid moments. As for a bhikkhu delirious with pain, he is exempt from penalties he incurs only during periods when the pain is so great that he does not know what he is doing.	除了不知道自己受到侵犯或明知後不同意的比丘外，《經分別》指出，有四種特殊類別的比丘可免受此戒條的處罰：任何精神錯亂的比丘、被附身、或因痛苦而發狂神智不清，或最初犯戒者（在本例中，是須提那尊者和與猴子在一起的比丘），他們的行為促使佛陀制定了戒條。《義註》將精神錯亂定義為「行為不得體，知覺錯亂，已拋棄所有慚愧感，不知犯大、小學處」的人。它認為這是一種健康狀況，並將其歸咎於膽汁。受到嚴重的誘發精神病藥物影響的比丘顯然屬於這裡的豁免範圍，但受到更常見的麻醉劑影響的比丘則不然。至於附身，《義註》說，這種情況可能發生在靈體嚇唬人的時候，或者當靈體通過感官圖像分散人的注意力，通過人的嘴將手插入人的心臟時（！）。無論出於什麼原因，它指出，精神錯亂和被附身的比丘只有在他們的知覺錯亂時（“當他們的正念完全被遺忘，並且他們不知道火，金，糞便和檀香是什麼時”）才可以免受懲罰，在清醒時所發生則不能豁免。至於因痛苦而發狂神智不清的比丘，只有當疼痛劇烈到他不知道自己在做什麼時，他才可以免於懲罰。
These four categories are exempted from penalties under nearly all of the rules, although the first offender for each rule is exempted only for the one time he acted in such a way as to provoke the Buddha into formulating the rule. I will only rarely mention these categories again, and—except where expressly stated otherwise—the reader should bear them in mind as exempt in every case.	這四類別幾乎在所有戒條中都可以免於處罰，儘管每條戒條的初犯只有一次，其行為引起佛陀制定該戒條時才可以得到豁免。我很少會再次提及這些類別，除非另有明確說明，否則讀者應該牢記它們在任何情況下都可以豁免。
Lastly, the Vinīta-vatthu to this rule includes an interesting case that formed the basis for an additional rule:	最後，這條戒條的《Vinīta-vatthu》包括一個有趣的案例，它構成了附加戒條的基礎：
“At that time a certain bhikkhu had gone to the Gabled Hall in the Great Wood at Vesālī to pass the day and was sleeping, having left the door open. His various limbs were stiff with the ‘wind forces’ (i.e., he had an erection) (§). Now at that time a large company of women bearing garlands and scents came to the park, headed for the dwelling. Seeing the bhikkhu, they sat down on his male organ (§) and, having taken their pleasure and remarking, ‘What a bull of a man, this one!’ they picked up their garlands and scents, and left.”	「當時，有一位比丘到毘舍離大林的重閣講堂去打發一天，正在睡覺，門開著。他的各個肢體因「風力」而變得僵硬（即他勃起）（§）。那時，一大群帶著花環和香水的婦女來到公園，朝著住所走去。看到比丘後，他們坐在他的男性器官上（§），取得愉悅後說道：「這個人真是個公牛！」他們拿起花環和香水就離開了。
The bhikkhu incurred no penalty, but the Buddha gave formal permission to close the door when resting during the day. From this permission, the Commentary formulates a prohibition—that a bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa if he does not close the door when sleeping during the day—but if the Buddha had intended a prohibition, he surely would have stated the rule in that form himself. In other words, one may sleep during the day without being penalized for whether the door is open or not.	比丘沒有受到懲罰，但佛陀正式允許白天休息時關門。根據這項許可，《義註》制定了一條禁令——比丘如果白天睡覺時不關門，就會犯《突吉羅》——但如果佛陀有意禁止，他肯定會親自以禁令形式陳述這條戒條。換句話說，比丘可以在白天睡覺，而不會因為門是否打開而受到懲罰。
Summary: Voluntary sexual intercourse—genital, anal, or oral—with a human being, non-human being, or common animal is a pārājika offense.	摘要：與人類、非人或普通動物自願發生性交（生殖器、肛門或口腔）是《波羅夷》罪。

* * *

2	二
Should any bhikkhu, in what is reckoned a theft, take what is not given from an inhabited area or from the wilderness—just as when, in the taking of what is not given, kings arresting the criminal would flog, imprison, or banish him, saying, “You are a robber, you are a fool, you are benighted, you are a thief”—a bhikkhu in the same way taking what is not given also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.	如果任何比丘，在村落或林野，拿取未給予的東西，被視為盜竊，就像國王逮捕罪犯，拿取未給予的東西時會鞭打、監禁或驅逐他一樣說：「你是強盜，你是愚人，你是愚昧無知的，你是小偷。」——比丘以同樣的方式拿取未給予的東西，也是波羅夷，不共住。
This rule against stealing is, in the working out of its details, the most complex in the Pāṭimokkha and requires the most explanation—not because stealing is a concept especially hard to understand, but because it can take so many forms. The Canon treats the issue in a case-by-case fashion that resists easy summary. To further complicate matters, the Commentary’s discussion of this rule is extremely prolix and deviates frequently from the Canon’s in both major and minor ways. Because the deviations are so numerous, we will focus solely on the major ones.	就其細節而言，這條禁止偷竊的戒條是《波羅提木叉》中最複雜的，也需要最多的解釋——不是因為偷竊是一個特別難以理解的概念，而是因為它可以有多種形式。《聖典》以逐案的的方式對待這個議題，拒絕簡單地總結。使事情變得更加複雜的是，《義註》對這條戒條的討論極其冗長，並且經常在主要和次要方面偏離《聖典》的內容。由於偏差如此之多，我們將只關注主要的偏差。
The Vibhaṅga defines the act of stealing in terms of four factors.	《經分別》根據四個因素定義了偷竊行為。
Object: anything belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.	對象：屬於另一個人或一群人的任何東西。
Perception: One perceives the object as belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.	感知：察覺到該對象屬於另一個人或一群人。
Intention: One decides to steal it.	意圖：決定偷竊它。
Effort: One takes it.	努力：拿走它。
Stealing under any circumstances is always an offense. However, the severity of the offense depends on another factor, which is—	在任何情況下偷竊都是犯戒行為。然而，犯戒的嚴重程度取決於另一個因素，即——
The value of the object.	該對象的價值。

Object	對象
For an object to qualify as what is not given—the rule’s term for anything that may be the object of a theft—it must belong to someone else: “not given, not forfeited, not abandoned/discarded; guarded, protected, claimed (§—literally, ‘viewed as “mine”’), possessed by someone else.” In all of the Vibhaṅga’s cases under this rule, that “someone else” is either an individual human being or a group of human beings. The question of property belonging to the Saṅgha logically fits here, but because the topic is fairly complex we will discuss it as a special case below.	一個對象要符合“未給予”的條件（該戒條對可能成為盜竊對象的任何物品的術語），它必須屬於其他人：“未給予、未沒收喪失、未遺棄/丟棄；” 被看守、保護、聲稱（§—字面意思是“被視為‘我的’）、被其他人擁有。” 在這條戒條下的所有《經分別》案例中，「其他人」若非一個人，則為一群人。僧團財產的疑問在邏輯上適用於這裡，但由於這個主題相當複雜，我們將在下面作為一個特例來討論。
Because items that have been given away or discarded do not fulfill the factor of object here, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who takes a discarded object—such as rags from a pile of refuse—or unclaimed items from a wilderness. The Commentary, in some of its examples, includes items given up for lost under “abandoned,” but this interpretation has to be heavily qualified. If the owner retains a sense of ownership for the lost item, it would fall under the term claimed, and thus would still count as not given. Only if the owner abandons all sense of ownership would it genuinely count as abandoned.	因為被送出或丟棄的物品不符合這裡的對象因素，所以對於比丘來說，拿走被丟棄的物品——例如一堆垃圾中的破布——或來自林野中無主的物品，並沒有犯戒。《義註》中的一些例子中，「遺棄」包括了因遺失而放棄的物品，但這種解釋必須經過嚴格限定。如果失主保留對遺失物品的所有權意識，則該物品將屬於有主的，因此仍然算作未給予。只有擁有者放棄所有的所有權意識，才算真正的遺棄。
The Vinīta-vatthu mentions an interesting case in which the groundskeeper in an orchard permits bhikkhus to take fruit from the orchard, even though he was not authorized to do so. The bhikkhus committed no offense.	《Vinīta-vatthu》提到了一個有趣的案例，果園的園丁允許比丘們從果園拿水果，儘管他沒有被授權這樣做。比丘們沒有犯任何戒。
The Commentary adds that if people are guarding an object as the property of a location—for example, an offering to a Buddha image, cetiya, or other sacred place—the object would also qualify as “not given” under this rule. Although the Vibhaṅga mentions property of this sort under NP 30 and Pc 82, for some reason it doesn’t mention it here. Nevertheless, the Commentary’s judgment on this point reflects a custom that had become widespread by its time, that of giving valuable items to a cetiya (this includes Buddha images) and dedicating them not to the Saṅgha but to the cetiya. Some medieval Indian Buddhist inscriptions express the idea that the cetiya or the Buddha relics (if any) within the cetiya actually own such objects, but the Commentary states that these objects have an owner simply in the sense that human beings are watching over them for the purpose of the cetiya. The jewels decorating the reliquary of the Sacred Tooth in Kandy or the offerings to the Emerald Buddha in Bangkok, for example, would fall under this category. According to the Commentary, the Saṅgha is duty-bound to care for such items but has no rights of ownership over them. In its discussion both of this rule and of Pv.XIX, it states that items given to the Saṅgha may be used for the purpose of the cetiya—for example, to contribute to its decoration or upkeep—but items given to the cetiya may not be used for the purpose of the Saṅgha.	《義註》補充說，如果人們將某個物品作為某個地點的財產來保護——例如，供奉給佛像、支提或其他神聖場所的供品——根據這條戒條，該物品也將被視為“未給予”。儘管《經分別》在《捨墮》三十和《波逸提》八二中提到了此類財產，但由於某種原因，它在這裡沒有提及。然而，《義註》對這一點的判斷反映了當時流行的一種習俗，即向支提（包括佛像）贈送貴重物品，將它們奉獻給支提，而不是僧團。一些中世紀印度佛教銘文表達了這樣的想法，即支提或支提內的佛舍利（如果有的話）實際上擁有這些物品，但《義註》指出，這些物品有主人，只因有人為了支提的緣故正在看守它們。例如，在康提裝飾佛牙箱的珠寶或曼谷供奉玉佛的供品就屬於這一類。根據《義註》，僧團有義務保管這些物品，但沒有所有權。在對該戒條和《附隨》一九的討論中，它指出給予僧伽的物品可以用於支提—例如，有助於其裝飾或維護—但給予支提的物品不可作為僧伽之用。
From the Commentary’s discussion of this type of ownership, it would appear that if there are no longer any human beings watching over a cetiya, the items donated to it would no longer count as having an owner and thus could be removed for safekeeping, preferably to another cetiya. Any bhikkhu who took such items for himself, however, would be risking the wrath of the devas who might be guarding the cetiya. This is why it is traditional in such cases to conduct a ceremony formally requesting the permission of any guardian devas, at the same time promising not to take such items for one’s own use.	從《義註》對這種類型所有權的討論來看，如果不再有任何人看管支提，捐贈給它的物品將不再被視為有主物，因此可以被移走以妥善保管，最好是移到另一個支提。然而，任何比丘若將這些物品據為己有，就會冒著觸怒可能守護支提的天神的風險。這就是為什麼在這種情況下，傳統上會舉行儀式，正式請求任何守護天神的許可，同時承諾不會將這些物品據為己用。
The Vibhaṅga states that items belonging to common animals or petas are not covered by this rule. On this point, see the discussion under Non-offenses, below.	《經分別》說，屬於一般動物或亡者及鬼的物品不屬於此戒條的範圍。關於這一點，請參閱下面「不犯」部分的討論。

Perception	感知
For the act of taking what is not given to count as theft, one must also perceive the object as not given. Thus there is no offense if one takes an object, even if it is not given, if one sincerely believes that it is ownerless or thrown away. Similarly, if a bhikkhu takes an object mistaking it for his own or as belonging to a friend who has given him permission to take his things on trust, there is no offense even if the assumption about the trust proves to be a misperception. Also, a bhikkhu who takes things from the Community’s common stores, on the assumption that he has the right to help himself, commits no offense even if the assumption proves false.	將未給予而拿取算做盜竊的行為，該人必須察覺該物品是未給予的。因此，如果一個人真誠地相信它是無主的或被丟棄的，那麼即使它是未給予的，如果該人拿走了它，也沒有犯戒。同樣地，如果比丘拿走一件物品，誤認為它是他自己的，或者是屬於一位允許他以信託方式拿走他的東西的朋友的，即使有關信託的假設被證明是一種誤解，也沒有犯戒。此外，比丘假設他有權利自助，從僧團的公共儲藏中拿東西，即使這個假設被證明是錯的，也沒有犯戒。
The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu, spotting some objects during the day, returns to steal them at night. However, instead of taking the objects he spotted, he ends up taking some possessions of his own. He earns a dukkaṭa for his efforts.	《Vinīta-vatthu》中有一個案例，一位比丘在白天發現一些物品，然後在晚上回來偷它們。然而，他最終沒有拿走他發現的物品，而是拿走了自己的一些所有物。他透過自己的努力犯了《突吉羅》。
None of the texts discuss the possible case in which one might be in doubt as to whether the object in question is not given, perhaps because the compilers felt that the factor of intention, discussed next, would not apply in such cases. Thus it would not be an offense under this rule. However, the wise policy when one is in doubt about an item’s ownership would be not to take the item for one’s own, or at most to take it on loan, as explained below.	沒有任何文本討論懷疑該物品是否尚未給予的這種可能情況，也許是因為編譯者認為接下來討論的意圖因素不適用於這種情況。因此，根據該戒條，這不會構成犯戒。然而，當一個人對某件物品的所有權有疑問時，明智之舉是不要將其據為己有，或最多借用它，如下所述。

Intention	意圖
The act of taking what is not given, even when one perceives it as not given, counts as theft only if one’s intention is to steal it. Thus, as the non-offense clauses say, a bhikkhu incurs no offense if he takes an object temporarily or on trust. On these points, see the discussion under Non-offenses, below. Also, the Vinīta-vatthu rules that a bhikkhu who, seeing an article left in a place where it might be damaged, puts it in safe keeping for the owner, commits no offense.	拿取未給予之物的行為，即使察覺到它尚未給予，只有當一個人的意圖是偷竊它時，才算是偷竊。因此，正如不犯條款所說，比丘如果暫時或受託取用某物，並不會犯戒。關於這點，請參閱下面「不犯」部分的討論。此外，《Vinīta-vatthu》規定，比丘看到一件物品被留在可能會被損壞的地方，為該物主妥善保管，這並不構成犯戒。
The Commentary discusses two cases of taking an item with a conditional intent (parikappāvahāra): placing a condition on the article, and placing a condition on the place. It illustrates the first case with the example of a bhikkhu entering a dark storeroom and taking a sack full of items, thinking, “If the sack contains cloth, I’ll steal it; if it contains just thread, I won’t.” In this case, if the sack does indeed contain cloth, then it was stolen the moment the bhikkhu moved the sack from its place (see below). If it contains just thread, and he returns it to its place, he commits no offense. If, however, the bhikkhu takes the sack thinking, “I’ll steal whatever is in the sack,” the Commentary maintains that he is not guilty of stealing until he finds out what the sack contains and then picks it up again, but this case does not really fit under this category, as the bhikkhu has actually placed no condition on the article and so stole it when he first picked it up.	《義註》討論了帶有條件意圖（parikappāvahāra）拿取物品的兩種情況：對物品設定條件，以及對地點設定條件。它用一個比丘的例子來說明第一個情況，他進入一個黑暗的儲藏室，拿起一袋裝滿物品的袋子，心想：「如果袋子裡有布，我就偷它；如果它只包含線，我不偷。」在這種情況下，如果袋子裡確實裝有布，那麼當比丘把袋子從原來的位置移開時，它就被偷了（見下文）。如果裡面只有線，他把它放回原處，他就沒有犯戒。然而，如果比丘拿起袋子時心裡想：「我要偷袋子裡的東西」，《義註》認為，在他發現袋子裡裝著什麼，然後再把它拿起來之前，他並沒有犯偷竊，但這個情況並不真正屬於這一類，因為比丘實際上沒有對這個物品設定任何條件，所以當他第一次拿起它時就偷走了它。
Placing a condition on the place means thinking, “If I can take this item past such-and-such a place (such as a gateway), I’ll steal it; if anyone sees me beforehand, I’ll pretend that I’m just looking at it and will return it to its place.” Because one has not definitely decided to steal it when first picking it up, the theft is committed only when one takes the item past the determined place.	對地點設定條件意味著心想：「如果我可以帶著這個物品通過某某地點（例如出入口），我就會偷它；如果有人先看到我，我會假裝我只是在看它，把它放回原處。」由於第一次拿起物品時並沒有明確決定要偷竊，只有當拿物品通過了決意的地點時才算偷竊。

Effort	努力
Assuming that all of the above conditions are met—the object belongs to someone else, one perceives it as belonging to someone else, and one intends to steal it—if one then takes it, that constitutes stealing. The question then arises as to precisely what acts constitute taking.	假設上述所有條件都滿足，即該物品是別人的，自己察覺到該物是屬於別人的，並意圖去偷竊它—如果拿走了它，就構成偷竊。那麼問題來了，究竟什麼行為才構成拿取。
The Vibhaṅga, instead of giving a systematic answer to this question, provides a long list of possible situations and then defines how taking is defined in each case. Simply reading through the list can require some patience, and it’s easy to sympathize with the bhikkhus in the past who had to memorize it. Here, to shorten the discussion, we will reverse its order, listing first the actions that qualify as taking and then the situations to which the actions apply. Actions requiring only minor clarification will be explained in the list; those requiring extended discussion will be explained below.	《經分別》並沒有對這個問題給出系統的答案，而是提供了一長串可能的情況，然後定義了在每種情況下的怎樣算是「拿取」。單純地閱讀這個列單可能需要一些耐心，而且很容易同情過去必須記住它的比丘們。在這裡，為了縮短討論，我們將顛倒其順序，首先列出符合「拿取」的行動，然後列出這些行動適用的情況。只需要進行少量澄清的行動將在列表中進行解釋；下文將解釋那些需要進一步討論的內容。
Moving the object from its place: objects buried in the ground; sitting on the ground; sitting on another object sitting on the ground; hanging from a place above ground, such as a peg or clothesline; floating, flying, or dropping in mid-air; sitting in a boat; sitting in a vehicle; an object that one has caused another person to drop; footless animals, animals that one might pick up or push from their place (according to the Commentary, this also covers larger footed animals that are lying down); objects that one has been asked to guard. The Vibhaṅga makes clear that items in a vehicle also count as taken when the vehicle is moved from its place.	將物品從原來的位置移動：埋在地下的物品；坐在地上；坐在地上的另一個物品上；懸掛在地面以上的地方，例如掛鉤或晾衣繩；漂浮、飛行或掉落在半空中；坐在船上；坐在車內；一個人導致另一個人掉落的物品；無足動物，人們可能會從其所在位置拿起或推走的動物（根據《義註》，這也包括躺著的較大有足動物）；被要求看守的物品。《經分別》明確規定，當車輛從其位置移動時，在車輛中的物品也算作被拿走。
“Cutting off” a fistful: objects inside a container. According to the Commentary, this means reaching into the container and grabbing, say, a fistful of coins in such a way that the coins in the fist do not touch any of the other coins in the container. In this case, the taking would be accomplished before the object was removed from the container.	「切掉」一把：容器內的物品。根據《義註》，這意味著伸手進入容器並抓住一把硬幣，使得拳頭中的硬幣不接觸容器中的任何其他硬幣。在這種情況下，在將物品從容器中取出之前就完成了「拿取」。
Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: objects inside a container; water or any liquid, whether in a container or not. Again, the Commentary states that the objects or liquid in one’s vessel must not touch the remaining objects or liquid outside the vessel. And, again, in the case of taking objects or liquid situated in a container in this way, the taking would be accomplished before the objects or liquid were removed from the container.	將器皿插入一池液體或一堆物體中，並使一池液體或一堆物體中的一些進入器皿：容器內的物體；水或任何液體，無論是否在容器中。《義註》再次指出，器皿中的物體或液體不得接觸器皿外的剩餘物體或液體。並且，再次，在以這種方式拿取位於容器中的物體或液體的情況下，「拿取」將在物體或液體從器皿中移出之前完成。
Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: objects too long or large to be taken from a container in a vessel or fistful.	完全從容器口中取出：太長或太大而無法從容器中以器皿拿取或一把拿取的物體。
Drinking liquid from a container: This would apply to drinking from the container without moving the container from its place. If the container is moved from its place, that would constitute the taking. As with the fistful, the Commentary argues that the liquid is taken only when the liquid ingested does not make contact with the liquid not ingested. This can be done either by swallowing, by closing one’s lips, or by removing one’s mouth from the container.	從容器中飲用液體：這適用於在不將容器移離其位置的情況下從容器中飲用液體。若容器被移離其原位，則構成「拿取」。與一把一樣，《義註》認為只有當攝入的液體不與未攝入的液體接觸時才算「拿取」液體。這可以透過吞嚥、閉上嘴唇或將嘴從容器移開來完成。
Moving the object from one part of one’s body to another: an object that one is already carrying before deciding to steal it. The Vibhaṅga recognizes five body parts here: head, upper torso, hip, and each of the hands. The Commentary defines head as anything above the neck; upper torso as anything below the head down, on the torso, to the level of the sternum, and on the arm, to the elbow; hip as the remainder of the body below the upper torso; and hand as the arm from the elbow on down. The Commentary notes that this definition applies only to cases where the owners have not asked one to carry the article for them. Neither the Commentary nor the Sub-commentary explains this condition, but a possible reason might be that if they have asked a bhikkhu to carry the article for them, without their intending for him to give it to someone else, it would count as guarded by him or deposited with him for safe keeping, and thus would fall under another category. If, on the other hand, they asked him to carry the object to give to someone else and he decided to take it for himself, the case would come under Deceit, discussed below.	將物品從身體的一個部位移動到另一個部位：在決定偷竊之前已經攜帶的物品。《經分別》在這裡識別出五個身體部位：頭部、上軀幹、臀部和每隻手。《義註》將頭部定義為頸部以上的任何部位；上軀幹，為頭部以下、軀幹至胸骨水平、手臂至手肘；臀部是上軀幹以下身體的其餘部分；手，為手臂從手肘以下。《義註》指出，這項定義僅適用於所有者未要求他人為其搬運物品的情況。《義註》和《複註》都沒有解釋這個條件，但一個可能的原因是，如果他們要求比丘為他們攜帶該物品，而不是想讓他將其交給其他人，那麼該物品將被視為由比丘守護，或存放在他那裡安全保管，因此屬於另一類。另一方面，如果他們要求他攜帶該物品送給其他人，而他決定將其據為己有，則該情況將屬於如下所述的欺詐行為。
Dropping the object: an object one is already carrying before deciding to steal it.	掉落物品：在決定偷竊前已經攜帶的物品。
Causing the object to move a hairbreadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a boat or any similar vessel floating in water.	導致物體向上游、下游或穿過水體移動毫髮寬度：一艘船或漂浮在水中的任何類似載體。
Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: water in a lake, canal, or reservoir.	破壞堤防使水流出：湖泊、運河或水庫中的水。
Causing an animal to move all its feet: two-footed (this includes human beings, i.e., slaves), four-footed, many-footed animals. According to the Commentary, this applies whether one touches the animal or simply lures it or threatens it without touching it. If the animal is lying down, simply getting it to get up on its feet counts as taking it. In the case of helping a slave to escape from slavery, if the slave follows one’s order or advice to escape, one is guilty of taking; but if one simply informs the slave of good ways to reach freedom or offers food or protection along the way, one incurs no offense.	使動物移動其所有的腳：兩足動物（這包括人類，即奴隸）、四足動物、多足動物。根據《義註》，無論是接觸動物還是只是引誘它或威脅它而不觸摸它，這都適用。如果動物躺著，只要讓它站起來就可以算「拿取」它。在幫助奴隸逃脫奴隸身份的情況下，如果奴隸聽從某人的命令或建議逃跑，則犯了「拿取」；但是，如果一個人只是告訴奴隸獲得自由的好方法，或者沿途提供食物或保護，那麼就不會犯戒。
Cutting down: plants growing in place, whether on dry land or in a body of water. The Commentary states that once the plant is cut totally through, then even though it doesn’t yet fall down—as when a tree is entangled in the branches of neighboring trees—it is nevertheless taken.	砍伐：植物就地生長，無論是在旱地或水體。《義註》指出，一旦植物被完全砍斷，即使它還沒有倒下——就像一棵樹被鄰近樹木的樹枝纏住一樣——它仍然是被「拿取」了。
Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession: pieces of land (fields, orchards, building sites), buildings, objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safekeeping. (According to the Commentary, items loaned to a bhikkhu also fall into this category.) According to the Vibhaṅga, if a case of this sort goes to court, this type of taking is completed when the owner finally loses the case. The Vinaya-mukha adds that if the owner appeals the case after the first hearing, the taking is accomplished when the owner loses in the highest court to which he/she makes an appeal.	導致所有者放棄重新擁有的努力（§）：土地（田地、果園、建築工地）、建築物、交由比丘保管的物品。（根據《義註》，借給比丘的物品也屬於這一類。）根據《經分別》，如果此類案件進入法庭，當所有者最終敗訴時，這種類型的「拿取」就完成了。《戒律入口》補充說，如果所有者在第一次聽證會後對案件提出上訴，則當所有者在他/她提出上訴的最高法院敗訴時，「拿取」就完成了。
The discussion in the Commentary and Sub-commentary indicates that the two categories of “objects a bhikkhu has been asked to guard,” and “objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safe keeping” differ in that in the latter case the object has been handed to the bhikkhu, whereas in the former it hasn’t. This, however, does not fit with the Vibhaṅga, which in defining “deposited” uses the word upanikkhitaṁ, which in NP 18 means “placed down next to.” A way to distinguish the two categories more closely in line with the Vibhaṅga would be to say that, in the latter case, the object is in such a location that the owner, in order to retrieve it, would have to ask the bhikkhu’s permission to do so, whereas in the former he/she wouldn’t. For example, an item placed in the bhikkhu’s hut or a monastery storeroom would count as deposited with the bhikkhu—regardless of whether it had been handed to him—whereas an item set by the side of a public road—with the bhikkhu simply asked to watch over it for a short period of time—would count as an object he has been asked to guard.	《義註》和《複註》中的討論表明，「比丘被要求看守的物品」和「存放給比丘妥善保管的物品」這兩類的不同之處在於，在後一種情況下，該物品已被交給比丘，而前者卻沒有。然而，這與《經分別》不符，《經分別》在定義「存放」時使用了「upanikkhitaṁ」一詞，在《捨墮》一八中意思是「放置在旁邊」。一種更符合《經分別》的區分這兩個類別的方法是，在後一種情況下，物品所在的位置使得所有者為了取回它，必須徵求比丘的許可取回，而在前者中他/她不必。例如，放置在比丘小屋（孤邸）或寺院儲藏室中的物品將被視為存放在比丘那裡——無論它是否已交給他——而放置在公共道路旁的物品——比丘只被要求短時間看管——就算是被要求看守的物品。
Shifting a boundary marker: pieces of land. The Vinaya-mukha notes that this contradicts the preceding definition of how one takes a piece of land, as the owner might not even know that the marker had been moved, and would not necessarily give up ownership even if he/she saw a bhikkhu moving it. The Sub-commentary tries to explain the discrepancy by maintaining that shifting a boundary marker fulfills the factor of effort here only if the act of shifting the marker, in and of itself, induces the owner to give up any efforts to reclaim the land, but that would make this category superfluous. A better explanation would be that this definition of taking applies to attempts to lay claim to Saṅgha land, for otherwise—if land can be stolen only when the owner abandons ownership—then Saṅgha land could not be stolen, because there is no one acting for the Saṅgha of the Four Directions who could renounce once and for all any efforts to reclaim the land.	移動界碑：一塊土地。《戒律入口》指出，這與前面關於如何「拿取」一塊土地的定義相矛盾，因為所有者甚至可能不知道界碑已被移動，即使他/她看到比丘移動，也不一定會放棄所有權。《複註》試圖解釋這種差異，認為只有當移動界碑的行為本身導致所有者放棄任何收回土地的努力時，移動界碑才滿足此處的努力因素，但這將使這個類別變得多餘。更好的解釋是，這種「拿取」的定義適用於試圖聲稱擁有僧伽土地所有權，否則——如果土地只有在所有者放棄所有權時才能被盜——那麼僧伽土地就不可能被盜，因為沒有人可以代表四方僧伽一勞永逸地放棄任何收回土地的努力。
Exchanging lottery tickets: See Swindling, below.	交換彩票(彩券)：請參閱下文的詐騙。
Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: See Smuggling, below.	帶應課稅物品通過海關區而不繳納關稅：請參閱下文的走私。
Of these various ways of taking, the Commentary devotes the most space to the first, “moving the object from its place.” Its discussion is at odds with the Canon on many points, most notably in striking out the separate categories for taking large objects from a container (removing it entirely from the mouth of a container) and boats (causing them to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water), and simply subsuming them under this category. Although it may have regarded these separate categories as arbitrary, it introduces many arbitrary distinctions and inconsistencies of its own. Apparently its distinctions come from the ancient commentaries, for even Buddhaghosa expresses despair at trying to commit them all to writing. Here we will stick with the Canon’s scheme for defining the act of taking, and focus on the parts of the Commentary’s discussion that accord with the Canon. As for those that deviate from the Canon, only important deviations will be noted.	在這些不同的「拿取」方式中，《義註》用了最多的篇幅來描述第一種，「將物品從原來的位置移動」。它的討論在許多方面與《聖典》不一致，最值得注意的是，刪除了從容器中拿取大型物體（將其完全從容器口取出）和船隻（導致它們向上游、下游或穿過水體移動毫髮寬度）的單獨類別，並單純地將它們歸入此類別。儘管它可能認為這些單獨的類別是隨意的，但它自己卻引入了許多隨意的區分和不一致。顯然，它的區分來自古代註釋，因為即使是佛音也對試圖將它們全部寫入文字表示絕望。這裡我們將堅持《聖典》定義「拿取」行為的方案，並著重在《義註》中符合《聖典》的部分。至於那些偏離《聖典》的內容，只會指出重要的偏差。
In general, the Commentary defines an object’s place in terms of the directions in which it can be moved: up, down (as when an object sitting on sand can be pushed down into the sand), left, right, forward (toward the person taking it), and away. With reference to the last five of these actions, the place of the object is defined in three-dimensional terms: the space it occupies. Thus to take an object in any of these directions, one must push or pull it entirely outside of the coordinates of the space it initially occupied. However, with reference to lifting the object up, the place is defined in two-dimensional terms: the area of contact between the object and its support, whether that support is another object or the ground. Thus to take an object by lifting it, one only need lift it a hairbreadth from its support.	總體來說，《義註》根據物體可以被移動的方向來定義物體的位置：上、下（如當坐在沙上的物體可以被推入沙子時）、左、右、前進（朝向拿取者），和遠離。關於這些動作中的最後五個，物體的位置是用三維術語定義的：它所佔據的空間。因此，要沿著這些方向中的任何一個方向拿取物體，必須將其完全推或拉到其最初佔據的空間座標之外。然而，關於舉起物體，該位置是用二維術語定義的：物體與其支撐物之間的接觸面積，無論該支撐物是另一個物體還是地面。因此，要舉起一個物體來拿取，只需將其從支撐物上舉起毫髮寬度即可。
For example, a television set on a shelf is taken either when it is slid left along the shelf to the point where its right side is just left of where the left side used to be, or slid right to the point where its left side is just right of where the right side used to be, or lifted a hairbreadth off the shelf.	例如，當架子上的電視機沿著架子向左滑動到其右側恰好位於原本左側的左邊時，或是向右滑動到其左側恰好位於原本右側的右邊時，或是從架子上抬起了毫髮寬度，就算被拿取。
Because objects in the air have no support, the Commentary defines their space in three-dimensional terms no matter which direction they are moved. For instance, if one catches a piece of cloth being blown by the wind, its place is the three-dimensional space it occupies at the moment one catches it. If one stops a flying peacock without touching it, its place is the three-dimensional space it occupies at the moment it stops to hover. In either case, the object is taken when displaced any direction outside the coordinates of that space. In the case of the cloth, this could be done simply by dropping it. In the case of the peacock, it could be done by waving one’s hands and getting it to fly in the desired direction. If the peacock happens to land on one’s arm, it is taken when one moves it to another part of one’s body or puts it down.	由於空氣中的物體沒有支撐，因此無論它們被向哪個方向移動，《義註》都以三維術語定義它們的空間。比如說，如果你抓住一塊被風吹動的布，它所在的位置就是一個人在抓住它的那一刻所佔據的三維空間。如果一個人停止一隻飛翔的孔雀而不觸碰它，那麼它所在的位置就是它停止盤旋那一刻所佔據的三維空間。在任何一種情況下，當物體被移位到在該空間的座標之外的任何方向時，就算被拿取。就布料而言，只需將其掉落就算完成拿取。就孔雀而言，只需揮動雙手，讓它朝著想要的方向飛去就算完成拿取。如果孔雀剛好落在一個人的手臂上，當一個人將它移到身體的另一個部位或將它放下時，就算被拿取。
For animals swimming in water, it would make sense to define place in the same terms as birds flying in the air, but the Commentary insists that the entire body of water in which they are kept constitutes their place.	對於在水中游泳的動物來說，用與在空中飛行的鳥類相同的術語來定義位置也說得通，但《義註》堅持認為它們所在的整個水體構成了它們的位置。
Objects on a living person—such as a bracelet on the person’s arm—have the person’s body as their place. Thus if, in trying to remove the bracelet, one pulls it up and down the arm, it is not yet taken. It is taken only when one removes it entirely from the hand. If one is stealing the person’s clothes, they are taken only when removed from his/her body. If the person, stripped of the clothes, is still holding onto them, they are taken only when pulled from his/her hand.	活人身上的物體（例如人手臂上的手鐲）以人的身體作為其位置。因此，如果在試圖取下手鐲時，將其在手臂上下拉動，則手鐲尚未被拿取。只有當一個人將手鐲完全從手中拿開時，才算被拿取。如果有人偷了某人的衣服，只有當衣服從他/她身上脫下來時才算被拿取。如果被剝去衣服的人仍然抓著衣服，只有從他/她的手中拉出衣服時，衣服才算被拿取。
For some objects, the Commentary defines place in terms that seem rather arbitrary. For instance, a robe on a line is taken when it is lifted a hairbreadth off the line, but for some reason if it is moved along the line it is not taken until it is ten or twelve fingerbreadths away from the area it originally occupied on the line. An object leaning against a wall has two places: the spot where it sits on the ground and the spot it touches on the wall. A vehicle’s place is defined two-dimensionally: the spots where its wheels touch the ground (perhaps this is defined on analogy with the feet of an animal). An object tied to a post has that connection as an extra part of its place. Thus a pot tied by a chain to a post is not taken until it is removed from the area it occupied under the general definition above and either the chain is cut or the post pulled up. Although there is a certain logic to each of these cases, the added distinctions seem unnecessary complications added to an already complicated issue. For simplicity’s sake there would seem every reason to stick with the general definition of place even in these special cases, although there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to prove or disprove the Commentary here.	對於某些物體，《義註》對位置的定義似乎相當隨意。例如，當一條線上的袈裟被提高離該線一毫髮寬度時，它就算被拿取，但由於某種原因，如果它沿著該線被移動，直到它距離它在該線上原來佔據的區域十或十二個手指寬度時，它才算被拿取。靠在牆上的物體有兩個位置：它位於地面上的位置和它接觸牆壁的位置。車輛的位置是二維定義的：車輪接觸地面的點（也許這是透過類比動物的腳來定義的）。綁在柱子上的物體將該連接作為其位置的額外部分。因此，用鏈條綁在柱子上的罐子不算被拿取，直到將其從根據上面一般定義的所佔據區域移開並且鏈條被切斷或柱子被拔起為止。儘管每種情況都有一定的邏輯，但增加的差異似乎為本已複雜的問題增添了不必要的複雜性。為了簡單起見，即使在這些特殊情況下，似乎也有充分的理由堅持位置的一般定義，儘管《經分別》中沒有任何內容可以證明或反駁這裡的《義註》。
However, as noted above, several of the Commentary’s definitions of place clearly contradict the Vibhaṅga. In some cases, the contradiction is simple, as when the Commentary insists that an animal kept in an enclosure—a cow in a pen, a peacock in a garden—is taken not when its feet are moved, but only when removed from the enclosure. In other cases, the contradiction is more complex, in that the Commentary tries to define taking as “moving the object from its place” in cases where the Vibhaṅga defines the act of taking in other terms. For example, with an object sitting in the bottom of a container, it says that the object is taken when lifted a hairbreadth from the bottom, there being no need to remove the object from the container before it is considered taken. In the case of a boat, the Commentary defines the place of the boat in modified three-dimensional terms: the entire space where the boat displaces water. To take it by pushing it down in the water, the top of the boat has to sink lower than the level where the keel originally was; to take it by lifting it up, one need only lift it a hairbreadth above the water, there being no need to lift the keel to a point higher than where the highest point of the boat was. However, because the Vibhaṅga does not define the taking of boats or objects in containers in terms of “moving the object from its place,” the Commentary’s analysis of these possibilities is beside the point.	然而，如上所述，《義註》中對位置的一些定義顯然與《經分別》相矛盾。在某些情況下，矛盾很簡單，例如當《義註》堅持認為飼養在圍起來的區域中的動物（圍欄中的牛，花園中的孔雀）不是在其腳移動時才被拿取，而是只有在從圍起來的區域中移出時才被拿取。在其他情況下，矛盾更為複雜，因為《義註》試圖將「拿取」定義為「將物品從原來的位置移動」，而《經分別》以其他術語定義「拿取」的行為。例如，如果一個物體位於容器的底部，它說該物體從底部抬起一毫髮寬度時就被拿取了，在該物體被視為拿取之前，不需要將其從容器中取出。就船隻的情況而言，《義註》以修改後的三維術語定義了船隻的位置：船排開水的整個空間。為了透過將其推入水中來拿取它，船的頂部必須下沉到低於船的龍骨原來所在的水平；為了透過舉起來拿取它，只需將其舉出水面一毫髮寬度即可，無需將龍骨舉得高於船之前的最高點。然而，由於《經分別》並沒有將拿取船隻或容器中的物體定義為「將物品從原來的位置移動」，因此《義註》對這些可能性的分析是不是重點，與主題無關。
Other special cases in the Vibhaṅga include the following:	《經分別》中的其他特殊情況包含如下：
a. Swindling: Objects are being distributed by lot to the Community, and a bhikkhu takes the portion rightfully going to another bhikkhu. The Vibhaṅga offers no further explanation, but the Commentary states that the taking can be accomplished in various ways. If, after the drawing of the tickets, X puts his ticket in the place of Y’s ticket before picking up Y’s, the taking is accomplished when he picks up Y’s. If he picks up Y’s before putting his own ticket in its place, the taking is accomplished when he lets go of his own. If both tickets don’t appear (they’ve been concealed?) and X gets Y to take X’s portion, the taking is accomplished when he then picks up Y’s portion. The underlying assumption in all this is that Y’s portion belongs to him as soon as he has drawn the ticket for it. The Commentary adds that this exchange counts as theft regardless of whether X’s portion is worth more than Y’s, less than Y’s, or the two portions are of equal value.	a. 詐騙：物品以抽籤的方式分發給僧團，一個比丘理應拿取的部份卻到了另一個比丘那裡。《經分別》沒有提供進一步的解釋，但《義註》指出，可以透過多種方式完成拿取。如果在抽籤後，X 在拿取 Y 的籤之前，將自己的籤放在 Y 的籤的位置上，則當他拿取 Y 的籤時，即完成拿取。如果他在將自己的籤放回原來的位置之前拿起 Y 的籤，那麼當他放開自己的籤時，就完成了拿取。如果兩張籤都沒有出現（它們被隱藏了？）並且 X 讓 Y 拿走了 X 的部分，那麼當他拿起 Y 的部分時，拿取就完成了。所有這一切的基本假設是，一旦 Y 抽出籤，Y 的部分就屬於 Y 了。《義註》補充說，無論 X 的部分價值高於 Y 的價值、低於 Y 的價值，還是兩部分價值相等，這種交換都算是竊盜。
The Commentary to Mv.I.62 adds that if a bhikkhu claims higher seniority than is actually his in order to obtain better donations, he should be treated under this rule when, through this ruse, he obtains donations that should have gone to another bhikkhu. However, this type of action would appear to fall under Deceit, discussed below.	《大品》.一.62的《義註》補充說，如果一個比丘為了獲得更好的布施而聲稱比他實際的戒臘更高，那麼當他通過這種詭計獲得了本應交給另一位比丘的布施時，他應該受到這條戒條的處置。然而，這種類型的行為似乎屬於欺詐行為，如下所述。
b. Smuggling: A bhikkhu carrying items subject to an import duty hides them as he goes through customs. The taking is accomplished when the item leaves the customs area. The Vibhaṅga calculates the value of the object here, for the purpose of determining the seriousness of the offense, by the duty owed on it, and not its actual selling price.	b. 走私：一名比丘攜帶需繳納進口關稅的物品，在通過海關時將其隱藏起來。當物品離開海關區域時，「拿取」即完成。為了確定犯戒的嚴重性，《經分別》在此計算物品的價值，是根據其所欠的關稅，而不是其實際售價。
The Vinīta-vatthu states that there is no penalty if the bhikkhu goes through customs not knowing that he has an item subject to import duties among his effects. The relevant cases show that this can mean one of two things: Either he knows that he has the item with him but not that it is subject to import duties; or he does not know that he has the item with him at all. The Commentary adds that if a bhikkhu informs the customs official that he has an item subject to import duties and yet the official decides not to collect the duty, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. It also states that if a bhikkhu goes through customs with a conditional intent—“If they ask to see my belongings, I’ll pay the fee, but if they wave me through I won’t”—then if the officials do wave him through without asking to see his belongings, he incurs no offense. At present, when people entering a country are asked to choose different passageways through a customs area, marked “Goods to declare” and “Nothing to declare,” a bhikkhu with goods to declare who enters the “Nothing to declare” passageway cannot take advantage of this allowance for conditional intent, as he has already indicated an unconditional intent through his choice of a passageway.	《Vinīta-vatthu》說，如果比丘在通關時不知道他的財物中含有需繳納進口關稅的物品，則不犯戒。相關案例表明，這可能意味著以下兩件事之一：要麼他知道他隨身攜帶該物品，但不知道該物品需要繳納進口關稅；或者他根本不知道他帶著該物品。《義註》補充說，如果比丘通知海關官員他有一件物品需要繳納進口關稅，但官員決定不徵收關稅，則比丘不犯戒。它還指出，如果比丘帶著有條件的意圖通過海關——「如果他們要求查看我的物品，我會支付費用，但如果他們揮手讓我通過，我不會」——那麼如果官員確實揮手讓他通過，沒有要求查看他的物品，他不犯戒。目前，當人們入境時被要求選擇不同的通道通過海關區域，標有「貨物需申報」和「無需申報」的通道，攜帶有貨物需申報的比丘進入「無需申報」通道時，不能利用有條件意圖的開緣，因為他已經透過選擇通道表明了無條件的意圖。
The Vibhaṅga states that if, to avoid paying an import duty at a frontier, one crosses the frontier in such a way as to evade the customs area (§), one incurs only a dukkaṭa. At present, the civil law judges this sort of behavior as more reprehensible than slipping an item through customs, but from the point of view of the Vinaya the lesser penalty still holds. The Commentary says that this allowance applies only in cases when one evades the customs area by a distance of more than two leḍḍupātas—approximately 36 meters. (A leḍḍupāta is a unit of measure that appears frequently in the Canon and is defined as the distance a man of average stature can throw a clod of dirt underarm.)	《經分別》說，如果為了避免在邊境繳納進口關稅，而以逃避關稅區（§）的方式跨越邊境，則只會犯《突吉羅》。目前，民法認為這種行為比偷渡物品更應受到譴責，但從戒律的角度來看，仍應受到較輕的懲罰。《義註》稱，這項開緣僅適用於逃避海關區域距離超過 2 個 leḍḍupāta（約 36 公尺）的情況。（ leḍḍupāta 是一種在《聖典》中經常出現的測量單位，被定義為中等身材的人將一塊泥土用低手丟擲而出的距離。）
The Vibhaṅga’s position here is important to understand, for it has implications concerning the extent to which the evasion of other government fees and taxes would fall under this rule. The underlying assumption here seems to be that a dutiable item carried into a customs area is impounded by the king (or government). The payment of the duty is thus an act of recovering full ownership of the item. An item carried across the frontier without entering the customs area would not count as impounded, even though the king would probably claim the right to impound or even confiscate it if his agents apprehended the smuggler. Translated into modern terms, this would indicate that the evasion of other taxes claimed by the government—such as inheritance taxes—would incur the full penalty here only if the item being taxed was impounded on government property, and one evaded the tax by taking the item out of impoundment without paying the required fee. Otherwise, the penalty for tax evasion would be a dukkaṭa.	理解《經分別》在此的立場很重要，因為它涉及到逃避其他政府費用和稅收在多大程度上屬於此戒條的範圍。這裡的基本假設似乎是，帶入海關區域的應稅物品被國王（或政府）扣押。因此，繳納關稅是恢復該物品的全部所有權的行為。未進入海關區域而跨越邊境的物品不會被視為被扣押，儘管如果國王的特工逮捕了走私者，國王可能會聲稱有權扣押甚至沒收該物品。用現代術語來說，這表明，逃避政府徵收的其他稅款（例如遺產稅），只有當徵稅物品被扣押在政府財產上，並且在未繳納規定費用的情況下將物品從扣押中取出來逃稅時，才會受到全額懲罰。否則，對逃稅的懲罰是《突吉羅》。
None of the texts discuss the question of contraband, i.e., articles that a customs official would confiscate outright rather than allow into a country after the payment of a fee. Apparently, such goods smuggled through a customs house would fall into this category, although—as even the payment of a fee would not legally get them through customs—their selling value would be the determining factor in calculating the seriousness of the offense.	這些文本都沒有討論違禁品問題，即海關官員在支付費用後會直接沒收而不是允許入境的物品。顯然，透過海關走私，即使支付費用也不能合法地通過海關的貨物屬於這一類，而它們的售價將成為計算犯戒嚴重性的決定性因素。
c. Malfeasance: The Vinīta-vatthu includes an unusual case in which a wealthy man with two heirs—a son and a nephew—tells Ven. Ajjuka, “When I am gone, show the place (where my treasure is buried) (§) to whichever of my heirs has the greater faith.” After the man’s death, Ven. Ajjuka sees that the nephew has the greater faith and so shows the place of the treasure to him. The nephew awards the Saṅgha with a large donation; the son accuses Ven. Ajjuka of having wrongfully deprived him of his rightful inheritance. On hearing this, Ven. Ānanda first accuses Ven. Ajjuka of a pārājika, but when the wealthy man’s wishes are revealed, Ven. Upāli convinces Ven. Ānanda that Ven. Ajjuka committed no offense.	c. 瀆職：《Vinīta-vatthu》包括一個不尋常的案例，其中一位有兩個繼承人（一個兒子和一個侄子）的富人告訴阿酬尊者，“當我離開後，請向我的繼承人中有較大信心者，展示那個地方（埋藏我的寶藏的地方）（§）。” 男子死後，阿酬尊者見侄子信心較大，便向他展示了寶藏所在。姪子給僧團一大筆布施；兒子指責阿酬尊者錯誤地剝奪了他的合法繼承權。聞言，阿難尊者首先指責阿酬尊者犯《波羅夷》，但當富人的願望被揭露時，優波離尊者說服了阿難尊者，阿酬尊者沒有犯戒。
None of the texts discuss the details of this case, which seems to have postdated the Buddha’s parinibbāna. The apparent assumption underlying the ruling is that when X dies, the inheritance he leaves to Y belongs to Y from the moment of X’s death. Otherwise, the items in question would be ownerless until apportioned out among the heirs, and thus would not fulfill the factor of object under this rule. Also, the taking in this case would be accomplished in line with the Vibhaṅga’s standard definition for taking with regard to the objects involved—and not necessarily when the cheated heir gives up trying to reclaim the inheritance—for in Ven. Ajjuka’s case Ven. Ānanda was ready to impose a pārājika even though the son had not abandoned his claim.	沒有任何文本討論這個案例的細節，這似乎是在佛陀般涅槃之後發生的。該裁決背後的明顯假設是，當 X 死亡時，他留給 Y 的遺產從 X 死亡那一刻起就屬於 Y。否則，相關物品在分配給繼承人之前將是無主的，因此不符合本戒條下的對象因素。此外，在這種情況下，「拿取」將按照《經分別》對所涉及對象的拿取標準定義來完成－而不一定是當被欺騙的繼承人放棄試圖收回遺產時－因為在阿酬尊者的案例中，儘管兒子並沒有放棄聲稱擁有，阿難尊者已經準備好施加《波羅夷》了。
d. Destruction of property: The Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs a dukkaṭa. Thus the simple destruction of property does not fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu intends to steal some grass belonging to the Community but ends up setting fire to it instead, thus incurring a dukkaṭa. The Commentary notes that this ruling applies only because the bhikkhu did not move the grass from its place. What this means is that if he had first taken the grass from its place and then destroyed it in any way, the factor of effort under this rule would have been fulfilled and—all other factors of a pārājika offense being present—he would have been guilty of the full offense.	d. 毀損財物：《經分別》說，如果比丘破壞、散落、焚燒或以其他方式使他人的財產無法使用，他犯《突吉羅》。因此，單純地破壞財產並不能滿足此戒條下的努力因素。《Vinīta-vatthu》中記載了一個案例，一名比丘打算偷一些屬於僧團的草，但結果卻放火燒了它，從而犯《突吉羅》。《義註》指出，這項裁決適用僅因比丘沒有將草移離原處的情況。這意味著，如果他首先將草從原處上拿走，然後以任何方式摧毀它，則此戒條下的努力因素將被滿足，並且－《波羅夷》違犯的所有其他因素都存在－他將完全違犯此戒。
Special cases cited in the Commentary include the following:	《義註》中引用的特殊案例包括：
a. False dealing: A bhikkhu makes counterfeit money or uses counterfeit weights. The taking is accomplished when the counterfeit is accepted. This case, however, would seem to fall under the category of Deceit (see below), in that the counterfeit is a form of a lie. If the owner of an object accepts the counterfeit and hands over an object in return, the object cannot be described as stolen. However, the object obtained in trade in this way would have to be forfeited under NP 20, and the Community, if it felt so inclined, could impose a disciplinary transaction on the offender (see BMC2, Chapter 20).	a. 虛假交易：比丘製造偽鈔或使用偽造砝碼。當偽造品被接受時，「拿取」就完成了。然而，本情況似乎屬於欺詐類別（見下文），因為偽造品是謊言的一種形式。如果物品的所有者接受了偽造品並交出物品作為回報，則該物品不能被描述為被偷竊。然而，根據《捨墮》二十，以這種方式透過交易獲得的物品必須被捨出，並且如果僧團願意的話，可以對違犯者實施治罪羯磨（參見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第二十章）。
b. Robbery: Using threats, a bhikkhu compels the owner of an object to give it to him. The taking is accomplished when the owner complies. This would not count as giving because the owner is not giving the item willingly.	b. 搶劫：比丘利用威脅，強迫物品的所有者將物品交給他。當所有者服從時，「拿取」即告完成。這不算是給予，因為物品的所有者並不是自願給予的。
c. Concealing: A bhikkhu finds an object left on the ground and, to deceive the owner, covers it with dirt or leaves with the intent of stealing it later. If the owner, after searching for the item, temporarily abandons the search and the bhikkhu then picks it up, it is stolen when removed from its base. If the owner, deciding that the item is lost, abandons it for good before the bhikkhu picks it up, the Commentary says that the bhikkhu is not guilty of theft but owes the owner compensation. We have discussed the topic of lost items above, under Object, and will discuss the topic of compensation below.	c. 隱藏：比丘發現地上有物品，為了欺騙所有者，用泥土或樹葉覆蓋它，意圖稍後偷走它。如果所有者在搜尋該物品後，暫時放棄搜尋，然後比丘撿起它，那麼當它從底座上移除時，它就算被偷走。如果所有者認定物品遺失，在比丘取走物品之前將其永久遺棄，《義註》說，比丘沒有犯偷竊戒，但應賠償所有者。我們已經在上面的「對象」章節下，討論了遺失物品的議題，並將在下面討論賠償的議題。

The value of the object	對象的價值
As stated above, any case of stealing counts as an offense, but the gravity of the offense is determined by the value of the object. This is the point of the phrase in the rule reading, “just as when there is the taking of what is not given, kings… would banish him, saying… ‘You are a thief.’” In other words, for a theft to entail a pārājika it must be a criminal case, which in the time of the Buddha meant that the goods involved were worth at least five māsakas, a unit of money used at the time. Goods valued collectively at more than one māsaka but less than five are grounds for a thullaccaya; goods valued collectively at one māsaka or less, grounds for a dukkaṭa. As the Commentary notes, the value of the articles is determined by the price they would have fetched at the time and place of the theft. As stated above, in the case of smuggling the Vibhaṅga measures the value of the object, for the purpose of this rule, as the duty owed on it, not the value of the object itself.	如上所述，任何偷竊行為都被視為犯戒，但犯戒的嚴重程度取決於對象物品的價值。這就是戒條中這句話的要點，「就像當有人拿取未給予的東西時，國王......會驅逐他，說......『你是一個小偷。』」換句話說，竊盜行為涉及《波羅夷》的，一定是刑事犯罪案件，在佛陀時代，這意味著所涉及的貨物至少價值 5 摩沙迦（當時使用的貨幣單位）。總價值超過 1 摩沙迦但低於 5 摩沙迦的商品，犯《偷蘭遮》；總價值為 1 摩沙迦或更低的商品，犯《突吉羅》。正如《義註》指出的那樣，物品的價值取決於它們在被偷的時間和地點的售價。如上所述，在走私的情況下，就本戒條而言，《經分別》是以對其所徵收的關稅作為物品的價值，而不是物品本身的價值。
This leaves us with the question of how a māsaka would translate into current monetary rates. No one can answer this question with any certainty, for the oldest attempt to peg the māsaka to the gold standard dates from the V/Sub-commentary, which sets one māsaka as equal to 4 rice grains’ weight of gold. At this rate, the theft of an item worth 20 rice grains’ (1/24 troy ounce) weight of gold or more would be a pārājika offense.	這給我們留下了一個問題：摩沙迦如何轉換為當前的貨幣利率。沒有人能夠肯定地回答這個問題，因為將摩沙迦與金本位掛鉤的最古老的嘗試可以追溯到V/《複註》，其中將 1 摩沙迦等於 4 粒米重的黃金。按照這個利率，偷竊價值 20 粒米（1/24 金衡盎司）黃金或更高將構成《波羅夷》罪。
One objection to this method of calculation is that some of the items mentioned in the Vinīta-vatthu as grounds for a pārājika when stolen—e.g., a pillow, a bundle of laundry, a raft, a handful of rice during a famine—would seem to be worth much less than 1/24 troy ounce of gold. However, we must remember that many items regarded as commonplace now may have been viewed as expensive luxuries at the time.	對這種計算方法的一個反對意見是，《Vinīta-vatthu》中提到的一些被偷時作為《波羅夷》依據的物品——例如，一個枕頭、一捆衣物、一艘木筏、飢荒期間的一把米——其價值似乎遠低於 1/24 金衡盎司黃金。然而，我們必須記住，許多現在被認為司空見慣的物品在當時可能被視為昂貴的奢侈品。
In addition, there is one very good reason for adopting the standard set by the V/Sub-commentary: It sets a high value for the least article whose theft would result in a pārājika. Thus when a bhikkhu steals an item worth 1/24 troy ounce of gold or more, there can be no doubt that he has committed the full offense. When the item is of lesser value, there will be inescapable doubt—and when there is any doubt concerning a pārājika, the tradition of the Vinaya consistently gives the bhikkhu the benefit of the doubt: He is not expelled. A basic principle operating throughout the texts is that it is better to risk letting an offender go unpunished than to risk punishing an innocent bhikkhu.	此外，採用V/《複註》設定的標準還有一個很好的理由：它為偷竊會導致《波羅夷》的最少物品設定了很高的價值。因此，當比丘偷竊價值 1/24 金衡盎司黃金或更高的物品時，毫無疑問他已經完全違犯此戒。當物品的價值較低時，就會不可避免地產生懷疑——當對《波羅夷》有任何疑問時，戒律的傳統始終給予比丘以懷疑的好處：他不會被驅逐。貫穿整個文本的一個基本原則是，冒著讓犯戒者不受懲罰的風險，比冒著懲罰無辜比丘的風險要好。
There is a second advantage to the V/Sub-commentary’s method of calculation: its precision and clarity. Some people have recommended adopting the standard expressed in the rule itself—that if the theft would result in flogging, imprisonment, or banishment by the authorities in that time and at that place, then the theft would constitute a pārājika—but this standard creates more problems than it would solve. In most countries the sentence is largely at the discretion of the judge or magistrate, and the factor of value is only one among many taken into account when determining the penalty. This opens a whole Pandora’s box of issues, many of which have nothing to do with the bhikkhu or the object he has taken—the judge’s mood, his social philosophy, his religious background, and so forth—issues that the Buddha never allowed to enter into the consideration of how to determine the penalty for a theft.	V/《複註》的計算方法還有第二個優點：精確、清晰。有些人建議採用戒條本身所表達的標準，即如果偷竊行為會導致當時該地點的當局鞭打、監禁或流放，那麼該偷竊行為就構成《波羅夷》，但這一標準產生的問題多於其解決的問題。在大多數國家，刑罰很大程度上由法官或治安官酌情決定，價值因素只是決定刑罰時考慮的眾多因素之一。這就打開了整個潘朵拉魔盒的問題，其中許多問題與比丘或他所拿取的對象物品無關——法官的情緒、他的社會哲學、他的宗教背景等等——佛陀從未允許在對竊盜罪的刑罰如何確定時考慮的問題。
Thus the V/Sub-commentary’s method of calculation has the benefits that it is a quick and easy method for determining the boundaries between the different levels of offense in any modern currency; it involves no factors extraneous to the tradition of the Vinaya, and—as noted above—it draws the line at a value above which there can be no doubt that the penalty is a pārājika.	因此，V/《複註》的計算方法的優點是，它是一種快速、簡單的方法，可以確定任何現代貨幣的不同犯戒程度之間的界限；它不涉及與戒律傳統無關的因素，而且——如上所述——它劃定了一個價值，高於這個價值，毫無疑問，懲罰就是《波羅夷》。
The Commentary, arguing from two cases in the Vinīta-vatthu, states that if a bhikkhu steals several items on different occasions, the values of the different items are added together to determine the severity of the offense only if they were stolen as part of a single plan or intention. If they are stolen as a result of separate intentions, each act of stealing is treated as a separate offense whose severity depends on the value of the individual item(s) stolen in that act. This point is best explained with examples:	《義註》根據《Vinīta-vatthu》中的兩個案例進行論證，指出如果比丘在不同場合偷竊了幾件物品，則只有當這些物品屬於單一計劃或意圖的一部分被偷竊時，才將不同物品的價值加在一起以確定犯戒的嚴重程度。如果它們是因不同意圖而被偷竊，則每次偷竊行為均被視為單獨的犯戒行為，其嚴重程度取決於該行為中被偷竊的個別物品的價值。這一點最好用例子來解釋：
In one of the Vinīta-vatthu cases, a bhikkhu steals ghee from a jar “little by little.” This, according to the Commentary, means that first he decides to steal a spoonful of ghee from a jar. After swallowing the spoonful, he decides to steal one more. After that he decides to steal another, and so on until he has finished the jar. Because each spoonful was stolen as a consequence of a separate plan or intention, he incurs several dukkaṭas, each for the theft of one spoonful of ghee.	在一個《Vinīta-vatthu》案件中，一位比丘「一點一點地」從罐子裡偷竊酥油。根據《義註》，這意味著他首先決定從罐子裡偷一匙酥油。吞下一匙後，他決定再偷一匙。之後他決定再偷一個，依此類推，直到他吃完這個罐子。由於每匙酥油都是因單獨的計劃或意圖而被偷竊，他犯了數次《突吉羅》，因偷竊每一匙酥油而犯一次《突吉羅》。
If, however, he decides at one point to steal enough lumber to build himself a hut and then steals a plank from here and a rafter from there, taking lumber over many days at different places from various owners, he commits one offense in accordance with the total value of all the lumber stolen, inasmuch as he took all the pieces of wood as a consequence of one prior plan.	然而，如果他在某一時刻決定偷足夠的木材來為自己建造一座小屋（孤邸），然後從這裡偷一塊木板，從那裡偷一根椽子，並在許多天內從不同的所有者那裡獲取木材，那麼他就根據所有被盜木材的總價值犯了戒，因為他根據先前的計劃拿走了所有木材。

Derived offenses	衍生違犯
In addition to the lesser offenses related to the value of the object, the Vibhaṅga also lists lesser offenses related to two factors of the full offense under this rule: effort and perception.	除了與物品的價值相關的較輕的犯戒之外，《經分別》還列出了與此戒條下的完全違犯的兩個因素相關的較輕的犯戒：努力和感知。
With regard to effort, the Vibhaṅga states that the derived offenses begin when one walks toward the object with the intent of stealing it, with each separate act—and in the case of walking toward the object, each step—incurring a dukkaṭa, up to a point just prior to the actual stealing where the offenses turn into thullaccayas. Where this point occurs depends on the act constituting the actual taking, as follows:	關於努力，《經分別》指出，當一個人帶著偷竊的意圖走向該物品時，衍生的犯戒就開始了，每一個單獨的行為——在走向該物品的情況下，每一步——都會犯一次《突吉羅》，直到在實際偷竊之前的那一時刻，犯戒行為變成了《偷蘭遮》。這一時刻的發生點取決於構成實際「拿取」的行為，如下：
Moving the object from its place: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Making the object budge without fully moving it from its place: a thullaccaya.	將物品從原來的位置移動：直到觸摸物品的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。使物品移動而不將其完全移離其位置：《偷蘭遮》。
“Cutting off” a fistful: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Making the object budge without fully cutting off a fistful: a thullaccaya.	「切掉」一把：直到觸摸物品的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。使物品移動而不完全切掉一把：《偷蘭遮》。
Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: all steps up through touching the pool or pile: dukkaṭas. Making the pool or pile budge without fully getting five māsakas worth separated from the pool or pile and inside the vessel: a thullaccaya.	將器皿插入一池液體或一堆物體中，並使一池液體或一堆物體中的一些進入器皿：直到接觸該池或該堆的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。使該池或該堆移動，而沒有完全將價值 5 摩沙迦從該池或該堆分離出來並進入器皿內：《偷蘭遮》。
Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Lifting the object: a thullaccaya. Bringing it up to the level of the mouth of the container: another thullaccaya.	完全從容器口中取出：直到接觸物品的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。舉起物品：《偷蘭遮》。將其提升到容器口的高度：另一個《偷蘭遮》。
Drinking liquid from a container: all steps up through drinking one māsaka worth of liquid as part of one prior plan (§): dukkaṭas. Drinking between one and five māsakas’ worth of liquid: a thullaccaya.	從容器中飲用液體：作為先前計劃的一部分，直到飲用價值 1 摩沙迦的液體的所有步驟 (§)：《突吉羅》。飲用價值 1 到 5 摩沙迦的液體：《偷蘭遮》。
Moving the object from one part of one’s body to another or dropping it: all steps up through touching the object with the intent to move it or drop it: dukkaṭas. Moving it but not to the point of putting it on another part of the body or dropping it: a thullaccaya.	將物體從身體的一個部分移動到另一個部分或將其掉落：意圖移動或放下物體，直到觸摸它的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。移動它，但還不到將其放在身體的其他部位或將其掉落：《偷蘭遮》。
Causing a boat to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: all steps up through loosening the moorings and/or touching it: dukkaṭas. Making the boat rock without causing it to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a thullaccaya.	讓船隻向上游、下游或穿過水體移動毫髮寬度：鬆開繫泊裝置和/或接觸它之前的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。使船搖晃而不使其向上游、下游或穿過水體移動毫髮寬度：《偷蘭遮》。
Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: all steps up through breaking the embankment and letting up to one māsaka’s worth of water flow out: dukkaṭas. Letting between one and five māsakas’ worth of water flow out: a thullaccaya.	破壞堤防使水流出：破壞堤防，讓價值 1 摩沙迦的水流出之前的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。讓價值 1 到 5 摩沙迦的水流出來：《偷蘭遮》。
Causing an animal to move all its feet: all steps up through touching the animal: dukkaṭas. Getting it to move any of its feet prior to its moving its last foot: a thullaccaya for each step.	使動物移動其所有的腳：直到接觸動物的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。讓它在移動最後一隻腳之前先移動任何一隻腳：每一步都是一次《偷蘭遮》。
Cutting down: all steps prior to the next to the last chop needed to cut the plant through: dukkaṭas. The next to the last chop: a thullaccaya.	砍伐：在最後一次劈砍之前將植物砍斷所需的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。緊接著最後一次劈砍：《偷蘭遮》。
Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of objects handed to one for safe keeping: all steps up through telling the owner, “I didn’t receive (§) it”: dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner’s mind as to whether he/she will get the object back: a thullaccaya. If the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.	導致所有者放棄重新擁有交給某人保管的物品的努力（§）：所有步驟直到告訴所有者“我沒有收到（§）它”：《突吉羅》。使所有者懷疑他/她是否會拿回物品：《偷蘭遮》。如果案件告上法庭而比丘敗訴，他就會再犯一次《偷蘭遮》。
Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of land: all steps up to laying claim to the land: dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner’s mind as to whether he/she will lose the land: a thullaccaya. Again, if the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.	導致所有者放棄重新擁有土地的努力（§）：直到聲稱土地所有權的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。使所有者懷疑他/她是否會失去土地：《偷蘭遮》。再者，如果案件告上法庭而比丘敗訴，他就會再犯一次《偷蘭遮》。
Shifting a boundary marker: all steps up through removing the boundary marker from its original place: dukkaṭas. Any steps between that and putting the boundary marker in a new place: thullaccayas.	移動界碑：直到將界碑從其原始位置移走的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。在移走和將界碑放置在新位置之間的任何步驟：《偷蘭遮》。
Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: all steps up through touching the object with the intent of taking it out of the customs area: dukkaṭas. Making the object move without fully moving it from the customs area: a thullaccaya.	帶應課稅物品通過海關區而不繳納關稅：直到觸摸該物品以將其帶出海關區的所有步驟：《突吉羅》。使物品移動而不將其完全移出海關區域：《偷蘭遮》。
The commentaries state that when a heavier penalty is incurred in offenses of this sort, only that penalty is counted, and the preceding lighter ones are nullified. They derive this principle from a passage in the Vibhaṅga to Sg 10-13 and, using the Great Standards, apply it to all the rules. Thus, for example, if a bhikkhu trying to steal a book simply touches it, he incurs a string of dukkaṭas for each step in walking up to the book and taking hold of it. If he budges the book slightly but not so much as to move it completely from its place, the dukkaṭas are nullified and replaced with a thullaccaya. If he actually takes the book, that nullifies the thullaccaya and replaces it with a pārājika.	註釋指出，此類犯戒僅計算受到的較重懲罰，之前較輕的懲罰無效。他們從《僧殘》十到十三的《經分別》中的一段經文中得出這一原則，並使用《四大教示》，將其應用於所有戒條。因此，舉例來說，如果一個比丘試圖偷一本書，僅僅只是觸碰它，那麼他走到這本書並抓住它的每一步，犯一連串《突吉羅》。如果他稍微移動這本書，但又沒有完全移動它的位置，那麼《突吉羅》就會失效，並被《偷蘭遮》取代。如果他真的拿走了這本書，那麼《偷蘭遮》就會失效，並以《波羅夷》取而代之。
There is some question, though, as to whether the compilers of the Canon intended the passage under Sg 10-13 to be taken as a general principle. They don’t mention it under any of the other saṅghādisesa rules or in the otherwise parallel passage in the Vibhaṅga to Pc 68. Thus, the principle seems intended only for those four rules. To be on the strict side, it seems best to say that, unless otherwise noted, a bhikkhu who completes an act must make amends for all the offenses incurred in leading up to it. Under the pārājika rules this is a moot point, for once the pārājika is committed the offender is no longer a bhikkhu. But under the lesser rules this principle is still relevant.	然而，關於《聖典》的編撰者是否打算將《僧殘》十到十三中的段落視為一般原則，存在一些疑問。他們沒有在任何其他《僧殘》戒條下或在《波逸提》六八的《經分別》其他類似的段落中提及它。因此，該原則似乎僅適用於這四個戒條。從嚴格的角度來看，最好的說法是，除非另有說明，完成某一行為的比丘必須彌補在該行為之前所造成的所有罪過。根據《波羅夷》戒條，這是一個有爭議的問題，因為一旦犯了《波羅夷》，犯戒者就不再是比丘了。但在較小的戒條下，這項原則仍然適用。
As for the derived offenses related to the factor of perception, these deal with the situation in which an article does not qualify as not given under this rule—e.g., it has no owner, or the owner has given it up or thrown it away—and yet the bhikkhu perceives it as not given. If he takes it with intent to steal, he incurs a dukkaṭa for each of the three stages of effort. In the case of an object that can be stolen by moving it from its place, these would be: touching the object, making it budge, moving it from its place. A similar set of offenses would apply in the stages appropriate for taking any of the other types of objects listed above.	至於與感知因素有關的衍生違犯，這些涉及的是不符合本戒條規定的物品的情況，例如，該物品沒有所有者，或者所有者已將其放棄或扔掉——然而比丘認為它沒有被給予。如果他出於偷竊的目的而取走它，他會因三個階段中每一階段的努力而犯一次《突吉羅》。如果物品可以透過將其從原來的位置移開而被偷，則這些階段將是：觸摸該物體，使其移動，將其移離原來的位置。類似的犯戒行為將適用於拿取上述任何其他類型物品的適當階段。

Accomplices	共犯
A bhikkhu can commit an offense not only if he himself steals an object, but also if he incites another to steal. The offenses involved in the acts leading up to the theft are as follows:	比丘不僅自己偷竊物品，而且煽動他人偷竊，都可能犯戒。導致偷竊的行為所涉及的犯戒行為如下：
If a bhikkhu tells an accomplice to take an object that would be grounds for a pārājika, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the accomplice agrees to do so, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once the accomplice succeeds in taking the object as instructed—regardless of whether he gets away with it, and of whether he shares it with the instigator—the instigator incurs a pārājika. If the accomplice is a bhikkhu, he too incurs a pārājika. If the object would be grounds for a thullaccaya or a dukkaṭa, the only penalties incurred prior to the actual theft would be dukkaṭas.	如果比丘告訴共犯拿走一件可以當《波羅夷》根據的物體，他就會犯《突吉羅》。當共犯同意這樣做時，教唆者就會犯《偷蘭遮》。一旦共犯按照指示成功拿取了物品——無論他是否逃脫懲罰，也無論他是否與教唆者分享該物品——教唆者都會犯《波羅夷》。如果共犯是比丘，他也會犯《波羅夷》。如果該物品是《偷蘭遮》或《突吉羅》的根據，則在實際偷竊之前發生的唯一懲罰將是《突吉羅》。
The Commentary insists that if the accomplice is sure to take the item, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika as soon as the accomplice agrees to take it. However, as the Vinaya-mukha notes, this contradicts the Canon, and there is no way to measure whether a proposed theft is a sure thing or not.	《義註》堅持認為，如果共犯肯定會拿走該物品，那麼一旦共犯同意拿走該物品，比丘就會犯《波羅夷》。然而，正如《戒律入口》所指出的，這與《聖典》互相矛盾，並且無法衡量提議的偷竊是否是肯定的事情。
If there is any confusion in carrying out the instructions—e.g., if the accomplice, instead of taking the object specified by the instigator, takes something else instead; or if he is told to take it in the afternoon but instead takes it in the morning—the instigator incurs only the penalties for proposing the theft and persuading the accomplice, and not the penalty for the theft itself. The same holds true if the instigator rescinds his order before the theft takes place, but the accomplice goes ahead and takes the object anyway.	如果在執行指示時出現任何混亂，例如，如果共犯沒有拿走教唆者指定的物品，而是拿走了其他東西；或者如果他被告知在下午取走，而在早上取走，則教唆者僅因提出偷竊行為並說服共犯而受到懲罰，而不會因偷竊本身而受到懲罰。如果教唆者在偷竊發生前撤銷命令，但共犯卻繼續拿走物品，情況也是如此。
According to the Vibhaṅga, an instigator who wishes to call off the theft before it is carried out but who for one reason or another cannot get his message to the accomplice in time, incurs the full penalty for the completed theft.	根據《經分別》，如果教唆者希望在偷竊行為實施之前取消偷竊行為，但由於某種原因無法及時向共犯傳達訊息，則將因已完成的偷竊行為而受到全額懲罰。
The Commentary also adds that the factor of the thief’s perception does not affect the penalties. In other words, if Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to steal object X, and B takes Y, thinking it to be X, A is absolved of any responsibility for the theft. Conversely, if B takes X, thinking it to be Y, A is guilty of the theft.	《義註》還補充說，偷竊者的感知因素並不影響懲罰。換句話說，如果比丘 A 告訴比丘 B 偷東西 X，而 B 認為 Y 是 X，就拿走了 Y，那麼 A 就免除了偷竊的任何責任。相反，如果 B 拿走了 X，並認為它是 Y，則 A 犯有偷竊罪。
The Vibhaṅga also notes that if an instigator tells his accomplice to take an item when he (the instigator) makes a sign—such as winking (§) his eye, lifting his eyebrow, or lifting his head—he incurs a dukkaṭa in making this order, a thullaccaya if the accomplice agrees to do as told, and the full offense when the accomplice actually takes the item at the time of the sign. If the accomplice takes the item before or after the sign, though, the instigator incurs no offense. The Sub-commentary, noting that the signs mentioned in the Vibhaṅga are so fleeting that it would be impossible to take the item at the very moment of the sign, interprets this last statement as follows: If the accomplice starts trying to take the item right after the sign, then regardless of how much time that takes, it counts as “at the time of the sign.” Only if he makes an appreciable delay before attempting the theft does it count as “after the sign.”	《經分別》還指出，如果教唆者告訴他的共犯在他（教唆者）做出示意動作時拿走一件物品——例如眨眼（§）、揚起眉毛或抬起頭——他會在做這個命令動作時犯《突吉羅》，如果共犯同意按照指示行事，則為《偷蘭遮》；如果共犯在示意動作時實際拿走了該物品，則構成完全犯戒。不過，如果共犯在示意動作之前或之後拿走物品，教唆者不犯戒。《複註》指出，《經分別》中提到的示意動作是如此短暫，以至於不可能在示意動作出現的那一刻拿走該物品，因此對最後的陳述解釋如下：如果共犯在示意動作之後開始試圖拿走該物品，無論花費多少時間，都算是「示意動作時」。只有當他在嘗試偷竊之前明顯延遲時，才算作「在示意動作之後」。
We can extrapolate from this discussion and say that any physical gesture that, from the context of events, is intended and understood as an order to take an item, would count under the factor of effort here. This extrapolation will be useful when treating the unauthorized use of credit cards, below.	我們可以從這個討論中推斷出，從事件的背景來看，任何意圖被理解為拿取某件物品的命令的肢體動作，都將算在此處的努力因素中。在處理下面未經授權的信用卡使用時，這種推論將很有用。
The Vibhaṅga states that if there is a chain of command involving two or more bhikkhus (not counting the instigator)—for example, Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B to tell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D to commit the theft—then when D agrees to commit the theft, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once D takes the object as instructed, all four incur the penalty coming from the theft. If there is any confusion in the chain of command—e.g., Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D directly—neither A nor C incurs the penalty for the theft itself. Bhikkhu A would incur a dukkaṭa for telling B, whereas C would incur no penalty at all.	《經分別》指出，如果存在涉及兩個或更多比丘（不包括教唆者）的指揮鏈——例如，比丘 A 告訴比丘 B 告訴比丘 C 告訴比丘 D 實施偷竊——那麼當 D 同意實施偷竊時，教唆者犯《偷蘭遮》。一旦 D 依照指示取走物品，四人都會因偷竊而受到懲罰。如果指揮鏈中存在任何混亂，例如，比丘 B 沒有告訴 C，而是直接告訴 D，那麼 A 和 C 都不會因為偷竊本身而受到懲罰。比丘 A 會因告訴 B 而犯《突吉羅》，而 C 則不會受到任何懲罰。
The Commentary notes that the instigator in any of these cases incurs the penalty only if he gives an explicit command to take the item (although this statement has to be qualified to include signs meant as commands, as mentioned above). If he simply tells his accomplice that such-and-such an item is located in such-and-such a place and would be easy to steal, he incurs no penalty even if the accomplice actually commits the theft. This point applies to many of the rules in which giving a command to do an action that would break the rule would also fulfill the factor of effort: A statement counts as a command only if it is a clear imperative to do the action. Under the few rules where this is not the case, we will note the exception.	《義註》指出，在任何這些情況下，教唆者只有在明確命令拿走該物品時才會受到懲罰（儘管此陳述也包括意味著命令的示意動作，如上所述）。如果他只是告訴共犯，某某物品位於某某地方，很容易偷竊，即使共犯確實實施了偷竊行為，他也不會受到懲罰。這一點適用於許多戒條，在這些戒條中，發出命令執行違反戒條的行動也將滿足努力因素：只有當明確要求執行某項行動時，該語句才算是命令。在情況並非如此的少數戒條，我們將註明例外情況。
None of the texts mention the scenario in which Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to take an item for him without letting B know that he is committing a theft—for instance, telling B that the item belongs to him (A), that it is ownerless, or letting B come to either conclusion on his own. Nevertheless, it would appear that if B then actually takes the item as told, all of the factors for an offense would be fulfilled for A: He gives the command to take (the imperative the Vibhaṅga uses in illustrating commands to “steal”—avahara—can also simply mean to “take”), he knows that the item belongs to someone else, he intends to have it taken, and it is taken as a result of his command. As for B, he would not be committing an offense, as his state of mind would not fulfill the factors of perception and intention for a theft.	沒有任何文本提到這樣的場景：比丘 A 告訴比丘 B 為他拿走一件物品，但不讓 B 知道他正在偷竊，例如，告訴 B 該物品屬於他（A），或它是無主的，或者讓 B 自己得出兩者中任一結論。然而，看起來如果 B 實際上按照所告知的那樣拿走了該物品，那麼 A 就滿足了所有犯戒因素：他發出了拿走的命令（《經分別》在解釋「偷竊」命令時使用的祈使語氣—— avahara ——也可以只表示「拿走」），他知道該物品屬於其他人，他打算拿走它，並且由於他的命令而被拿走。至於 B，他不犯戒，因為他的心理狀態不符合偷竊的感知和意圖因素。
Cases of this sort would not fall under Deceit, discussed below, because that category covers only cases where one deceives the owner of the item, or his agent, into giving the item, and thus technically the item counts as given. Here the item is not given, for the person deceived into taking it is not responsible for it at all.	此類案件不屬於下面討論的欺詐行為，因為該類別僅涵蓋欺騙物品所有者或其代理人給予物品的情況，因此從技術上講，該物品算作已經給予了。這裡該物品並沒有被給予，因為被欺騙拿走該物品的人根本不為此負責。
As with the extrapolation from the discussion of signs, this application of the Great Standards will also be useful when we discuss unauthorized use of credit cards, below. It will also prove useful in our discussion of the following rule.	與從示意動作的討論中推斷一樣，當我們在下面討論未經授權使用信用卡時，《四大教示》的應用也將很有用。它在我們接下來的戒條討論中也證明是有用的。

Shared responsibility

共同責任

If bhikkhus go in a group to commit a theft but only one of them does the actual taking, all still incur the penalty coming from the theft. Similarly, if they steal valuables worth collectively more than five māsakas but which when divided among them yield shares worth less than five māsakas each, all incur a pārājika. According to the Commentary, any bhikkhus who assist a bhikkhu in a fraudulent case also incur the same offense he does: a pārājika if he wins, a thullaccaya if he loses. This judgment, however, must be qualified by noting that the assistant incurs these penalties only if he perceives the case to be fraudulent.

如果比丘們結伴偷竊，但只有一個人實際偷竊，則所有人仍會受到偷竊的懲罰。同樣，如果他們偷竊的物品的總價值超過 5 摩沙迦，但在分配時所獲得的份額每人價值低於 5 摩沙迦，則所有人都犯《波羅夷》。根據《義註》，任何在詐欺案件中協助比丘的比丘也會招致與他所犯的同樣的罪行：如果他贏了，則為《波羅夷》，如果他輸了，則為《偷蘭遮》。然而，這項判斷必須受到限制，因為協助者只有在察覺到案件具有欺詐性時才會受到這些懲罰。

Special cases	特別案例
As mentioned above, the notion of stealing covers a wide range of actions. To delineate this range, the texts discuss a variety of actions that border on stealing, some of them coming under this rule, some of them not.	如上所述，偷竊的概念涵蓋了廣泛的行為。為了界定這個範圍，文本討論了各種接近偷竊的行為，其中一些屬於這一戒條，有些則不屬於這一戒條。
Belongings of the Saṅgha. According to the Commentary to NP 30, an item belongs to the Saṅgha when donors, intending for it to be Saṅgha property, offer it to one or more bhikkhus representing the Saṅgha, and those bhikkhus receive it, although not necessarily into their hands. Saṅgha property thus counts as “what is not given” as far as individual bhikkhus are concerned, for it has an owner—the Saṅgha of all times and places—and is guarded by the individual Community of bhikkhus.	僧伽的財物。根據《捨墮》三十的《義註》，當施主打算將某件物品作為僧團財產，將其供養給代表僧團的一名或多名比丘時，該物品就屬於僧團，而那些比丘收到它，儘管不一定在他們手中。因此，就比丘個人而言，僧伽財產被視為「未給予的東西」，因為它有一個所有者—一切時間和地點的僧伽—並由個別比丘僧體守護。
The Canon divides Saṅgha property into two sorts: light/inexpensive (lahu-bhaṇḍa) and heavy/expensive (garu-bhaṇḍa). Light property includes such things as robes, bowls, medicine, and food; heavy property, such things as monastery land, buildings, and furnishings (see BMC2, Chapter 7). The Buddha gave permission for individual Communities to appoint officials to be responsible for the proper use of Saṅgha property. The officials responsible for light property are to distribute it among the members of the Community, following set procedures to ensure that the distribution is fair (see BMC2, Chapter 18). Once an individual member has received such property, he may regard it as his own and use it as he sees fit.	《聖典》將僧伽財產分為兩類：輕的/便宜的（lahu-bhaṇḍa）和重的/昂貴的（garu-bhaṇḍa）。輕財產包括袈裟、缽、藥、食等；重財產，例如寺院土地、建築物和傢俱等（參見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第七章）。佛陀允許各僧團任命執事負責僧伽財產的適當使用。負責輕財產的執事應按照既定程序將其分配給僧團成員，以確保分配公平（請參閱《佛教修道準則第二冊》第十八章）。個別成員收到該財產後，可以將其視為自己的財產並按照自己的意願使用。
In the case of heavy property, though, the officials are responsible for seeing that it is allotted for proper use in the Community, but the individual bhikkhus allowed to use it may not regard it as their own personal property. This is an important point. At most, such items may be taken on loan or exchanged—with the approval of the Community—for other heavy property of equal value. A bhikkhu who gives such items away to anyone—ordained or not—perceiving it as his to give, incurs a thullaccaya no matter what the value of the object (Cv.VI.15.2—see BMC2, Chapter 7). Of course, if he knows that it is not his to give or take, then in appropriating it as his own he incurs the penalty for stealing.	然而，就重財產而言，執事有責任確保其在僧團內分配得當，但被允許使用的比丘個人不可將其視為自己的個人財產。這是很重要的一點。最多，這些物品可以借出，或在僧團的批准下交換為其他同等價值的重財產。比丘將這些物品給予任何人—出家與否—認為這是他的而給予，無論該物品的價值如何，犯《偷蘭遮》（《小品》.六.15.2—見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第七章）。當然，如果他知道給予或拿取的東西不是他的，那麼在將其據為己有時，他就會受到偷竊的懲罰。
The Buddha was highly critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy property of the Saṅgha. In the origin story to Pr 4, he cites the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to find favor with a lay person, gives that person some of the Saṅgha’s heavy property. Such a bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the world.	佛陀嚴厲批評任何給予僧伽重財產的比丘。在《波羅夷》四的起源故事中，他引用了一位比丘的例子，該比丘希望得到在家人的青睞，並給予該在家人一些僧伽的重財產。他說，這樣的比丘是世間五大盜賊之一。
However, the Vinīta-vatthu includes a case where bhikkhus visiting a monastery arrange for a lay person to pick and give them some of the fruit growing in the monastery. The Buddha, in judging the case, states that they committed no offense as they were taking the fruit just for their own consumption. This implies that if they were to take the fruit for other purposes—to have it sold, for instance—they would be guilty of an offense. The Commentary adds that visiting bhikkhus have this right only if the resident bhikkhus are not caring for the fruit trees, if the trees had not been donated to provide funds for a particular purpose in the monastery, or if the resident bhikkhus eat from the trees as if they alone were the owners and are not willing to share. In other words, the visiting bhikkhus, as a matter of courtesy, should ask the residents first. If the residents share, one may take what they offer. If they don’t, and the trees are not dedicated to another purpose, one may take just enough for one’s own consumption. The Commentary also adds that if the monastery is vacant, one may go ahead and take the fruit, for it is meant for all bhikkhus who come.	然而，《Vinīta-vatthu》中提到了一個例子，比丘們參觀寺院時，會安排一位居士採摘寺院裡生長的一些水果，送給他們。佛陀在審判此案時指出，他們並沒有犯任何戒，因為他們只是為了自己食用而摘取水果。這意味著，如果他們將這些水果用於其他目的（例如出售），他們就會犯戒。《義註》補充說，只有當常住比丘不照管果樹、或者當這些果樹沒有被布施來為寺院的特定目的提供資金、或者當常住比丘以果樹為食，就好像他們是唯一的所有者並且不願意分享，來訪的比丘才享有這項權利。換句話說，來訪的比丘，出於禮貌，應該先詢問居住者。如果居住者願意分享，可以接受他們提供的東西。如果他們不分享，而這些樹也沒有專門用於其他目的，那麼可拿走只足夠自己食用的東西。《義註》還補充說，如果寺院空著，可以直接去拿水果，因為它是為所有前來的比丘準備的。
The Vinīta-vatthu also notes that a bhikkhu who takes heavy property of the Saṅgha donated for use in a particular monastery and uses it elsewhere incurs a dukkaṭa. If he takes it on loan, he commits no offense.	《Vinīta-vatthu》也指出，比丘將被布施於特定寺院使用的僧伽重財產用於其他地方，犯《突吉羅》。如果他借用它，他並沒有犯戒。
Deceit. If a bhikkhu uses a deliberate lie to deceive another person into giving an item to him, the transgression is treated not as a case of stealing—because, after all, the item is given to him—but rather as a case of lying. If the lie involves making false claims to superior meditative attainments, it is treated under Pr 4. If not, it is treated under Pc 1. The Vinīta-vatthu gives seven examples: five cases where, during a distribution of requisites in the Community, a bhikkhu asks for and is given an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu; and two where a bhikkhunī approaches her teacher’s lay supporter and asks for medicines, saying that they will be for her teacher, although she actually ends up using them herself. In all of these cases, the penalty is a pācittiya for lying under Pc 1.	欺詐。如果比丘故意撒謊，欺騙他人給他某樣東西，那麼這種犯戒行為就不會被視為偷竊—因為畢竟該物品是被給予他的—而是被視為撒謊。如果謊言涉及虛假聲稱具有卓越的修行成就，則根據《波羅夷》四進行處理。如果不是，則根據《波逸提》一進行處理。《Vinīta-vatthu》給出了七個案例：五個案例中，在僧團中分發必需品期間，比丘為不存在的比丘索取額外的一份，並得到了額外的一份；另兩個案例，一位比丘尼接近她老師的在家供養者並索取藥物，並說這些藥物是給她老師的，儘管最終她自己使用了這些藥物。在所有這些案例下，根據《波逸提》一，說謊的懲罰是《波逸提》。
The Commentary, in its discussion of the bhikkhus taking an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu, insists that the penalty for lying applies only to cases where donors have already given the requisites to the Community. If, prior to their giving the requisites to the Community, a bhikkhu asks them directly for a portion for a non-existent bhikkhu, the Commentary says that he has committed a theft under this rule. This, however, contradicts the ruling in the two cases involving the bhikkhunī, who asks directly from the donor. Thus it would appear that in any case where a bhikkhu obtains an article from a donor through deceit, the penalty would be the pācittiya for lying.	《義註》在討論比丘為一個不存在的比丘收取額外的份額時，堅持認為撒謊的懲罰只適用於布施者已經向僧團給予必需品的情況。如果在向僧團給予必需品之前，一位比丘直接向他們索取一位不存在的比丘的份額，《義註》說根據這條戒條，他犯了偷竊。然而，這與涉及直接向施主索取的比丘尼的兩起案例的裁決相矛盾。因此，在任何情況下看來，當比丘透過欺詐手段從施主那裡獲得物品時，懲罰是因說謊的《波逸提》。
The question arises, what about a bhikkhu who, given an item to take to someone else, originally plans to take it to the intended recipient but later changes his mind? It does not seem right to impose a heavier penalty on him than on a person who uses deceit to get the item to begin with, so it seems best to impose on him the dukkaṭa for a broken promise (Mv.III.14.1-14—see the discussion under Pc 1). For the principles surrounding the courier’s right to take an item on trust in the donor or the recipient, see the discussion of trust under the non-offense clauses.	那麼問題來了，一位比丘，被給予一件物品要拿給別人，原本打算把它拿給指定的接受者，但後來又改變了主意，該怎麼處置？對他施加比對一開始就使用欺詐手段獲得物品的人更重的懲罰似乎是不正確的，因此似乎最好對他施加《突吉羅》來懲罰他的失信（《大品》.三.14.1-14—請參閱《波逸提》一下的討論）。有關遞送者基於施主或接受者的信任而收取物品的權利的原則，請參閱不犯條款下對信任的討論。
Receiving stolen goods. Accepting a gift of goods or purchasing them very cheaply, knowing that they were stolen, would in Western criminal law result in a penalty similar to stealing itself. However, neither the Canon nor the commentaries mention this case. The closest they come is in the Vinīta-vatthu, where a groundskeeper gives bhikkhus fruit from the orchard under his care, even though it was not his to give, and there was no offense for the bhikkhus. From this it can be inferred that there is no offense for receiving stolen goods, even knowingly, although a bhikkhu who does so would not be exempt from the civil law and the consequent proceedings, in the course of which the Community would probably urge him to disrobe.	收受贓物。在西方刑法中，接受商品禮物或以非常便宜的價格購買商品，而且明知這些商品是被偷的，將導致與偷竊本身類似的懲罰。然而，《聖典》和註釋均未提及此種情況。最接近的地方是在《Vinīta-vatthu》，園丁從他照管的果園裡給予比丘們水果，儘管這不是他的，卻仍給予比丘們，而比丘們並沒有犯戒。由此可以推斷，收受贓物並不構成犯戒，即使在知情的情況下，儘管這樣做的比丘不能免於民法和隨後的訴訟，在此過程中，僧團可能會敦促他還俗。
Compensation owed. The Commentary introduces the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, or compensation owed, to cover cases where a bhikkhu is responsible for the loss or destruction of another person’s property. It defines this concept by saying that the bhikkhu must pay the price of the object to the owner or give the owner another object of equal value to the one lost or destroyed; if the bhikkhu does not give compensation, and the owner gives up his/her efforts to receive compensation, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika. The Commentary applies this concept not only to cases where the bhikkhu knowingly and intentionally destroys the object, but also to cases where he borrows or agrees to look after something that then gets lost, stolen, or destroyed through his negligence; or where he takes an item mistakenly thinking that it was discarded or that he was in a position to take it on trust.	所欠賠償。《義註》引入了 bhaṇḍadeyya （所欠賠償）的概念，以涵蓋比丘對他人財產的損失或毀壞負責的情況。它定義了這個概念，說比丘必須向所有者支付該物品的價格，或向所有者提供與丟失或毀壞的物品價值相同的另一件物品；如果比丘不給予補償，並且所有者放棄了獲得補償的努力，那麼比丘就會犯《波羅夷》。《義註》不僅將這個概念應用於比丘明知而故意毀壞物品的情況，也適用於他借用或同意看管某物，但由於他的疏忽而丟失、被盜或毀壞的情況；或者他拿走一件物品時，誤認為該物品已被丟棄，或他可以基於信任拿走該物品。
To cite a few examples: A bhikkhu breaks another person’s jar of oil or places excrement in the oil to spoil it. A bhikkhu charged with guarding the Community storeroom lets a group of other bhikkhus into the storeroom to fetch belongings they have left there; they forget to close the door and, before he remembers to check it, thieves slip in to steal things. A group of thieves steal a bundle of mangoes but, being chased by the owners, drop it and run; a bhikkhu sees the mangoes, thinks that they have been thrown away, and so eats them after getting someone to present them to him. A bhikkhu sees a wild boar caught in a trap and, out of compassion, sets it free but cannot reconcile the owner of the trap to what he has done. In each of these cases, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu in question owes compensation to the owner of the goods. (In the case of the mangoes, he must compensate not only the owners but also the thieves if it turns out that they had planned to come back and fetch the fruit.) If he abandons his responsibility to the owner(s), he incurs a pārājika.	舉幾個例子：一位比丘打碎了別人的油罐，或是把排泄物放入油中，毀掉了油。一位負責看守僧團儲藏室的比丘讓一群其他比丘進入儲藏室取回他們留在那裡的所有物；他們忘記關門，在他記得檢查之前，小偷就溜進來偷東西了。一群小偷偷了一捆芒果，但被所有者追趕，丟下逃跑；一位比丘看到芒果，以為它們已被丟掉，於是請人將芒果手授給他後吃掉它們。一位比丘看到一頭野豬被困在陷阱中，出於慈悲，將其釋放，但無法讓陷阱的主人接受他的所作所為。《義註》說，在上述每一種情況下，相關比丘都欠貨物所有者賠償。（就芒果而言，他不僅必須賠償所有者，而且如果發現竊賊計劃回來取芒果，他也必須賠償竊賊。）如果他放棄對所有者（們）的責任，他就會犯《波羅夷》。
In making these judgments, the Commentary is probably following the civil law of its day, for the Canon contains no reference at all to the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, and some of its judgments contradict the Commentary’s. As we noted above, the Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the Vinīta-vatthu discusses cases where a bhikkhu takes an item on mistaken assumptions, or where he feels compassion for an animal caught in a trap and so sets it free, it says that there is no offense. Thus it seems strange for the Commentary to assign a pārājika to an action that, according to the Canon, carries a dukkaṭa or no penalty at all. Of course, it would be a generous policy to offer the owner reasonable compensation, but it is by no means certain that a bhikkhu would have the wherewithal or liberty to do so. Because the Canon does not allow a bhikkhu to ask his supporters for donations to pay to another lay person—except for his parents (Mv.VIII.22; see BMC2, Chapter 10)—there is no way a bhikkhu could raise the needed funds. The Canon places only one responsibility on a bhikkhu who causes material loss to a lay person: The Community, if it sees fit, can force him to apologize to the owner (Cv.I.20; see BMC2, Chapter 20). Beyond that, the Canon does not require that he make material compensation of any kind. Thus, as the Commentary’s concept of bhaṇḍadeyya is clearly foreign to the Canon, there seems no reason to adopt it.	在做出這些判斷時，《義註》可能遵循了當時的民法，因為《聖典》根本沒有提到 bhaṇḍadeyya 的概念，而且它的一些判斷與《義註》的判斷相矛盾。正如我們上面提到的，《經分別》指出，如果比丘破壞、散落、焚燒或以其他方式使他人的財產無法使用，他犯《突吉羅》。當《Vinīta-vatthu》討論比丘因錯誤的假設而拿走一件物品，或者他對被困在陷阱中的動物感到同情並因此將其釋放的情況時，它說沒有犯戒。因此，根據《聖典》，《義註》為一項犯《突吉羅》或根本沒有犯戒的行為指定了《波羅夷》的懲罰，這似乎很奇怪。當然，為所有者提供合理的補償是一項慷慨之舉，但無法確定比丘是否有足夠的資金或自由這樣做。因為《聖典》不允許比丘向他的支持者索要捐款來支付給另一個在家人——除了他的父母（《大品》.八.22；見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第十章）——所以比丘不可能籌集到所需的資金。《聖典》只規定對在家人造成物質損失的比丘承擔一項責任：如果僧團認為合適，可以強迫他向所有者道歉（《小品》.一.20；參見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第二十章）。除此之外，《聖典》並沒有要求他做出任何形式的物質補償。因此，由於《義註》中的 bhaṇḍadeyya 概念對於正典來說顯然是不相干的，似乎沒有理由採用它。
Enforcement of rules. There is one important area in which even the Commentary does not require compensation, and that is when a bhikkhu sees another bhikkhu using an inappropriate object and arranges to have it destroyed. Here the Commentary draws its argument from the origin story to this rule, in which the Buddha orders the bhikkhus to destroy an inappropriately made hut—a “potter’s hut,” which was made from earth and then fired like a pot. From this example, the Commentary draws the following judgment: If a bhikkhu starts to build an inappropriate hut in a certain territory, the “owners” of the territory (i.e., the resident senior bhikkhus) should tell him to stop. If he does not heed their decision and actually builds the hut there, then when they are able to assemble a sufficient number of righteous bhikkhus, the resident senior bhikkhus can send him an order to remove it. If, after the order has been sent three times, the hut is still not removed, the bhikkhus are to dismantle it in such a way that the materials can be reused. The original builder is then to be told to remove the materials. If he doesn’t, then the resident bhikkhus are not responsible for any loss or damage they may undergo.	戒條的執行。有一個重要的領域，在該領域甚至連《義註》也不要求賠償，那就是當一位比丘看到另一位比丘使用不適當的物品並安排將其銷毀時。在此，《義註》從這一戒條起源故事推引出論據，其中佛陀命令比丘摧毀一座不恰當建造的小屋（孤邸）——一座“陶工的小屋”，它是用泥土製成的，然後像鍋一樣燒製。從這個例子，《義註》得出如下判斷：如果一個比丘開始在某個地區建造不合適的小屋，該地區的「主人」（即常住的長老）應該叫他停止。如果他不聽從他們的決定，真的在那裡建造了小屋，那麼當他們能夠聚集足夠數量的正直比丘時，常住的長老就可以命令他拆除它。如果命令發出三次後，小屋仍未拆除，比丘們應將其拆除，以便材料可以重新使用。然後，原建築者將被告知移除這些材料。如果他不這樣做，那麼居住的比丘們對可能遭受的任何損失或損害不負有責任。
The Commentary then derives a further principle from this example to say that if Bhikkhu X, who is knowledgeable in the Vinaya, sees Bhikkhu Y using inappropriate requisites of any sort, he is entitled to get them destroyed or reduced to an appropriate form. He is also not obligated to compensate Y for any loss or inconvenience incurred.	然後，《義註》從這個例子中得出進一步的原則，即如果精通戒律的 X 比丘看到 Y 比丘使用任何種類的不適當的必需品，他有權將它們銷毀或簡化為適當的形式。他也沒有義務賠償 Y 所遭受的任何損失或不便。
Court actions. As stated above, if a bhikkhu knowingly starts an unfair court case against someone else and then wins it in the final court to which the accused makes appeal, he incurs a pārājika. The Commentary to the Bhikkhunīs’ Sg 1, however, states that even if a bhikkhu is actually mistreated by someone—defamed, physically injured, robbed, etc.—and then tries to take a just court action against the guilty party, he incurs a pārājika if he wins. Again, this is an instance where the Commentary has no support from the Canon and, as the Vinaya-mukha points out, its assertion cannot stand. However, the training of a bhikkhu requires that he view all losses in the light of kamma and focus on looking after the state of his mind rather than on seeking compensation in social or material terms.	法庭訴訟。如上所述，如果一個比丘故意向他人提起不公平的法庭訴訟，然後在被告提出上訴的最終法庭中勝訴，他犯《波羅夷》。然而，比丘尼《僧殘》一的《義註》指出，即使比丘實際上受到某人的虐待——誹謗、身體傷害、搶劫等——然後試圖對有罪方採取公正的法庭行動，如果他贏了，他犯《波羅夷》。再一次，這是《義註》沒有得到《聖典》支持的例子，並且正如《戒律入口》所指出的那樣，它的主張是站不住腳的。然而，比丘的訓練要求他從業的角度看待所有損失，並專注於照顧自己的心態，而不是尋求社會或物質方面的補償。
There is no question in any of the texts that if a bhikkhu is asked to give evidence in a courtroom and does so, speaking in accordance with the facts, he commits no offense no matter what the outcome for the others involved. However, Pc 9 would require that he first be authorized to do so by the Community if his testimony involves reporting the wrongdoing of others. See that rule for further details.	在任何文本中，毫無疑問的是，如果比丘被要求在法庭上提供證據，並且按照事實說話，那麼無論其他相關人員的結果如何，他都沒有犯戒。然而，如果他的證詞涉及舉報他人的不當行為，《波逸提》九將要求他首先獲得僧團的授權。有關更多詳細信息，請參閱該戒條。

Modern cases	現代案例
The modern world contains many forms of ownership and monetary exchange that did not exist in the time of the Buddha, and so contains many forms of stealing that did not exist then either. Here are a handful of cases that come to mind as examples of ways in which the standards of this rule might be applied to modern situations.	現代世界包含了佛陀時代不存在的多種形式的所有權和貨幣交換，因此也包含了當時也不存在的多種形式的偷竊。這裡有一些想到的案例，作為該戒條的標準可應用於現代情況的範例。
Infringement of copyright. The international standards for copyright advocated by UNESCO state that infringement of copyright is tantamount to theft. However, in practice, an accusation of copyright infringement is judged not as a case of theft but as one of “fair use,” the issue being the extent to which a person in possession of an item may fairly copy that item for his/her own use or to give or sell to another person without compensating the copyright owner. Thus even a case of “unfair use” would not fulfill the factors of effort and object under this rule, in that—in creating a copy—one is not taking possession of an item that does not belong to one, and one is not depriving the owners of something already theirs. At most, the copyright owners might claim that they are being deprived of compensation owed to them, but as we have argued above, the principle of compensation owed does not rightly belong under this rule. In the terminology of the Canon, a case of unfair use would fall under either of two categories—acting for the material loss of the copyright owners or wrong livelihood—categories that entail a dukkaṭa under the general rule against misbehavior (Cv.V.36). They would also make one eligible for a disciplinary transaction, such as reconciliation or banishment (see BMC2, Chapter 20), which the Community could impose if it saw the infringement as serious enough to merit such a punishment.	侵犯版權。聯合國教科文組織所倡導的版權國際標準規定，侵害著作權等同於偷竊。然而，在實踐中，侵犯版權的指控不是被視為偷竊案件，而是被視為「合理使用」案件，問題在於擁有某項物品的人可以在多大程度上合理地為自己使用複製該物品，或在不補償版權所有者的情況下贈送或出售給他人。因此，即使是「不合理使用」的情況也不能滿足此戒條下的努力和對象因素，因為在建立拷貝時，並沒有佔有不屬於自己的物品，並且也沒有剝奪所有者已經屬於他們的東西。至多，版權所有者可能聲稱自己被剝奪了應得的賠償，但正如我們上面所論證的，所欠賠償原則不屬於本戒條的範疇。在《聖典》的術語中，不合理使用的案件屬於兩種類別中的任何一種—為版權所有者的物質損失而採取行動或邪命—根據禁止不當行為的一般戒條，這兩種類別意味著《突吉羅》（《小品》.五.36）。它們還將使一個人符合接受治罪羯磨的條件，例如下意或驅出（參見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第二十章），如果僧團認為侵犯嚴重到足以值得受到這樣的懲罰，則可以實施之。
Copying computer software. The agreement made when installing software on a computer, by which one agrees not to give the software to anyone else, comes under contract law. As such, a breach of that contract would be treated under the category of “deceit,” described above, which means that a bhikkhu who gives software to a friend in defiance of this contract would incur the penalty for a broken promise. As for the friend—assuming that he is a bhikkhu—the act of receiving the software and putting it on his computer would be treated under the precedent, mentioned above, of the bhikkhus receiving fruit from an orchard groundkeeper not authorized to give it away: He would incur no offense. However, as he must agree to the contract before installing the software on his computer, he would incur a penalty for a broken promise if he then gave the software to someone else in defiance of the contract.	複製電腦軟體。在電腦上安裝軟體時達成的協議，即同意不將該軟體提供給其他任何人的協議，受合約法管轄。因此，違反該合約將被視為上述「欺詐」類別，這意味著違反該合約而向朋友提供軟體的比丘將因違背承諾而受到懲罰。至於朋友——假設他是比丘——接收軟體並將其放入他的電腦的行為將按照上述比丘從未經授權贈送水果的果園管理員那裡接收水果的先例來處理：他不會犯任何戒。然而，由於他在電腦上安裝軟體之前必須同意合約，如果他隨後違反合約將軟體提供給其他人，他將面臨違背承諾的懲罰。
Credit cards. The theft of a credit card would of course be an offense. Because the owner of the card, in most cases, would not be required to pay for the stolen card, the seriousness of a theft of this sort would be determined by how the thief used the card. NP 20 would forbid a bhikkhu from using a credit card to buy anything even if the card were his to use, although a bhikkhu who had gone to the extent of stealing a card would probably not be dissuaded by that rule from using it or having someone else use it for him. In any event, the use of the card would be equivalent to using a stolen key to open a safe. If the thief hands the credit card to a store clerk to make a purchase, that would count as a gesture telling the clerk to transfer funds from the account of the credit card company. Because such operations are automated, the clerk’s attempt to have the funds transferred would count not as an act of deceit but an act of taking. If the credit card company’s machines authorize the transaction, then the theft occurs as soon as funds are transferred from one account to another. The seriousness of the theft would be calculated in line with the principle of the “prior plan” mentioned above.	信用卡。偷竊信用卡當然是犯戒。由於在大多數情況下，卡片的所有者不需要為被盜的卡片付款，因此此類偷竊的嚴重性將取決於偷竊者如何使用卡片。《捨墮》二十禁止比丘使用信用卡購買任何東西，即使該卡是他自己的而使用它，儘管該戒條可能無法阻止一個已經達到偷卡程度的比丘使用它或讓某人替他使用它。無論如何，使用該卡就相當於使用偷來的鑰匙打開保險箱。如果偷竊者將信用卡交給店員進行購買，這將被視為一種告訴店員從信用卡公司帳戶中轉移資金的示意動作。由於此類操作是自動化的，因此店員試圖轉移資金的行為不會被視為欺詐行為，而是一種拿取行為。如果信用卡公司的機器授權交易，那麼一旦資金從一個帳戶轉移到另一個帳戶，偷竊就算發生。偷竊的嚴重程度將按照上述「先前計劃」的原則進行計算。
In a situation where the funds, if transferred, would entail a pārājika, then if the machines do not authorize the transaction, the bhikkhu trying to use the card would incur a thullaccaya for getting the clerk to attempt the transfer. If the clerk, doubting the bhikkhu’s right to use the card, refuses to attempt the transfer, the bhikkhu would incur a dukkaṭa in making the gesture of command.	在這種情況下，如果資金轉移，犯《波羅夷》，那麼如果機器不授權交易，嘗試使用該卡的比丘將因讓店員嘗試轉帳而犯《偷蘭遮》。如果店員懷疑比丘使用該卡的權利而拒絕嘗試轉帳，比丘做出命令的示意動作就犯《突吉羅》。
Similar considerations would apply to the unauthorized use of debit cards, ATM cards, phone cards, personal identification numbers, or any other means by which funds would be transferred from the owner’s account by automated means.	類似的考量也適用於未經授權使用簽帳金融卡、ATM 卡、電話卡、個人識別號碼或透過自動方式從所有者帳戶轉移資金的任何其他方式。
A forged check drawn on a bank where the scanning and approval of checks is fully automated would fall under this category. If drawn on a bank where an employee would be responsible for approving the check, the entire case would come under false dealing, discussed above.	從銀行提款的偽造支票，如果支票的掃描和批准是完全自動化的，則屬於此類。如果從銀行提款，而銀行的員工負責批准支票，則整個案件將屬於虛假交易，如上所述。
Unauthorized telephone or Internet use would count as theft only if the charges were automatically transferred from the owner’s account. If the owner is simply billed for the charges, he/she could refuse to pay, and so no theft would have occurred. This would count, not as a theft, but as promise made in bad faith, which would incur a pācittiya. If, however, the case seemed serious enough, and the pācittiya too light a punishment, the Community could impose a disciplinary transaction on the offender.	未經授權的電話或網路使用，僅當費用自動從所有者的帳戶轉移時才算偷竊。如果所有者只是收到繳費帳單，他/她可以拒絕付款，因此不會發生偷竊。這不算偷竊，而是算惡意做出的承諾，這將犯《波逸提》。然而，如果案件看起來足夠嚴重，並且《波逸提》懲罰太輕，僧團可以對犯戒者實行治罪羯磨。
Impounded items—such as a repaired automobile kept in a mechanic’s shop—would apparently be treated in a similar way to smuggled goods.	被扣押的物品——例如存放在機械店裡的修理過的汽車——顯然會以與走私貨物類似的方式處理。

Non-offenses	不犯
In addition to the blanket exemptions mentioned under the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here list six exemptions to this rule. Two relate to the status of the object, two to the factor of perception, and two to the factor of intention.	除了上個戒條中提到的總括性豁免之外，《經分別》的不犯條款還列出了此戒條的六項豁免。其中兩個與對象的狀態有關，兩個與感知因素有關，兩個與意圖因素有關。
Object	對象
There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object belonging (1) to a peta (§) or (2) to an animal (§). Thus there is no offense in taking the remains of a lion’s kill, regardless of how possessive the lion may feel, although the Commentary wisely advises waiting until the lion has eaten enough of its kill no longer to be hungry, for otherwise the bhikkhu may become lion’s kill himself.	若比丘拿走 (1) 亡者及鬼 (§) 或 (2) 動物 (§) 的物品，並不犯戒。因此，無論獅子的佔有欲有多麼強烈，拿走獅子獵物的殘骸並沒有犯戒，儘管《義註》明智地建議等到獅子吃完它的獵物後不再感到飢餓再拿走，否則比丘可能會變成獅子的獵物。
The term peta, as used in the Canon, includes not only hungry ghosts, but also human corpses. In the early days of the religion, bhikkhus were expected to make their robes from discarded cloth, one source being the cloths used to wrap corpses laid in charnel grounds. (The bhikkhus would wash and boil the cloth before using it themselves.) However, they were not to take cloth from undecomposed bodies, and here is why:	《聖典》中的「peta」一詞不僅包括餓鬼，也包括人的屍體。在佛教的早期，比丘們被要求用廢棄的布料製作袈裟，其中一個來源是用來包裹停放在停屍場的屍體的布料。（比丘們在使用布之前會先清洗並將布煮沸。）但是，他們不能從未腐爛的屍體上取布，原因如下：
“Now at that time a certain bhikkhu went to the charnel ground and took hold of discarded cloth on a body not yet decomposed. But the spirit of the dead one was (still) dwelling in that body. Then it said to the bhikkhu, ‘Venerable sir, don’t take hold of my cloak.’ The bhikkhu, disregarding it, went off (with the cloak). Then the body, rising up, followed right behind the bhikkhu. Then the bhikkhu, entering his dwelling, closed the door. Then the body fell down right there.”	「當時，有一位比丘來到停屍場，抓住覆蓋在尚未腐爛的屍體上廢棄的布料。但死者的靈魂（仍然）住在那個屍體裡。然後它對比丘說：「尊者，不要抓住我的遮掩物。」比丘不理會它，（帶著遮掩物）走了。然後，屍體站起來，緊跟在比丘身後。然後，比丘進入他的住處，關上了門。然後屍體就倒在了那裡。」
The story gives no further details, and we are left to imagine for ourselves both the bhikkhu’s state of mind while being chased by the body and his friends’ reaction to the event. As is usual with the stories in the Vibhaṅga, the more outrageous the event, the more matter-of-fact is its telling, and the more its humor lies in the understatement.	故事沒有提供更多細節，我們只能自己想像比丘被屍體追趕時的心態以及他的朋友們對此事件的反應。正如《經分別》中的故事一樣，事件越離譜，它的敘述就越是實事求是，而其幽默感也越是在輕描淡寫中體現。
At any rate, as a result of this incident the Buddha laid down a dukkaṭa for taking cloth from an undecomposed body—which, according to the Commentary, means one that is still warm.	無論如何，由於這起事件，佛陀為從未腐爛的屍體中拿取布料制定了犯《突吉羅》——根據《義註》，這意味著屍體仍然是溫暖的。
The Commentary also classes devas under petas here and states that a bhikkhu may take a deva’s belongings with no penalty. It illustrates this point with two examples. In the first, a bhikkhu takes a piece of cloth left hanging on a tree as an offering to a deva. In the second, a bhikkhu with clairvoyant powers gains a vision of Sakka, the king of the devas, who is wearing an expensive cloth. The bhikkhu takes the cloth with the intention of making a robe for himself, even though Sakka keeps screaming, “Don’t take it! Don’t take it!” This latter example may have been included in the Commentary simply for its shock value in order to wake up sleepy students in the back of the room. Even if the Commentary is right in saying that the bhikkhu in question did not incur an offense, there’s no denying he’s a fool.	《義註》在此也將天神歸類為亡者及鬼之下，並指出比丘可以拿走天神的所有物而不受懲罰。它用兩個例子來說明這一點。在第一個例子中，比丘拿走一塊掛在樹上作為對天神的供養的布。在第二個例子中，一位具有天眼通的比丘看到身著昂貴衣服的天王帝釋。比丘拿走這塊布，打算為自己做一件袈裟，儘管帝釋不斷喊叫：「別拿走它！別拿走它！」後一個例子可能只是因為它的具震撼價值而被包含在《義註》中，以便喚醒教室後面昏昏欲睡的學生。即使《義註》說涉及的比丘沒有犯戒是正確的，但不可否認他是個愚人。
Perception	感知
There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object perceiving it (1) to be his own or (2) to have been thrown away (§). The Commentary states that if the bhikkhu finds out that the object does indeed have an owner, he owes the owner compensation and would be guilty of an offense when the owner abandons his efforts to gain that compensation. As we have already noted, the concept of compensation owed has no basis in the Canon, but if the object still lies in the bhikkhu’s possession and he decides not to return it, that decision would count as a thieving intention. The theft of the object could then be treated under the category of a borrowed object, which in practice has the same effect as the Commentary’s notion of compensation owed: The theft would be accomplished when the owner abandons his/her efforts to regain possession. However, if the object no longer exists (it was consumed by the bhikkhu or destroyed) or is no longer in the bhikkhu’s possession (he lost it or gave it away), the resolution of the issue is purely an individual matter between the bhikkhu and the owner, although as we noted above, the Community, if it sees fit, could force the bhikkhu to apologize to the owner.	如果比丘認為該物品（1）是他自己的，或（2）被丟棄（§）而拿走它，則不犯戒。《義註》指出，如果比丘發現該物品確實有一個所有者，他就要賠償所有者，並且當所有者放棄獲得賠償的努力時，他就會犯戒。正如我們已經指出的，所欠賠償的概念在《聖典》中沒有根據，但如果該物品仍然在比丘手中，而他決定不歸還它，該決定將被視為偷竊的意圖。那麼，該物品的偷竊行為可以被視為借用物品的範疇，這實際上與《義註》中的所欠賠償概念具有相同的效果：當所有者放棄重新擁有的努力時，偷竊行為就完成了。然而，如果該物品不再存在（它被比丘消耗或毀壞）或不再為比丘所有（他丟失或把它送走了），則問題的解決純粹是比丘和所有者之間的個人問題。儘管正如我們上面所指出的，如果僧團認為合適，可以強迫比丘向所有者道歉。
Intention	意圖
There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object (1) on trust or (2) temporarily.	如果比丘（1）基於信任，或（2）暫時地，拿走物品，則不犯戒。
To rightly take an object on trust, Mv.VIII.19.1 states that five conditions must be met:	為了正確地基於信任拿取物品，《大品》.八.19.1說必須滿足五個條件：
a. The owner is an acquaintance.	a. 所有者是熟識的人。
b. He/she is an intimate.	b. 他/她是一個親密的人。
c. He/she has spoken of the matter. (According to the Commentary, this means that he/she has said, “You may take any of my property you want.”)	c. 他/她已經談到了此事。（根據《義註》，這意味著他/她說：「你可以拿走任何你想要的且屬於我的財產。」）
d. He/she is still alive.	d. 他/她還活著。
e. One knows that he/she will be pleased at one’s taking it.	e. 知道他/她會因為拿走它而感到高興。
The Commentary to this rule states that in practice only three of these conditions need to be met: the fourth, the fifth, and any one of the first three. As the Vinaya-mukha notes, there are good practical reasons for adopting the Commentary’s interpretation here. There is also the formal reason that otherwise the first two conditions would be redundant.	此戒條的《義註》指出，實際上只需要滿足這些條件中的三個：第四個、第五個以及前三個條件中的任何一個。正如《戒律入口》所指出的，這裡採用《義註》的解釋有充分且實際的理由。還有否則前兩個條件將是多餘的正式理由。
Mv.VIII.31.2-3 discusses how an item can be rightly taken on trust if a bhikkhu, as courier, is conveying it from a donor to an intended recipient. The deciding factor is what the donor says while handing over the item, which apparently determines who exercises rights of ownership over the item while it is in transit. If the donor says, “Give this to so-and-so” (which means that ownership has not yet been transferred to the recipient), one may rightly take the item on trust in the donor but not in the recipient. If he/she says, “I give this to so-and-so” (which transfers ownership to the recipient), one may rightly take the item on trust in the recipient but not in the donor. If, before the courier can convey the item to the intended the recipient, he learns that the owner—as determined by the donor’s statement—happens to die, he may determine the item as an inheritance from the owner.	《大品》.八.31.2-3討論如果比丘作為遞送者，將物品從施主遞送給預定的接受者，如何正確地基於信任拿走物品。決定因素是施主在移交物品時所說的話，這顯然決定了誰在運輸過程中行使該物品的所有權。如果施主說，「把這個給某某」（這意味著所有權尚未轉移給接受者），人們可以基於對施主的信任而正確地拿取該物品，而非基於對接受者的信任。如果他/她說，「我把這個給某某」（這將所有權轉移給接收者），人們可以基於對接受者的信任而正確地拿取該物品，而非基於對施主的信任。如果在遞送者將物品遞送給預定接受者之前，得知所有者碰巧去世，此所有者是根據施主的聲明來確定的，他可以確定物品是該所有者的遺產。
In both cases where the item may be legitimately taken on trust, none of the texts discuss whether the factors listed in Mv.VIII.19.1 also have to be met or whether the allowances here are a special exemption to those factors granted specifically to couriers. However, because the allowances are so particular about who maintains ownership over the article while it is in transit, it would seem that the owner would have the right to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the courier’s taking the item on trust. This further suggests that the courier would have to take the owner’s perceived wishes into account, which implies that the factors listed in Mv.VIII.19.1 still hold here.	在這兩種情況下，該物品可以合法地基於信任被拿走，沒有任何文本討論是否也必須滿足《大品》.八.19.1中列出的因素，或者此處的開緣是否為特別同意授予遞送者的那些因素的特殊豁免。然而，由於開緣對於物品在運輸過程中的所有權歸屬有如此嚴格的規定，因此所有者似乎有權對遞送者基於信任拿取物品表示滿意或不滿。這進一步表明，遞送者必須考慮所有者的感知意願，這意味著《大品》.八.19.1中列出的因素在這裡仍然適用。
The Vinīta-vatthu treats the case of a bhikkhu who takes an item mistakenly thinking that he had the right to take it on trust; the Buddha termed this a “misconception as to trust” and did not impose a penalty. The Commentary to this rule adds that if the original owner informs one that he is displeased because he sincerely wanted to keep the item for another use, one should return it to him; but, in line with the Vinīta-vatthu, it does not indicate a penalty for not returning it. If the owner is displeased with one for other reasons, the Commentary says, there is no need to return the item.	《Vinīta-vatthu》處理了一個比丘的案例，他錯誤地認為他有權以基於信任的方式拿走一件物品；佛陀將此稱為「對信任的誤解」，並沒有施加懲罰。此戒條的《義註》補充說，如果原所有者告知說他感到不高興，因為他由衷地想保留該物品以作他用，則應將其歸還給他；但是，根據《Vinīta-vatthu》，它沒有表示會因為不歸還而受到懲罰。《義註》稱，如果所有者因其他原因而感到不高興，則無需歸還該物品。
As for taking an item temporarily, the Commentary says this means taking it with the intention that (a) “I’ll return it” or (b) “I’ll make compensation.” There is support in the Vibhaṅga for including (a) here, but none for (b). If the Commentary included (b) to cover cases where a bhikkhu borrows an object but then happens to lose or destroy it, there is no need to include it, for as we have already explained, a bhikkhu is under no compulsion to compensate people for items lost or destroyed. If the Commentary meant it to cover cases where a bhikkhu takes ownership of an object belonging to a person with whom he has not established trust and with whom he plans to discuss compensation later, it doesn’t really fit under this exemption, for one is taking permanent possession of the item. Given the strict conditions that the Canon places on the exemption for taking an item on trust, it seems unlikely that its compilers would have countenanced an exemption for a bhikkhu to go around imposing unilateral trades, taking possession of items on the unfounded assumption that the owners would gladly accept compensation at a later time. If there is any place for this sort of exemption in the Vibhaṅga’s framework, it would be as a variant on taking on trust. Thus it would have to meet the following factors: The owner is an acquaintance or an intimate or has spoken of the matter; he/she is still alive; and one knows that he/she would be pleased if one takes the item and gives compensation later.	至於暫時拿走一件物品，《義註》稱，這意味著拿走它的意圖是（a）「我將歸還它」或（b）「我將給予補償」。《經分別》中支持此處納入（a），但沒有（b）。如果《義註》中納入（b）以涵蓋比丘借用物品但隨後丟失或毀壞的情況，則無需納入它，因為正如我們已經解釋過的，比丘沒有義務向人們賠償物品丟失或毀壞。如果《義註》的意思是涵蓋這樣的情況：比丘拿走屬於他尚未建立信任的人的物品的所有權，並且他計劃稍後與該人討論賠償，那麼它實際上不適合這種豁免，因為是永久佔有該物品。鑑於《聖典》對以信任方式拿取物品的豁免規定了嚴格的條件，其編纂者似乎不太可能會支持比丘的豁免，以進行單方面交易，以毫無根據地假設所有者會樂意在以後接受補償為由佔有物品。如果在《經分別》的框架中存在這種豁免的地方，那將是作為基於信任拿取的一種變體。因此，它必須滿足以下因素：所有者是熟人、密友或談過此事；他/她還活著；知道如果拿走該物品並隨後給予補償，他/她會很高興。
In addition to the exemptions listed under the non-offense clauses, the Vinīta-vatthu contains ten other types of cases that involve no offense under this rule. Some of these have already been mentioned in the above discussions, but it is convenient to have them gathered in one place.	除了不犯條款中列出的豁免之外，《Vinīta-vatthu》還包含十種其他類型的案例，這些案例不涉及本戒條下的犯戒。其中一些已經在上面的討論中提到過，但將它們集中在一個地方會很方便。
—A bhikkhu, seeing an expensive garment, feels a desire to steal it but does not act on the desire. The commentaries take this as a general principle for all rules, that the mere arising of a mind state does not constitute an offense.	—一位比丘看到一件昂貴的衣服，生起偷竊的欲望，但不按照欲望行動。註釋將此作為所有戒條的一般原則，即只有心境生起並不構成犯戒。
—A bhikkhu, seeing a cloak blown up by a whirlwind, catches it to return it to the owners.	—一位比丘，看到一件衣服被旋風吹起，抓住它，把它還給主人。
—A bhikkhu takes an item on trust but later discovers that the trust is misconceived.	—一位比丘基於信任拿取了一件物品，但後來發現這信任被誤解。
—A bhikkhu goes through a customs house, not knowing that a dutiable item is among his belongings.	—一位比丘穿過海關，不知道他的所有物中有一件應納稅的物品。
—Visiting bhikkhus, for the sake of food, take fruit from a tree belonging to the Saṅgha.	—來訪的比丘們，為了食物，取屬於僧伽的樹上的果子。
—Bhikkhus receive fruit from the guardian of an orchard, even though the guardian is not entitled to give the fruit away.	—比丘們從果園的守護者那裡得到水果，儘管守護者無權將水果送出。
—A bhikkhu, seeing an item left lying about, puts it away so that it won’t get lost. The owner comes looking for the item and asks, “Who stole it?” The bhikkhu, perhaps ironically, responds, “I stole it.” The owner then charges him with a theft. The case goes to the Buddha, who says that the bhikkhu committed no offense, in that his answer was just a manner of speaking and not an actual acknowledgement of a theft.	—一位比丘，看到一件物品被放在地上，就把它收起來，以免它丟失。失主來尋找物品並問道：「誰偷了它？」比丘也許是諷刺地回答：「我偷了它。」失主隨後指控他偷竊。案件到了佛陀那邊，佛陀說比丘沒有犯戒，因為他的回答只是一種說話方式，而不是真正承認偷竊。
—A bhikkhu, out of compassion, releases an animal caught in a hunter’s snare.	—一位比丘出於慈悲，釋放了被獵人網羅捕獲的動物。
—Ven. Ajjuka points out a bequest to an heir in line with the original owner’s wishes.	—阿酬尊者按照原主人的意願，指出對繼承人的遺贈。
—Ven. Pilindavaccha uses his psychic powers to retrieve a pair of kidnapped children. The Buddha states that this entails no penalty because such a thing lies in the province of those with psychic power. The Vinaya-mukha, in discussing this case, takes it as a precedent for saying that if a bhikkhu returns a stolen article to its legal owner, there is no offense. The Buddha’s statement, though, was probably meant to discourage bhikkhus without psychic powers from getting directly involved in righting wrongs of this sort. If a bhikkhu without psychic powers happens to learn of the whereabouts of stolen goods, kidnapped children, etc., he may inform the authorities, if he sees fit, and let them handle the situation themselves. However, for safety’s sake, a bhikkhu living in a wilderness frequented by thieves would be wise not to be perceived as siding either with the thieves or the authorities.	—畢陵伽婆蹉尊者利用他的神通力找回了一對被綁架的孩子。佛陀指出，這不會帶來任何懲罰，因為這種事屬於具有神通力的人的範疇。《戒律入口》在討論此案時，將此作為先例，說如果比丘將偷來的東西歸還給其合法所有者，則沒有犯戒。不過，佛陀的說法可能是為了阻止沒有神通的比丘直接參與此類糾正錯誤的行為。如果沒有神通的比丘碰巧得知贓物、被綁架的兒童等的下落，如果他認為合適，他可以通知當局，讓他們自行處理。然而，為了安全起見，生活在盜賊經常出沒的林野中的比丘最好不要被視為站在盜賊或當局一邊。
Summary: The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a pārājika offense.	摘要：竊取任何價值 1/24 盎司或以上金衡黃金的物品是《波羅夷》罪。

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3	三
Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive a human being of life, or search for an assassin for him, or praise the advantages of death, or incite him to die (saying): “My good man, what use is this evil, miserable life to you? Death would be better for you than life,” or with such an idea in mind, such a purpose in mind, should in various ways praise the advantages of death or incite him to die, he also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.	若有比丘故意奪人的生命，或為他尋找行兇者，或讚揚死亡的好處，或煽動他去死（說）：「我的善男子，這邪惡、悲慘的生命對你有何用？死比生好」，或懷著這樣的想法，懷著這樣的目的，用各種方式來讚揚死亡的好處，或者煽動他去死，也是波羅夷，不共住。
This rule against intentionally causing the death of a human being is best understood in terms of five factors, all of which must be present for there to be the full offense.	這條禁止故意造成人死亡的戒條最好從五個因素來理解，所有這些因素都必須存在才能構成完整的犯戒。
1) Object: a human being, which according to the Vibhaṅga includes human fetuses as well, counting from the time consciousness first arises in the womb immediately after conception up to the time of death.	1）對象：人類，根據《經分別》，也包括人類胎兒，從受孕後意識在子宮中首次出現的時間算起，直到死亡為止。
2) Intention: knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wanting to cause that person’s death. “Knowingly” also includes the factor of—	2）意圖：明知、有意識、故意、有目的地想要導致該人死亡。「明知」還包括以下這一因素—
3) Perception: perceiving the person as a living being.	3）感知：察覺到該人是活人。
4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing that person to die.	4）努力：為了導致該人死亡而所做的任何事。
5) Result: The life-faculty of the person is cut as the result of one’s act.	5）結果：該人的命根因自己的行為而被切斷。

Object	對象
The Vibhaṅga defines a human being as a person “from the time consciousness first becomes manifest in a mother’s womb, up to its death-time.” As DN 15 makes clear, the presence of the new being’s consciousness is necessary for the embryo to survive in the womb. Thus the survival of the embryo in the womb is a clear sign that consciousness is present. This means that consciousness is manifest from the moment of conception.	《經分別》將人類定義為「從意識首次在母親子宮中顯現出來，直至死亡」的人。正如《長部》15經所表明的那樣，新生命意識的存在對於胚胎在子宮中生存是必要的。因此，胚胎在子宮中的存活是意識存在的明顯標誌。這意味著意識從受孕那一刻起就顯現出來。
From this it follows that a bhikkhu who intentionally causes an abortion—by arranging for the operation, supplying the medicines, or advising a woman to get an abortion and she follows through—incurs a pārājika. A bhikkhu who encourages a woman to use a means of contraception that works after the point of conception would be guilty of a pārājika if she were to follow his advice.	由此可見，比丘故意造成墮胎—透過安排手術、提供藥物或建議女人墮胎並且她照做了—犯《波羅夷》。比丘鼓勵女人在受孕後使用有效的避孕方法，如果她聽從了他的建議，比丘將會犯下《波羅夷》罪。
There is a series of cases in the Vinīta-vatthu in which bhikkhus provide medicines for women seeking an abortion, followed by two cases in which a bhikkhu provides medicines to a barren woman who wants to become fertile and to a fertile woman who wants to become barren. In neither of these two latter cases does anyone die or suffer pain, but in both cases the bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa. From this, the Commentary infers that bhikkhus are not to act as doctors to lay people, an inference supported by the Vibhaṅga to Sg 13. (The Commentary, though, gives a number of exceptions to this principle. See the discussion in BMC2, Chapter 5.)	《Vinīta-vatthu》中有一系列比丘為尋求墮胎的婦女提供藥物的案例，隨後還有兩個案例，其中有一位比丘，為一位想要生育的不孕婦女，和一位想要避孕的生育婦女，提供藥物。在後兩個案例下，沒有人死亡或遭受痛苦，但在這兩個案例下，比丘都犯《突吉羅》。由此，《義註》推論出比丘不應充當在家人的醫生，這一推論得到了《僧殘》十三的《經分別》的支持。（不過，《義註》給出了這一原則的一些例外情況。參見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第五章的討論。)
The question arises as to whether one’s own life would qualify as “object” under this rule—in other words, the extent to which attempted suicides are covered here. The Vibhaṅga to this rule mentions three types of suicide, treating each of them differently.	問題是，根據這條戒條，自己的生命是否符合「對象」的資格—換句話說，這裡涵蓋了試圖自殺的程度。這條戒條的《經分別》提到了三種類型的自殺，並對每種類型進行了不同的處理。
a) In the origin story, bhikkhus search for assassins, i.e., get other people to take their lives. That action is directly mentioned in the rule and explained in the Vibhaṅga, so it does come under the rule.	a) 在起源故事中，比丘尋找行兇者，也就是讓其他人結束自己的生命。該行為在戒條中直接提及並在《經分別》中解釋，因此它確實受本戒條管轄。
b) The Vinīta-vatthu includes a case in which a bhikkhu tries to commit suicide by throwing himself over a cliff, and the Buddha formulates a separate rule to cover that case. The penalty assigned by the rule, however, does not fit the pattern for derived offenses under this rule, which shows that an attempted suicide of that sort would not be treated here.	b) 《Vinīta-vatthu》包括一個比丘試圖跳崖自殺的案例，佛陀制定了一個單獨的戒條來涵蓋這個案例。然而，該戒條所規定的懲罰並不符合本戒條下衍生違犯的模式，這表明此處不會處理此類試圖自殺。
c) The origin story also tells of bhikkhus who take their own lives, but the main rule here does not mention that action, nor does the Vibhaṅga discuss it. The Commentary extrapolates from the rule in case (b) to cover almost all attempts at suicide, but there are reasons for questioning the Commentary’s reasoning on this issue. For a discussion, see “Special cases,” below.	c) 起源故事也講述了比丘自殺的故事，但這裡的主要戒條沒有提到這一行為，《經分別》也沒有討論它。《義註》從情況（b）中的戒條推斷涵蓋了幾乎所有的試圖自殺，但有理由質疑《義註》對此問題的推斷。有關討論，請參閱下面的「特別案例」。
The Vibhaṅga states that a bhikkhu who kills a “non-human being”—a yakkha, nāga, or peta—incurs a thullaccaya. The Commentary adds a devatā to this list, and goes on to say that a spirit possessing a human being or an animal can be exorcised in either of two ways. The first is to command it to leave: This causes no injury to the spirit and results in no offense. The second is to make a doll out of flour paste or clay and then to cut off various of its parts (!). If one cuts off the hands and feet, the spirit loses its hands and feet. If one cuts off the head, the spirit dies, which is grounds for a thullaccaya.	《經分別》指出，殺死「非人」（夜叉、龍或鬼）的比丘犯《偷蘭遮》。《義註》在這個清單中加入了天神，並接著說，附身於人類或動物的靈體可以透過兩種方式中的任何一種來驅除。第一種是命令其離開：這樣不傷害靈體，也不犯戒。第二種是用麵粉糊或黏土製作一個娃娃，然後切掉它的各個部分（！）。如果砍掉手腳，靈體就失去了手腳。如果砍下頭，靈體就會死亡，就犯《偷蘭遮》。
A bhikkhu who intentionally kills a common animal is treated under Pc 61.	故意殺死普通動物的比丘將根據《波逸提》六一受到處置。

Intention & perception	意圖和感知
The Vibhaṅga defines the factor of intention in three contexts—the word-analysis, the non-offense clauses, and the Vinīta-vatthu—analyzing it with one set of terms in the first context, and another set in the last two. There are two ways of interpreting the discrepancy: Either the two sets differ only in language but not in substance, or they actually differ in substance. The Commentary, without seeming to notice what it is doing, adopts the second interpretation. In other words, it defines the factors of intention in markedly different ways in the different contexts, yet does not assert that one set of terms is more authoritative than the other or even take note of the differences between them. In fact, it takes one of the terms common to the non-offense clauses and the Vinīta-vatthu and defines it in one way in one context and another in the other. All of this creates a great deal of confusion.	《經分別》在三種脈絡中定義了意圖因素－語句解說、不犯條款和《Vinīta-vatthu》－在第一種脈絡中使用一組術語進行分析，在後兩種脈絡中使用另一組術語進行分析。有兩種方法可以解釋這種差異：要麼這兩組僅在語言上有所不同，而沒有實質上的不同，要麼它們的確在實質上有所不同。《義註》似乎沒有注意到它在做什麼，就採用了第二種解釋。換句話說，它在不同的脈絡中以明顯不同的方式定義了意圖因素，但並沒有肯定地說一組術語比另一組術語更具權威性，甚至沒有注意到它們之間的差異。事實上，它採用了不犯條款和《Vinīta-vatthu》所共用的術語之一，並在一種脈絡中以一種方式定義它，而在另一種脈絡中以另一種方式定義它。所有這些都造成了極大的混亂。
A more fruitful way of analyzing the two sets of terms, which we will adopt here, is to assume that they differ only in language but not in substance. We will take as our framework the set of terms used in the non-offense clauses and the Vinīta-vatthu, as it is clearer and more amply illustrated than the other set, and then refer to the other set, along with some of the explanations from the Commentary, when these help to give a more refined understanding of what the non-offense clauses and Vinīta-vatthu are saying.	我們將在這裡採用的分析這兩組術語的一種更有效的方法是，假設它們僅在語言上有所不同，而在實質上沒有差異。我們將以不犯條款和《Vinīta-vatthu》中使用的該組術語作為我們的框架，因為它比另一組更清晰、更充分地說明，然後參考另一組以及一些來自《義註》的解釋，當這些有助於更精確地理解不犯條款和《Vinīta-vatthu》的意思。
The non-offense clauses state that there is no offense for a bhikkhu who acts unintentionally, not knowing, or without aiming at death. In the Vinīta-vatthu, unintentionally is used to describe cases in which a bhikkhu acts accidentally, such as dropping a poorly held stone, brick, or adze; removing a pestle from a shelf and accidentally knocking off another one. Not knowing is used in cases in which the bhikkhu deliberately does an action but without knowing that his action could cause death. An example would be giving food to a friend not knowing that it is poisoned. Not aiming at death is used in cases where the bhikkhu deliberately does an action but does not intend that action to result in death. Relevant examples include trying to help a bhikkhu who is choking on food by slapping him on the back and inadvertently causing his death; telling a bhikkhu to stand on a piece of scaffolding while helping with construction work, only to see the scaffolding collapse; describing the joys of heaven to an audience, only to have a member of the audience decide to commit suicide in hopes of going there.	不犯條款說，比丘無意、不知、或不以死亡為目的的行為並不構成犯戒。在《Vinīta-vatthu》中，「無意」用來描述比丘意外地做出的行為的情況，例如，把拿不穩的石頭、磚頭或錛子掉在地上；從架子上取下一把研杵，不小心碰掉了另一把。「不知」用於比丘故意做某事但不知道他的行為可能導致死亡的情況。一個例子是給朋友食物，但他不知道食物有毒。「不以死亡為目的」用於比丘故意做某事但無意導致死亡的情況。相關的例子包括，試圖拍打一位被食物噎住的比丘的背來幫助他，卻無意中導致了他的死亡；告訴一位比丘在幫忙建築時站在鷹架上，結果卻看到鷹架倒塌；向聽眾描述天界的歡樂，結果卻有一位聽眾決定自殺，希望能去那裡。
Thus, to fulfill the factor of intention here, a bhikkhu must be acting intentionally, knowingly, and aiming at death.	因此，為了滿足這裡的意圖因素，比丘必須有意地、明知地、以死亡為目的而行動。
The word-analysis covers all the same points—although it shuffles the terms around—when it defines intentionally as “having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously.” Without teasing out the differences in terminology, we may simply note the important point added in its analysis, which is that an act of manslaughter counts as intentional here only when the bhikkhu has made a clear decision to kill. Thus if he were to strike a person unthinkingly in a sudden fit of rage, without being clear about what his intention was, it would not qualify as “intentional” here. The Commentary seconds this point when it defines having made the decision as “having summoned up a reckless mind state, ‘crushing’ through the power of an attack.” The Sub-commentary does not explain crushing or attack here, but apparently they mean aggressively overcoming, through a brute act of will, any contrary or hesitant thoughts in the mind.	當語句解說將故意定義為「有意願，明知且有意識地做出決定」時，語句解說涵蓋了所有相同的要點，儘管它對術語進行了重新排列。在不梳理出術語差異的情況下，我們可以簡單地注意到其分析中添加的重點，即只有當比丘明確決定殺人時，過失殺人行為才算故意殺人。因此，如果他在沒有明確意圖的情況下，突然發怒，不假思索地打人，這裡就不算是「故意」。《義註》支持這一點，將做出決定定義為「喚起魯莽的精神狀態，透過攻擊的力量『粉碎』」。這裡的《複註》並沒有解釋粉碎或攻擊，但顯然它們的意思是透過意志的殘酷行為，積極地克服心中任何相反或猶豫的想法。
The Vinīta-vatthu contains a few cases where bhikkhus kill people in situations where they did not even know that there was a person there: throwing a stone over a precipice, not knowing that there was a person standing below; sitting down on a pile of cloth on a chair, not knowing that a child was underneath the cloth; and setting fire to a grove, not knowing that there were people in the grove. The Buddha dismisses the first two cases without explanation as not coming under this rule. The last he classifies as an example of not aiming at death. We can conclude from this example that aiming at death must include the perception that there was someone there who could die. The Commentary seconds this conclusion in its analysis of the phrase knowingly and consciously in the word-analysis’s definition of intentionally. Although it again shuffles the terms around—using consciously to describe what the Vinīta-vatthu describes as knowingly—the important point in its conclusion is that an essential element in the factor of intention is the factor of perception: In its words, one must be aware that, “This is a living being.”	《Vinīta-vatthu》中記載了一些比丘在他們甚至不知道有人在那裡的情況下殺人的例子：在懸崖上扔石頭，卻不知道下面站著一個人；坐在椅子上的一堆布上，不知道布下有個孩子；放火燒了一座小樹林，卻不知道樹林裡還有人。佛陀對前兩種情況不予理會，沒有做出任何解釋，因為不屬於這條戒條。他將最後一個歸類為不以死亡為目的的例子。從這個例子我們可以得出結論，以死亡為目的必須包括感知：那裡有人可能會死。《義註》在語句解說的「故意」定義中的明知且有意識地一詞的分析中，支持了這一結論。儘管它再次重新排列了術語－用有意識來描述《Vinīta-vatthu》所描述的明知－其結論中的重點是，意圖因素中的一個基本要素是感知因素：用它的話說，必須是意識到：「這是一個活著的眾生。」
Note that, given this definition, one need not know that the living being is a human being for the factor of perception to be fulfilled. The Commentary illustrates this point with an example in which a bhikkhu who, seeing a goat lying down in a certain spot during the day, decides to return to that spot to kill the goat that night. In the meantime, however, the goat gets up and a man comes to lie down in its place. The bhikkhu approaches the man in the dark, still thinking him to be a goat, and kills him. The verdict: a pārājika.	請注意，根據此定義，無需知道活著的眾生是人類即可滿足感知因素。《義註》中用一個例子來說明這一點：一位比丘白天看到一隻山羊躺在某個地方，決定當天晚上回到那個地方殺死這隻山羊。然而同時，山羊站了起來，一個人在它的位置上躺了下來。比丘在黑暗中接近這個人，仍然認為他是一隻山羊，並殺死了他。結論：《波羅夷》。
Although this judgment may seem strange, there is nothing in the Canon to contradict it. The closest case in the Vinīta-vatthu concerns a bhikkhu who digs a pitfall with the intention that whatever living beings fall into it will perish. The penalty, if an animal dies as a result, is a pācittiya; if a human being, a pārājika. In this case, the intention/perception of killing a living being is broad enough to include a human being, and so fulfills the relevant factors here.	雖然這個判斷看起來很奇怪，但《聖典》中沒有任何內容與之相矛盾。《Vinīta-vatthu》中最接近的例子涉及一位比丘，他挖了一個陷阱，意圖讓任何掉入其中的生物都會死亡。若動物因此死亡，則懲罰為《波逸提》；如果是人類，則為《波羅夷》。在這種情況下，殺死生物的意圖/感知足夠廣泛，廣泛到足以包括人類，因此滿足這裡的相關因素。
In discussing this last case, the Commentary notes that if one digs the pitfall but then renounces one’s intention to cause death, one has to completely fill in the pitfall in such a way that it cannot cause injury—even to the extent of causing someone to stumble—if one wants to avoid the penalty coming from any injury the pitfall might cause. If the pitfall is only partially filled in and a person stumbles into it and later dies from his injuries, the bhikkhu incurs the full offense under this rule. The same judgment applies to any other attempt to kill not aimed at a particular victim. For instance, if a bhikkhu harboring this sort of general intention builds a trap but then changes his mind, he has to destroy the trap so thoroughly that it cannot be reassembled. Similarly, when a bhikkhu writes a passage describing the advantages of dying (see below) with the thought that anyone who reads it might decide to commit suicide, if he then changes his mind he has to destroy the writing so thoroughly that it cannot be pieced together. If, instead of writing the passage himself, he simply picks up a pre-existing written passage of this sort and then—with a similar intention—puts it in a place where it might be easily seen, he can avoid any penalty simply by returning the passage to the place where he found it.	在討論最後一個案例時，《義註》指出，如果一個人挖了陷阱，但隨後又放棄了致人死亡的意圖，如果想避免因陷阱可能造成的傷害而受到懲罰，必須以一種不會造成傷害的方式完全填滿陷阱－甚至不會造成某人絆倒。如果陷阱只被部分填滿，而某人跌入其中並隨後因受傷而死亡，則根據此戒條，比丘將完全違犯。同樣的判決也適用於任何其他不針對特定受害者的殺害企圖。例如，如果一位比丘懷有這種普遍意圖，建造了一個陷阱，但後來又改變了主意，他必須徹底摧毀這個陷阱，使其無法重新組裝起來。同樣地，當一位比丘寫了一篇描述死亡好處的文章（見下文），並認為任何讀過它的人都可能決定自殺時，如果他隨後改變主意，他就必須徹底毀掉這篇文章，以至於無法將其拼湊起來。如果他不是自己寫這篇文章，而是僅僅拿起已有的此類書面文章，然後以類似的意圖將其放在容易看到的地方，他只需將文章放回到他發現它的地方就可以避免任何懲罰。
In discussing the topic of pitfalls, the Commentary also treats the issue of how much of an intention counts when setting up a situation that might cause death. Specifically, it asks whether—while one is digging a hole for another purpose—a passing thought that “this hole could kill anyone who fell into it” would fulfill the factor of intention under this rule, or whether this factor would be fulfilled only if the original purpose for digging the hole was to cause death. The Commentary notes that opinions are divided on this point, but it sides with the latter position.	在討論陷阱這個主題時，《義註》還討論了在造成可能導致死亡的情況時意圖的重要性的問題。具體來說，它詢問－當一個人為了另一個目的而挖洞時－一閃而過的想法「這個洞可能會殺死掉進去的任何人」會滿足本戒條下的意圖因素，或者這個因素只有在挖這個洞的最初目的是為了致人死亡的情況下才會被滿足。《義註》說，在這一點上意見分歧，但它支持後一種立場。
The Vinīta-vatthu contains an unusual case of a bhikkhu who uses a friend as a guinea pig for testing poison. The friend dies, and the bhikkhu incurs only a thullaccaya. The Commentary explains this by distinguishing two types of test: one to see if a particular poison is strong enough to kill a person; the other, to see if a particular person is strong enough to survive the poison. In either of these cases, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya regardless of whether the victim dies. If, though, the bhikkhu gives poison to a person with the desire that it cause that person’s death, he incurs a pārājika if the victim dies, and a thullaccaya if not.	《Vinīta-vatthu》中有一個不尋常的例子，一位比丘用朋友作為試驗毒藥的小白鼠。朋友死了，比丘只犯《偷蘭遮》。《義註》透過區分兩種類型的試驗來解釋這一點：一種是看看某種特定的毒藥是否足以殺死一個人；另一種是看某個特定的人是否夠強壯能在毒藥中倖存下來。在這兩種情況下，無論受害者是否死亡，比丘都會犯《偷蘭遮》。然而，如果比丘對某人下毒，想要導致該人死亡，那麼如果受害者死亡，他就會犯《波羅夷》，如果沒有死，他就會犯《偷蘭遮》。
The Vinīta-vatthu also includes a case in which bhikkhus, out of compassion for an ill friend, hasten his death and thus incur the full offense under this rule. This shows that impulse and motive are irrelevant in defining the factor of intention here.	《Vinīta-vatthu》還記載了一個例子，比丘們出於對生病朋友的同情，加速了他的死亡，從而完全違犯了本戒條。這表明衝動和動機與定義此處的意圖因素無關。

Effort	努力
This factor covers four types of action: taking life, arranging an assassin, describing the advantages of dying, and inciting a person to die.	這個因素涵蓋了四種行為：奪取生命、安排行兇者、描述死亡的好處、煽動他人死亡。
a) Taking life	a) 奪取生命
The Vibhaṅga defines taking life as “the cutting off, the ending, of the life faculty; interrupting the continuity.” The Vibhaṅga lists a variety of means by which one might try to do this, which the Commentary divides into four categories:	《經分別》將奪取生命定義為「命根的切斷、終止；中斷連續。」《經分別》列出了可以嘗試做到這一點的各種方法，《義註》將其分為四類：
—One’s own person: hitting with one’s hands or feet; using weapons such as knives, sticks, clubs, etc.; handing poison to a person; giving a pregnant woman medicine that would cause an abortion; moving an ill person.	—自身：用手或腳擊打；使用刀、棍、棒等武器；將毒藥給人；給孕婦服用會導致流產的藥物；移動病人。
—Throwing: hurling a stone, shooting an arrow. At present, shooting a gun or hurling a grenade would come under this category.	—投擲：投擲石頭、射箭。目前，開槍或投擲手榴彈都屬於這一類。
—Stationary devices: setting a trap, digging a pitfall, placing a weapon in a place where a victim may fall, sit, or lie down on it; placing poison in food, etc. At present, setting out a land mine would come under this category.	—固定裝置：設置陷阱、挖陷阱、將武器放置在受害者可能跌倒、坐或躺的地方；在食物中投毒等等。目前，埋設地雷屬於此類。
—Commanding: telling another person to commit a murder. This category includes recommendations expressed in the imperative as well as express commands. A few examples:	—命令：命令另一個人去殺人。此類別包括祈使句中表達的建議，和表達命令。舉幾個例子：
TELLING B TO KILL C. The way in which a bhikkhu is penalized for getting another person to commit a murder—through sign or verbal command—can be inferred from the discussion of accomplices under the preceding rule. The Vibhaṅga here, as under that rule, states that if one’s accomplice does not follow one’s instructions precisely, one is absolved of an offense. In discussing this point, the Commentary goes into great detail concerning the six ways the command to kill can be specified: the object [the person to be killed], the time, the place, the weapon to use, the action by which the weapon is to be used [e.g., “Stab him in the neck”], and the position the victim should be in [sitting, standing, lying down] when the act is to be done. If the instigator specifies any of these things and yet his accomplice does not carry them out to the letter, the instigator does not incur the penalty for the actual murder. For instance, Bhikkhu A tells his student B to kill C while C is sitting in meditation at midnight. The student gets into C’s room at midnight, only to find C asleep in bed, which is where he kills him. Bhikkhu A thus incurs only the thullaccaya for convincing his student to accept the command.	叫 B 去殺 C。比丘因唆使他人去謀殺而受到懲罰的方式－透過示意動作或口頭命令－可以從前一個戒條下共犯的討論中推斷出來。根據該戒條，《經分別》在此說，如果共犯沒有完全遵循指示，那麼就可以免於犯戒。《義註》在論述這一點時，詳細闡述了殺人命令的六種措辭方式：對象[要被殺的人]、時間、地點、使用的武器、使用武器的動作[例如，「刺他的脖子」]，以及受害者在進行該行動時應採取的姿勢[坐著、站立、躺著]。如果教唆者指定了其中任何一項，但他的共犯沒有嚴格執行，則教唆者不會因實際謀殺而受到懲罰。例如，比丘 A 告訴他的學生 B ，在半夜 C 打坐的時候，殺了 C 。學生半夜進入 C 的房間，發現 C 睡在床上，於是他在那裡殺死了他。因此，比丘 A 只因說服他的學生接受命令而犯《偷蘭遮》。
As under the preceding rule, the Commentary tries to argue that if B will certainly succeed in killing C in line with A’s command, A incurs a pārājika when giving the command, but again, this opinion does not conform with the Vibhaṅga.	正如前一個戒條一樣，《義註》試圖爭辯說，如果 B 按照 A 的命令肯定會成功殺死 C ，則 A 在發出命令時犯《波羅夷》，但同樣地，這種觀點不符合《經分別》。
The case of the innocent accomplice—one who does not know that the action he is being told to do will result in death—also seems relevant here, as in the case where a bhikkhu prepares a syringe of poison and tells his accomplice, who thinks the syringe contains medicine, to inject it into a patient. There seems every reason to impose a pārājika on the bhikkhu if the patient then dies, but the accomplice would incur no offense.	無辜共犯的案例－一個不知道他被告知要做的行為會導致死亡的人－似乎也與這裡有關，就像一位比丘準備一筒注射器毒藥並告訴他的共犯的情況一樣，他的共犯認為注射器含有藥物，用於將其注射到病人體內。如果病人死了，似乎有充分的理由對比丘施加《波羅夷》，但共犯沒有犯戒。
RECOMMENDING MEANS OF ABORTION.	推薦墮胎方式。
RECOMMENDING MEANS OF EUTHANASIA. The Vinīta-vatthu includes a case of a criminal who has just been punished by having his hands and feet cut off. A bhikkhu asks the man’s relatives, “Do you want him to die? Then make him drink buttermilk (§) (!).” The relatives follow the bhikkhu’s recommendation, the man dies, and the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.	推薦安樂死的方法。《Vinīta-vatthu》中記載了一名罪犯剛接受了被砍掉手腳的懲罰。一位比丘問該罪犯的親戚們：「你們想讓他死嗎？那就讓他喝酪漿(§)(!)。」親戚們聽從了比丘的推薦，這個人死了，比丘犯《波羅夷》。
RECOMMENDING MEANS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Again from the Vinīta-vatthu: A bhikkhu tells an executioner to kill his victims mercifully with a single blow, rather than torturing them. The executioner follows his advice and the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika, for the recommendation to kill mercifully is still a recommendation to kill. According to the Vinīta-vatthu, if the executioner says that he will not follow the bhikkhu’s advice and then kills his victims as he pleases, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The Commentary adds that if the executioner tries to follow the bhikkhu’s advice and yet needs more than one blow to do the job, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya.	建議死刑手段。再次來自《Vinīta-vatthu》：一位比丘告訴劊子手，要仁慈地一擊殺死受害者，而不是折磨他們。劊子手聽從了他的建議，比丘犯《波羅夷》，因為仁慈地殺人的建議仍然是殺人的建議。根據《Vinīta-vatthu》，如果劊子手說他不會聽從比丘的建議，然後隨心所欲地殺死受害者，那麼比丘不會受到懲罰。《義註》補充說，如果劊子手試圖聽從比丘的建議，但需要不止一擊才能完成這項工作，比丘犯《偷蘭遮》。
INDIRECT STATEMENTS. The Canon and Commentary differ as to whether indirect statements that are not imperatives would also qualify as commands or recommendations under this rule. The Commentary maintains that a bhikkhu cannot get around a penalty by phrasing his wish for a murder in more roundabout ways, and gives an example in which a bhikkhu tells people, “In such-and-such a place a bandit is staying. Whoever cuts off his head will receive great honor from the King.” If any of the bhikkhu’s listeners kills the bandit as a result of his instigation, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.	間接陳述。對於非命令性的間接陳述是否也符合本戒條下的命令或建議的問題，《聖典》和《義註》存在分歧。《義註》認為，比丘不能以更迂迴的方式表達他想要謀殺的願望來逃避懲罰，並舉了一個比丘告訴人們的例子：「在某某地方，有一個強盜居住。誰砍下他的頭，誰就會受到國王的極大榮耀。」《義註》說，如果比丘的任何聽眾在他的慫恿下殺死了強盜，比丘犯《波羅夷》。
Examples of commands and recommendations in the Canon, however, are all expressed as imperatives: “Do this!” “If you want him to die, do this.” The only examples of indirect statements are those in which a bhikkhu expresses a wish, “O, if only so-and-so were murdered.” According to the Vibhaṅga, this statement incurs a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it is made in public or private, and regardless of whether one knows that anyone else is overhearing it or not. There is no discussion, however, of what one’s intention might be in making the statement, nor of the consequences for the speaker if anyone, inspired by his remark, actually kills the person in question. This implies that the authors of the Vibhaṅga did not regard statements of this sort as fulfilling the factor of effort under this rule. This may seem unduly lenient, but given that a bhikkhu whose express command to kill is followed but not to the letter would also incur only a thullaccaya, this judgment seems consistent with the Vibhaṅga’s pattern of assigning penalties.	然而，《聖典》中的命令和建議的例子都以祈使語氣表達：「這樣做！」「如果你想讓他死，就這麼做吧。」間接陳述的唯一例子是那些比丘表達願望的例子：「噢，如果某某被謀殺就好了。」根據《經分別》，這種陳述會犯《突吉羅》，無論它是公開說還是私下說，也無論一個人是否知道其他人正在無意中聽到它。然而，沒有討論發表陳述的意圖是什麼，也沒有討論如果有人受到他的言論的啟發，實際上殺死了有關的人，那麼他將面臨什麼後果。這暗示《經分別》的作者並不認為此類陳述滿足了本戒條下的努力因素。這可能顯得過於寬鬆，但考慮到比丘如果遵守明示的殺戮命令，但不嚴格執行，也只會犯《偷蘭遮》，這一判決似乎與《經分別》的懲罰模式一致。
In addition to the four above categories of means of killing, the Commentary includes two of its own:	除了上述四類殺人手段外，《義註》還包括自己的兩類：
—Magical formulae: reciting passages that call on malevolent spirits to bring about a person’s death, using voodoo, etc.	—魔咒：背誦召喚惡靈導致人死亡的經文、使用巫術等。
—Psychic powers: using the “evil eye” or other similar innate powers.	—神通：使用「邪眼」或其他類似的先天力量。
The Canon contains a number of passages—MN 56 is one example—describing people who, “developed in mind,” use their powers to kill. The Commentary notes the existence of these passages and of “some teachers” who cite them as proof that meditative powers can be used in this way, but it dismisses the idea on the grounds that meditative powers are skillful and based on pleasant mental states, whereas the act of killing is unskillful and based on painful mental states. The Sub-commentary adds that the powers described in the Canon are actually based on magical formulae. Still, because the success of these formulae depends on a certain level of concentration, it would seem that using one’s powers of concentration to kill would fulfill the factor of effort here.	《聖典》包含許多段落（《中部》56經就是一個例子），描述那些「心智發達」的人，利用自己的力量殺人。《義註》指出了這些段落的存在以及「一些老師」的存在，這些老師引用它們作為冥想力量可以以這種方式使用的證據，但它駁回了這個想法，因為冥想力量是善巧的並且基於愉快的精神狀態，而殺戮行為是不善巧的並且基於痛苦的精神狀態。《複註》補充說，《聖典》中描述的力量實際上是基於魔咒的。不過，因為這些咒語的成功取決於某種程度的定，所以用定力殺人似乎就滿足了這裡的努力因素。

b) Arranging an assassin	b) 安排行兇者
As the rule indicates, a bhikkhu may commit an offense under this rule not only by using any of the six above-mentioned means of taking life but also by “searching for an assassin.” The Vibhaṅga explains this phrase in the rule simply with a list of weapons: a sword, a spear, a harpoon (§—BD omits this item), a skewer/stake, a club, a stone, a knife, poison, or a rope. There are two ways of making sense of this list. One is that, because the Pali word for assassin is literally “knife-carrier” (satthahāraka), the Vibhaṅga is taking pains to explain that an assassin might also use other weapons aside from a knife. The other way of interpreting the list, favored by the Commentary, is to view the Vibhaṅga’s list as an attempt to define the word satthahāraka—which, according to the Commentary, is a general term for a murderous weapon. The Commentary then goes on to say that the entire phrase searching for an assassin means setting up a stationary device, as described above. There are two problems with this interpretation, the first being that the word satthahāraka clearly means “assassin” in other parts of the Canon (see, for example, MN 145); the second being that this interpretation makes the phrase entirely superfluous: setting up a stationary device is already covered by another part of the rule. Thus we will follow the first interpretation of the Vibhaṅga’s explanation of the phrase: It is indicating that an assassin may use any weapon at all.	正如戒條所表明的，比丘不僅可以使用上述六種奪取生命方式中的任何一種，而且還可以透過「尋找行兇者」來犯戒。《經分別》僅僅用一張武器清單解釋了戒條中的這句話：劍、矛、魚叉（§—《戒律書》省略了此項）、串子/木樁、棍棒、石頭、刀、毒藥或繩索。有兩種方法可以理解這個清單。一是，因為巴利單字中行兇者的字面意思是「持刀者」（satthahāraka），所以《經分別》煞費苦心地解釋行兇者除了刀之外還可能使用其他武器。理解該清單的另一種方式，受到《義註》的青睞，是將《經分別》的清單視為試圖定義 satthahāraka 此單字－根據《義註》，此單字是殺人武器的通用術語。《義註》接著說，尋找行兇者整句話意思是設置固定裝置，如上所述。這個理解有兩個問題，第一個是 satthahāraka 此單字在《聖典》的其他部分中明確表示「行兇者」（參見，例如，《中部》145經）；第二個是，這種理解使該句話完全多餘：戒條的另一部分已經涵蓋了設置固定裝置。因此，我們將遵循《經分別》對這句話的解釋的第一個理解：它表明行兇者可以使用任何武器。
The question remains, however, as to how this interpretation is not redundant with commanding under the explanation of the ways of taking life. The answer appears to be this: The word satthahāraka is most commonly used in the Canon in the context of an assisted suicide, in which a person who wants to die but cannot bring himself to commit suicide arranges for someone else, a satthahāraka, to kill him. Thus the inclusion of this phrase in the rule means that a bhikkhu intent on dying who arranges for someone else to do the job for him would incur all the derived offenses leading up to the actual death. At present, this would rule out trying to get a doctor to arrange an assisted suicide for oneself. If one were to help arrange an assisted suicide for someone else, the case would come under commanding, above, as would the case of arranging an assassin for someone else not at that person’s request.	然而，問題仍然在於，在解釋奪取生命的方式時，這種理解如何與命令並存而不顯得多餘。答案似乎是這樣的：「satthahāraka」這個單字在《聖典》中最常用於協助自殺，即一個想要死但又無法自殺的人安排其他人（satthahāraka）殺死他。因此，在戒條中包含這句話意味著，一個想要死亡的比丘如果安排其他人為他做這項工作，將會犯下導致實際死亡的所有衍生違犯。目前，這將排除試圖讓醫生為自己安排協助自殺的可能性。如果要幫助他人安排協助自殺，那麼該情況屬於上述的命令，就像在未經他人請求下，為該人安排行兇者的情況一樣。
As we will see below, cases where one tries to kill oneself without arranging for someone else to do the job would not come under this rule. The apparent reason for making a distinction and including the act of “searching for an assassin” to kill oneself under this rule is that, in doing so, one would be asking another person to take on the seriously unskillful kamma of taking a human life.	正如我們將在下面看到的，一個人試圖自殺而不安排其他人來完成這項工作的情況不屬於這一戒條。做出區分並將「尋找行兇者」自殺行為納入這項戒條的明顯原因是，這樣做時，會要求另一個人承擔奪人生命的嚴重不善業。
The Commentary’s most useful comment in this context is its assertion that searching here must mean actually arranging, because the simple act of looking for an assassin without actually finding one would not incur any of the offenses under this rule.	在這種情況下，《義註》中最有用的評論是它斷言這裡的尋找必須意味著實際安排，因為僅僅只有尋找行兇者而沒有實際找到，不會招致本戒條下的任何罪行。

c) Describing the advantages of dying	c) 描述死亡的好處
This, the third type of act covered by this rule, can include berating a sick person (“Why do you keep hanging on to life like this? Don’t you realize what a burden you are to others?”) or simply telling a person of the miseries of life or the bliss of dying and going to heaven in such a way that he/she might feel inspired to commit suicide or simply pine away to death. The Vinīta-vatthu also includes under this type of act any statements that a nurse might make out of compassion to shorten the miseries of an illness by encouraging a patient to let go of life so as not to dawdle in the face of death. Thus, the Commentary notes, a bhikkhu talking to a dying patient should be very circumspect in how he chooses his words, focusing not on how to speed up the dying process but on how to inspire the patient with the following thoughts: “The attainment of the paths and fruitions is not out of the ordinary for a virtuous person. So, having formed no attachment for such things as your dwelling, and establishing mindfulness in the Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha, or the body, you should be heedful in your attention.” The Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 4 contains a number of stories in which bhikkhus comfort a dying bhikkhu by asking him to reflect on what he has attained through the practice, which was apparently a common way of encouraging a dying bhikkhu to focus his thoughts on the best object possible. The suttas also contain advice on how to encourage patients facing death. See, for example, MN 143, SN 36:7, SN 55:54, and AN 6:16. In all of these cases, the advice is aimed not at precipitating death but at inspiring calm and insight.	這是這個戒條涵蓋的第三種行為，可以包括斥責病人（「你為什麼要這樣堅持生命？難道你沒有意識到你給別人帶來了多大的負擔嗎？」）或只是告訴一個人，生命的苦難，或死亡並進入天界的幸福，以至於他/她可能會受到啟發而自殺或乾脆憔悴而死。《Vinīta-vatthu》還包括屬於此類的行為：護士出於同情心可能做出的任何陳述，鼓勵患者放棄生命，以免在死亡面前拖磨，以縮短疾病的痛苦。因此，《義註》指出，比丘在與臨終病人交談時，應該非常謹慎地選擇措辭，不要關注如何加速臨終過程，而應關注如何啟發病人產生以下想法：「對於有戒行的人來說，道與果的成就並非不尋常的。因此，當你對住所等事物不產生執著，並在佛、法、僧、或身中建立正念時，你應該在你的注意力上保持警覺。」《波羅夷》四的《Vinīta-vatthu》包含了許多故事，在這些故事中，比丘安慰一位臨終的比丘，要他反思自己透過修行所獲得的成就，這顯然是鼓勵臨終的比丘將念頭集中在盡可能好的所緣上的常見方法。經文也包含如何鼓勵面臨死亡的患者的建議。例如，請參閱《中部》143經、《相應部》36:7經、《相應部》55:54經和《增支部》6:16經。在所有這些情況下，建議的目的不是加速死亡，而是激發冷靜和內觀。
The Vibhaṅga notes that a statement describing the advantages of dying would fulfill the factor of effort regardless of whether delivered by gesture, by voice, by writing, or by means of a messenger. The same holds true for any statements under the next type of act.	《經分別》指出，描述死亡好處的陳述將滿足努力的因素，無論是透過手勢、聲音、書寫或透過使者傳達。這同樣適用於下一個類型的行為之下的任何陳述。

d) Inciting a person to die	d) 煽動他人死亡
Inciting a person to die, the fourth type of act, covers:	煽動他人死亡是第四種行為，包括：
—Recommending suicide. This includes not only telling a person to commit suicide but also giving advice—whether requested or not—on the best ways to commit the act.	—建議自殺。這不僅包括告訴一個人自殺，還包括無論是否要求，都提供有關實施該行為的最佳方式的建議。
—Telling a person to go to a dangerous place where he/she might die of the dangers.	—告訴一個人去一個危險的地方，在那裡他/她可能會因危險而死亡。
—Arranging a terrible sight, sound, etc., to frighten a person to death, or a beautiful, “heart-stirring” one to attract a person who will then pine away to death when it fades.	—安排一種可怕的景象、聲音等，把人嚇死，或者安排一種美麗的、「令人心曠神怡」的景象、聲音等來吸引人，等它消失後，人就會憔悴而死。
Four issues arise in relation to the above ways of killing:	上述殺害方式有四個問題：
Command. Giving a command or recommendation to get another person to perform any of these last three types of action—arranging an assassin, describing the advantages of dying, or inciting another person to die—would also fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.	命令。發出命令或建議讓另一個人執行最後三種類型的行動中的任何一種－安排行兇者、描述死亡的好處或煽動另一個人死亡－也符合本戒條下的努力因素。
Inaction. Given the Vibhaṅga’s definition of taking life, we can infer that inaction does not fulfill the factor of effort here, for it does not cut off the life faculty. Thus if a bhikkhu sits idly when seeing a flood sweep a person downstream, he commits no offense—regardless of his feelings about the person’s death—even if the person then drowns. Recommending that another person sit idly as well would also not fulfill the factor of effort here, because the category of command covers only the act of inciting the listener to do any of the four actions that would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.	不作為（見死不救）。根據《經分別》對奪取生命的定義，我們可以推斷，不作為在這裡並不能滿足努力因素，因為它不會切斷命根。因此，如果比丘看到洪水把人沖到下游時，無所事事地坐著，那麼無論他對這個人的死亡有什麼感受，即使這個人隨後被淹死，他也不會犯任何戒。建議另一個人也無所事事地坐著也不會滿足這裡的努力因素，因為命令類別僅涵蓋煽動聽者執行本戒條下滿足努力因素的四種行動中的任何一種。
Medical care and life-support. The same holds true if a bhikkhu decides not to give a patient a treatment—or to discontinue treatment—that might conceivably extend the patient’s life: It does not fulfill the factor of effort, for such acts do not cut off the life faculty. At most they simply allow it to end on its own. The Canon supports this inference by treating such actions not under this rule but under Mv.VIII.26.3-4, where it imposes only a dukkaṭa on the act of refusing to give any treatment at all to an ill bhikkhu, or of discontinuing all care for an ill bhikkhu prior to his recovery or death. This shows that the compilers of the Canon did not regard these acts as cutting off the life faculty. (Mv.VIII.26.8 lists the ideal characteristics of a bhikkhu who tends to the sick, but does not impose a penalty on a bhikkhu who cares for the sick but lacks the ideal qualities; at no point does the Canon impose a required level of care for the sick. The compilers’ refusal to mandate a level of care is wise. If there were a case in which the bhikkhus did not feel that that level of care was appropriate for their patient, they would have only one option: to abandon the patient, so as to incur only a dukkaṭa and not the potentially higher penalty for not measuring up to the mandated care. Thus, instead of protecting the patient, a higher level of mandated care would expose the patient to abandonment.) For this reason, deciding to withhold or discontinue a particular treatment—while still continuing otherwise to care for the patient—would not be grounds for an offense.	醫療護理和生命維持。如果比丘決定不提供患者可以延長患者生命的治療，或停止治療，同樣的情況也適用：它不滿足努力因素，因為這樣的行為不會切斷命根。最多只是允許生命自行結束。《聖典》支持這一推論，不是根據本戒條而是根據《大品》.八.26.3-4來處理此類行為，其中拒絕對生病的比丘進行任何治療，或在生病的比丘康復或死亡之前停止對他的所有護理的行為，僅只犯《突吉羅》。由此可見，《聖典》的編纂者並不認為這些行為是切斷命根的行為。（《大品》.八.26.8列出了照顧病人的比丘的理想特質，但沒有對照顧病人但缺乏理想特質的比丘施加懲罰；《聖典》在任何時候都沒有規定病人所需的護理水平。編譯者拒絕強制規定護理水平是明智的。如果出現比丘們認為該水平的護理不適合他們的病人的情況，他們只有一個選擇：放棄患者，這樣只會犯《突吉羅》，而不是因為未達到強制規定的護理水平而受到潛在的更高懲罰。因此，更高水平的強制護理不但不能保護患者，反而會使患者面臨被遺棄的風險。）因此，決定拒絕或停止特定治療－同時仍繼續以其他方式護理患者－不會成為犯戒的理由。
If, however, a bhikkhu caring for a patient acts in a way to cut off the patient’s life faculty, that would fulfill the factor of effort here. The Vinīta-vatthu makes this point with a set of cases in which bhikkhus give patients treatments that are actually harmful for the patients. In the instances where the other factors for an offense are present—the bhikkhus mean to kill the patient, and the patient dies—the bhikkhus incur the full offense. In another set of cases, a bhikkhu feeling pity for a friend in severe pain praises the pleasures that await him after death. Again, in the instances where the bhikkhu intends to bring about the patient’s death and the patient dies, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.	然而，如果一位比丘照顧病人時以切斷病人命根的方式行事，那就滿足了這裡的努力因素。《Vinīta-vatthu》透過一組比丘為病人提供實際上對病人有害的治療的案例來闡述這一點。在有其他犯戒因素的情況下－比丘意圖殺死病人，而病人死亡－比丘則完全違犯此戒。在另一組案例中，一位比丘對一位遭受劇烈痛苦的朋友感到憐憫，並稱讚死後等待著他的快樂。再者，當比丘意圖導致病人死亡而病人死亡時，比丘犯《波羅夷》。
For more on the topic of medical care, see BMC2, Chapter 5.	有關醫療護理主題的更多信息，請參閱《佛教修道準則第二冊》第五章。
Shared responsibility. Unlike the Vibhaṅga to the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga here does not explicitly discuss the issue of how to allot penalties when a group of bhikkhus acts together to commit a murder but only one of them delivers the fatal blow. However, the Vinīta-vatthu contains a series of cases in which bhikkhus act as a group to give a treatment to a sick bhikkhu with the aim of ending his life. When the bhikkhu dies, all of them incur a pārājika. In one of the cases the bhikkhu dies from a medical treatment to the nose, in another he dies from eating food. None of the texts discuss whether all the bhikkhus in question took turns giving the fatal dosage, or if only one of the bhikkhus did while the others helped to prepare it. Given that arranging an assassin would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule, it seems reasonable to infer that actively assisting in a murder would also fulfill the factor, even if one does not deliver the fatal blow. From this inference we can conclude that the discussion of shared responsibility under the preceding rule would also apply here.	共同責任。與前一個戒條的《經分別》不同的是，這裡的《經分別》並沒有明確討論當一群比丘共同實施謀殺但只有一個人造成致命一擊時如何分配懲罰的問題。然而，《Vinīta-vatthu》包含一系列比丘們以團體的方式治療生病的比丘，並打算結束他的生命的案例。當比丘去世時，他們都犯《波羅夷》。在其中一例中，比丘因鼻子接受治療而死亡，在另一例中，他則因進食而死亡。沒有任何文本討論是否所有相關的比丘輪流給予致命的劑量，或者是只有一名比丘這樣做，而其他比丘則幫助準備。鑑於安排一名行兇者就滿足了本戒條下的努力因素，似乎可以合理地推斷，即使沒有造成致命一擊，積極協助謀殺也滿足了這一因素。由此推論，我們可以得出結論，前一個戒條中關於共同責任的討論也適用於此處。

Result	結果
This factor is fulfilled if, as a result of the bhikkhu’s action, the victim dies through the cutting of his/her life-faculty. Because the life-faculty is something that inevitably ends, there is a need to define clearly how far the influences of a bhikkhu’s actions should be traced for him to be considered responsible for a death.	如果比丘的行動導致受害者因命根切斷而死亡，那麼這一因素就會被滿足。因為命根是不可避免會結束的，因此有必要明確定義比丘行動的影響程度，追溯到他被認定為死亡負責。
The Commentary treats this issue by posing two scenarios under its discussion of pitfalls. In the first, an intended victim survives a fall into a pitfall, manages to climb out, but later dies of a disease incurred from the fall. In this case, the Commentary says, the factor of result is fulfilled. The same holds true if the disease goes into remission only to return and take the victim’s life many years later. If complications arise from the disease, however, and the victim dies from a combination of the disease and its complications, then if the original disease was the predominant factor in the death, the bhikkhu would be responsible for the victim’s death; if the complications were the predominant factor, he would not.	《義註》透過在陷阱討論中提出兩種情境來處理這個問題。第一種情況是，一名預定的受害者跌入陷阱後倖存下來，並設法爬出來，但後來死於跌倒引起的疾病。《義註》說，在這種情況下，結果因素就被滿足。如果疾病得到緩解，但多年後又復發並奪走受害者的生命，情況也是如此。然而，如果併發症是由疾病引起的，而受害者因疾病及其併發症的結合而死亡，那麼如果原本的疾病是死亡的主要因素，比丘就要對受害者的死亡負責；如果併發症是主要因素，他就不必負責。
In the second scenario, an intended victim falls into the pitfall while being chased by thieves but does not die in the fall. Instead, the thieves catch up with him, drag him out of the pitfall, and kill him. In this case, the bhikkhu is still responsible for the victim’s death because his pitfall was instrumental in enabling the thieves to catch and kill the victim.	在第二種情況下，預定的受害者在被小偷追趕時掉入陷阱，但並未死亡。相反，小偷追上了他，將他從陷阱中拖了出來，並殺死了他。在這種情況下，比丘仍然對受害者的死亡負有責任，因為他的陷阱有助於小偷抓住並殺死受害者。
The Commentary also considers a different sort of case related to the factor of result: If a bhikkhu means to cause the death of a group of people, then when any member of the group dies as a result of his efforts, the Commentary says that he incurs a pārājika. In other words, he does not have to fulfill his intention of killing the whole group in order to fulfill the factor of result here.	《義註》也考慮了與結果因素相關的另一種情況：如果一個比丘有意造成一群人的死亡，那麼當該群體的任何成員由於他的努力而死亡時，《義註》說，他犯《波羅夷》。也就是說，他並不需要實現殺死整個群體的意圖，才能滿足這裡的結果因素。

Derived penalties	衍生懲罰
The Canon assigns lesser penalties in cases where a bhikkhu tries to cause a person’s death through any of the four means mentioned in this rule and yet the person does not die. If the person experiences pain or injury as a result of the bhikkhu’s efforts, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the bhikkhu’s efforts result in neither pain nor death, the penalty is a dukkaṭa for each separate action involved in the attempt.	如果比丘試圖透過本戒條中提到的四種方法中的任何一種導致某人死亡，但這個人並未死亡，則《聖典》會給予較輕的懲罰。如果因為比丘的努力而使人感到疼痛或受傷，懲罰是《偷蘭遮》。如果比丘的努力既沒有導致痛苦，也沒有導致死亡，則對嘗試中涉及的每一個單獨行為的懲罰是《突吉羅》。
If a bhikkhu intends simply to injure the victim or cause him/her pain, and yet the victim dies as a result of the bhikkhu’s actions, the case is treated under Pc 74.	如果比丘只是意圖傷害受害者或給他/她帶來痛苦，但受害者卻因比丘的行為而死亡，則該情況按《波逸提》七四來處理。
There is an apparent contradiction in the Vinīta-vatthu concerning the penalty for a bhikkhu who tries to kill one person but ends up killing another instead. In one case it says that a bhikkhu who means to kill X but kills Y instead incurs a pārājika. In another case it tells of a bhikkhu who gives medicine to a woman who wants to commit an abortion near the end of a full-term pregnancy. The woman takes the medicine but, instead of the fetus’ aborting, the woman dies and the infant survives. In this case, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya, presumably for the pain he caused the infant.	《Vinīta-vatthu》中關於對試圖殺某人但最終卻殺了另一個人的比丘的懲罰有一個明顯的矛盾。在某個案例中，它說一位比丘想要殺死 X ，但卻殺死了 Y ，犯《波羅夷》。在另一個案例中，講述了一位比丘為想要在完全足月妊娠即將結束時墮胎的婦女提供藥物。婦女服用了藥物，但胎兒並沒有流產，而是婦女死亡，胎兒倖存。在這種情況下，比丘犯《偷蘭遮》，大概是因為他帶給胎兒的痛苦。
The Commentary tries to resolve this contradiction with an illustration: A bhikkhu with a grudge against A decides to ambush him. He sees B coming down the road and, mistaking him for A, shoots him dead on the spot. Because his intention was to kill the person he was aiming at, he incurs a pārājika. We can call this a case of mistaken identity. In cases of this sort, whether the “right” or the “wrong” person dies is of no consequence to the offense.	《義註》試圖用一個例子來解決這個矛盾：一位對 A 懷有怨恨的比丘決定伏擊他。他看到 B 沿著路過來，誤認為他是 A ，當場開槍打死了他。因為他的意圖是殺死他所瞄準的人，所以他犯《波羅夷》。我們可以稱之為身份誤認的情況。在這種情況下，無論是「正確」的人還是「錯誤」的人死亡，對於犯戒都沒有影響。
If, however, the bhikkhu is a poor shot, takes aim at B but misses him, and inadvertently kills C instead, he does not incur a pārājika, for he did not intend to kill C during any part of his action. His only penalties are the dukkaṭas he incurs while preparing for B’s murder.	然而，如果比丘射擊技術不佳，瞄準 B 但沒有擊中他，並且無意中殺死了 C ，那麼他就不會犯《波羅夷》，因為他在行動的任何部分都無意殺死 C 。他唯一受到的懲罰是在準備謀殺 B 時犯《突吉羅》。

Special cases	特別案例
The Vinīta-vatthu includes three special cases that touch on this rule but inspired the Buddha to formulate separate rules to deal specifically with them:	《Vinīta-vatthu》包括三個特殊情況，它們涉及到本戒條，但啟發佛陀制定單獨的戒條來專門處理它們：
1) A bhikkhu, sitting down hard in a chair without first checking it carefully, kills a child lying in the chair and covered with a blanket—no penalty for the death, but a dukkaṭa for sitting down without first checking carefully.	1）一位比丘，在沒有仔細檢查的情況下重重地坐在椅子上，殺死了一個躺在椅子裡並蓋著毯子的孩子－並沒有因該死亡事故受到懲罰，但由於沒有先仔細檢查而坐下而犯《突吉羅》。
2) Some group-of-six bhikkhus, for the fun of it, throw a rock from a mountaintop and accidentally kill a young cowherd standing below—again, no penalty for the death, but a dukkaṭa for throwing a rock in fun. (The Commentary states that rock here also covers sticks, bricks, and other similar objects; and that throwing also includes rolling. It also states that if a bhikkhu has a valid reason for throwing or rolling a rock not in fun—for example, he is engaged in construction work and rolls a piece of rock to someone else on the job; he is eating his meal and throws a piece of wood to chase away crows or dogs—he incurs no offense.)	2）某六群比丘為了好玩，從山頂扔石頭，不小心殺死了站在山下的一位年輕牧牛者－同樣，並沒有因該死亡事故受到懲罰，但因為好玩扔石頭而犯《突吉羅》。（《義註》指出，這裡的石頭也包括棍棒、磚塊和其他類似的物體；投擲也包括滾動。它還指出，如果比丘有正當理由投擲或滾動石頭而非除為了好玩－例如，他從事建築工作，滾動石頭給正在工作的其他人；他正在吃飯，扔一塊木頭來趕走烏鴉或狗－他不犯戒。）
3) A bhikkhu, feeling oppressed and discontented, throws himself over a cliff. Instead of dying, he lands on and kills a hapless basket-maker standing at the foot of the cliff—again, no offense for the death, but a dukkaṭa for throwing oneself from a high place. This rule shows that attempts to kill oneself—aside from searching for an assassin, as mentioned above—would not come under the main rule here, because the bhikkhu would have apparently felt pain when landing on the basket-maker, and yet the penalty is only a dukkaṭa. If the case had been treated under the main rule, he would have been penalized with a thullaccaya instead.	3）一位比丘感到壓抑和不滿，跳崖自殺。他沒有死，而是壓死了站在懸崖腳下的一個倒霉的編籃人－同樣，並沒有因該死亡事故受到懲罰，但因為從高處跳下自殺而犯《突吉羅》。這條戒條表明，除了如上所述尋找行兇者之外，企圖自殺不屬於這裡的主要戒條，因為比丘壓在編籃人身上時顯然會感到疼痛，但懲罰只是《突吉羅》。如果按照主要戒條處理此案，他會犯《偷蘭遮》。
The Commentary extrapolates from this case to apply the dukkaṭa to all attempts at suicide, including even the decision not to take food when motivated by a desire to die. However, it then runs into the question of how far this penalty applies to a bhikkhu who is ill. Its verdict: As long as medicine and attendants are available to him, the penalty would still apply. But then it lists two cases where the penalty would not apply: (a) A bhikkhu is suffering from a long and serious illness, and the attendant bhikkhus are fed up with caring for him, thinking, “When will we be free of this sick one?” If the bhikkhu reflects that, even with medical care, his body won’t last and that the bhikkhus are being put to difficulties, he incurs no penalty in refusing food and medicine. (b) A bhikkhu—reflecting that his illness is harsh, the forces of life are running out, and yet the noble attainments appear to be within his reach—may refuse food and medicine without penalty.	《義註》從這個案例中推斷，將《突吉羅》應用於所有自殺企圖，甚至包括出於求死的動機而決定不吃東西。然而，接下來的問題是，這種懲罰對於生病的比丘適用到什麼程度。其判決是：只要他有藥物和護理人員，懲罰仍然適用。但隨後它列出了兩種不適用懲罰的情況： (a) 一位比丘患有長期而嚴重的疾病，護理的比丘厭倦了照顧他，心想：「我們什麼時候才能擺脫這個病人？」如果比丘反思，即使有醫療護理，他的身體也無法長久，而比丘們正面臨困難，那麼他不會因拒絕食物和藥物而受到懲罰。 (b) 比丘－反思他的病情很嚴重，生命力正在耗盡，且聖果看起來是在他力所能及的範圍內－可以拒絕食物和藥物，而不受懲罰。
The Commentary’s deliberations here show how difficult it is to legislate in this area, and there are reasons to question the way it applies the Great Standards here. Case (b) is apparently derived from SN 4:23, where Ven. Godhika takes his life and gains arahantship just moments before death; and from SN 35:87, where the Buddha says that one who puts down this body without taking up another body dies blamelessly. However, in arriving at its verdict in this case, the Commentary has to add the factors of motivation and perception to the equation, factors that are absent from the rule on which the judgment is based. It also leaves unanswered the question of how harsh the disease has to be, and how near the anticipated attainments, to qualify for this exemption.	《義註》中的審議顯示了在這一領域制定律法是多麼困難，並且有理由質疑其在此應用《四大教示》的方式。情況 (b) 顯然源自《相應部》4:23經，其中瞿提迦尊者在臨終前自殺並證得阿羅漢果。從《相應部》35:87經，佛陀說，放下此身而不取他身的人，死時無可指責。然而，在對本情況做出判決時，《義註》必須將動機和感知添加到因素中，而這些因素是判決所依據的戒條中所沒有的。它也沒有回答這樣的問題：疾病必須有多嚴重，以及預期的成就有多接近，才有資格獲得這種豁免。
This same holds true for case (a), which entails even more dubious reasoning. The Commentary’s judgment here has no clear precedent in the Canon; there is no clear line for deciding exactly how bad the illness and how fed up the attendants have to be for this case to apply; and why should the feelings of other people determine when it is or is not allowable to refuse food?	對於情況（a）也是如此，它的推理更加暧昧可疑。《義註》此處的判斷在《聖典》中沒有明確的先例；對於這種情況的適用，沒有明確的界線來確定病情的嚴重程度以及護理人員必須有多厭倦；而且為什麼要根據別人的感受來決定何時允許或不允許拒絕食物？
It is worth noting that the origin story to the original rule here gave the Buddha the opportunity, had he wanted it, to formulate a general rule against attempted suicides, but he chose not to. He later formulated this subsidiary rule only when a bhikkhu attempted a suicide in a way that endangered the life and safety of another person. Thus a more appropriate way of applying the Great Standards to this subsidiary rule would be to extend it only to cases of that sort: where a bhikkhu’s attempts at suicide would bring danger to another person’s life and limb.	值得注意的是，這裡原始戒條的起源故事給了佛陀機會，如果他願意的話，可以制定禁止試圖自殺的一般戒條，但他選擇不這樣做。後來，只有當比丘試圖以會危害他人生命和安全的方式自殺時，他才制定了這條輔助戒條。因此，將《四大教示》應用於這條輔助戒條的一個更合適的方法是僅將其擴展到此類情況：比丘的試圖自殺會給另一個人的生命和肢體帶來危險。
As for ways of attempting suicide that do not endanger others, it seems better to follow the Buddha’s wisdom in not legislating about this issue at all, and to treat it as a matter of Dhamma rather than Vinaya. In other words, one should keep in mind his comment in SN 35:87 that the only blameless death is an arahant’s. If, lacking that attainment, one chooses to refuse food when ill to speed up one’s death, one should be heedful of the risks that death and rebirth can involve.	至於試圖自殺而不危及他人的方式，似乎最好遵循佛陀的智慧，根本不對此議題制定律法，並將其視為「法」而不是「律」的問題。換句話說，人們應該記住他在《相應部》35:87經中的評論，即唯一無可指責的死亡是阿羅漢的死亡。如果缺乏這種成就，在生病時選擇拒絕食物以加速死亡，則應該警惕死亡和重生可能涉及的風險。

Non-offenses	不犯
As stated above, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who kills a person unintentionally, not knowing, or not aiming at death.	如上所述，比丘無意、不知、或不以死亡為目的而殺死人，並無犯戒。
As for the standard exemptions, the Thai edition lists all four under this rule: a bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, and the first offenders (in this case, some group-of-six bhikkhus who, in a follow-up to the origin story, described the advantages of death to a man with a beautiful wife, in hopes that he would commit suicide so that she could be theirs; he did commit suicide, but she denounced them). Other editions of the Canon omit exemptions for a bhikkhu possessed by spirits or delirious with pain. The Commentary refers to the standard exemptions as a set simply with the word, “insane, etc.” There is reason to believe that if these two exemptions were missing in the time of the Commentary, it would have noted their absence.	至於標準豁免，泰文版列出了本戒條下的所有四種：精神錯亂，被靈體附身，因疼痛而狂亂，以及第一個犯此戒的比丘（在這個案例中，某六群比丘，他們在起源故事的後續，向一個擁有美麗妻子的男人描述了死亡的好處，希望他自殺，這樣她就可以屬於他們；他確實自殺了，但她譴責了他們）。其他版本的《聖典》省略了對被靈體附身，或因痛苦而狂亂的比丘的豁免。《義註》將標準豁免視為一組，僅用“精神錯亂等”一詞來提及。有理由相信，如果在《義註》的時代缺少這兩項豁免，那麼它會指出它們不存在。
Summary: Intentionally bringing about the death of a human being, even if it is still an embryo—whether by killing the person, arranging for an assassin to kill the person, inciting the person to die, or describing the advantages of death—is a pārājika offense.	摘要：故意造成一個人的死亡，即使它還是一個胚胎－無論是殺人、安排行兇者殺人、煽動人去死，還是描述死亡的好處－都是《波羅夷》罪。

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4	四
Should any bhikkhu, without direct knowledge, claim a superior human state, a truly noble knowledge and vision, as present in himself, saying, “Thus do I know; thus do I see,” such that regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, he—being remorseful and desirous of purification—might say, “Friends, not knowing, I said I know; not seeing, I said I see—vainly, falsely, idly,” unless it was from over-estimation, he also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.	如果任何比丘在沒有證知的情況下，宣稱自己具有上人法、真正聖智見，他說：「我如是知；我如是見，」以至於無論以後是否受到盤問，他在悔恨欲清淨的情況下，可能會說：「朋友們，不知，我說我知；不見，我說我見。──徒勞、虛假、無益。」除非是因為高估，否則也是波羅夷，不共住。
All conscious lies are forbidden by the first pācittiya rule, but knowingly to make a false claim to a superior human state is one of the most heinous lies a bhikkhu can tell, so here it receives its own rule and the heaviest possible penalty.	所有有意識的謊言都是第一條《波逸提》戒條所禁止的，但故意謊稱有上人法是比丘所能說出的最令人髮指的謊言之一，因此在這裡它有自己的戒條和最重的可能懲罰。
The seriousness with which the Buddha regarded a breach of this training rule is indicated by his statements to the original instigators:	佛陀對違反這項學處的行為的嚴肅態度可以從他對最初犯戒者的陳述中看出：
“You worthless men, how can you for the sake of your stomachs speak praise of one another’s superior human states to householders? It would be better for you that your bellies be slashed open with a sharp butcher’s knife than that you should for the sake of your stomachs speak praise of one another’s superior human states to householders. Why is that? For that reason you would undergo death or death-like suffering, but you would not on that account, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. But for this reason you would, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell…. Bhikkhus, in this world with its devas, māras, and brahmās, its generations with brahmans and contemplatives, princes and men, this is the ultimate great thief: he who claims an unfactual, non-existent superior human state. Why is that? You have consumed the nation’s almsfood through theft.”	「你們這些無用之人，怎能為了自己的口腹，對諸居士互相讚歎上人法呢？與其為了自己的口腹而對諸居士互相讚歎上人法，不如用一把鋒利的屠刀把自己的肚子剖開。所以者何？因彼，你會經歷死亡或類死的痛苦，但你不會因此而在身壞命終後，墮入惡處、惡趣、惡生、地獄。但以是故，身壞命終後，墮於惡處、惡趣、惡生、地獄……。諸比丘們，在這個有天神、魔羅、梵天的世界，以及有婆羅門和沙門、王子和人類的世間，這是最大之賊：他聲稱有一個不真實的、不存在的上人法。所以者何？你們通過盜竊食國家施與之食故。」
The full offense under this rule has four factors.	本戒條下的完整犯戒有四個因素。
1) Object: a superior human state.	1）對象：上人法。
Perception: One perceives it as not present in oneself.	2）感知：知道它不存在於自己身上。
Effort: One addresses a human being, mentioning that state in connection with oneself—either the state as within oneself, or oneself as in the state.	3）努力：對一個人說話，提到與自己有關的狀態－若不是自己內在的狀態，就是狀態中的自己。
4) Intention: with the intent to misrepresent the truth, motivated by an evil desire.	4）意圖：出於邪惡的慾望，意圖扭曲事實。
The commentaries add a fifth factor—result—saying that one’s listener must understand what one is saying for there to be the full offense, but as we will see below, this factor appears to be based on a misreading of the Vibhaṅga.	註釋加入了第五個因素－結果－說聽者必須理解在說什麼，才能構成完整的犯戒，但正如我們將在下面看到的，這個因素看起來是基於對《經分別》的誤讀。

Object	對象
The Vibhaṅga lists many superior human states, defining them as follows:	《經分別》列出了許多上人法，定義如下：
meditative absorption (jhāna): the four jhānas;	禪定（jhāna）：四種禪那；
emancipation (vimokkha): the emptiness (suññatā) emancipation, the theme-less (animitta) emancipation, and the non-directed (appaṇihita) emancipation;	解脫（vimokkha）：空（suññatā）解脫、無相（animitta）解脫、無願（appaṇihita）解脫；
concentration (samādhi): the emptiness concentration, the theme-less concentration, and the non-directed concentration;	三昧（samādhi）：空三昧、無相三昧、無所有三昧；
meditative attainments (samāpatti): the emptiness attainment, the theme-less attainment, and the non-directed attainment;	正受（samāpatti）：空正受、無相正受、無所有正受；
knowledge-and-vision (ñāṇa-dassanā): knowledge of past lives, knowledge of the passing away and arising of beings, and knowledge of the ending of mental effluents (āsava);	智見（nāṇa-dassanā）：宿住隨念智、有情死生智、漏盡智（āsava）；
path-development (magga-bhāvanā): the 37 Wings to Awakening (bodhipakkhiya-dhamma)—the four establishings of mindfulness, the four right exertions, the four bases of power, the five faculties, the five strengths, the seven factors for Awakening, and the noble eightfold path;	修道（magga-bhāvanā）：三十七菩提分法（bodhipakkhiya-dhamma）－四念處、四正勤、四神足、五根、五力、七覺支、及八正道；
the realization of the noble fruits (phala-sacchikiriya): the fruit of stream-entry, the fruit of once-returning, the fruit of non-returning, and the fruit of arahantship;	證得聖果（phala-sacchikiriya）：入流果、一來果、不還果、阿羅漢果；
the abandoning of defilements (kilesappahāna): the abandoning of passion, aversion, and delusion;	斷煩惱（kilesappahāna）：斷貪、瞋、癡；
the mind’s freedom from hindrance (vinīvaraṇatā cittassa): the mind unhindered by passion, aversion, and delusion; and	心離蓋（vinīvaraṇatā cittassa）：心不受貪、瞋、癡的阻礙；和
delight in an empty dwelling (suññāgāre abhirati): the delight in an empty dwelling stemming from the four jhānas.	樂靜處（suññāgāre abhirati）：從四種禪那而生的樂靜處。
The Commentary classifies these states into two broad categories: mahaggata dhamma—“enlarged” or “expanded” states—related to the practice of meditative absorption; and lokuttara dhamma—transcendent states—related to the absolute eradication of the mental fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth.	《義註》將這些狀態分為兩大類：mahaggata dhamma－「廣大的」或「擴展的」狀態－與禪那修行有關；和lokuttara dhamma－出世間的狀態－與徹底根除將心束縛於輪迴的結使有關。
a. Mahaggata dhamma	廣大法
The discourses describe the four jhānas as follows:	經文對四種禪那的描述如下：
“There is the case where a bhikkhu—quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities—enters and remains in the first jhāna: rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought and evaluation. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion….	「有一種情況，一位比丘－離欲、離不善法－進入並安住於初禪：由遠離而生的喜與樂，伴隨著定向思惟（尋，覺）和評估（伺，觀）。他用遠離所產生的喜和樂來滲透、遍及、布滿、充滿這個身體……。
“And furthermore, with the stilling of directed thoughts and evaluations, he enters and remains in the second jhāna: rapture and pleasure born of concentration, unity of awareness free from directed thought and evaluation—internal assurance. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of concentration….	「再者，隨著定向思惟和評估的止息，他進入並安住於二禪：由定而生的喜與樂、內心安住一境，沒有定向思惟和評估－內在的確信。他用定而生的喜和樂滲透、遍及、布滿、充滿這個身體……。
“And furthermore, with the fading of rapture, he remains equanimous, mindful, and alert, and senses pleasure with the body. He enters and remains in the third jhāna, and of him the noble ones declare, ‘Equanimous and mindful, he has a pleasant abiding.’ He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the pleasure divested of rapture….	「再者，隨著喜的消退，他保持捨、正念、警覺，並感受身體的快樂。他進入並安住於三禪，聖者們對他宣稱：「他有捨心和正念，他安住在樂之中。」他以離喜的樂來滲透、遍及、布滿、充滿這個身體……。
“And furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain—as with the earlier disappearance of elation and distress—he enters and remains in the fourth jhāna: purity of equanimity and mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. He sits permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness, so that nothing of his entire body is unpervaded by pure, bright awareness.”—DN 2; MN 119; AN 5:28	「再者，隨著樂與苦的捨棄——正如先前喜悅與苦惱的消失一樣——他進入並安住於四禪：捨與正念的清淨，無樂亦無苦。他以清淨、光明的覺知遍及全身而坐，因此他整個身體的一切都被清淨、光明的覺知所遍及。」—《長部》2經；《中部》119經；《增支部》5:28經
The Commentary notes that four formless states—what the Canon calls “formlessnesses beyond form,” and the Commentary calls “formless jhānas”—are based on the fourth jhāna, and so would count as superior human states as well. The Canon describes them as follows:	《義註》指出，四種無色境界——《聖典》稱之為「超越色之無色」，《義註》稱之為「無色禪那」——是基於四禪，因此也算上人法。《聖典》對它們的描述如下：
“With the complete transcending of perceptions of form, and the passing away of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space….	「隨著對色想的徹底超越，以及有對想的消失，以及不作意種種想，（感知）「空無邊」，進入並安住於空無邊處……。
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness….	「隨著徹底超越空無邊處，（感知）「識無邊」，進入並安住於識無邊處…。
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness….	「隨著徹底超越識無邊處，（感知）「無所有」，進入並安住於無所有處…。
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.”—DN 15	「隨著徹底超越無所有處，進入並安住於非想非非想處。」——《長部》15經
A fifth state, the cessation of perception and feeling, is reached by transcending the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, and all who reach it become either non-returners or arahants. The Commentary argues that this state does not count as a superior human state, on the technical grounds that it is neither worldly (lokiya) nor transcendent, but nothing in the Canon indicates that a superior human state has to be clearly one or the other. Using the Commentary’s own reasoning with regard to the four formless states—that they are based on the fourth jhāna—the same argument can be used to include the cessation of perception and feeling as a superior human state as well.	第五種境界，是想與受的滅盡，是超越非想非非想處而達到的，所有達到此境界的人，要麼成為不來者，要麼成為阿羅漢。《義註》認為，這種境界不算是上人法，因為它既不是世間的（lokiya）也不是超越的，但《聖典》中沒有任何內容表明上人法必須明確是其中之一。使用《義註》本身關於四種無色境界的推理──它們是基於第四禪──同樣的論點也可以用來包括作為上人法的想和受的滅盡。
From the inclusion of the three knowledges in the Vibhaṅga’s list, the Commentary takes up the issue of whether the remaining five of the eight knowledges should be included as well. The three knowledges, as described in DN 2, are:	《義註》從將三明列入《經分別》列表開始，就討論了是否應該將八種智見中的其餘五種也包括在內的問題。《長部》2經中所描述的三明是：
Recollection of past lives (pubbenivāsānusati-ñāṇa): “He recollects his manifold past lives, i.e., one birth, two births, three births, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, one hundred, one thousand, one hundred thousand, many eons of cosmic contraction, many eons of cosmic expansion, many eons of cosmic contraction and expansion, (recollecting,) ‘There I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance. Such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such the end of my life. Passing away from that state, I re-arose there. There too I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance. Such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such the end of my life. Passing away from that state, I re-arose here.’ Thus he recollects his manifold past lives in their modes and details.”	宿住隨念智（pubbenivāsānusati-ñāṇa）：「隨念彼於宿世之種種住處，猶如一生、二生、三生、四生、五生、十生、二十生、三十生、四十生、五十生、百生、千生、十萬生、幾壞劫、幾成劫、幾成壞劫：『於彼處，我有如是名、生於如是種族、如是階級、取如是食、享受如是苦樂、有如是壽量。我由其處死而生於他處，於此我有如是名、生如是種族、如是之階級、取如是食、享受如是苦樂、有如是壽量。而我由彼處歿，生來此處。』具如是形相、境遇，隨念種種宿世之住處。」
Knowledge of the passing away and reappearing of beings (cutūpapāta-ñāṇa): “He sees—by means of the divine eye, purified and surpassing the human—beings passing away and re-appearing, and he discerns how they are inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate in accordance with their kamma: ‘These beings—who were endowed with bad conduct of body, speech, and mind, who reviled the noble ones, who held wrong views and undertook actions under the influence of wrong views—with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared in a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. But these beings—who were endowed with good conduct of body, speech, and mind, who did not revile the noble ones, who held right views and undertook actions under the influence of right views—with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared in a good destination, a heavenly world.’ Thus—by means of the divine eye, purified and surpassing the human—he sees beings passing away and re-appearing, and he discerns how they are inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate in accordance with their kamma.”	有情死生智（cutūpapāta-ñāṇa）：「彼以超越人界之天眼，觀察眾生，見眾生之死而又生；證知眾生應其所為之業，〔而有〕貴賤、美醜、幸福、不幸福。即：『諸賢！此等眾生具身、語、意之惡業，誹謗聖者，以懷邪見，得邪見業；彼等於身壞死後，生於惡生、惡趣、地獄。諸賢！此等眾生具身、語、意之善業，不誹謗聖者，以懷正見，得正見業；彼等身壞死後，生於善趣、天界。』如是，彼以清淨超越人界之天眼，觀察眾生，見眾生死而又生；證知眾生應其所為之業，〔而有〕貴賤、美醜、幸福、不幸福。」
Knowledge of the ending of mental effluents (āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa): “He discerns, as it has actually come to be, that ‘This is stress…. This is the origination of stress…. This is the cessation of stress…. This is the way leading to the cessation of stress…. These are (mental) effluents…. This is the origination of effluents…. This is the cessation of effluents…. This is the way leading to the cessation of effluents.’ His heart, thus knowing, thus seeing, is released from the effluent of sensuality, the effluent of becoming, the effluent of ignorance. With release, there is the knowledge, ‘Released.’ He discerns that ‘Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.’”	漏盡智（āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa）：「彼如實證知：『此是苦』，如實證知：『此是苦之集』，如實證知：『此是苦之滅』，如實證知：『此是到達苦滅之道』。如實證知：『此是漏之滅』，如實證知：『此是到達漏滅之道』。如是知、如是見故，其心解脫欲漏、解脫有漏、解脫無明漏，而『於解脫，解脫』之智慧生，證知：『生已盡，梵行已立，所作已辦，不受後有。』」
The first two of these knowledges, even though they comprised part of the Buddha’s Awakening, are mundane, in that people may develop them without necessarily attaining any of the transcendent paths and fruitions. Thus they belong under the category of mahaggata dhamma, as they are based on the attainment of jhāna either in this or in a previous life. The third knowledge, however—because it describes the arising of the transcendent paths and fruitions—comes under the category of lokuttara dhamma, and is the only one of the eight knowledges to do so.	前兩種智見，儘管它們是佛陀覺醒的一部分，但它們是世間的，因為人們可以修習它們，而不必獲得任何超越的道果。因此，它們屬於廣大法的範疇，因為它們是基於今生或前世證得禪那。然而，第三種智見──因為它描述了超越的道果的生起──屬於出世間法的範疇，並且是八種智見中唯一具有這種性質。
DN 2 describes the remaining five knowledges as:	《長部》2經將其餘五種智見描述為：
Insight knowledge (vipassanā-ñāṇa): “He discerns: ‘This body of mine is endowed with form, composed of the four primary elements, born from mother and father, nourished with rice and porridge, subject to inconstancy, rubbing, pressing, dissolution, and dispersion. And this consciousness of mine is supported here and bound up here.’”	觀智（vipassanā-ñāṇa）：「彼如次知：『我此身是由色所成、四大種所成、父母之所生，飯粥所長養者，是無常、破壞、粉碎、斷絕、壞滅之法。我之識與此相關連、依此而存在者。』」
Mind-made body (manomayiddhi): “From this body he creates another body, endowed with form, made of the mind, complete in all its parts, not inferior in its faculties, just as if a man were to draw a reed from its sheath.”	意所成身（manomayiddhi）：「彼由其色身，化作意所成，而有一切〔大〕肢小肢及不異其自己之身，猶如有人，由文奢草，取拔其莖。」
Supranormal powers (iddhividhī): “He wields manifold supranormal powers. Having been one he becomes many; having been many he becomes one. He appears. He vanishes. He goes unimpeded through walls, ramparts, and mountains as if through space. He dives in and out of the earth as if it were water. He walks on water without sinking as if it were dry land. Sitting cross-legged he flies through the air like a winged bird. With his hand he touches and strokes even the sun and moon, so mighty and powerful. He exercises influence with his body even as far as the Brahmā worlds.”	種種神變（iddhividhī）：「彼證得種種神變。一身而〔化為〕多身，多身而〔合為〕一身，或現身、或隱身；通過壁、透過墻，穿過山無有障礙，猶如於空中；出沒於大地，猶如於水；行於水上不沈，猶如於地上；趺坐、經行於空中，猶如有翼之鳥；有如是大威德，能以手捫摸日月，以身到達梵天界。」
Clairaudience (dibba-sota): “He hears—by means of the divine ear-property, purified and surpassing the human—both kinds of sounds: divine and human, whether near or far.”	天耳通（dibba-sota）：「彼清淨超越人間〔耳界〕，以天耳界，聞人天兩界遠近雙方之音聲。」
Mind-reading (cetopariya-ñāṇa): “He knows the awareness of other beings, other individuals, having encompassed it with his own awareness. He discerns a mind with passion as a mind with passion, and a mind without passion as a mind without passion (etc.).”	他心通（cetopariya-ñāṇa）：「以自己之心，徹〔見〕其他眾生及他人之心。如次證知之：證知有貪欲心，為有貪欲心。證知離貪欲心，為離貪欲心（等等）。」
The Commentary argues that all of these knowledges except vipassanā-ñāṇa count as superior human states. It does not explain why it excludes vipassanā-ñāṇa from the list, although it is probably following the belief current in its time, that vipassanā-ñāṇa does not require jhāna as a basis, even though the Canon clearly lists this ñāṇa—as distinct from vipassanā as a more general mental quality of clear-seeing—as dependent on jhāna.	《義註》認為，除了觀智之外，所有這些智見都算是上人法。它並沒有解釋為什麼它將觀智從列表中排除，儘管它可能遵循當時流行的信念，即觀智不需要禪那作為基礎，儘管《聖典》明確列出了此智——與毘婆舍那不同，毘婆舍那是一種更普遍的明見的心理品質——依賴於禪那。
There are other occult abilities that are not based on jhāna and for this reason do not count as mahaggata dhamma: such things as divination, giving protective charms, casting malevolent spells, psychic healing, practicing as a medium, etc. The discourses list these and other similar activities as tiracchāna-vijjā, animal knowledge, which—as the name implies—is far removed from superior human states. (See BMC2, Chapter 10.)	還有其他一些不以禪那為基礎的神秘能力，因此不算作廣大法：如占卜、給予護身符、施放惡意咒語、通靈治療、修行媒介等。經文列出了這些和其他類似的行為，稱為 tiracchāna-vijjā （畜生明），顧名思義，與上人法相去甚遠。（參見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第十章。）

b. Lokuttara dhamma	b. 出世間法
Lokuttara dhamma in its fullest sense, refers to the series of mental states, called paths and fruitions, in which the fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth are eradicated; and to the ultimate state of nibbāna, or liberation.	出世間法的最完整的意義是指一系列的心境界，稱為道果，其中束縛心於輪迴的結使被根除；並達到涅槃（或稱解脫）的終極境界。
The paths and fruitions occur in four pairs. In the first pair, the path to and fruition of stream-entry, three fetters are abandoned: self-identity views (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), uncertainty (vicikicchā), and grasping at habits and practices (silabbata-parāmāsa). In the second pair—the path to and fruition of once-returning—passion, aversion, and delusion are weakened, but no additional fetters are cut. In the third pair, the path to and fruition of non-returning, two additional fetters are abandoned: sensual passion (kāma-rāga) and irritation (paṭigha); and in the fourth pair, the path to and fruition of arahantship, five: rūpa-rāga—passion for forms (e.g., the objects of rūpa jhāna); arūpa-rāga—passion for formless phenomena (e.g., the objects of arūpa jhāna); māna—conceit; uddhacca—restlessness; and avijjā—ignorance. With the cutting of this last set of fetters, all bonds with the cycle of rebirth are cut for good, and the mind attains nibbāna.	道果成四對出現。在第一對，即入流道果中，三種結使被斷除：身見（sakkāya-diṭṭhi）、疑（vicikicchā）以及戒禁取（silabbata-parāmāsa）。在第二對──一來道果──中，貪、瞋、癡被削弱，但沒有額外的結使被斷除。在第三對，即不還道果中，另外兩個結使被斷除：欲貪（kāma-rāga）和瞋恚（paṭigha）；第四對是阿羅漢道果，其中有五個：rūpa-rāga－色貪（例如色界禪那所緣）；arūpa-rāga－無色貪（例如無色界禪那所緣）；māna－慢；uddhacca－掉舉；和avijjā－無明。隨著這最後一組結使的斷除，所有與輪迴的束縛都被永久斷除，心證得涅槃。
The term nibbāna literally means extinguishing, as of a fire. The commentarial explanation of this term that best fits the way it is used in the Canon is found at Vism.VIII,247, where Buddhaghosa derives it etymologically from nir, a negative prefix, and vāna, binding: thus, unbinding or liberation. In the physics of the Buddha’s time, fire as it burned was said to be in a state of agitation, dependence, attachment, and entrapment—both clinging to and being trapped by its sustenance. Extinguished, it was said to become calm, independent, and unattached. It let go of its sustenance and was released. In the mind’s extinguishing, or unbinding, a parallel change occurs.	涅槃 nibbāna 一詞的字面意思是熄滅，如火一樣。這個術語最適合它在《聖典》中的使用方式的註釋解釋，可以在《清淨道論》.八,247 中找到，其中佛音在詞源學上從 nir （否定前綴）和 vāna （束縛）衍生出這個術語：因此，意思是解除束縛或解脫。在佛陀時代的物理學中，火在燃燒時被認為處於一種激動、依賴、執著和束縛的狀態——既執著於它的維持物，又被它的維持物所束縛。據說，熄滅後，它會變得平靜、獨立、不執著。它放下了它的維持物並被釋放了。當心熄滅，或解脫時，會發生相似的變化。
Nibbāna is one; the paths and their fruitions, eight. Thus there are nine lokuttara dhammas. Although the Vibhaṅga explicitly mentions only the four transcendent fruitions in its list of superior human states, the Commentary argues that the remaining five implicitly qualify as well. There is support for the Commentary’s argument in that the Vibhaṅga includes the noble eightfold path in its list, and SN 55:5 equates this path with the stream.	涅槃是一種；道及其果，八種。因此，有九種出世間法。雖然《經分別》在其上人法的列表中只明確提到了四種出世間果，但《義註》認為其餘五種也隱含地符合資格。《義註》的論點得到了支持，因為《經分別》在其列表中包括了八聖道，而《相應部》55:5經將這條道等同於流。
The Commentary classifies the three types of concentration and emancipation in the Vibhaṅga’s list—emptiness, theme-less, and non-directed—as equivalent to the transcendent paths, and the three corresponding attainments as transcendent fruitions. A passage in MN 121, however, indicates that at least the theme-less concentration would count as a mahaggata dhamma because it can be attained without full insight into its fabricated nature, and the same classification might hold for all three of these concentrations and emancipations. Regardless of which class they fall into, however, they are all superior human states. As for the Wings to Awakening, the Commentary maintains that they count as superior human states only when developed to the level of any of the transcendent paths. It also adds that any other attainment equivalent to a lokuttara dhamma—such as complete comprehension of the four noble truths—would fulfill the factor of object here as well.	《義註》將《經分別》中的三種三昧、解脫──空、無相、無所有──歸類為與出世間道相同，而相應的三種成就則為出世間果。然而，《中部》121經中的一段文字表明，至少無相的三昧可以算作廣大法，因為它可以在沒有完全洞察其捏造本質的情況下獲得，並且相同的分類可能適用於所有這三種三昧和解脫。但無論屬於哪一類，都是上人法。至於菩提分法，《義註》認為，只有當它們發展到任何出世間道的層次時，才算得上人法。它還補充說，任何其他等同於出世法的成就——例如對四聖諦的完全理解——也將滿足這裡的對象因素。

Perception	感知
Claiming a superior human state that one mistakenly thinks one has achieved is no offense under this rule, although if addressed to a lay person the claim would come under Pc 8. The same holds for a claim that is actually true.	根據本戒條，誤以為自己已經成就並聲稱上人法，不構成犯戒，儘管如果是針對在家人聲稱，將受到《波逸提》八的管轄。對於實際上真實的聲稱也是如此。
There is the question, however, of what offense there would be for a bhikkhu who has attained a superior human state—such as the first jhāna—without realizing the fact, and then claims to have attained it, thinking his statement to be false. The Vibhaṅga defines non-existent as “not to be found; not knowing, not seeing a skillful state within oneself, (yet saying,) ‘There is a skillful state within me.’” Also, under the factor of intention, it states that misrepresenting one’s view or opinion would fulfill that factor. This implies that a superior human state would count as non-existent if one did not see it as existent. If one then misrepresented one’s view to another person, claiming the state to be existent, one would fulfill the factors of the full offense here.	然而，問題是，如果一位比丘已經證得了上人法——例如初禪——卻沒有意識到這一事實，然後聲稱自己證得了，並認為自己的說法是錯誤的，那麼這犯什麼罪呢？《經分別》將不存在定義為「沒被發現；不知道，看不到自己內在的善法，（而說）『我內在有善法。』」此外，在意圖因素下，它指出歪曲自己的觀點或意見就滿足了該因素。這意味著，如果看不到上人法存在，那麼它就被視為不存在。如果向另一個人歪曲自己的觀點，聲稱上人法存在，那麼就滿足了這裡的完全違犯的要素。
Unlike the Vibhaṅga to Pc 1, the Vibhaṅga to this rule does not consider the case where a bhikkhu, doubtful of his attainment, states it as an undoubted fact. This suggests that the compilers of the Vibhaṅga saw the full offense here as applying only to cases where a bhikkhu knows without a doubt that his claim to a superior human state is untrue. From this it would follow that if one is in doubt about one’s attainment of such a state and yet makes a definite claim to it, one would incur a pācittiya under Pc 1.	與《波逸提》一的《經分別》不同，本戒條的《經分別》不考慮這樣的情況：一位比丘懷疑自己的成就，卻將其陳述為不容置疑的事實。這表明，《經分別》的編撰者認為這裡的完全違犯只適用於比丘毫無疑問地知道他對上人法的聲稱是不真實的情況。由此可見，如果對自己是否達到這樣一種境界有疑問，但又明確聲稱達到這種境界，那麼就會在《波逸提》一戒條下犯《波逸提》。

Effort	努力
According to the Vibhaṅga, a statement mentioning oneself in connection with a superior human state is one indicating either that the state is present in oneself or that one is present in the state. Such a statement fulfills this factor only if it explicitly mentions oneself, although the reference to the state may be either explicit or implicit. Explicit mention of the state would include saying such things as, “I have attained the first jhāna,” “I have seen the heavenly realms,” “I know my previous lifetimes.” The Vibhaṅga’s example of an implicit mention of a state is the statement, “I delight in an empty dwelling,” the implication being that one’s delight comes from the attainment of jhāna. At present, many meditation communities have developed their own idioms for describing superior human attainments—one being “I have no doubts about the Buddha’s teaching” as a way of claiming stream-entry—and, in the context of such communities, idioms of this sort would count as implicit mention as well. As we will see under the discussion of intention, this sort of statement would incur an offense only if one intended the implicit meaning.	根據《經分別》，將自己與上人法聯繫起來的陳述為：表明該境界存在於自己之中或自己處在於該境界中。儘管對境界的提及可以是明確的或隱含的，但這樣的陳述只有在明確提及自己時才滿足本因素。明確提及境界包括說諸如「我已證得初禪」、「我已見天界」、「我知道我的前世」之類的話。《經分別》中隱含地提及境界的例子是這樣一句話：「我樂於空居」，該含義是其喜悅來自於禪那的成就。目前，許多禪修團體已經發展出自己的慣用語來描述上人法成就，其中之一是「我對佛陀的教義毫不懷疑」，以此作為宣稱入流的一種方式，並且在這些團體的背景脈絡下，這種慣用語也算是隱含的提及。正如我們將在討論意圖時看到的那樣，只有當人們意圖表達隱含的含義時，這種陳述才會招致犯戒。
A statement in which one mentions oneself—rather than the state—implicitly in connection with a superior human state is not grounds for a pārājika. If it is a deliberate lie, it constitutes either a thullaccaya or a dukkaṭa. Because the grounds for determining the offense in this case are a matter of controversy, we will discuss them separately, under Understanding, below.	如果某人在陳述中提及自己（而不是境界），並隱含地與上人法聯繫在一起，則不能成為《波羅夷》的根據。如果是故意的謊言，則構成《偷蘭遮》或《突吉羅》其中之一。由於本案例中確定犯戒的根據存在爭議，因此我們將在下面的理解部分中單獨討論。
The word statement here covers not only spoken statements but also written statements and physical gestures. An example of a claim by gesture occurs in the Vibhaṅga: A group of bhikkhus makes an agreement that the first to set out from their dwelling would, by that very gesture, be known to the rest as an arahant. One of the group, who was not an arahant but wanted to be regarded as one, set out first from the dwelling and in so doing committed a pārājika. At present, a claim made in writing would also fulfill the factor of effort here.	這裡的陳述一詞不僅包括口頭陳述，還包括書面陳述和肢體示意動作。《經分別》中有一個透過手勢陳述的例子：一群比丘達成協議，第一個從他們的住所出發的人將透過這個示意動作被其他人認為是阿羅漢。其中一位雖然不是阿羅漢，但想被視為阿羅漢，他首先從住處出發，這樣做就犯了《波羅夷》。目前，以書面形式提出的陳述也將滿足此處的努力因素。
The Vibhaṅga specifies that the statement fulfills this factor whether it is addressed to a man or a woman, lay or ordained. The Vinīta-vatthu contains two cases in which bhikkhus, sitting in private, make false statements laying claim to superior human states. In the first case, the offender is rebuked by another bhikkhu who could read minds; in the second, the offender is rebuked by a devatā. In both cases, the Buddha imposes a dukkaṭa on the offenders. Thus the Commentary and K/Commentary conclude that a statement mentioning oneself in connection with a superior human state must be directed at a human listener for it to fulfill the factor of effort here. If one makes such a statement in private or directs it to a common animal or a deva, one incurs only a dukkaṭa.	《經分別》明確指出，無論是針對男性或女性、在家人或出家人陳述，都滿足本因素。《Vinīta-vatthu》包含兩個案例，其中比丘們私下坐著，做出虛假陳述，聲稱擁有上人法。在第一個案例中，犯戒者受到另一位有他心通的比丘的斥責；在第二個案例中，犯戒者受到一位天神斥責。在這兩種情況下，佛陀都會對犯戒者施加《突吉羅》。因此，《義註》和 K/《義註》的結論是，提及自己與上人法有關的陳述必須針對人類聽眾，才能滿足此處的努力因素。如果私下發表這樣的言論，或是針對普通的動物或天神，他只會犯《突吉羅》。
The original instigators of this rule, instead of each making claims about his own attainments, made false claims about one another’s attainments. This case is not mentioned in the rule, the Vibhaṅga, or the commentaries, and so is not an offense under this rule, but it would come under Pc 1.	本戒條的最初犯戒者不是每個人都聲稱自己的成就，而是對彼此的成就做出虛假的聲稱。這種情況在戒條、《經分別》或註釋中都沒有提到，因此根據本戒條不構成犯戒，但它屬於《波逸提》一。
The Commentary raises a question not addressed in the Vibhaṅga: Does mentioning a state in connection with oneself include claims about attainments in one’s previous lives? Without explaining its reasoning, it simply says No: In connection with oneself applies only to the present aggregates and not to past ones. With regard to the mahaggata dhammas, it would be possible to make a claim about an attainment in a past life that would not apply to one’s present state, because the simple fact that one may have attained jhāna in a previous lifetime has no implications bearing on the present lifetime. That sort of attainment doesn’t necessarily carry over from one lifetime to the next. With regard to lokuttara dhammas, however, the fact that one may have achieved stream-entry in a previous lifetime would have implications for the present lifetime: One is destined to achieve at least stream-entry again at some point before death, which puts one on the level of a faith-follower or a Dhamma-follower, “one who has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill” (SN 25:1). This is equivalent to the path to stream-entry. So it would seem reasonable to say that a claim to a mahaggata dhamma attained in a previous lifetime would not fulfill the factor of effort here, whereas a claim to a lokuttara dhamma attained in a previous lifetime would. And, of course, if a bhikkhu falsely claims present knowledge of previous lifetimes, that would unequivocally fulfill this factor.	《義註》提出了《經分別》中未提及的問題：提及與自己有關的境界是否包括宣稱自己前世的成就？它沒有解釋其推理，只是簡單地說「不」：與自己相關僅適用於現在的五蘊，而不適用於過去的五蘊。就廣大法而言，可以宣稱前世的成就不適用於現在的狀態，因為一個人可能在前世證得禪那的這一簡單事實並不代表會持續到今生。這種成就不一定會從一世延續到下一世。然而，就出世法而言，一個人在前世可能已證得入流這一事實，會對今生產生持續影響：一個人注定至少會在死前的某個時刻再次證得入流，這使得他在信仰追隨者或佛法追隨者的層面上，「進入正確的道路，進入善人之地，超越凡夫之地」（《相應部》25:1經）。這相當於入流道。因此，如果說前世證得的廣大法不能滿足這裡努力的因素，而說前世證得的出世間法則可以，這似乎是合理的。當然，如果比丘虛假地聲稱擁有前世的現時知識，那就明確地滿足了本因素。

Intention	意圖
To incur an offense under this rule, the statement must be (1) meant to misrepresent the truth and (2) motivated by evil desire.	要根據本戒條構成犯戒，該陳述必須 (1) 意圖歪曲事實，並且 (2) 出於邪惡的欲望。
According to the Vibhaṅga a statement meant to misrepresent the truth can be characterized in any of seven ways (§): Before making it, one knows that it is a lie; while making it, one knows that it is a lie; after making it, one knows that it was a lie; one misrepresents one’s view; one misrepresents one’s opinion; one misrepresents one’s approval; and one misrepresents one’s state. The Commentary focuses on the first of these characteristics as essential: One must know before making the statement that it will be a lie. If one doesn’t realize it beforehand but notices it only while making it or just after making it, it would count simply as a slip of the tongue, and thus—as discussed under Pc 1—not as a deliberate lie. When the intention to misrepresent the truth is absent, the statement does not come under this rule. For example, if one means to say one thing that does not bear on a superior human state but accidentally says something else that comes out as a claim to such a state, one commits no offense.	根據《經分別》，旨在歪曲事實的陳述可以透過七種方式中的任何一種來表徵（§）：在做出陳述之前，知道它是謊言；做的時候，知道這是謊言；做了之後，知道是謊言；不如實地敘述自己的觀點；不如實地敘述自己的意見；不如實地敘述自己的認可；不如實地敘述自己的狀態。《義註》重點關注這些表徵中的第一個表徵：在發表聲明之前必須知道這將是一個謊言。如果事先沒有意識到這一點，只是在做的時候或做了之後才注意到它，那麼這將被僅僅算做失言，因此——正如《波逸提》一中所討論的——不屬於故意的謊言。當不存在歪曲事實的意圖時，該陳述不屬於本戒條的範圍。例如，如果一個人想說一件與上人法無關的事情，但無意中說出了其他一些陳述該境界的事情，那麼這個人並沒有犯戒。
Other examples of not intending to misrepresent the truth appear in a series of cases in the Vinīta-vatthu where bhikkhus are absolved of an offense under this rule because they “did not intend to boast.” The Vibhaṅga gives no precise definition of this phrase, but the cases in question give a fair idea of what it means. They all involve statements where the reference to a superior human state is only implicit. In some of them, ill bhikkhus are asked—as was common in the time of the Buddha—“Do you have any superior human states (§)?” the purpose being—if they had such an attainment—to focus their minds on it; and if not, to direct their efforts to gaining such an attainment before their illness worsened. The ill bhikkhus respond in a variety of ways which, on the surface, look like equivocation. They don’t have any superior human attainments, yet don’t want to give the impression that they’ve achieved nothing at all, so they say such things as, “A state to be aroused through the arousing of energy,” or, “A state to be aroused through committed commitment.” In other cases, the ill bhikkhus are told not to fear death and they respond, “I’m not afraid of death,” or, “He who has remorse might be afraid of death.” In still other cases, ill bhikkhus are asked how they are bearing up under their illnesses and they respond, “This could not be borne by any old person (§),” or, “This could not be borne by an ordinary person (§).” There are also cases where bhikkhus are being pressured by their relatives to disrobe and they respond with such statements as, “It’s impossible for a person like me to live in a house,” or, “I have blocked off sensual passions.”	其他無意歪曲事實的例子出現在《Vinīta-vatthu》的一系列案例中，根據本戒條，比丘們免於犯戒，因為他們「無意誇耀」。《經分別》沒有給出這個用語的精確定義，但所討論的案例很好地說明了它的含義。它們都涉及僅隱含地提及上人法的陳述。在其中一些中，生病的比丘被問到——這在佛陀時代很常見——「你有沒有上人法（§）？」目的是──如果他們有這樣的成就──將他們的心集中於其上；如果沒有，就讓他們努力在病情惡化之前獲得這樣的成就。生病的比丘們以各種各樣的方式回應，表面上看起來像是模稜兩可的。他們沒有任何上人法成就，但又不想給人留下他們一事無成的印象，所以他們會說「法依精進而得」，或者，「法依專念修持而成就。」在其他案例中，生病的比丘被告知不要害怕死亡，他們回答說：「我不怕死」，或者「有悔恨的人可能會害怕死亡」。還有一些情況，生病的比丘被問及他們如何忍受疾病時，他們回答說：「這是任何老人都無法承受的（§）」，或者，「這是普通人無法承受的（§）」。也有這樣的情況，比丘受到親戚的壓力，要求還俗，而他們的回應是，「像我這樣的人不可能住家裡」，或者「我已經斷絕了欲樂」。
In each of these cases, the bhikkhus later felt conscience-stricken that their words might be construed as a boast, and so went to the Buddha, who stated that, because their purpose was not to boast—apparently, they were simply trying to avoid difficult situations, and the Commentary shows how they could easily have been thinking of something beside superior human states—they incurred no penalty.	在每一個案例中，比丘們後來都感到良心不安，因為他們的話可能會被理解為誇耀，於是他們去找佛陀，佛陀說，因為他們的目的不是誇耀——顯然，他們只是試圖避免困難的情況。《義註》表明他們如何很容易地想到除了上人法之外的其他東西——他們沒有受到懲罰。
Strangely enough—given its explanations of these cases—when the Commentary discusses the factor of “not intending to boast” under the non-offense clauses, it defines it as applying to a bhikkhu who, not motivated by desire, makes a non-deceptive claim of knowledge to his fellow bhikkhus. The Sub-commentary, however, notes that the Commentary’s definition does not fit the Vinīta-vatthu cases and so gives its own definition of “not intending to boast”: saying something that would fulfill the factor of effort yet without desiring to speak of a superior human state, and without being aware that one’s words imply such a state. Drawing on the examples in the Vinīta-vatthu, we can qualify the Sub-commentary’s explanation by noting that this exemption applies even if the reference to oneself is explicit, but not if the reference to the superior human state is.	奇怪的是，考慮到對這些情況的解釋，當《義註》討論不犯條款中「無意誇耀」的因素時，它將其定義為適用於不為欲望所驅使、向他的比丘同儕做出非欺騙性的知識宣稱的比丘。然而，《複註》指出，《義註》的定義與《Vinīta-vatthu》的案例不符，因此給出了自己的「無意誇耀」的定義：說一些可以滿足努力因素的事情，但不想談論上人法，且沒有意識到自己的言語暗示著這樣的境界。借鑒《Vinīta-vatthu》中的例子，我們可以指出即使明確提及自己，該豁免也適用，來限定《複註》的解釋，但明確提及上人法則不適用。
Thus, if one makes an innocent statement that could be construed as implying a claim to a superior human state without explicitly mentioning such as state, then regardless of how other people might interpret it, if one’s purpose is not to boast or lay claim to that state then there is no offense. However, if the inference was intended—and a deliberate misrepresentation—the factor of intention here would be fulfilled. As for untrue statements that make explicit reference to a superior human state—e.g., “I have reached the fourth jhāna”—the inference is obviously intended, and so these automatically fulfill the factor of “intending to misrepresent the truth.”	因此，如果一個人發表了一個單純無惡意的聲明，可以被解釋為暗示對上人法的主張，而沒有明確提及這樣的境界，那麼無論其他人如何解釋它，如果一個人的目的不是吹噓或聲稱該境界，那就沒有犯戒。然而，如果這個推論是有意的──而且是故意的扭曲──那麼這裡的意圖因素就會得到滿足。至於那些明確提及上人法的不實陳述，例如「我已證得第四禪」，顯然是有意圖的推論，因此這些自然就滿足了「意圖歪曲事實」的因素。
As for evil desire: The Commentary—citing a passage from an Abhidhamma text, the Vibhaṅga, which in turn is based on MN 5—defines evil desire here as the wish to have others believe that skillful states not present within oneself are actually there. In other words, one must want one’s statement to be taken seriously. This means that motive is an essential part of this factor. To make a self-deprecating, sarcastic joke referring to one’s non-existent superior human attainments as if they were existent, but not intending to be taken seriously, would not fulfill the factor of intention here, regardless of how one’s listeners took the remark. However, because such a remark is a falsehood, it would fall under Pc 1, even though made in jest. For this reason, cases of this sort are not mentioned in the non-offense clauses under this rule because they do carry a pācittiya offense. However, even though the penalty they carry is relatively minor, jokes of this sort should not be viewed lightly. Not only can they lead to serious misunderstandings among one’s listeners, but they also betray an off-handed disrespect for the Dhamma, and in particular for the attainments that a bhikkhu should view as among the highest means and ends of his training.	至於邪惡的欲望：《義註》引用阿毘達摩文獻《經分別》中的一段話，而該文又以《中部》5經為基礎——在這裡將邪惡的欲望定義為希望讓別人相信自己不存在的善法實際上存在。換句話說，一個人必須希望自己的言論能被認真對待。這意味著動機是這個因素的必要組成部分。開一個自嘲、諷刺的玩笑，指的是一個人不存在的上人法，就好像它們確實存在一樣，但不打算被認真對待，無論聽眾如何看待這句話，都不能滿足這裡的意圖。然而，由於這樣的言論是謊言，因此即使是開玩笑，它也屬於《波逸提》一。因此，此類案例在本戒條的不犯條款中並未提及，因為它們確實犯《波逸提》。不過，儘管懲罰相對較小，但此類玩笑也不應掉以輕心。它們不僅會導致聽者產生嚴重的誤解，而且還會表現出對佛法的不尊重，尤其是對比丘應該視為修行最高手段和目的的成就的不尊重。

Understanding	理解
The Vibhaṅga discusses two sets of cases in which the factor of understanding plays a role in determining the offense. In the first set, bhikkhus intend to lie about attaining one superior human state (such as the second jhāna) but actually lie about attaining another one (such as the third). In the second set, they make claims about attainments, explicitly mentioning an attainment but not explicitly mentioning themselves (e.g., a bhikkhu, referring to the dwelling in which he lives, says, “Those who live in this dwelling are arahants”). Given that understanding plays a role here, the question is: Whose understanding is at issue here, the speaker’s or the listener’s? The Commentary assumes the listener’s understanding to be at issue. Furthermore—despite the Vibhaṅga’s applying this factor only to these two sets—the Commentary extrapolates from them to say that this condition applies to all cases covered by this rule: The listener must understand what the bhikkhu is saying for there to be a full offense.	《經分別》討論了兩組情況，其中理解因素在確定犯戒時發揮了作用。在第一組中，比丘意圖謊稱證得一種上人法（如第二禪），但實際上卻謊稱證得另一種上人法（如第三禪）。在第二組中，他們宣稱自己的成就，明確提及成就，但沒有明確提及自己（例如，一位比丘，指他所居住的住所，說：「居住在該住所的人是阿羅漢」）。鑑於理解在這裡發揮著作用，問題是：誰的理解是這裡爭議中的問題，是說者的還是聽者的？《義註》假設涉及聽眾的理解。此外，儘管《經分別》僅將此因素應用於這兩組，但《義註》從它們推斷出，這一狀況適用於本戒條所涵蓋的所有情況：聽者必須理解比丘所說的內容，才能構成完全的違犯。
This interpretation, however, appears to be based on a misreading of the Canon. Under other rules where the question of the listener’s understanding is a factor—such as the rules for disrobing and Saṅghādisesa 3—the pattern in the Vibhaṅga is to state explicitly, “If he understands,” “If he doesn’t understand,” “She didn’t understand,” with the “he” or “she” in a different case than that of the participles describing the bhikkhu. Here, however, when the Vibhaṅga mentions the factor of understanding, it uses a present participle in the same case as the participle describing the person speaking: sampajāna-musā bhaṇantassa paṭivijānantassa āpatti pārājikassa—“For the one speaking a deliberate lie and understanding (it as such), an offense of defeat” and so forth. (Some have suggested that the paṭivijānantassa in this phrase is an example of the genitive absolute, which would apply to a different agent than the main agent of the sentence. However, the syntax of the sentence and the placement of the word do not follow the pattern for the genitive absolute, which has to be composed of a noun and a participle set apart from the rest of the sentence.) This means that the participle for “understanding” refers to the same person referred to as “speaking”: In other words, it refers to the bhikkhu, and not to the listener, who is nowhere mentioned in the passage.	然而，這種解釋似乎是基於對《聖典》的誤讀。在其他戒條中，聽者的理解問題是一個因素，例如還俗和《僧殘》三的戒條，《經分別》中的模式是明確敘述，「如果他理解」，「如果他不理解」，「她不理解」，「他」或「她」的情況與描述比丘的分詞不同。然而，在這裡，當《經分別》提到理解因素時，它使用了現在分詞，其情況與描述說者的分詞相同：sampajāna-musā bhaṇantassa paṭivijānantassa āpatti pārājikassa——「對於那些故意說謊和理解的人（就其本身而言），《波羅夷》罪」等等。（有些人認為這個措辭中的 paṭivijānantassa 是所有格獨立句的一個例子，它適用於與句子的主要動作發出者不同的動作發出者。但是，句子的語法和單字的位置並不遵循所有格獨立句的模式，它必須由一個名詞和一個與句子其餘部分分開的分詞組成。）這意味著「理解」的分詞指的是與「說話」相同的人：換句話說，它指的是比丘，而不是指聽者，這段經文中沒有提到聽者。
This, of course, raises the question of why the speaker’s understanding of his own statement would be an issue, and the answer is this:	當然，這產生了一個問題：為什麼發言者對自己發言的理解會成為一個問題，答案是這樣的：
In the first set of cases—where the bhikkhu means to lay false claim to one superior human state but actually lays false claim to another—if he does not realize that he has made a slip of the tongue, the statement would not normally count as a conscious lie, as he is not aware of what he is saying at the moment he is saying it. Because he is not paying attention to his words, he should not receive the full penalty. However, if he is alert enough to know what he is saying, then—as the Commentary points out—all the factors of an offense are present. Because both his intended and his actual statements are corrupt, he should not be allowed to avoid the penalty simply because of a brief slip of the tongue. Thus, the Vibhaṅga assigns a pārājika in cases of this sort if the bhikkhu is aware of what he is saying, and a thullaccaya if not.	在第一組情況下，比丘本意對一個上人法提出虛假主張，但實際上卻對另一個上人法提出虛假主張，如果他沒有意識到自己失言了，那麼該陳述通常不會被視為是有意識的謊言，因為他當時並不知道自己在說什麼。因為他沒有注意自己的言論，所以他不應該受到全額懲罰。然而，如果他足夠警覺，知道自己在說什麼，那麼——正如《義註》所指出的——犯戒的所有因素都存在。由於他的意圖和實際陳述都是墮落的，因此不應允許他僅僅因為短暫的失言而逃避懲罰。因此，如果比丘知道自己在說什麼，《經分別》在這種情況下會指派《波羅夷》罪，如果不知道，則指派《偷蘭遮》罪。
In the second set of cases, where the bhikkhu’s remarks concern a superior human state explicitly but himself only implicitly, he deserves a heavier penalty if he is aware of the implicit connection than if he is not. Thus the Vibhaṅga assigns a thullaccaya if he is, and a dukkaṭa if not.	在第二組情況下，比丘的言論明確地涉及上人法，但只是隱含地涉及他自己，如果他意識到這種隱含的聯繫，那麼他應該比沒有意識到而受到更重的懲罰。因此，如果他意識到，《經分別》指派《偷蘭遮》罪，如果沒意識到，則指派《突吉羅》罪。
For those interested in the Commentary’s interpretation—that the understanding is the duty of the listener, and that it must be present in all cases for there to be the full offense under this rule—here it is:	對於那些對《義註》的解釋感興趣的人——理解是聽者的義務，並且它必須出現在所有情況下，才能構成本戒條下的完全違犯——這裡是《義註》的解釋：
Understanding, according to the Commentary, means simply that the listener hears the statement clearly enough to know that it is a claim. Whether he/she understands the names for the states claimed—jhāna, clairvoyance, clairaudience, or whatever—is not an issue. The same is true of whether he/she believes the statement to be true or false. If the listener to whom an explicit claim to a superior human state is directed does not understand it, but a passer-by does, the penalty is still a pārājika.	根據《義註》，理解僅僅意味著聽者足夠清楚地聽到該陳述，從而知道它是一個主張。他/她是否理解所聲稱的境界名稱——禪那、天眼、天耳或其他什麼——都不是問題。無論他/她相信該陳述是真是假，情況也是如此。如果聽聞明確主張上人法的聽眾不理解，但路人理解，則懲罰仍然是《波羅夷》。
The Commentary adds that if the listener does not hear the bhikkhu clearly enough to catch all he says, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the listener at first has some doubt as to what the bhikkhu said but later realizes that it was a claim to a superior human state, the offense is still a thullaccaya. If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu at all, the Commentary—probably extrapolating from the Vinīta-vatthu cases concerning bhikkhus speaking in private—gives the bhikkhu a dukkaṭa.	《義註》補充說，如果聽者沒有聽清比丘的聲音，無法聽清他所說的一切，則懲罰是《偷蘭遮》。如果聽者起初對比丘所說的話有一些疑問，但後來意識到這是聲稱上人法，仍然是犯《偷蘭遮》罪。如果聽者根本沒有聽到比丘的聲音，《義註》——可能是從有關比丘私下講話的《Vinīta-vatthu》案例中推斷出來的——就會給予比丘《突吉羅》。
If the bhikkhu makes a claim to a superior human state in which he mentions himself only implicitly—e.g., “The bhikkhus you support are non-returners”—the Commentary follows a similar pattern in assigning offenses: a thullaccaya if the listener understands, a dukkaṭa if he/she doesn’t, a dukkaṭa if he/she doesn’t even hear the claim.	如果比丘聲稱上人法，而他只是含蓄地提到自己——例如，「你所供養的比丘是不還者」——《義註》則遵循類似的模式來指派違犯：如果聽者理解，則為《偷蘭遮》；如果他/她不理解，則為《突吉羅》；如果他/她甚至沒有聽到該聲稱，則為《突吉羅》。
As noted above, however, the Commentary’s judgments on this issue appear to be based on a misreading of the Vibhaṅga.	然而，如上所述，《義註》對這個問題的判斷似乎是基於對《經分別》的誤讀。

Special cases	特別案例
Special cases in the Vinīta-vatthu:	《Vinīta-vatthu》裡的特別案例：
1) Brahmans speaking with exaggerated faith or politeness address bhikkhus of no particular attainments as if they were arahants (“May the arahants come…. May the arahants be seated”). This puts the bhikkhus in a quandary and so they ask the Buddha how to behave in such a situation. His response: There is no offense in accepting invitations such as these from a “speaker with faith”—the point being that there is no offense in coming, sitting, etc., as long as the intention is just to accept the invitation and not to imply a claim.	1）婆羅門以誇張的信心或禮貌說話，稱呼沒有特殊成就的比丘，就好像他們是阿羅漢一樣（「願阿羅漢來…願阿羅漢入座」）。這讓比丘們陷入了進退兩難的境地，所以他們向佛陀請教在這種情況下該如何行事。他的回應是：接受來自「有信心的說者」的邀請並沒有犯戒——重點是，來參加、坐下等等就沒有犯戒，只要意圖只是接受邀請非而暗示聲稱。
2) Bhikkhus, hoping that people will esteem them, engage in special practices—the examples given in the Vinīta-vatthu include living in the jungle, going for alms, sitting, standing, walking, and lying down (apparently in meditation for long periods of time), but from them we can extrapolate to other practices such as any of the ascetic (dhutaṅga) practices or vegetarianism, etc., followed so as to impress others. The penalty: a dukkaṭa. Because this ruling might give the mistaken impression that one should not adopt the dhutaṅga practices or engage in long periods of sitting, etc., the Commentary includes a list of blameless reasons for living in the wilderness: seeing that village-dwelling makes one’s mind restless, desiring seclusion, desiring to attain arahantship, reflecting that the Buddha praised living in the wilderness, anticipating that one will be a good example to one’s fellows in the holy life. A bhikkhu who undertakes any of the dhutaṅga practices for these or similar reasons would incur no offense.	2）比丘們希望人們尊重他們，進行特殊的修行－《Vinīta-vatthu》中給出的例子包括住在叢林中、托缽、坐、站、行、臥（顯然是在長時間的禪修中），但從中我們可以推斷出其他修行，例如任何苦行（頭陀行）修行或素食主義等等，以便給他人留下深刻的印象，也算在內。懲罰：《突吉羅》。因為這個規定可能會給人一種不應該修頭陀行或長時間打坐等等的錯誤印象，所以《義註》列舉了一系列生活在林野中無可指責的理由：看到村居使人心掉舉，渴望隱居，渴望證得阿羅漢果，反思佛陀對林野生活的讚嘆，期盼自己能成為梵行生活同儕的榜樣。因這些或類似原因而進行任何頭陀行修行的比丘不會招致任何犯戒。

Non-offenses	不犯
In addition to the standard non-offenses, the Vibhaṅga lists two that we have already covered in connection with perception and intention: There is no offense if one makes a claim out of a mistaken and exaggerated understanding of one’s attainment; and no offense if one is not intending to boast, i.e., one makes a claim that may sound like an implicit reference to a superior human state but is not intended as such.	除了標準的不犯之外，《經分別》還列出了我們已經討論過的與感知和意圖相關的兩項：如果一個人基於對自己成就的錯誤和誇大的理解而聲稱，則不構成犯戒；如果一個人無意自吹自擂，也就是說，一個人聲稱可能聽起來像是在隱含地提到上人法，但他的本意並非如此，那麼也沒有犯戒。
Summary: Deliberately lying to another person that one has attained a superior human state is a pārājika offense.	摘要：故意向他人說謊，聲稱自己已證得上人法是《波羅夷》罪。

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A bhikkhu who violates any of these four pārājika rules is automatically no longer a bhikkhu. There is no need for him to go through a formal ceremony of disrobing, for the act of violating the rule is an act of disrobing in and of itself. As each of the rules states, he is no longer in affiliation, which the word-analysis defines as no longer having a single transaction (i.e., he can no longer participate in any Community meetings), no longer having a single recitation (i.e., he can no longer participate in the uposatha (see BMC2, Chapter 15)), no longer having a training in common with the bhikkhus.	比丘違反這四種《波羅夷》戒條中的任何一個，就自動不再是比丘。他不需要經過正式的還俗儀式，因為違反戒條的行為本身就是還俗行為。正如每條戒條所述，他不再具有從屬關係，語句解說將其定義為不再進行一次僧伽羯磨（即，他不能再參加任何僧團集會），不再進行一次誦戒（即，他不能再參加布薩（見《佛教修道準則第二冊》第十五章）），也不能再與比丘們共同受訓。
Even if a bhikkhu who has violated any of these rules continues to pretend to be a bhikkhu, he does not really count as one; as soon as the facts are known he must be expelled from the Saṅgha. He can never again properly ordain as a bhikkhu in this life. If he tries to ordain in a Community that does not know of his offense, his ordination is invalid, and he must be expelled as soon as the truth is found out.	即使一個比丘違反了這些戒條中的任何一條，他仍然假裝是比丘，他也不算真正的比丘；一旦真相大白，就必須將他逐出僧團。他此生再也不能正式出家為比丘了。如果他試圖在一個不知道他的罪行的僧團中受具足戒，他的受戒是無效的，一旦發現真相，他必須立即被逐出。
The Commentary to Pr 1 maintains that he is allowed to “go forth” as a novice, but because the Vibhaṅga does not clearly support this position, not all Communities accept it.	《波羅夷》一的《義註》認為，他被允許作為沙彌「出家」，但由於《經分別》沒有明確支持這一立場，因此並非所有僧團都接受它。
Ignorance of these rules does not exempt an offender from the penalty, which is why the Buddha ordered that they be taught to each new bhikkhu as soon as possible after ordination (Mv.I.78.2-5). Because the rules cover a number of cases that are legal in present-day society (e.g., recommending abortion, proving to oneself how supple one has become through yoga by inserting one’s penis in one’s mouth) or that are common practice among people who see nothing wrong with flirting with the edges of the law (e.g., hiding an article subject to customs duties when entering a country), it is especially important to inform each new bhikkhu of the rules’ full implications from the very start.	對這些戒條的無知並不能免除犯戒者的懲罰，這就是為什麼佛陀下令在出家後儘快向每位新比丘傳授這些戒條（《大品》.一.78.2-5）。因為這些戒條涵蓋了當今社會合法的許多情況（例如，建議墮胎、通過將陰莖插入嘴裡的瑜伽來證明自己變得多麼柔軟）或者是人們常見的做法，他們認為遊走法律的邊緣並沒有什麼錯（例如，在進入一個國家時隱藏需要繳納關稅的物品），從一開始就告知每個新比丘戒條的全部含義尤為重要。
If a bhikkhu suspects that he has committed a pārājika, he should immediately inform a senior bhikkhu well versed in the rules. The way the senior bhikkhu should handle the case is well-illustrated by an incident reported in the Commentary to Pr 2: A king together with an enormous crowd once went to worship the Great Stūpa at a certain monastery in Sri Lanka. Among the crowd was a visiting bhikkhu from the South of the country who was carrying an expensive roll of cloth. The commotion of the event was so great that he dropped the cloth, was unable to retrieve it, and soon gave it up for lost. One of the resident bhikkhus happened to come across it and, desiring to steal it, quickly put it away before the owner might see it. Eventually, of course, he became tormented by guilt and went to the resident Vinaya expert to admit a pārājika and disrobe.	如果比丘懷疑自己犯了《波羅夷》，他應該立刻通知熟悉戒律的長老比丘。《波羅夷》二的《義註》中所記述的一件事很好地說明了長老比丘應當的處理方式：有一次，一位國王帶著一大群人去斯里蘭卡的某座寺院朝拜大佛塔。人群中有一位來自國家南方的來訪比丘，他手裡拿著一卷昂貴的布。事件引起的騷動如此之大，以至於他把布掉在地上，無法取回，很快就因遺失將之放棄了。一位常住的比丘碰巧發現了它，想要偷走它，並在主人看到它之前趕緊把它收起來。最終，當然，他受到了愧疚的折磨，並去找常住的戒律專家承認犯了《波羅夷》並還俗。
The Vinaya expert, though, wouldn’t let him disrobe until he had found the owner of the cloth and inquired about it more fully. Eventually, after a long search, the bhikkhu was able to track down the original owner at a monastery back South, who told him that at the time of the theft he had given the cloth up for lost and had abandoned all mental attachment for it. Thus, as the cloth was ownerless, the resident bhikkhu had incurred not a pārājika, but simply some dukkaṭas for the preliminary efforts with intention to steal.	然而，戒律專家在找到布的主人並更詳細地詢問之前，不讓他還俗。最終，經過長時間的尋找，這位比丘在南方的一座寺院找到了原主人，原主人告訴他，在被盜時，他已經因遺失把這塊布放棄了，並放棄了對它的所有心理執著。因此，由於布料是無主的，常住的比丘並沒有犯《波羅夷》，而只是為了偷竊的初步努力而犯了一些《突吉羅》。
This example shows several things: the great thoroughness with which a senior bhikkhu should investigate a possible pārājika, the compassion he should show to the offender, and the fact that the offender should be given the benefit of the doubt wherever possible: He is to be considered innocent until the facts prove him guilty.	這個例子說明了幾件事：長老比丘應該非常徹底地調查可能的《波羅夷》，他應該對犯戒者表現出慈悲，以及只要有可能，就應該對犯戒者給予無罪推定：他應該在事實證明他有罪之前，被認為是無罪的。
There are, however, cases of another sort, in which a bhikkhu commits a pārājika and refuses to acknowledge the fact. If his fellow bhikkhus see, hear, or have any suspicions that this has happened, they are duty-bound to bring up the issue with him. If they are not satisfied with his assertions of his innocence, the case becomes an accusation issue, which must be resolved in line with the procedures outlined in Sg 8 and Chapter 11.	然而，也有另一種情況，比丘犯了《波羅夷》，並且拒絕承認這一事實。如果他的比丘同儕看到、聽到或懷疑這件事發生，他們有責任向他提出這個問題。如果他們對他的無罪斷言不滿意，該案件將成為指控問題，必須根據《僧殘》八和第十一章中概述的程序解決。
Finally, the Commentary concludes its discussion of the pārājikas by noticing that there are altogether 24—eight actual, twelve equivalent, and four derived—pārājikas for bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs.	最後，《義註》總結了對《波羅夷》的討論，指出比丘和比丘尼共有 24 種《波羅夷》——八種實際的、十二種等同的，和四種衍生的《波羅夷》。
The eight actual pārājikas are:	八個實際的《波羅夷》是：
the four for bhikkhus (also observed by the bhikkhunīs), and	比丘四種（比丘尼也遵守），以及
the four additional pārājikas for bhikkhunīs alone.	只有比丘尼遵守的四種額外的《波羅夷》。
The twelve equivalent pārājikas include the eleven disqualified types who should not be ordained as bhikkhus in the first place. If they happen to be ordained, their ordination is invalid; once they are found out they must be expelled for life (Mv.I.61-68; see BMC2, Chapter 14 for details). They are—	十二種等同的《波羅夷》包括十一種不合格的類型，他們從一開始就不應該受具足戒為比丘。若已受戒，其受戒無效；一旦被發現，必須終身擯出（《大品》.一.61-68；詳情請參閱《佛教修道準則第二冊》第十四章）。他們是-
a paṇḍaka (essentially, a eunuch or a person born neuter—see Saṅghādisesa 2),	黃門（本質上是太監或生來中性的人－見《僧殘》二），
a “non-human” being, (this includes nāgas, petas, devas, and yakkhas),	「非人類」眾生（包括龍、餓鬼、天神和夜叉），
a hermaphrodite,	雌雄同體，
a person who poses as a bhikkhu without having been ordained,	未經受具足戒而冒充比丘的人，
a bhikkhu who has ordained in another religion without first giving up his status as a bhikkhu,	未先放棄比丘身分而在另一宗教出家的比丘，
a person who has murdered his father,	殺死自己父親的人，
a person who has murdered his mother,	殺死自己母親的人，
a person who has murdered an arahant,	殺死阿羅漢的人
a person who has sexually molested a bhikkhunī,	玷污比丘尼的人，
a person who has maliciously injured a Buddha to the point of causing him to bleed, and	惡意傷害佛陀以致流血者（出佛身血），
a person who has dishonestly caused a schism in the Saṅgha, knowing or suspecting that his position was contrary to the Dhamma-Vinaya.	明知或懷疑自己的立場違反法與律，不誠實地造成僧團分裂的人（破和合僧）。
These eleven equivalent pārājikas apply to bhikkhunīs as well.	這十一種等同的《波羅夷》也適用於比丘尼。
The twelfth equivalent pārājika, which applies only to bhikkhunīs, is the case where a bhikkhunī leaves the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha and takes up the role of a lay woman (Cv.X.26.1). Unlike the bhikkhus, the bhikkhunīs have no formal procedure for disrobing. If they leave the Saṅgha, they are not allowed to reordain for the rest of this lifetime.	第十二種等同的《波羅夷》僅適用於比丘尼，是比丘尼離開比丘尼僧團並擔任在家女居士角色的情況（《小品》.十.26.1）。與比丘不同，比丘尼沒有正式的還俗程序。若離開僧團，此生不得再受具足戒。
In addition to the twenty actual and equivalent pārājikas, the Commentary gives separate listing to the four anulomika (derived) pārājikas, which are actually four cases included under Pr 1: the bhikkhu with a supple back who sticks his penis in his mouth, the bhikkhu with a long penis who inserts it into his anus, the bhikkhu who performs oral intercourse with someone else, and the bhikkhu who receives anal intercourse. Of these, three can be extrapolated to apply to bhikkhunīs, too. Why the Commentary lists these cases as separate pārājikas is hard to tell, unless it’s simply to ensure that these permutations of Pr 1 don’t get overlooked. Still, the entire list of 24 is important, for under the rules dealing with falsely accusing another bhikkhu of having committed a pārājika (Sg 8 & 9) or the rule dealing with concealing another bhikkhu’s pārājika offense (Pc 64), the Commentary defines pārājika as including equivalent and derived pārājikas as well.	除了二十種實際的和等同的《波羅夷》之外，《義註》還單獨列出了四種 anulomika （衍生的）《波羅夷》，這實際上是《波羅夷》一中包含的四種狀況：背部柔軟的比丘，將陰莖插入嘴裡的比丘，陰莖較長的比丘插入自己的肛門、與他人進行口交的比丘、以及接受肛交的比丘。其中三種也可以推論適用於比丘尼。為什麼《義註》將這些案例列為單獨的《波羅夷》很難說，除非只是為了確保《波羅夷》一的這些排列不會被忽視。儘管如此，24 種完整的清單仍然很重要，因為根據處理虛假指控另一比丘犯有《波羅夷》的戒條（《僧殘》八和《僧殘》九）或處理隱瞞另一比丘的《波羅夷》罪行的戒條（《波逸提》六四），《義註》定義了《波羅夷》也包括等同的和衍生的《波羅夷》。