波罗夷

This term, according to the Parivāra, derives from a verb meaning to lose or be defeated. A bhikkhu who commits any of the four following offenses has surrendered to his own mental defilements to such an extent that he defeats the purpose of his having become a bhikkhu in the first place. The irrevocable nature of this defeat is illustrated in the Vibhaṅga with a number of similes: “as a man with his head cut off… as a withered leaf freed from its stem… as a flat stone that has been broken in half cannot be put together again… as a palmyra tree cut off at the crown is incapable of further growth.” A bhikkhu who commits any of these offenses severs himself irrevocably from the life of the Saṅgha and is no longer considered a bhikkhu.

根据《附随》，这个术语源自于一个动词，意思是「失去」或「被击败」。比丘若犯下列四条戒中的任何一种，就已经屈服于自己的心理烦恼，以致他违背了自己成为比丘的初衷。《经分别》中用许多比喻说明了这种击败的不可挽回的性质：「就像一个人的头被砍掉了……就像一片枯萎的叶子脱离了茎……就像一块被碎成两半的扁平石头无法再拼凑起来……就像一棵被砍掉树冠的糖棕无法进一步生长一样。” 犯下任何这些戒的比丘不可挽回地从僧团生活中断绝，并且不再被视为比丘。

1	一
Should any bhikkhu—participating in the training and livelihood of the bhikkhus, without having renounced the training, without having declared his weakness—engage in sexual intercourse, even with a female animal, he is defeated and no longer in affiliation.	如果任何比丘——参加比丘的训练和生活，没有放弃训练，没有表明自己的弱点——进行性交，即使是与雌性动物，也是波罗夷，不共住。
As we noted in the Introduction, the first formulation of this rule followed on Ven. Sudinna’s having had sex with one of his former wives. His motives, by worldly standards, were relatively noble: He was complying with his parents’ desire that he provide them with an heir. However, in the incident leading to the second formulation of this rule—in which the Buddha added the phrase “even with a female animal”—the instigator’s motives were considerably less so.	正如我们在引言中指出的，这条戒条的最初制定是在须提那尊者与他的前妻们之一发生了性关系。按照世俗的标准，他的动机相对崇高：他遵守父母的愿望，为他们提供一个继承人。然而，在导致第二次制定这条戒条的事件中——佛陀在其中添加了「即使是与雌性动物」这句话——犯戒者的动机却远非如此。
“Now at that time, a certain bhikkhu living in the Great Wood at Vesālī, having befriended a monkey with food (§), engaged in sexual intercourse with it. Then, dressing (§) early in the morning and carrying his bowl and outer robe, the bhikkhu went into Vesālī for alms. A number of bhikkhus wandering on a tour of the lodgings went to the bhikkhu’s dwelling. The monkey saw them coming from afar and, on seeing them, went up to them and wiggled its rear and wiggled its tail and offered its rear and made a sign (§). The thought occurred to the bhikkhus, ‘Undoubtedly this bhikkhu is engaging in sexual intercourse with this monkey.’ So they hid off to one side. “Then the bhikkhu, having gone for alms in Vesālī, returned bringing almsfood. The monkey went up to him. The bhikkhu, having eaten a portion of the almsfood, gave a portion to the monkey. The monkey, having eaten the almsfood, offered its rear to the bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu engaged in sexual intercourse with it (§). “Then the bhikkhus said to the bhikkhu, ‘Hasn’t a training rule been formulated by the Blessed One? How can you engage in sexual intercourse with this monkey?’ “‘It’s true, friends, that a training rule has been formulated by the Blessed One, but that’s with regard to a human female, not to a female animal.’”	「当时，有一位比丘住在毘舍离大林里，以食物与一只猴子结交（§），并与它交合。然后，比丘一大早穿好衣服，带著钵和外衣，到毘舍离去托钵。众多比丘巡行房舍，来到了该比丘的住处。猴子远远地看见他们来了，一见他们，就走到他们面前，摇著臀部，摇著尾巴，把臀部拱了出来，做了个淫相（§）。比丘们心想：「毫无疑问，这位比丘正在与这只猴子交合。」于是他们躲到一边。「然后，比丘在毘舍离托钵之后，带著托钵食物回来了。猴子向他走来。比丘吃完一部分钵食后，将一部分给予猴子。猴子吃完钵食后，将它的屁股示现给比丘，比丘就与它交合（§）。「然后，诸比丘对该比丘说：『世尊不是制定了学处吗？你怎么能和这只猴子交合呢？ “‘朋友们，确实有一条学处是由世尊制定的，但那是针对人类女性，而不是针对雌性动物。’” 律藏-经分别-波罗夷-猕猴品
The full offense here is composed of four factors: effort, object, knowledge, and consent.	这里完整的违犯由四个因素组成：努力、对象、知悉和同意。

Effort	努力
The term sexual intercourse refers to all kinds of sexual intercourse involving genitals (literally, the “urine path” (passāva-magga)—i.e., a woman’s vagina or a man’s penis); the anus (vacca-magga); or the mouth (mukha). The Vibhaṅga summarizes the various possible combinations of these orifices, and concludes that all of them—except for mouth-to-mouth penetration, which is treated under Derived Offenses, below—fulfill the factor of effort here. Unfortunately, the Vibhaṅga’s summary is couched in technical terminology, using magga (path) to mean either the genitals or the anal orifice, and amagga (not-path) to mean the mouth. The Commentary, in discussing the summary, mistakenly classifies the mouth as a magga as well, and so has to invent a different meaning for amagga: a wound bordering on one of the three maggas. Because the Commentary’s discussion of this point is based on a misunderstanding, there is no need to pursue it in further detail.	性交一词是指所有类型的性交，涉及生殖器（字面意思是「尿道」（passāva-magga），即女性的阴道或男性的阴茎）；肛门（vacca-magga）；或嘴（mukha）。《经分别》总结了这些孔穴的各种可能的组合，并得出结论：除了口对口的插入（在下面的衍生违犯中处理）之外，所有这些孔穴都满足了这里的努力因素。不幸的是，《经分别》的总结是用技术术语表达的，使用 magga （道）来表示生殖器或肛门，使用 amagga （非道）来表示嘴。《义注》在讨论总结时，错误地将嘴也归类为道，因此必须为「非道」发明一个不同的意义：与三道之一接壤的伤口。由于《义注》对这一点的讨论是基于误解，因此无需进一步追究。
The Vibhaṅga states that sexual intercourse has been performed when, in any of the possible combinations covered by this rule, one organ enters the other even if just to “the extent of a sesame seed.” This means that a bhikkhu engaging in genital, oral, or anal intercourse is subject to this rule regardless of which role he plays. The question of whether there is a covering, such as a condom, between the organs is irrelevant, as are the questions of whether the bhikkhu is actively or passively involved, and whether any of the parties involved reaches orgasm.	《经分别》指出，当在该戒条涵盖的任何可能的组合中，一个器官进入另一个器官时，即使只是达到“芝麻籽的程度”，也代表发生了性交。这意味著比丘进行性交、口交或肛交时，无论他扮演什么角色，都隶属于这条戒条。器官之间是否有覆盖物（例如保险套）的问题不相干，比丘是主动参与还是被动参与，以及参与的任何一方是否达到性高潮的问题都是不相干的。

Object	对象
The full penalty under this rule applies to any voluntary sexual intercourse with a human being, a “non-human” being (a yakkha, nāga, or peta), or a common animal, whether female, male, neuter, or hermaphrodite.	这条戒条下的全额惩罚适用于与人类、「非人类」（夜叉 yakkha 、龙 nāga 或亡者及鬼 peta ）或普通动物（无论是雌性、雄性、中性或雌雄同体）的任何自愿性交。
Performing sexual intercourse with a dead body—even a decapitated head—also entails the full penalty if the remains of the body are intact enough for the act to be accomplished.	如果尸体的残骸够完整以完成性交，与尸体（即使是与被斩首的头）进行性交也将受到全额惩罚。
In addition, the Vinīta-vatthu lists two examples of “self-intercourse”: A bhikkhu with a supple back takes his penis into his mouth, and a bhikkhu with an unusually long penis inserts it into his anus. Both cases carry the full penalty.	此外，《Vinīta-vatthu》还列举了两个「自我性交」的例子：一个背部柔软的比丘将阴茎放入口中，一个阴茎异常长的比丘将其插入肛门。两种情况均需受到全额惩罚。

Knowledge & consent	知悉 & 同意
For sexual intercourse to count as an offense, the bhikkhu must know that it is happening and give his consent. Thus if he is sexually assaulted while asleep or otherwise unconscious and remains oblivious to what is happening, he incurs no penalty. If, however, he becomes conscious during the assault or was conscious right from the start, then whether he incurs a penalty depends on whether he gives his consent during any part of the act.	将性交算做犯戒，比丘必须知道它正在发生并给予他的同意。因此，如果他在睡觉或失去知觉时遭到性侵犯，并且对发生的事情浑然不觉，他不会受到惩罚。然而，如果他在袭击过程中变得清醒，或者从一开始就清醒了，那么他是否受到惩罚取决于他在行为的任何部分是否表示同意。
Strangely enough, neither the Canon nor the Commentary discusses the factor of consent in any detail, except to mention by way of passing that it can apply to the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out. From the examples in the Vinīta-vatthu, it would appear that consent refers to a mental state of acquiescence, together with its physical or verbal expression. Mere physical compliance does not count, as there are cases where bhikkhus forced into intercourse comply physically but without consenting mentally and so are absolved of any offense. However, there is also a case in which a woman invites a bhikkhu to engage in sexual intercourse, saying that she will do all the work while he can avoid an offense by doing nothing. The bhikkhu does as she tells him to, but when the case comes to the Buddha’s attention, the Buddha imposes a pārājika on the act without even asking the bhikkhu whether he consented or not. The assumption is that complying with a request like this indicates consent, regardless of whether one makes any physical or verbal movement at all.	奇怪的是，《圣典》和《义注》都没有详细讨论同意因素，只是顺便提到它可以适用于插入、完全插入、留在原处或拔出的阶段。从《Vinīta-vatthu》中的例子来看，同意看来是指一种默许的心理状态，连同其身体或言语表达。仅仅身体上的顺从并不算数，因为在某些情况下，比丘被迫进行性交，但没有心理上的同意，因此没有犯任何戒。然而，也有一种情况，女人邀请比丘发生性行为，说她会做所有的工作，他什么都不做就可以避免犯戒。比丘照她的吩咐去做，但当这件事引起佛陀的注意时，佛陀甚至没有询问比丘是否同意，就认定该行为犯《波罗夷》。前提是，遵守这样的请求就表明同意，无论一个人是否做出任何身体或口头动作。
Taken together, these cases imply that if one is sexually assaulted, one is completely absolved from an offense only if (1) one does not give one’s mental consent at any time during the act or (2) one does feel mental consent during at least part of the act but puts up a struggle so as not to express that consent physically or verbally in any way. (As the Commentary notes, drawing a general principle from the Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 2, mere mental consent without physical expression is not enough to count as a factor of an offense, for there is no offense simply in the arising of a thought or mental state.) If one puts up no struggle and feels mental consent, even if only fleetingly during the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out, one incurs the full penalty. This would seem to be the basis for the Commentary’s warning in its discussion of the Vinīta-vatthu case in which a bhikkhu wakes up to find himself being sexually assaulted by a woman, gives her a kick, and sends her rolling. The warning: This is how a bhikkhu still subject to sensual lust should act if he wants to protect his state of mind.	总而言之，这些案例意味著，如果一个人受到性侵犯，只有在以下情况下才可以完全免除犯戒：（1）一个人在行为过程中的任何时候都没有心理上同意，或者（2）一个人至少在行为过程中的某部份确实感到心理上的同意，但奋力挣扎避免以任何方式透过身体或口头表达同意。（如《义注》中所指出的，从《波罗夷》二的《Vinīta-vatthu》中得出一条一般原则，仅在心理上同意而没有身体表达，不足以算作犯戒的一个因素，因为仅仅在想法或心理状态中产生并不构成犯戒。）如果一个人没有做出任何挣扎并感到精神上同意，即使只是在插入、完全插入、留在原处或拔出阶段短暂地发生，也会受到全额惩罚。这似乎是《义注》在讨论《Vinīta-vatthu》的例子时发出警告的基础，在该案例中，一名比丘醒来，发现自己遭到一名女人的性侵犯，踢了她一脚，然后让她滚出去。警告：如果一个比丘仍然受制于色欲，他想要保护他的心境，就应该这样做。
The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu with “impaired faculties”—one who feels neither pleasure nor pain during intercourse—engages in intercourse under the assumption that his impairment exempts him from the rule. The case is brought to the Buddha, who states, “Whether this worthless man did or didn’t feel [anything], it is a case involving defeat.” From this ruling it can be argued that a bhikkhu indulging in intercourse as part of a tantric ritual incurs the full penalty even if he doesn’t feel pleasure in the course of the act.	《Vinīta-vatthu》中记载了一个案例，一位「官能受损」的比丘——在性交时既感觉不到快乐也感觉不到痛苦——认为他的缺陷使他不受戒条约束而进行性交。这个案例被提交给佛陀，佛陀说：“无论这个愚痴人有没有（任何）感觉，这都是一个《波罗夷》的案例。” 从这个裁决可以看出，一个比丘在密宗仪式中沉溺于性交，即使他在行为过程中没有感到快乐，也会受到全额惩罚。

Derived offenses	衍生违犯
Two thullaccaya offenses are directly related to this rule. The first is for mouth-to-mouth penetration— i.e., the act of inserting any part of one’s mouth into the mouth of another person, or consenting to the insertion of another person’s mouth in one’s own—regardless of whether the other person is a man, a woman, or a common animal. When this act occurs under the influence of lust, as in an intense kiss, the thullaccaya here would be incurred in addition to whatever penalty is assigned for lustful bodily contact under Sg 2.	两种《偷兰遮》罪与此戒条直接相关。第一种是口对口插入－即将一个人的嘴的任何部分插入另一个人的嘴里，或同意另一个人的嘴插入自己的嘴里的行为－无论对方是否是一个男人，女人，或普通的动物。当这种行为在性欲的影响下发生时，例如在激烈的接吻中，除了根据《僧残》二对出于性欲的身体接触所规定的惩罚之外，还会犯《偷兰遮》。
The second thullaccaya is for the unlikely case of a bhikkhu who attempts intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse. To attempt intercourse with any other part of a dead body or with any part of an insentient object, such as an inflatable doll or mannequin, incurs a dukkaṭa. (If this led to an ejaculation, however, the case would be treated under Sg 1.)	第二种《偷兰遮》是针对一个不太可能发生的情况，即比丘试图与尸体腐烂的嘴巴、肛门或生殖器性交。试著与尸体的任何其他部分或无知觉物体的任何部位（例如充气娃娃或人体模型）进行性交，都会犯《突吉罗》。（但是，如果这导致射精，则该情况将根据《僧残》一进行处理。）
The Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being’s body apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the saṅghādisesa rules—either Sg 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sg 2 for lustful bodily contact. As we shall see below, the penalties assigned in the latter case are as follows: if the partner is a woman, a saṅghādisesa; if a paṇḍaka (see Sg 2), a thullaccaya; if a man or a common animal, a dukkaṭa. We can infer from the Vibhaṅga’s ruling here that if a bhikkhu has an orgasm while attempting intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse, with any other part of a dead body, or with any part of an insentient object, the case would come under Sg 1.	《经分别》指出，如果比丘试图与除三孔穴之外的众生身体的任何部位发生性交，这种情况就属于《僧残》戒条－若非《僧残》一代表故意射精，则为《僧残》二代表出于性欲的身体接触。正如我们将在下面看到的，后一种情况的惩罚如下：如果对象是女人，《僧残》；如果是黄门 paṇḍaka （参见《僧残》二），《偷兰遮》；如果是男人或普通动物，《突吉罗》。在此我们可以从《经分别》的裁决中推断出，如果一个比丘在尝试与尸体腐烂的嘴、肛门或生殖器，或与尸体的任何其他部分，或与无知觉物体的任何部分性交时获得性高潮，该情况属于《僧残》一。
The Commentary disagrees with the Vibhaṅga on these points, however, saying that the derived offenses under this rule can include only dukkaṭa and thullaccaya penalties. In its explanation of Sg 1, it sets forth a system of eleven types of lust in which the lust for the pleasure of bringing about an ejaculation, lust for the pleasure of bodily contact, and lust for the pleasure of intercourse are treated as completely separate things that must be treated under separate rules. Thus, it says, if a bhikkhu aiming at intercourse takes hold of a woman’s body, it is simply a preliminary to intercourse and thus entails only a dukkaṭa, rather than a saṅghādisesa for lustful bodily contact. Similarly, if he has a premature ejaculation before beginning intercourse, there is no offense at all.	然而，《义注》在这些观点上不同意《经分别》，称此戒条衍生的违犯只能包括《突吉罗》和《偷兰遮》惩罚。在对《僧残》一的解释中，它提出了十一种性欲的系统，其中对射精快感的性欲，对身体接触快感的性欲，和对性交快感的性欲被视为完全不同的事情，必须根据不同的戒条处理。因此，它说，如果一个以性交为目的的比丘抓住了一个女人的身体，这只是性交的一个预备行动，因此只犯《突吉罗》，而不是出于性欲身体接触的《僧残》。同样地，如果他在开始性交之前出现早泄，也没有任何犯戒。
These are fine academic distinctions and are clearly motivated by a desire to draw neat lines between the rules, but they lead to practical problems. As the Commentary itself points out, if a bhikkhu commits an act that falls near the borderline between these rules but cannot later report precisely which type of lust he was feeling in the heat of the moment, there is no way his case can be judged and a penalty assigned. At any rate, though, there is no basis in the Canon for the Commentary’s system, and in fact it contradicts not only the Vibhaṅga’s ruling mentioned above, but also its definition of lustful under Sg 2, 3, & 4, which is exactly the same for all three rules and places no limits on the type of lust involved. All of this leads to the conclusion that the Commentary’s neat system for classifying lust is invalid, and that the Vibhaṅga’s judgment holds: If a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being’s body apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the saṅghādisesa rules—either Sg 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sg 2 for lustful bodily contact—rather than here.	这些都是很好的学术区别，显然是出于希望在戒条之间划清界线的动机，但它们会导致实际问题。正如《义注》本身指出的那样，如果比丘所犯下的行为接近这些戒条的边缘，但后来无法准确地报告他在一时冲动中感受到哪种类型的欲望，那么他的情况就无法判断并给予惩罚。但，无论如何，《义注》的系统在《圣典》中是没有任何依据的，事实上，它不仅与上述《经分别》的裁决相矛盾，而且也与在《僧残》二、三、四中对性欲的定义相矛盾，这个定义在所有三个戒条都是相同的，并且对所涉及的性欲类型没有限制。这一切都得出这样的结论：《义注》对性欲进行分类的简洁工整系统是无效的，而《经分别》的判断是成立的：如果比丘试图与除三孔穴之外的众生身体的任何部分进行交合，那么这种情况就属于《僧残》戒条的范畴－若非《僧残》一代表故意射精，则为《僧残》二代表出于性欲的身体接触－而不是这里。

Blanket exemptions	总括性豁免
In addition to bhikkhus who do not know they are being assaulted or do not give their consent when they do know, the Vibhaṅga states that there are four special categories of bhikkhus exempted from a penalty under this rule: any bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, or the first offender(s) (in this case, Ven. Sudinna and the bhikkhu with the monkey) whose actions prompted the Buddha to formulate the rule. The Commentary defines as insane anyone who “goes about in an unseemly way, with deranged perceptions, having cast away all sense of shame and compunction, not knowing whether he has transgressed major or minor training rules.” It recognizes this as a medical condition, which it blames on the bile. A bhikkhu under the influence of a severe psychosis-inducing drug would apparently fall under this exemption, but one under the influence of a more common intoxicant would not. As for spirit possession, the Commentary says that this can happen either when spirits frighten one or when, by distracting one with sensory images, they insert their hands into one’s heart by way of one’s mouth (!). Whatever the cause, it notes that insane and possessed bhikkhus are exempt from penalties they incur only when their perceptions are deranged (“when their mindfulness is entirely forgotten and they don’t know what fire, gold, excrement, and sandalwood are”) and not from any they incur during their lucid moments. As for a bhikkhu delirious with pain, he is exempt from penalties he incurs only during periods when the pain is so great that he does not know what he is doing.	除了不知道自己受到侵犯或明知后不同意的比丘外，《经分别》指出，有四种特殊类别的比丘可免受此戒条的处罚：任何精神错乱的比丘、被附身、或因痛苦而发狂神智不清，或最初犯戒者（在本例中，是须提那尊者和与猴子在一起的比丘），他们的行为促使佛陀制定了戒条。《义注》将精神错乱定义为「行为不得体，知觉错乱，已抛弃所有惭愧感，不知犯大、小学处」的人。它认为这是一种健康状况，并将其归咎于胆汁。受到严重的诱发精神病药物影响的比丘显然属于这里的豁免范围，但受到更常见的麻醉剂影响的比丘则不然。至于附身，《义注》说，这种情况可能发生在灵体吓唬人的时候，或者当灵体通过感官图像分散人的注意力，通过人的嘴将手插入人的心脏时（！）。无论出于什么原因，它指出，精神错乱和被附身的比丘只有在他们的知觉错乱时（“当他们的正念完全被遗忘，并且他们不知道火，金，粪便和檀香是什么时”）才可以免受惩罚，在清醒时所发生则不能豁免。至于因痛苦而发狂神智不清的比丘，只有当疼痛剧烈到他不知道自己在做什么时，他才可以免于惩罚。
These four categories are exempted from penalties under nearly all of the rules, although the first offender for each rule is exempted only for the one time he acted in such a way as to provoke the Buddha into formulating the rule. I will only rarely mention these categories again, and—except where expressly stated otherwise—the reader should bear them in mind as exempt in every case.	这四类别几乎在所有戒条中都可以免于处罚，尽管每条戒条的初犯只有一次，其行为引起佛陀制定该戒条时才可以得到豁免。我很少会再次提及这些类别，除非另有明确说明，否则读者应该牢记它们在任何情况下都可以豁免。
Lastly, the Vinīta-vatthu to this rule includes an interesting case that formed the basis for an additional rule:	最后，这条戒条的《Vinīta-vatthu》包括一个有趣的案例，它构成了附加戒条的基础：
“At that time a certain bhikkhu had gone to the Gabled Hall in the Great Wood at Vesālī to pass the day and was sleeping, having left the door open. His various limbs were stiff with the ‘wind forces’ (i.e., he had an erection) (§). Now at that time a large company of women bearing garlands and scents came to the park, headed for the dwelling. Seeing the bhikkhu, they sat down on his male organ (§) and, having taken their pleasure and remarking, ‘What a bull of a man, this one!’ they picked up their garlands and scents, and left.”	「当时，有一位比丘到毘舍离大林的重阁讲堂去打发一天，正在睡觉，门开著。他的各个肢体因「风力」而变得僵硬（即他勃起）（§）。那时，一大群带著花环和香水的妇女来到公园，朝著住所走去。看到比丘后，他们坐在他的男性器官上（§），取得愉悦后说道：「这个人真是个公牛！」他们拿起花环和香水就离开了。
The bhikkhu incurred no penalty, but the Buddha gave formal permission to close the door when resting during the day. From this permission, the Commentary formulates a prohibition—that a bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa if he does not close the door when sleeping during the day—but if the Buddha had intended a prohibition, he surely would have stated the rule in that form himself. In other words, one may sleep during the day without being penalized for whether the door is open or not.	比丘没有受到惩罚，但佛陀正式允许白天休息时关门。根据这项许可，《义注》制定了一条禁令——比丘如果白天睡觉时不关门，就会犯《突吉罗》——但如果佛陀有意禁止，他肯定会亲自以禁令形式陈述这条戒条。换句话说，比丘可以在白天睡觉，而不会因为门是否打开而受到惩罚。
Summary: Voluntary sexual intercourse—genital, anal, or oral—with a human being, non-human being, or common animal is a pārājika offense.	摘要：与人类、非人或普通动物自愿发生性交（生殖器、肛门或口腔）是《波罗夷》罪。

* * *

2	二
Should any bhikkhu, in what is reckoned a theft, take what is not given from an inhabited area or from the wilderness—just as when, in the taking of what is not given, kings arresting the criminal would flog, imprison, or banish him, saying, “You are a robber, you are a fool, you are benighted, you are a thief”—a bhikkhu in the same way taking what is not given also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.	如果任何比丘，在村落或林野，拿取未给予的东西，被视为盗窃，就像国王逮捕罪犯，拿取未给予的东西时会鞭打、监禁或驱逐他一样说：「你是强盗，你是愚人，你是愚昧无知的，你是小偷。」——比丘以同样的方式拿取未给予的东西，也是波罗夷，不共住。
This rule against stealing is, in the working out of its details, the most complex in the Pāṭimokkha and requires the most explanation—not because stealing is a concept especially hard to understand, but because it can take so many forms. The Canon treats the issue in a case-by-case fashion that resists easy summary. To further complicate matters, the Commentary’s discussion of this rule is extremely prolix and deviates frequently from the Canon’s in both major and minor ways. Because the deviations are so numerous, we will focus solely on the major ones.	就其细节而言，这条禁止偷窃的戒条是《波罗提木叉》中最复杂的，也需要最多的解释——不是因为偷窃是一个特别难以理解的概念，而是因为它可以有多种形式。《圣典》以逐案的的方式对待这个议题，拒绝简单地总结。使事情变得更加复杂的是，《义注》对这条戒条的讨论极其冗长，并且经常在主要和次要方面偏离《圣典》的内容。由于偏差如此之多，我们将只关注主要的偏差。
The Vibhaṅga defines the act of stealing in terms of four factors.	《经分别》根据四个因素定义了偷窃行为。
Object: anything belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.	对象：属于另一个人或一群人的任何东西。
Perception: One perceives the object as belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.	感知：察觉到该对象属于另一个人或一群人。
Intention: One decides to steal it.	意图：决定偷窃它。
Effort: One takes it.	努力：拿走它。
Stealing under any circumstances is always an offense. However, the severity of the offense depends on another factor, which is—	在任何情况下偷窃都是犯戒行为。然而，犯戒的严重程度取决于另一个因素，即——
The value of the object.	该对象的价值。

Object	对象
For an object to qualify as what is not given—the rule’s term for anything that may be the object of a theft—it must belong to someone else: “not given, not forfeited, not abandoned/discarded; guarded, protected, claimed (§—literally, ‘viewed as “mine”’), possessed by someone else.” In all of the Vibhaṅga’s cases under this rule, that “someone else” is either an individual human being or a group of human beings. The question of property belonging to the Saṅgha logically fits here, but because the topic is fairly complex we will discuss it as a special case below.	一个对象要符合“未给予”的条件（该戒条对可能成为盗窃对象的任何物品的术语），它必须属于其他人：“未给予、未没收丧失、未遗弃/丢弃；” 被看守、保护、声称（§—字面意思是“被视为‘我的’）、被其他人拥有。” 在这条戒条下的所有《经分别》案例中，「其他人」若非一个人，则为一群人。僧团财产的疑问在逻辑上适用于这里，但由于这个主题相当复杂，我们将在下面作为一个特例来讨论。
Because items that have been given away or discarded do not fulfill the factor of object here, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who takes a discarded object—such as rags from a pile of refuse—or unclaimed items from a wilderness. The Commentary, in some of its examples, includes items given up for lost under “abandoned,” but this interpretation has to be heavily qualified. If the owner retains a sense of ownership for the lost item, it would fall under the term claimed, and thus would still count as not given. Only if the owner abandons all sense of ownership would it genuinely count as abandoned.	因为被送出或丢弃的物品不符合这里的对象因素，所以对于比丘来说，拿走被丢弃的物品——例如一堆垃圾中的破布——或来自林野中无主的物品，并没有犯戒。《义注》中的一些例子中，「遗弃」包括了因遗失而放弃的物品，但这种解释必须经过严格限定。如果失主保留对遗失物品的所有权意识，则该物品将属于有主的，因此仍然算作未给予。只有拥有者放弃所有的所有权意识，才算真正的遗弃。
The Vinīta-vatthu mentions an interesting case in which the groundskeeper in an orchard permits bhikkhus to take fruit from the orchard, even though he was not authorized to do so. The bhikkhus committed no offense.	《Vinīta-vatthu》提到了一个有趣的案例，果园的园丁允许比丘们从果园拿水果，尽管他没有被授权这样做。比丘们没有犯任何戒。
The Commentary adds that if people are guarding an object as the property of a location—for example, an offering to a Buddha image, cetiya, or other sacred place—the object would also qualify as “not given” under this rule. Although the Vibhaṅga mentions property of this sort under NP 30 and Pc 82, for some reason it doesn’t mention it here. Nevertheless, the Commentary’s judgment on this point reflects a custom that had become widespread by its time, that of giving valuable items to a cetiya (this includes Buddha images) and dedicating them not to the Saṅgha but to the cetiya. Some medieval Indian Buddhist inscriptions express the idea that the cetiya or the Buddha relics (if any) within the cetiya actually own such objects, but the Commentary states that these objects have an owner simply in the sense that human beings are watching over them for the purpose of the cetiya. The jewels decorating the reliquary of the Sacred Tooth in Kandy or the offerings to the Emerald Buddha in Bangkok, for example, would fall under this category. According to the Commentary, the Saṅgha is duty-bound to care for such items but has no rights of ownership over them. In its discussion both of this rule and of Pv.XIX, it states that items given to the Saṅgha may be used for the purpose of the cetiya—for example, to contribute to its decoration or upkeep—but items given to the cetiya may not be used for the purpose of the Saṅgha.	《义注》补充说，如果人们将某个物品作为某个地点的财产来保护——例如，供奉给佛像、支提或其他神圣场所的供品——根据这条戒条，该物品也将被视为“未给予”。尽管《经分别》在《舍堕》三十和《波逸提》八二中提到了此类财产，但由于某种原因，它在这里没有提及。然而，《义注》对这一点的判断反映了当时流行的一种习俗，即向支提（包括佛像）赠送贵重物品，将它们奉献给支提，而不是僧团。一些中世纪印度佛教铭文表达了这样的想法，即支提或支提内的佛舍利（如果有的话）实际上拥有这些物品，但《义注》指出，这些物品有主人，只因有人为了支提的缘故正在看守它们。例如，在康提装饰佛牙箱的珠宝或曼谷供奉玉佛的供品就属于这一类。根据《义注》，僧团有义务保管这些物品，但没有所有权。在对该戒条和《附随》一九的讨论中，它指出给予僧伽的物品可以用于支提—例如，有助于其装饰或维护—但给予支提的物品不可作为僧伽之用。
From the Commentary’s discussion of this type of ownership, it would appear that if there are no longer any human beings watching over a cetiya, the items donated to it would no longer count as having an owner and thus could be removed for safekeeping, preferably to another cetiya. Any bhikkhu who took such items for himself, however, would be risking the wrath of the devas who might be guarding the cetiya. This is why it is traditional in such cases to conduct a ceremony formally requesting the permission of any guardian devas, at the same time promising not to take such items for one’s own use.	从《义注》对这种类型所有权的讨论来看，如果不再有任何人看管支提，捐赠给它的物品将不再被视为有主物，因此可以被移走以妥善保管，最好是移到另一个支提。然而，任何比丘若将这些物品据为己有，就会冒著触怒可能守护支提的天神的风险。这就是为什么在这种情况下，传统上会举行仪式，正式请求任何守护天神的许可，同时承诺不会将这些物品据为己用。
The Vibhaṅga states that items belonging to common animals or petas are not covered by this rule. On this point, see the discussion under Non-offenses, below.	《经分别》说，属于一般动物或亡者及鬼的物品不属于此戒条的范围。关于这一点，请参阅下面「不犯」部分的讨论。

Perception	感知
For the act of taking what is not given to count as theft, one must also perceive the object as not given. Thus there is no offense if one takes an object, even if it is not given, if one sincerely believes that it is ownerless or thrown away. Similarly, if a bhikkhu takes an object mistaking it for his own or as belonging to a friend who has given him permission to take his things on trust, there is no offense even if the assumption about the trust proves to be a misperception. Also, a bhikkhu who takes things from the Community’s common stores, on the assumption that he has the right to help himself, commits no offense even if the assumption proves false.	将未给予而拿取算做盗窃的行为，该人必须察觉该物品是未给予的。因此，如果一个人真诚地相信它是无主的或被丢弃的，那么即使它是未给予的，如果该人拿走了它，也没有犯戒。同样地，如果比丘拿走一件物品，误认为它是他自己的，或者是属于一位允许他以信托方式拿走他的东西的朋友的，即使有关信托的假设被证明是一种误解，也没有犯戒。此外，比丘假设他有权利自助，从僧团的公共储藏中拿东西，即使这个假设被证明是错的，也没有犯戒。
The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu, spotting some objects during the day, returns to steal them at night. However, instead of taking the objects he spotted, he ends up taking some possessions of his own. He earns a dukkaṭa for his efforts.	《Vinīta-vatthu》中有一个案例，一位比丘在白天发现一些物品，然后在晚上回来偷它们。然而，他最终没有拿走他发现的物品，而是拿走了自己的一些所有物。他透过自己的努力犯了《突吉罗》。
None of the texts discuss the possible case in which one might be in doubt as to whether the object in question is not given, perhaps because the compilers felt that the factor of intention, discussed next, would not apply in such cases. Thus it would not be an offense under this rule. However, the wise policy when one is in doubt about an item’s ownership would be not to take the item for one’s own, or at most to take it on loan, as explained below.	没有任何文本讨论怀疑该物品是否尚未给予的这种可能情况，也许是因为编译者认为接下来讨论的意图因素不适用于这种情况。因此，根据该戒条，这不会构成犯戒。然而，当一个人对某件物品的所有权有疑问时，明智之举是不要将其据为己有，或最多借用它，如下所述。

Intention	意图
The act of taking what is not given, even when one perceives it as not given, counts as theft only if one’s intention is to steal it. Thus, as the non-offense clauses say, a bhikkhu incurs no offense if he takes an object temporarily or on trust. On these points, see the discussion under Non-offenses, below. Also, the Vinīta-vatthu rules that a bhikkhu who, seeing an article left in a place where it might be damaged, puts it in safe keeping for the owner, commits no offense.	拿取未给予之物的行为，即使察觉到它尚未给予，只有当一个人的意图是偷窃它时，才算是偷窃。因此，正如不犯条款所说，比丘如果暂时或受托取用某物，并不会犯戒。关于这点，请参阅下面「不犯」部分的讨论。此外，《Vinīta-vatthu》规定，比丘看到一件物品被留在可能会被损坏的地方，为该物主妥善保管，这并不构成犯戒。
The Commentary discusses two cases of taking an item with a conditional intent (parikappāvahāra): placing a condition on the article, and placing a condition on the place. It illustrates the first case with the example of a bhikkhu entering a dark storeroom and taking a sack full of items, thinking, “If the sack contains cloth, I’ll steal it; if it contains just thread, I won’t.” In this case, if the sack does indeed contain cloth, then it was stolen the moment the bhikkhu moved the sack from its place (see below). If it contains just thread, and he returns it to its place, he commits no offense. If, however, the bhikkhu takes the sack thinking, “I’ll steal whatever is in the sack,” the Commentary maintains that he is not guilty of stealing until he finds out what the sack contains and then picks it up again, but this case does not really fit under this category, as the bhikkhu has actually placed no condition on the article and so stole it when he first picked it up.	《义注》讨论了带有条件意图（parikappāvahāra）拿取物品的两种情况：对物品设定条件，以及对地点设定条件。它用一个比丘的例子来说明第一个情况，他进入一个黑暗的储藏室，拿起一袋装满物品的袋子，心想：「如果袋子里有布，我就偷它；如果它只包含线，我不偷。」在这种情况下，如果袋子里确实装有布，那么当比丘把袋子从原来的位置移开时，它就被偷了（见下文）。如果里面只有线，他把它放回原处，他就没有犯戒。然而，如果比丘拿起袋子时心里想：「我要偷袋子里的东西」，《义注》认为，在他发现袋子里装著什么，然后再把它拿起来之前，他并没有犯偷窃，但这个情况并不真正属于这一类，因为比丘实际上没有对这个物品设定任何条件，所以当他第一次拿起它时就偷走了它。
Placing a condition on the place means thinking, “If I can take this item past such-and-such a place (such as a gateway), I’ll steal it; if anyone sees me beforehand, I’ll pretend that I’m just looking at it and will return it to its place.” Because one has not definitely decided to steal it when first picking it up, the theft is committed only when one takes the item past the determined place.	对地点设定条件意味著心想：「如果我可以带著这个物品通过某某地点（例如出入口），我就会偷它；如果有人先看到我，我会假装我只是在看它，把它放回原处。」由于第一次拿起物品时并没有明确决定要偷窃，只有当拿物品通过了决意的地点时才算偷窃。

Effort	努力
Assuming that all of the above conditions are met—the object belongs to someone else, one perceives it as belonging to someone else, and one intends to steal it—if one then takes it, that constitutes stealing. The question then arises as to precisely what acts constitute taking.	假设上述所有条件都满足，即该物品是别人的，自己察觉到该物是属于别人的，并意图去偷窃它—如果拿走了它，就构成偷窃。那么问题来了，究竟什么行为才构成拿取。
The Vibhaṅga, instead of giving a systematic answer to this question, provides a long list of possible situations and then defines how taking is defined in each case. Simply reading through the list can require some patience, and it’s easy to sympathize with the bhikkhus in the past who had to memorize it. Here, to shorten the discussion, we will reverse its order, listing first the actions that qualify as taking and then the situations to which the actions apply. Actions requiring only minor clarification will be explained in the list; those requiring extended discussion will be explained below.	《经分别》并没有对这个问题给出系统的答案，而是提供了一长串可能的情况，然后定义了在每种情况下的怎样算是「拿取」。单纯地阅读这个列单可能需要一些耐心，而且很容易同情过去必须记住它的比丘们。在这里，为了缩短讨论，我们将颠倒其顺序，首先列出符合「拿取」的行动，然后列出这些行动适用的情况。只需要进行少量澄清的行动将在列表中进行解释；下文将解释那些需要进一步讨论的内容。
Moving the object from its place: objects buried in the ground; sitting on the ground; sitting on another object sitting on the ground; hanging from a place above ground, such as a peg or clothesline; floating, flying, or dropping in mid-air; sitting in a boat; sitting in a vehicle; an object that one has caused another person to drop; footless animals, animals that one might pick up or push from their place (according to the Commentary, this also covers larger footed animals that are lying down); objects that one has been asked to guard. The Vibhaṅga makes clear that items in a vehicle also count as taken when the vehicle is moved from its place.	将物品从原来的位置移动：埋在地下的物品；坐在地上；坐在地上的另一个物品上；悬挂在地面以上的地方，例如挂钩或晾衣绳；漂浮、飞行或掉落在半空中；坐在船上；坐在车内；一个人导致另一个人掉落的物品；无足动物，人们可能会从其所在位置拿起或推走的动物（根据《义注》，这也包括躺著的较大有足动物）；被要求看守的物品。《经分别》明确规定，当车辆从其位置移动时，在车辆中的物品也算作被拿走。
“Cutting off” a fistful: objects inside a container. According to the Commentary, this means reaching into the container and grabbing, say, a fistful of coins in such a way that the coins in the fist do not touch any of the other coins in the container. In this case, the taking would be accomplished before the object was removed from the container.	「切掉」一把：容器内的物品。根据《义注》，这意味著伸手进入容器并抓住一把硬币，使得拳头中的硬币不接触容器中的任何其他硬币。在这种情况下，在将物品从容器中取出之前就完成了「拿取」。
Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: objects inside a container; water or any liquid, whether in a container or not. Again, the Commentary states that the objects or liquid in one’s vessel must not touch the remaining objects or liquid outside the vessel. And, again, in the case of taking objects or liquid situated in a container in this way, the taking would be accomplished before the objects or liquid were removed from the container.	将器皿插入一池液体或一堆物体中，并使一池液体或一堆物体中的一些进入器皿：容器内的物体；水或任何液体，无论是否在容器中。《义注》再次指出，器皿中的物体或液体不得接触器皿外的剩余物体或液体。并且，再次，在以这种方式拿取位于容器中的物体或液体的情况下，「拿取」将在物体或液体从器皿中移出之前完成。
Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: objects too long or large to be taken from a container in a vessel or fistful.	完全从容器口中取出：太长或太大而无法从容器中以器皿拿取或一把拿取的物体。
Drinking liquid from a container: This would apply to drinking from the container without moving the container from its place. If the container is moved from its place, that would constitute the taking. As with the fistful, the Commentary argues that the liquid is taken only when the liquid ingested does not make contact with the liquid not ingested. This can be done either by swallowing, by closing one’s lips, or by removing one’s mouth from the container.	从容器中饮用液体：这适用于在不将容器移离其位置的情况下从容器中饮用液体。若容器被移离其原位，则构成「拿取」。与一把一样，《义注》认为只有当摄入的液体不与未摄入的液体接触时才算「拿取」液体。这可以透过吞咽、闭上嘴唇或将嘴从容器移开来完成。
Moving the object from one part of one’s body to another: an object that one is already carrying before deciding to steal it. The Vibhaṅga recognizes five body parts here: head, upper torso, hip, and each of the hands. The Commentary defines head as anything above the neck; upper torso as anything below the head down, on the torso, to the level of the sternum, and on the arm, to the elbow; hip as the remainder of the body below the upper torso; and hand as the arm from the elbow on down. The Commentary notes that this definition applies only to cases where the owners have not asked one to carry the article for them. Neither the Commentary nor the Sub-commentary explains this condition, but a possible reason might be that if they have asked a bhikkhu to carry the article for them, without their intending for him to give it to someone else, it would count as guarded by him or deposited with him for safe keeping, and thus would fall under another category. If, on the other hand, they asked him to carry the object to give to someone else and he decided to take it for himself, the case would come under Deceit, discussed below.	将物品从身体的一个部位移动到另一个部位：在决定偷窃之前已经携带的物品。《经分别》在这里识别出五个身体部位：头部、上躯干、臀部和每只手。《义注》将头部定义为颈部以上的任何部位；上躯干，为头部以下、躯干至胸骨水平、手臂至手肘；臀部是上躯干以下身体的其余部分；手，为手臂从手肘以下。《义注》指出，这项定义仅适用于所有者未要求他人为其搬运物品的情况。《义注》和《复注》都没有解释这个条件，但一个可能的原因是，如果他们要求比丘为他们携带该物品，而不是想让他将其交给其他人，那么该物品将被视为由比丘守护，或存放在他那里安全保管，因此属于另一类。另一方面，如果他们要求他携带该物品送给其他人，而他决定将其据为己有，则该情况将属于如下所述的欺诈行为。
Dropping the object: an object one is already carrying before deciding to steal it.	掉落物品：在决定偷窃前已经携带的物品。
Causing the object to move a hairbreadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a boat or any similar vessel floating in water.	导致物体向上游、下游或穿过水体移动毫发宽度：一艘船或漂浮在水中的任何类似载体。
Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: water in a lake, canal, or reservoir.	破坏堤防使水流出：湖泊、运河或水库中的水。
Causing an animal to move all its feet: two-footed (this includes human beings, i.e., slaves), four-footed, many-footed animals. According to the Commentary, this applies whether one touches the animal or simply lures it or threatens it without touching it. If the animal is lying down, simply getting it to get up on its feet counts as taking it. In the case of helping a slave to escape from slavery, if the slave follows one’s order or advice to escape, one is guilty of taking; but if one simply informs the slave of good ways to reach freedom or offers food or protection along the way, one incurs no offense.	使动物移动其所有的脚：两足动物（这包括人类，即奴隶）、四足动物、多足动物。根据《义注》，无论是接触动物还是只是引诱它或威胁它而不触摸它，这都适用。如果动物躺著，只要让它站起来就可以算「拿取」它。在帮助奴隶逃脱奴隶身份的情况下，如果奴隶听从某人的命令或建议逃跑，则犯了「拿取」；但是，如果一个人只是告诉奴隶获得自由的好方法，或者沿途提供食物或保护，那么就不会犯戒。
Cutting down: plants growing in place, whether on dry land or in a body of water. The Commentary states that once the plant is cut totally through, then even though it doesn’t yet fall down—as when a tree is entangled in the branches of neighboring trees—it is nevertheless taken.	砍伐：植物就地生长，无论是在旱地或水体。《义注》指出，一旦植物被完全砍断，即使它还没有倒下——就像一棵树被邻近树木的树枝缠住一样——它仍然是被「拿取」了。
Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession: pieces of land (fields, orchards, building sites), buildings, objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safekeeping. (According to the Commentary, items loaned to a bhikkhu also fall into this category.) According to the Vibhaṅga, if a case of this sort goes to court, this type of taking is completed when the owner finally loses the case. The Vinaya-mukha adds that if the owner appeals the case after the first hearing, the taking is accomplished when the owner loses in the highest court to which he/she makes an appeal.	导致所有者放弃重新拥有的努力（§）：土地（田地、果园、建筑工地）、建筑物、交由比丘保管的物品。（根据《义注》，借给比丘的物品也属于这一类。）根据《经分别》，如果此类案件进入法庭，当所有者最终败诉时，这种类型的「拿取」就完成了。《戒律入口》补充说，如果所有者在第一次听证会后对案件提出上诉，则当所有者在他/她提出上诉的最高法院败诉时，「拿取」就完成了。
The discussion in the Commentary and Sub-commentary indicates that the two categories of “objects a bhikkhu has been asked to guard,” and “objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safe keeping” differ in that in the latter case the object has been handed to the bhikkhu, whereas in the former it hasn’t. This, however, does not fit with the Vibhaṅga, which in defining “deposited” uses the word upanikkhitaṁ, which in NP 18 means “placed down next to.” A way to distinguish the two categories more closely in line with the Vibhaṅga would be to say that, in the latter case, the object is in such a location that the owner, in order to retrieve it, would have to ask the bhikkhu’s permission to do so, whereas in the former he/she wouldn’t. For example, an item placed in the bhikkhu’s hut or a monastery storeroom would count as deposited with the bhikkhu—regardless of whether it had been handed to him—whereas an item set by the side of a public road—with the bhikkhu simply asked to watch over it for a short period of time—would count as an object he has been asked to guard.	《义注》和《复注》中的讨论表明，「比丘被要求看守的物品」和「存放给比丘妥善保管的物品」这两类的不同之处在于，在后一种情况下，该物品已被交给比丘，而前者却没有。然而，这与《经分别》不符，《经分别》在定义「存放」时使用了「upanikkhitaṁ」一词，在《舍堕》一八中意思是「放置在旁边」。一种更符合《经分别》的区分这两个类别的方法是，在后一种情况下，物品所在的位置使得所有者为了取回它，必须征求比丘的许可取回，而在前者中他/她不必。例如，放置在比丘小屋（孤邸）或寺院储藏室中的物品将被视为存放在比丘那里——无论它是否已交给他——而放置在公共道路旁的物品——比丘只被要求短时间看管——就算是被要求看守的物品。
Shifting a boundary marker: pieces of land. The Vinaya-mukha notes that this contradicts the preceding definition of how one takes a piece of land, as the owner might not even know that the marker had been moved, and would not necessarily give up ownership even if he/she saw a bhikkhu moving it. The Sub-commentary tries to explain the discrepancy by maintaining that shifting a boundary marker fulfills the factor of effort here only if the act of shifting the marker, in and of itself, induces the owner to give up any efforts to reclaim the land, but that would make this category superfluous. A better explanation would be that this definition of taking applies to attempts to lay claim to Saṅgha land, for otherwise—if land can be stolen only when the owner abandons ownership—then Saṅgha land could not be stolen, because there is no one acting for the Saṅgha of the Four Directions who could renounce once and for all any efforts to reclaim the land.	移动界碑：一块土地。《戒律入口》指出，这与前面关于如何「拿取」一块土地的定义相矛盾，因为所有者甚至可能不知道界碑已被移动，即使他/她看到比丘移动，也不一定会放弃所有权。《复注》试图解释这种差异，认为只有当移动界碑的行为本身导致所有者放弃任何收回土地的努力时，移动界碑才满足此处的努力因素，但这将使这个类别变得多余。更好的解释是，这种「拿取」的定义适用于试图声称拥有僧伽土地所有权，否则——如果土地只有在所有者放弃所有权时才能被盗——那么僧伽土地就不可能被盗，因为没有人可以代表四方僧伽一劳永逸地放弃任何收回土地的努力。
Exchanging lottery tickets: See Swindling, below.	交换彩票(彩券)：请参阅下文的诈骗。
Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: See Smuggling, below.	带应课税物品通过海关区而不缴纳关税：请参阅下文的走私。
Of these various ways of taking, the Commentary devotes the most space to the first, “moving the object from its place.” Its discussion is at odds with the Canon on many points, most notably in striking out the separate categories for taking large objects from a container (removing it entirely from the mouth of a container) and boats (causing them to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water), and simply subsuming them under this category. Although it may have regarded these separate categories as arbitrary, it introduces many arbitrary distinctions and inconsistencies of its own. Apparently its distinctions come from the ancient commentaries, for even Buddhaghosa expresses despair at trying to commit them all to writing. Here we will stick with the Canon’s scheme for defining the act of taking, and focus on the parts of the Commentary’s discussion that accord with the Canon. As for those that deviate from the Canon, only important deviations will be noted.	在这些不同的「拿取」方式中，《义注》用了最多的篇幅来描述第一种，「将物品从原来的位置移动」。它的讨论在许多方面与《圣典》不一致，最值得注意的是，删除了从容器中拿取大型物体（将其完全从容器口取出）和船只（导致它们向上游、下游或穿过水体移动毫发宽度）的单独类别，并单纯地将它们归入此类别。尽管它可能认为这些单独的类别是随意的，但它自己却引入了许多随意的区分和不一致。显然，它的区分来自古代注释，因为即使是佛音也对试图将它们全部写入文字表示绝望。这里我们将坚持《圣典》定义「拿取」行为的方案，并著重在《义注》中符合《圣典》的部分。至于那些偏离《圣典》的内容，只会指出重要的偏差。
In general, the Commentary defines an object’s place in terms of the directions in which it can be moved: up, down (as when an object sitting on sand can be pushed down into the sand), left, right, forward (toward the person taking it), and away. With reference to the last five of these actions, the place of the object is defined in three-dimensional terms: the space it occupies. Thus to take an object in any of these directions, one must push or pull it entirely outside of the coordinates of the space it initially occupied. However, with reference to lifting the object up, the place is defined in two-dimensional terms: the area of contact between the object and its support, whether that support is another object or the ground. Thus to take an object by lifting it, one only need lift it a hairbreadth from its support.	总体来说，《义注》根据物体可以被移动的方向来定义物体的位置：上、下（如当坐在沙上的物体可以被推入沙子时）、左、右、前进（朝向拿取者），和远离。关于这些动作中的最后五个，物体的位置是用三维术语定义的：它所占据的空间。因此，要沿著这些方向中的任何一个方向拿取物体，必须将其完全推或拉到其最初占据的空间座标之外。然而，关于举起物体，该位置是用二维术语定义的：物体与其支撑物之间的接触面积，无论该支撑物是另一个物体还是地面。因此，要举起一个物体来拿取，只需将其从支撑物上举起毫发宽度即可。
For example, a television set on a shelf is taken either when it is slid left along the shelf to the point where its right side is just left of where the left side used to be, or slid right to the point where its left side is just right of where the right side used to be, or lifted a hairbreadth off the shelf.	例如，当架子上的电视机沿著架子向左滑动到其右侧恰好位于原本左侧的左边时，或是向右滑动到其左侧恰好位于原本右侧的右边时，或是从架子上抬起了毫发宽度，就算被拿取。
Because objects in the air have no support, the Commentary defines their space in three-dimensional terms no matter which direction they are moved. For instance, if one catches a piece of cloth being blown by the wind, its place is the three-dimensional space it occupies at the moment one catches it. If one stops a flying peacock without touching it, its place is the three-dimensional space it occupies at the moment it stops to hover. In either case, the object is taken when displaced any direction outside the coordinates of that space. In the case of the cloth, this could be done simply by dropping it. In the case of the peacock, it could be done by waving one’s hands and getting it to fly in the desired direction. If the peacock happens to land on one’s arm, it is taken when one moves it to another part of one’s body or puts it down.	由于空气中的物体没有支撑，因此无论它们被向哪个方向移动，《义注》都以三维术语定义它们的空间。比如说，如果你抓住一块被风吹动的布，它所在的位置就是一个人在抓住它的那一刻所占据的三维空间。如果一个人停止一只飞翔的孔雀而不触碰它，那么它所在的位置就是它停止盘旋那一刻所占据的三维空间。在任何一种情况下，当物体被移位到在该空间的座标之外的任何方向时，就算被拿取。就布料而言，只需将其掉落就算完成拿取。就孔雀而言，只需挥动双手，让它朝著想要的方向飞去就算完成拿取。如果孔雀刚好落在一个人的手臂上，当一个人将它移到身体的另一个部位或将它放下时，就算被拿取。
For animals swimming in water, it would make sense to define place in the same terms as birds flying in the air, but the Commentary insists that the entire body of water in which they are kept constitutes their place.	对于在水中游泳的动物来说，用与在空中飞行的鸟类相同的术语来定义位置也说得通，但《义注》坚持认为它们所在的整个水体构成了它们的位置。
Objects on a living person—such as a bracelet on the person’s arm—have the person’s body as their place. Thus if, in trying to remove the bracelet, one pulls it up and down the arm, it is not yet taken. It is taken only when one removes it entirely from the hand. If one is stealing the person’s clothes, they are taken only when removed from his/her body. If the person, stripped of the clothes, is still holding onto them, they are taken only when pulled from his/her hand.	活人身上的物体（例如人手臂上的手镯）以人的身体作为其位置。因此，如果在试图取下手镯时，将其在手臂上下拉动，则手镯尚未被拿取。只有当一个人将手镯完全从手中拿开时，才算被拿取。如果有人偷了某人的衣服，只有当衣服从他/她身上脱下来时才算被拿取。如果被剥去衣服的人仍然抓著衣服，只有从他/她的手中拉出衣服时，衣服才算被拿取。
For some objects, the Commentary defines place in terms that seem rather arbitrary. For instance, a robe on a line is taken when it is lifted a hairbreadth off the line, but for some reason if it is moved along the line it is not taken until it is ten or twelve fingerbreadths away from the area it originally occupied on the line. An object leaning against a wall has two places: the spot where it sits on the ground and the spot it touches on the wall. A vehicle’s place is defined two-dimensionally: the spots where its wheels touch the ground (perhaps this is defined on analogy with the feet of an animal). An object tied to a post has that connection as an extra part of its place. Thus a pot tied by a chain to a post is not taken until it is removed from the area it occupied under the general definition above and either the chain is cut or the post pulled up. Although there is a certain logic to each of these cases, the added distinctions seem unnecessary complications added to an already complicated issue. For simplicity’s sake there would seem every reason to stick with the general definition of place even in these special cases, although there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to prove or disprove the Commentary here.	对于某些物体，《义注》对位置的定义似乎相当随意。例如，当一条线上的袈裟被提高离该线一毫发宽度时，它就算被拿取，但由于某种原因，如果它沿著该线被移动，直到它距离它在该线上原来占据的区域十或十二个手指宽度时，它才算被拿取。靠在墙上的物体有两个位置：它位于地面上的位置和它接触墙壁的位置。车辆的位置是二维定义的：车轮接触地面的点（也许这是透过类比动物的脚来定义的）。绑在柱子上的物体将该连接作为其位置的额外部分。因此，用链条绑在柱子上的罐子不算被拿取，直到将其从根据上面一般定义的所占据区域移开并且链条被切断或柱子被拔起为止。尽管每种情况都有一定的逻辑，但增加的差异似乎为本已复杂的问题增添了不必要的复杂性。为了简单起见，即使在这些特殊情况下，似乎也有充分的理由坚持位置的一般定义，尽管《经分别》中没有任何内容可以证明或反驳这里的《义注》。
However, as noted above, several of the Commentary’s definitions of place clearly contradict the Vibhaṅga. In some cases, the contradiction is simple, as when the Commentary insists that an animal kept in an enclosure—a cow in a pen, a peacock in a garden—is taken not when its feet are moved, but only when removed from the enclosure. In other cases, the contradiction is more complex, in that the Commentary tries to define taking as “moving the object from its place” in cases where the Vibhaṅga defines the act of taking in other terms. For example, with an object sitting in the bottom of a container, it says that the object is taken when lifted a hairbreadth from the bottom, there being no need to remove the object from the container before it is considered taken. In the case of a boat, the Commentary defines the place of the boat in modified three-dimensional terms: the entire space where the boat displaces water. To take it by pushing it down in the water, the top of the boat has to sink lower than the level where the keel originally was; to take it by lifting it up, one need only lift it a hairbreadth above the water, there being no need to lift the keel to a point higher than where the highest point of the boat was. However, because the Vibhaṅga does not define the taking of boats or objects in containers in terms of “moving the object from its place,” the Commentary’s analysis of these possibilities is beside the point.	然而，如上所述，《义注》中对位置的一些定义显然与《经分别》相矛盾。在某些情况下，矛盾很简单，例如当《义注》坚持认为饲养在围起来的区域中的动物（围栏中的牛，花园中的孔雀）不是在其脚移动时才被拿取，而是只有在从围起来的区域中移出时才被拿取。在其他情况下，矛盾更为复杂，因为《义注》试图将「拿取」定义为「将物品从原来的位置移动」，而《经分别》以其他术语定义「拿取」的行为。例如，如果一个物体位于容器的底部，它说该物体从底部抬起一毫发宽度时就被拿取了，在该物体被视为拿取之前，不需要将其从容器中取出。就船只的情况而言，《义注》以修改后的三维术语定义了船只的位置：船排开水的整个空间。为了透过将其推入水中来拿取它，船的顶部必须下沉到低于船的龙骨原来所在的水平；为了透过举起来拿取它，只需将其举出水面一毫发宽度即可，无需将龙骨举得高于船之前的最高点。然而，由于《经分别》并没有将拿取船只或容器中的物体定义为「将物品从原来的位置移动」，因此《义注》对这些可能性的分析是不是重点，与主题无关。
Other special cases in the Vibhaṅga include the following:	《经分别》中的其他特殊情况包含如下：
a. Swindling: Objects are being distributed by lot to the Community, and a bhikkhu takes the portion rightfully going to another bhikkhu. The Vibhaṅga offers no further explanation, but the Commentary states that the taking can be accomplished in various ways. If, after the drawing of the tickets, X puts his ticket in the place of Y’s ticket before picking up Y’s, the taking is accomplished when he picks up Y’s. If he picks up Y’s before putting his own ticket in its place, the taking is accomplished when he lets go of his own. If both tickets don’t appear (they’ve been concealed?) and X gets Y to take X’s portion, the taking is accomplished when he then picks up Y’s portion. The underlying assumption in all this is that Y’s portion belongs to him as soon as he has drawn the ticket for it. The Commentary adds that this exchange counts as theft regardless of whether X’s portion is worth more than Y’s, less than Y’s, or the two portions are of equal value.	a. 诈骗：物品以抽签的方式分发给僧团，一个比丘理应拿取的部份却到了另一个比丘那里。《经分别》没有提供进一步的解释，但《义注》指出，可以透过多种方式完成拿取。如果在抽签后，X 在拿取 Y 的签之前，将自己的签放在 Y 的签的位置上，则当他拿取 Y 的签时，即完成拿取。如果他在将自己的签放回原来的位置之前拿起 Y 的签，那么当他放开自己的签时，就完成了拿取。如果两张签都没有出现（它们被隐藏了？）并且 X 让 Y 拿走了 X 的部分，那么当他拿起 Y 的部分时，拿取就完成了。所有这一切的基本假设是，一旦 Y 抽出签，Y 的部分就属于 Y 了。《义注》补充说，无论 X 的部分价值高于 Y 的价值、低于 Y 的价值，还是两部分价值相等，这种交换都算是窃盗。
The Commentary to Mv.I.62 adds that if a bhikkhu claims higher seniority than is actually his in order to obtain better donations, he should be treated under this rule when, through this ruse, he obtains donations that should have gone to another bhikkhu. However, this type of action would appear to fall under Deceit, discussed below.	《大品》.一.62的《义注》补充说，如果一个比丘为了获得更好的布施而声称比他实际的戒腊更高，那么当他通过这种诡计获得了本应交给另一位比丘的布施时，他应该受到这条戒条的处置。然而，这种类型的行为似乎属于欺诈行为，如下所述。
b. Smuggling: A bhikkhu carrying items subject to an import duty hides them as he goes through customs. The taking is accomplished when the item leaves the customs area. The Vibhaṅga calculates the value of the object here, for the purpose of determining the seriousness of the offense, by the duty owed on it, and not its actual selling price.	b. 走私：一名比丘携带需缴纳进口关税的物品，在通过海关时将其隐藏起来。当物品离开海关区域时，「拿取」即完成。为了确定犯戒的严重性，《经分别》在此计算物品的价值，是根据其所欠的关税，而不是其实际售价。
The Vinīta-vatthu states that there is no penalty if the bhikkhu goes through customs not knowing that he has an item subject to import duties among his effects. The relevant cases show that this can mean one of two things: Either he knows that he has the item with him but not that it is subject to import duties; or he does not know that he has the item with him at all. The Commentary adds that if a bhikkhu informs the customs official that he has an item subject to import duties and yet the official decides not to collect the duty, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. It also states that if a bhikkhu goes through customs with a conditional intent—“If they ask to see my belongings, I’ll pay the fee, but if they wave me through I won’t”—then if the officials do wave him through without asking to see his belongings, he incurs no offense. At present, when people entering a country are asked to choose different passageways through a customs area, marked “Goods to declare” and “Nothing to declare,” a bhikkhu with goods to declare who enters the “Nothing to declare” passageway cannot take advantage of this allowance for conditional intent, as he has already indicated an unconditional intent through his choice of a passageway.	《Vinīta-vatthu》说，如果比丘在通关时不知道他的财物中含有需缴纳进口关税的物品，则不犯戒。相关案例表明，这可能意味著以下两件事之一：要么他知道他随身携带该物品，但不知道该物品需要缴纳进口关税；或者他根本不知道他带著该物品。《义注》补充说，如果比丘通知海关官员他有一件物品需要缴纳进口关税，但官员决定不征收关税，则比丘不犯戒。它还指出，如果比丘带著有条件的意图通过海关——「如果他们要求查看我的物品，我会支付费用，但如果他们挥手让我通过，我不会」——那么如果官员确实挥手让他通过，没有要求查看他的物品，他不犯戒。目前，当人们入境时被要求选择不同的通道通过海关区域，标有「货物需申报」和「无需申报」的通道，携带有货物需申报的比丘进入「无需申报」通道时，不能利用有条件意图的开缘，因为他已经透过选择通道表明了无条件的意图。
The Vibhaṅga states that if, to avoid paying an import duty at a frontier, one crosses the frontier in such a way as to evade the customs area (§), one incurs only a dukkaṭa. At present, the civil law judges this sort of behavior as more reprehensible than slipping an item through customs, but from the point of view of the Vinaya the lesser penalty still holds. The Commentary says that this allowance applies only in cases when one evades the customs area by a distance of more than two leḍḍupātas—approximately 36 meters. (A leḍḍupāta is a unit of measure that appears frequently in the Canon and is defined as the distance a man of average stature can throw a clod of dirt underarm.)	《经分别》说，如果为了避免在边境缴纳进口关税，而以逃避关税区（§）的方式跨越边境，则只会犯《突吉罗》。目前，民法认为这种行为比偷渡物品更应受到谴责，但从戒律的角度来看，仍应受到较轻的惩罚。《义注》称，这项开缘仅适用于逃避海关区域距离超过 2 个 leḍḍupāta（约 36 公尺）的情况。（ leḍḍupāta 是一种在《圣典》中经常出现的测量单位，被定义为中等身材的人将一块泥土用低手丢掷而出的距离。）
The Vibhaṅga’s position here is important to understand, for it has implications concerning the extent to which the evasion of other government fees and taxes would fall under this rule. The underlying assumption here seems to be that a dutiable item carried into a customs area is impounded by the king (or government). The payment of the duty is thus an act of recovering full ownership of the item. An item carried across the frontier without entering the customs area would not count as impounded, even though the king would probably claim the right to impound or even confiscate it if his agents apprehended the smuggler. Translated into modern terms, this would indicate that the evasion of other taxes claimed by the government—such as inheritance taxes—would incur the full penalty here only if the item being taxed was impounded on government property, and one evaded the tax by taking the item out of impoundment without paying the required fee. Otherwise, the penalty for tax evasion would be a dukkaṭa.	理解《经分别》在此的立场很重要，因为它涉及到逃避其他政府费用和税收在多大程度上属于此戒条的范围。这里的基本假设似乎是，带入海关区域的应税物品被国王（或政府）扣押。因此，缴纳关税是恢复该物品的全部所有权的行为。未进入海关区域而跨越边境的物品不会被视为被扣押，尽管如果国王的特工逮捕了走私者，国王可能会声称有权扣押甚至没收该物品。用现代术语来说，这表明，逃避政府征收的其他税款（例如遗产税），只有当征税物品被扣押在政府财产上，并且在未缴纳规定费用的情况下将物品从扣押中取出来逃税时，才会受到全额惩罚。否则，对逃税的惩罚是《突吉罗》。
None of the texts discuss the question of contraband, i.e., articles that a customs official would confiscate outright rather than allow into a country after the payment of a fee. Apparently, such goods smuggled through a customs house would fall into this category, although—as even the payment of a fee would not legally get them through customs—their selling value would be the determining factor in calculating the seriousness of the offense.	这些文本都没有讨论违禁品问题，即海关官员在支付费用后会直接没收而不是允许入境的物品。显然，透过海关走私，即使支付费用也不能合法地通过海关的货物属于这一类，而它们的售价将成为计算犯戒严重性的决定性因素。
c. Malfeasance: The Vinīta-vatthu includes an unusual case in which a wealthy man with two heirs—a son and a nephew—tells Ven. Ajjuka, “When I am gone, show the place (where my treasure is buried) (§) to whichever of my heirs has the greater faith.” After the man’s death, Ven. Ajjuka sees that the nephew has the greater faith and so shows the place of the treasure to him. The nephew awards the Saṅgha with a large donation; the son accuses Ven. Ajjuka of having wrongfully deprived him of his rightful inheritance. On hearing this, Ven. Ānanda first accuses Ven. Ajjuka of a pārājika, but when the wealthy man’s wishes are revealed, Ven. Upāli convinces Ven. Ānanda that Ven. Ajjuka committed no offense.	c. 渎职：《Vinīta-vatthu》包括一个不寻常的案例，其中一位有两个继承人（一个儿子和一个侄子）的富人告诉阿酬尊者，“当我离开后，请向我的继承人中有较大信心者，展示那个地方（埋藏我的宝藏的地方）（§）。” 男子死后，阿酬尊者见侄子信心较大，便向他展示了宝藏所在。姪子给僧团一大笔布施；儿子指责阿酬尊者错误地剥夺了他的合法继承权。闻言，阿难尊者首先指责阿酬尊者犯《波罗夷》，但当富人的愿望被揭露时，优波离尊者说服了阿难尊者，阿酬尊者没有犯戒。
None of the texts discuss the details of this case, which seems to have postdated the Buddha’s parinibbāna. The apparent assumption underlying the ruling is that when X dies, the inheritance he leaves to Y belongs to Y from the moment of X’s death. Otherwise, the items in question would be ownerless until apportioned out among the heirs, and thus would not fulfill the factor of object under this rule. Also, the taking in this case would be accomplished in line with the Vibhaṅga’s standard definition for taking with regard to the objects involved—and not necessarily when the cheated heir gives up trying to reclaim the inheritance—for in Ven. Ajjuka’s case Ven. Ānanda was ready to impose a pārājika even though the son had not abandoned his claim.	没有任何文本讨论这个案例的细节，这似乎是在佛陀般涅槃之后发生的。该裁决背后的明显假设是，当 X 死亡时，他留给 Y 的遗产从 X 死亡那一刻起就属于 Y。否则，相关物品在分配给继承人之前将是无主的，因此不符合本戒条下的对象因素。此外，在这种情况下，「拿取」将按照《经分别》对所涉及对象的拿取标准定义来完成－而不一定是当被欺骗的继承人放弃试图收回遗产时－因为在阿酬尊者的案例中，尽管儿子并没有放弃声称拥有，阿难尊者已经准备好施加《波罗夷》了。
d. Destruction of property: The Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs a dukkaṭa. Thus the simple destruction of property does not fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu intends to steal some grass belonging to the Community but ends up setting fire to it instead, thus incurring a dukkaṭa. The Commentary notes that this ruling applies only because the bhikkhu did not move the grass from its place. What this means is that if he had first taken the grass from its place and then destroyed it in any way, the factor of effort under this rule would have been fulfilled and—all other factors of a pārājika offense being present—he would have been guilty of the full offense.	d. 毁损财物：《经分别》说，如果比丘破坏、散落、焚烧或以其他方式使他人的财产无法使用，他犯《突吉罗》。因此，单纯地破坏财产并不能满足此戒条下的努力因素。《Vinīta-vatthu》中记载了一个案例，一名比丘打算偷一些属于僧团的草，但结果却放火烧了它，从而犯《突吉罗》。《义注》指出，这项裁决适用仅因比丘没有将草移离原处的情况。这意味著，如果他首先将草从原处上拿走，然后以任何方式摧毁它，则此戒条下的努力因素将被满足，并且－《波罗夷》违犯的所有其他因素都存在－他将完全违犯此戒。
Special cases cited in the Commentary include the following:	《义注》中引用的特殊案例包括：
a. False dealing: A bhikkhu makes counterfeit money or uses counterfeit weights. The taking is accomplished when the counterfeit is accepted. This case, however, would seem to fall under the category of Deceit (see below), in that the counterfeit is a form of a lie. If the owner of an object accepts the counterfeit and hands over an object in return, the object cannot be described as stolen. However, the object obtained in trade in this way would have to be forfeited under NP 20, and the Community, if it felt so inclined, could impose a disciplinary transaction on the offender (see BMC2, Chapter 20).	a. 虚假交易：比丘制造伪钞或使用伪造砝码。当伪造品被接受时，「拿取」就完成了。然而，本情况似乎属于欺诈类别（见下文），因为伪造品是谎言的一种形式。如果物品的所有者接受了伪造品并交出物品作为回报，则该物品不能被描述为被偷窃。然而，根据《舍堕》二十，以这种方式透过交易获得的物品必须被舍出，并且如果僧团愿意的话，可以对违犯者实施治罪羯磨（参见《佛教修道准则第二册》第二十章）。
b. Robbery: Using threats, a bhikkhu compels the owner of an object to give it to him. The taking is accomplished when the owner complies. This would not count as giving because the owner is not giving the item willingly.	b. 抢劫：比丘利用威胁，强迫物品的所有者将物品交给他。当所有者服从时，「拿取」即告完成。这不算是给予，因为物品的所有者并不是自愿给予的。
c. Concealing: A bhikkhu finds an object left on the ground and, to deceive the owner, covers it with dirt or leaves with the intent of stealing it later. If the owner, after searching for the item, temporarily abandons the search and the bhikkhu then picks it up, it is stolen when removed from its base. If the owner, deciding that the item is lost, abandons it for good before the bhikkhu picks it up, the Commentary says that the bhikkhu is not guilty of theft but owes the owner compensation. We have discussed the topic of lost items above, under Object, and will discuss the topic of compensation below.	c. 隐藏：比丘发现地上有物品，为了欺骗所有者，用泥土或树叶覆盖它，意图稍后偷走它。如果所有者在搜寻该物品后，暂时放弃搜寻，然后比丘捡起它，那么当它从底座上移除时，它就算被偷走。如果所有者认定物品遗失，在比丘取走物品之前将其永久遗弃，《义注》说，比丘没有犯偷窃戒，但应赔偿所有者。我们已经在上面的「对象」章节下，讨论了遗失物品的议题，并将在下面讨论赔偿的议题。

The value of the object	对象的价值
As stated above, any case of stealing counts as an offense, but the gravity of the offense is determined by the value of the object. This is the point of the phrase in the rule reading, “just as when there is the taking of what is not given, kings… would banish him, saying… ‘You are a thief.’” In other words, for a theft to entail a pārājika it must be a criminal case, which in the time of the Buddha meant that the goods involved were worth at least five māsakas, a unit of money used at the time. Goods valued collectively at more than one māsaka but less than five are grounds for a thullaccaya; goods valued collectively at one māsaka or less, grounds for a dukkaṭa. As the Commentary notes, the value of the articles is determined by the price they would have fetched at the time and place of the theft. As stated above, in the case of smuggling the Vibhaṅga measures the value of the object, for the purpose of this rule, as the duty owed on it, not the value of the object itself.	如上所述，任何偷窃行为都被视为犯戒，但犯戒的严重程度取决于对象物品的价值。这就是戒条中这句话的要点，「就像当有人拿取未给予的东西时，国王......会驱逐他，说......『你是一个小偷。』」换句话说，窃盗行为涉及《波罗夷》的，一定是刑事犯罪案件，在佛陀时代，这意味著所涉及的货物至少价值 5 摩沙迦（当时使用的货币单位）。总价值超过 1 摩沙迦但低于 5 摩沙迦的商品，犯《偷兰遮》；总价值为 1 摩沙迦或更低的商品，犯《突吉罗》。正如《义注》指出的那样，物品的价值取决于它们在被偷的时间和地点的售价。如上所述，在走私的情况下，就本戒条而言，《经分别》是以对其所征收的关税作为物品的价值，而不是物品本身的价值。
This leaves us with the question of how a māsaka would translate into current monetary rates. No one can answer this question with any certainty, for the oldest attempt to peg the māsaka to the gold standard dates from the V/Sub-commentary, which sets one māsaka as equal to 4 rice grains’ weight of gold. At this rate, the theft of an item worth 20 rice grains’ (1/24 troy ounce) weight of gold or more would be a pārājika offense.	这给我们留下了一个问题：摩沙迦如何转换为当前的货币利率。没有人能够肯定地回答这个问题，因为将摩沙迦与金本位挂钩的最古老的尝试可以追溯到V/《复注》，其中将 1 摩沙迦等于 4 粒米重的黄金。按照这个利率，偷窃价值 20 粒米（1/24 金衡盎司）黄金或更高将构成《波罗夷》罪。
One objection to this method of calculation is that some of the items mentioned in the Vinīta-vatthu as grounds for a pārājika when stolen—e.g., a pillow, a bundle of laundry, a raft, a handful of rice during a famine—would seem to be worth much less than 1/24 troy ounce of gold. However, we must remember that many items regarded as commonplace now may have been viewed as expensive luxuries at the time.	对这种计算方法的一个反对意见是，《Vinīta-vatthu》中提到的一些被偷时作为《波罗夷》依据的物品——例如，一个枕头、一捆衣物、一艘木筏、饥荒期间的一把米——其价值似乎远低于 1/24 金衡盎司黄金。然而，我们必须记住，许多现在被认为司空见惯的物品在当时可能被视为昂贵的奢侈品。
In addition, there is one very good reason for adopting the standard set by the V/Sub-commentary: It sets a high value for the least article whose theft would result in a pārājika. Thus when a bhikkhu steals an item worth 1/24 troy ounce of gold or more, there can be no doubt that he has committed the full offense. When the item is of lesser value, there will be inescapable doubt—and when there is any doubt concerning a pārājika, the tradition of the Vinaya consistently gives the bhikkhu the benefit of the doubt: He is not expelled. A basic principle operating throughout the texts is that it is better to risk letting an offender go unpunished than to risk punishing an innocent bhikkhu.	此外，采用V/《复注》设定的标准还有一个很好的理由：它为偷窃会导致《波罗夷》的最少物品设定了很高的价值。因此，当比丘偷窃价值 1/24 金衡盎司黄金或更高的物品时，毫无疑问他已经完全违犯此戒。当物品的价值较低时，就会不可避免地产生怀疑——当对《波罗夷》有任何疑问时，戒律的传统始终给予比丘以怀疑的好处：他不会被驱逐。贯穿整个文本的一个基本原则是，冒著让犯戒者不受惩罚的风险，比冒著惩罚无辜比丘的风险要好。
There is a second advantage to the V/Sub-commentary’s method of calculation: its precision and clarity. Some people have recommended adopting the standard expressed in the rule itself—that if the theft would result in flogging, imprisonment, or banishment by the authorities in that time and at that place, then the theft would constitute a pārājika—but this standard creates more problems than it would solve. In most countries the sentence is largely at the discretion of the judge or magistrate, and the factor of value is only one among many taken into account when determining the penalty. This opens a whole Pandora’s box of issues, many of which have nothing to do with the bhikkhu or the object he has taken—the judge’s mood, his social philosophy, his religious background, and so forth—issues that the Buddha never allowed to enter into the consideration of how to determine the penalty for a theft.	V/《复注》的计算方法还有第二个优点：精确、清晰。有些人建议采用戒条本身所表达的标准，即如果偷窃行为会导致当时该地点的当局鞭打、监禁或流放，那么该偷窃行为就构成《波罗夷》，但这一标准产生的问题多于其解决的问题。在大多数国家，刑罚很大程度上由法官或治安官酌情决定，价值因素只是决定刑罚时考虑的众多因素之一。这就打开了整个潘朵拉魔盒的问题，其中许多问题与比丘或他所拿取的对象物品无关——法官的情绪、他的社会哲学、他的宗教背景等等——佛陀从未允许在对窃盗罪的刑罚如何确定时考虑的问题。
Thus the V/Sub-commentary’s method of calculation has the benefits that it is a quick and easy method for determining the boundaries between the different levels of offense in any modern currency; it involves no factors extraneous to the tradition of the Vinaya, and—as noted above—it draws the line at a value above which there can be no doubt that the penalty is a pārājika.	因此，V/《复注》的计算方法的优点是，它是一种快速、简单的方法，可以确定任何现代货币的不同犯戒程度之间的界限；它不涉及与戒律传统无关的因素，而且——如上所述——它划定了一个价值，高于这个价值，毫无疑问，惩罚就是《波罗夷》。
The Commentary, arguing from two cases in the Vinīta-vatthu, states that if a bhikkhu steals several items on different occasions, the values of the different items are added together to determine the severity of the offense only if they were stolen as part of a single plan or intention. If they are stolen as a result of separate intentions, each act of stealing is treated as a separate offense whose severity depends on the value of the individual item(s) stolen in that act. This point is best explained with examples:	《义注》根据《Vinīta-vatthu》中的两个案例进行论证，指出如果比丘在不同场合偷窃了几件物品，则只有当这些物品属於单一计划或意图的一部分被偷窃时，才将不同物品的价值加在一起以确定犯戒的严重程度。如果它们是因不同意图而被偷窃，则每次偷窃行为均被视为单独的犯戒行为，其严重程度取决于该行为中被偷窃的个别物品的价值。这一点最好用例子来解释：
In one of the Vinīta-vatthu cases, a bhikkhu steals ghee from a jar “little by little.” This, according to the Commentary, means that first he decides to steal a spoonful of ghee from a jar. After swallowing the spoonful, he decides to steal one more. After that he decides to steal another, and so on until he has finished the jar. Because each spoonful was stolen as a consequence of a separate plan or intention, he incurs several dukkaṭas, each for the theft of one spoonful of ghee.	在一个《Vinīta-vatthu》案件中，一位比丘「一点一点地」从罐子里偷窃酥油。根据《义注》，这意味著他首先决定从罐子里偷一匙酥油。吞下一匙后，他决定再偷一匙。之后他决定再偷一个，依此类推，直到他吃完这个罐子。由于每匙酥油都是因单独的计划或意图而被偷窃，他犯了数次《突吉罗》，因偷窃每一匙酥油而犯一次《突吉罗》。
If, however, he decides at one point to steal enough lumber to build himself a hut and then steals a plank from here and a rafter from there, taking lumber over many days at different places from various owners, he commits one offense in accordance with the total value of all the lumber stolen, inasmuch as he took all the pieces of wood as a consequence of one prior plan.	然而，如果他在某一时刻决定偷足够的木材来为自己建造一座小屋（孤邸），然后从这里偷一块木板，从那里偷一根椽子，并在许多天内从不同的所有者那里获取木材，那么他就根据所有被盗木材的总价值犯了戒，因为他根据先前的计划拿走了所有木材。

Derived offenses	衍生违犯
In addition to the lesser offenses related to the value of the object, the Vibhaṅga also lists lesser offenses related to two factors of the full offense under this rule: effort and perception.	除了与物品的价值相关的较轻的犯戒之外，《经分别》还列出了与此戒条下的完全违犯的两个因素相关的较轻的犯戒：努力和感知。
With regard to effort, the Vibhaṅga states that the derived offenses begin when one walks toward the object with the intent of stealing it, with each separate act—and in the case of walking toward the object, each step—incurring a dukkaṭa, up to a point just prior to the actual stealing where the offenses turn into thullaccayas. Where this point occurs depends on the act constituting the actual taking, as follows:	关于努力，《经分别》指出，当一个人带著偷窃的意图走向该物品时，衍生的犯戒就开始了，每一个单独的行为——在走向该物品的情况下，每一步——都会犯一次《突吉罗》，直到在实际偷窃之前的那一时刻，犯戒行为变成了《偷兰遮》。这一时刻的发生点取决于构成实际「拿取」的行为，如下：
Moving the object from its place: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Making the object budge without fully moving it from its place: a thullaccaya.	将物品从原来的位置移动：直到触摸物品的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。使物品移动而不将其完全移离其位置：《偷兰遮》。
“Cutting off” a fistful: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Making the object budge without fully cutting off a fistful: a thullaccaya.	「切掉」一把：直到触摸物品的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。使物品移动而不完全切掉一把：《偷兰遮》。
Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: all steps up through touching the pool or pile: dukkaṭas. Making the pool or pile budge without fully getting five māsakas worth separated from the pool or pile and inside the vessel: a thullaccaya.	将器皿插入一池液体或一堆物体中，并使一池液体或一堆物体中的一些进入器皿：直到接触该池或该堆的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。使该池或该堆移动，而没有完全将价值 5 摩沙迦从该池或该堆分离出来并进入器皿内：《偷兰遮》。
Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Lifting the object: a thullaccaya. Bringing it up to the level of the mouth of the container: another thullaccaya.	完全从容器口中取出：直到接触物品的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。举起物品：《偷兰遮》。将其提升到容器口的高度：另一个《偷兰遮》。
Drinking liquid from a container: all steps up through drinking one māsaka worth of liquid as part of one prior plan (§): dukkaṭas. Drinking between one and five māsakas’ worth of liquid: a thullaccaya.	从容器中饮用液体：作为先前计划的一部分，直到饮用价值 1 摩沙迦的液体的所有步骤 (§)：《突吉罗》。饮用价值 1 到 5 摩沙迦的液体：《偷兰遮》。
Moving the object from one part of one’s body to another or dropping it: all steps up through touching the object with the intent to move it or drop it: dukkaṭas. Moving it but not to the point of putting it on another part of the body or dropping it: a thullaccaya.	将物体从身体的一个部分移动到另一个部分或将其掉落：意图移动或放下物体，直到触摸它的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。移动它，但还不到将其放在身体的其他部位或将其掉落：《偷兰遮》。
Causing a boat to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: all steps up through loosening the moorings and/or touching it: dukkaṭas. Making the boat rock without causing it to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a thullaccaya.	让船只向上游、下游或穿过水体移动毫发宽度：松开系泊装置和/或接触它之前的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。使船摇晃而不使其向上游、下游或穿过水体移动毫发宽度：《偷兰遮》。
Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: all steps up through breaking the embankment and letting up to one māsaka’s worth of water flow out: dukkaṭas. Letting between one and five māsakas’ worth of water flow out: a thullaccaya.	破坏堤防使水流出：破坏堤防，让价值 1 摩沙迦的水流出之前的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。让价值 1 到 5 摩沙迦的水流出来：《偷兰遮》。
Causing an animal to move all its feet: all steps up through touching the animal: dukkaṭas. Getting it to move any of its feet prior to its moving its last foot: a thullaccaya for each step.	使动物移动其所有的脚：直到接触动物的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。让它在移动最后一只脚之前先移动任何一只脚：每一步都是一次《偷兰遮》。
Cutting down: all steps prior to the next to the last chop needed to cut the plant through: dukkaṭas. The next to the last chop: a thullaccaya.	砍伐：在最后一次劈砍之前将植物砍断所需的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。紧接著最后一次劈砍：《偷兰遮》。
Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of objects handed to one for safe keeping: all steps up through telling the owner, “I didn’t receive (§) it”: dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner’s mind as to whether he/she will get the object back: a thullaccaya. If the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.	导致所有者放弃重新拥有交给某人保管的物品的努力（§）：所有步骤直到告诉所有者“我没有收到（§）它”：《突吉罗》。使所有者怀疑他/她是否会拿回物品：《偷兰遮》。如果案件告上法庭而比丘败诉，他就会再犯一次《偷兰遮》。
Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of land: all steps up to laying claim to the land: dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner’s mind as to whether he/she will lose the land: a thullaccaya. Again, if the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.	导致所有者放弃重新拥有土地的努力（§）：直到声称土地所有权的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。使所有者怀疑他/她是否会失去土地：《偷兰遮》。再者，如果案件告上法庭而比丘败诉，他就会再犯一次《偷兰遮》。
Shifting a boundary marker: all steps up through removing the boundary marker from its original place: dukkaṭas. Any steps between that and putting the boundary marker in a new place: thullaccayas.	移动界碑：直到将界碑从其原始位置移走的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。在移走和将界碑放置在新位置之间的任何步骤：《偷兰遮》。
Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: all steps up through touching the object with the intent of taking it out of the customs area: dukkaṭas. Making the object move without fully moving it from the customs area: a thullaccaya.	带应课税物品通过海关区而不缴纳关税：直到触摸该物品以将其带出海关区的所有步骤：《突吉罗》。使物品移动而不将其完全移出海关区域：《偷兰遮》。
The commentaries state that when a heavier penalty is incurred in offenses of this sort, only that penalty is counted, and the preceding lighter ones are nullified. They derive this principle from a passage in the Vibhaṅga to Sg 10-13 and, using the Great Standards, apply it to all the rules. Thus, for example, if a bhikkhu trying to steal a book simply touches it, he incurs a string of dukkaṭas for each step in walking up to the book and taking hold of it. If he budges the book slightly but not so much as to move it completely from its place, the dukkaṭas are nullified and replaced with a thullaccaya. If he actually takes the book, that nullifies the thullaccaya and replaces it with a pārājika.	注释指出，此类犯戒仅计算受到的较重惩罚，之前较轻的惩罚无效。他们从《僧残》十到十三的《经分别》中的一段经文中得出这一原则，并使用《四大教示》，将其应用于所有戒条。因此，举例来说，如果一个比丘试图偷一本书，仅仅只是触碰它，那么他走到这本书并抓住它的每一步，犯一连串《突吉罗》。如果他稍微移动这本书，但又没有完全移动它的位置，那么《突吉罗》就会失效，并被《偷兰遮》取代。如果他真的拿走了这本书，那么《偷兰遮》就会失效，并以《波罗夷》取而代之。
There is some question, though, as to whether the compilers of the Canon intended the passage under Sg 10-13 to be taken as a general principle. They don’t mention it under any of the other saṅghādisesa rules or in the otherwise parallel passage in the Vibhaṅga to Pc 68. Thus, the principle seems intended only for those four rules. To be on the strict side, it seems best to say that, unless otherwise noted, a bhikkhu who completes an act must make amends for all the offenses incurred in leading up to it. Under the pārājika rules this is a moot point, for once the pārājika is committed the offender is no longer a bhikkhu. But under the lesser rules this principle is still relevant.	然而，关于《圣典》的编撰者是否打算将《僧残》十到十三中的段落视为一般原则，存在一些疑问。他们没有在任何其他《僧残》戒条下或在《波逸提》六八的《经分别》其他类似的段落中提及它。因此，该原则似乎仅适用于这四个戒条。从严格的角度来看，最好的说法是，除非另有说明，完成某一行为的比丘必须弥补在该行为之前所造成的所有罪过。根据《波罗夷》戒条，这是一个有争议的问题，因为一旦犯了《波罗夷》，犯戒者就不再是比丘了。但在较小的戒条下，这项原则仍然适用。
As for the derived offenses related to the factor of perception, these deal with the situation in which an article does not qualify as not given under this rule—e.g., it has no owner, or the owner has given it up or thrown it away—and yet the bhikkhu perceives it as not given. If he takes it with intent to steal, he incurs a dukkaṭa for each of the three stages of effort. In the case of an object that can be stolen by moving it from its place, these would be: touching the object, making it budge, moving it from its place. A similar set of offenses would apply in the stages appropriate for taking any of the other types of objects listed above.	至于与感知因素有关的衍生违犯，这些涉及的是不符合本戒条规定的物品的情况，例如，该物品没有所有者，或者所有者已将其放弃或扔掉——然而比丘认为它没有被给予。如果他出于偷窃的目的而取走它，他会因三个阶段中每一阶段的努力而犯一次《突吉罗》。如果物品可以透过将其从原来的位置移开而被偷，则这些阶段将是：触摸该物体，使其移动，将其移离原来的位置。类似的犯戒行为将适用于拿取上述任何其他类型物品的适当阶段。

Accomplices	共犯
A bhikkhu can commit an offense not only if he himself steals an object, but also if he incites another to steal. The offenses involved in the acts leading up to the theft are as follows:	比丘不仅自己偷窃物品，而且煽动他人偷窃，都可能犯戒。导致偷窃的行为所涉及的犯戒行为如下：
If a bhikkhu tells an accomplice to take an object that would be grounds for a pārājika, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the accomplice agrees to do so, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once the accomplice succeeds in taking the object as instructed—regardless of whether he gets away with it, and of whether he shares it with the instigator—the instigator incurs a pārājika. If the accomplice is a bhikkhu, he too incurs a pārājika. If the object would be grounds for a thullaccaya or a dukkaṭa, the only penalties incurred prior to the actual theft would be dukkaṭas.	如果比丘告诉共犯拿走一件可以当《波罗夷》根据的物体，他就会犯《突吉罗》。当共犯同意这样做时，教唆者就会犯《偷兰遮》。一旦共犯按照指示成功拿取了物品——无论他是否逃脱惩罚，也无论他是否与教唆者分享该物品——教唆者都会犯《波罗夷》。如果共犯是比丘，他也会犯《波罗夷》。如果该物品是《偷兰遮》或《突吉罗》的根据，则在实际偷窃之前发生的唯一惩罚将是《突吉罗》。
The Commentary insists that if the accomplice is sure to take the item, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika as soon as the accomplice agrees to take it. However, as the Vinaya-mukha notes, this contradicts the Canon, and there is no way to measure whether a proposed theft is a sure thing or not.	《义注》坚持认为，如果共犯肯定会拿走该物品，那么一旦共犯同意拿走该物品，比丘就会犯《波罗夷》。然而，正如《戒律入口》所指出的，这与《圣典》互相矛盾，并且无法衡量提议的偷窃是否是肯定的事情。
If there is any confusion in carrying out the instructions—e.g., if the accomplice, instead of taking the object specified by the instigator, takes something else instead; or if he is told to take it in the afternoon but instead takes it in the morning—the instigator incurs only the penalties for proposing the theft and persuading the accomplice, and not the penalty for the theft itself. The same holds true if the instigator rescinds his order before the theft takes place, but the accomplice goes ahead and takes the object anyway.	如果在执行指示时出现任何混乱，例如，如果共犯没有拿走教唆者指定的物品，而是拿走了其他东西；或者如果他被告知在下午取走，而在早上取走，则教唆者仅因提出偷窃行为并说服共犯而受到惩罚，而不会因偷窃本身而受到惩罚。如果教唆者在偷窃发生前撤销命令，但共犯却继续拿走物品，情况也是如此。
According to the Vibhaṅga, an instigator who wishes to call off the theft before it is carried out but who for one reason or another cannot get his message to the accomplice in time, incurs the full penalty for the completed theft.	根据《经分别》，如果教唆者希望在偷窃行为实施之前取消偷窃行为，但由于某种原因无法及时向共犯传达讯息，则将因已完成的偷窃行为而受到全额惩罚。
The Commentary also adds that the factor of the thief’s perception does not affect the penalties. In other words, if Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to steal object X, and B takes Y, thinking it to be X, A is absolved of any responsibility for the theft. Conversely, if B takes X, thinking it to be Y, A is guilty of the theft.	《义注》还补充说，偷窃者的感知因素并不影响惩罚。换句话说，如果比丘 A 告诉比丘 B 偷东西 X，而 B 认为 Y 是 X，就拿走了 Y，那么 A 就免除了偷窃的任何责任。相反，如果 B 拿走了 X，并认为它是 Y，则 A 犯有偷窃罪。
The Vibhaṅga also notes that if an instigator tells his accomplice to take an item when he (the instigator) makes a sign—such as winking (§) his eye, lifting his eyebrow, or lifting his head—he incurs a dukkaṭa in making this order, a thullaccaya if the accomplice agrees to do as told, and the full offense when the accomplice actually takes the item at the time of the sign. If the accomplice takes the item before or after the sign, though, the instigator incurs no offense. The Sub-commentary, noting that the signs mentioned in the Vibhaṅga are so fleeting that it would be impossible to take the item at the very moment of the sign, interprets this last statement as follows: If the accomplice starts trying to take the item right after the sign, then regardless of how much time that takes, it counts as “at the time of the sign.” Only if he makes an appreciable delay before attempting the theft does it count as “after the sign.”	《经分别》还指出，如果教唆者告诉他的共犯在他（教唆者）做出示意动作时拿走一件物品——例如眨眼（§）、扬起眉毛或抬起头——他会在做这个命令动作时犯《突吉罗》，如果共犯同意按照指示行事，则为《偷兰遮》；如果共犯在示意动作时实际拿走了该物品，则构成完全犯戒。不过，如果共犯在示意动作之前或之后拿走物品，教唆者不犯戒。《复注》指出，《经分别》中提到的示意动作是如此短暂，以至于不可能在示意动作出现的那一刻拿走该物品，因此对最后的陈述解释如下：如果共犯在示意动作之后开始试图拿走该物品，无论花费多少时间，都算是「示意动作时」。只有当他在尝试偷窃之前明显延迟时，才算作「在示意动作之后」。
We can extrapolate from this discussion and say that any physical gesture that, from the context of events, is intended and understood as an order to take an item, would count under the factor of effort here. This extrapolation will be useful when treating the unauthorized use of credit cards, below.	我们可以从这个讨论中推断出，从事件的背景来看，任何意图被理解为拿取某件物品的命令的肢体动作，都将算在此处的努力因素中。在处理下面未经授权的信用卡使用时，这种推论将很有用。
The Vibhaṅga states that if there is a chain of command involving two or more bhikkhus (not counting the instigator)—for example, Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B to tell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D to commit the theft—then when D agrees to commit the theft, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once D takes the object as instructed, all four incur the penalty coming from the theft. If there is any confusion in the chain of command—e.g., Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D directly—neither A nor C incurs the penalty for the theft itself. Bhikkhu A would incur a dukkaṭa for telling B, whereas C would incur no penalty at all.	《经分别》指出，如果存在涉及两个或更多比丘（不包括教唆者）的指挥链——例如，比丘 A 告诉比丘 B 告诉比丘 C 告诉比丘 D 实施偷窃——那么当 D 同意实施偷窃时，教唆者犯《偷兰遮》。一旦 D 依照指示取走物品，四人都会因偷窃而受到惩罚。如果指挥链中存在任何混乱，例如，比丘 B 没有告诉 C，而是直接告诉 D，那么 A 和 C 都不会因为偷窃本身而受到惩罚。比丘 A 会因告诉 B 而犯《突吉罗》，而 C 则不会受到任何惩罚。
The Commentary notes that the instigator in any of these cases incurs the penalty only if he gives an explicit command to take the item (although this statement has to be qualified to include signs meant as commands, as mentioned above). If he simply tells his accomplice that such-and-such an item is located in such-and-such a place and would be easy to steal, he incurs no penalty even if the accomplice actually commits the theft. This point applies to many of the rules in which giving a command to do an action that would break the rule would also fulfill the factor of effort: A statement counts as a command only if it is a clear imperative to do the action. Under the few rules where this is not the case, we will note the exception.	《义注》指出，在任何这些情况下，教唆者只有在明确命令拿走该物品时才会受到惩罚（尽管此陈述也包括意味著命令的示意动作，如上所述）。如果他只是告诉共犯，某某物品位于某某地方，很容易偷窃，即使共犯确实实施了偷窃行为，他也不会受到惩罚。这一点适用于许多戒条，在这些戒条中，发出命令执行违反戒条的行动也将满足努力因素：只有当明确要求执行某项行动时，该语句才算是命令。在情况并非如此的少数戒条，我们将注明例外情况。
None of the texts mention the scenario in which Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to take an item for him without letting B know that he is committing a theft—for instance, telling B that the item belongs to him (A), that it is ownerless, or letting B come to either conclusion on his own. Nevertheless, it would appear that if B then actually takes the item as told, all of the factors for an offense would be fulfilled for A: He gives the command to take (the imperative the Vibhaṅga uses in illustrating commands to “steal”—avahara—can also simply mean to “take”), he knows that the item belongs to someone else, he intends to have it taken, and it is taken as a result of his command. As for B, he would not be committing an offense, as his state of mind would not fulfill the factors of perception and intention for a theft.	没有任何文本提到这样的场景：比丘 A 告诉比丘 B 为他拿走一件物品，但不让 B 知道他正在偷窃，例如，告诉 B 该物品属于他（A），或它是无主的，或者让 B 自己得出两者中任一结论。然而，看起来如果 B 实际上按照所告知的那样拿走了该物品，那么 A 就满足了所有犯戒因素：他发出了拿走的命令（《经分别》在解释「偷窃」命令时使用的祈使语气—— avahara ——也可以只表示「拿走」），他知道该物品属于其他人，他打算拿走它，并且由于他的命令而被拿走。至于 B，他不犯戒，因为他的心理状态不符合偷窃的感知和意图因素。
Cases of this sort would not fall under Deceit, discussed below, because that category covers only cases where one deceives the owner of the item, or his agent, into giving the item, and thus technically the item counts as given. Here the item is not given, for the person deceived into taking it is not responsible for it at all.	此类案件不属于下面讨论的欺诈行为，因为该类别仅涵盖欺骗物品所有者或其代理人给予物品的情况，因此从技术上讲，该物品算作已经给予了。这里该物品并没有被给予，因为被欺骗拿走该物品的人根本不为此负责。
As with the extrapolation from the discussion of signs, this application of the Great Standards will also be useful when we discuss unauthorized use of credit cards, below. It will also prove useful in our discussion of the following rule.	与从示意动作的讨论中推断一样，当我们在下面讨论未经授权使用信用卡时，《四大教示》的应用也将很有用。它在我们接下来的戒条讨论中也证明是有用的。

Shared responsibility

共同责任

If bhikkhus go in a group to commit a theft but only one of them does the actual taking, all still incur the penalty coming from the theft. Similarly, if they steal valuables worth collectively more than five māsakas but which when divided among them yield shares worth less than five māsakas each, all incur a pārājika. According to the Commentary, any bhikkhus who assist a bhikkhu in a fraudulent case also incur the same offense he does: a pārājika if he wins, a thullaccaya if he loses. This judgment, however, must be qualified by noting that the assistant incurs these penalties only if he perceives the case to be fraudulent.

如果比丘们结伴偷窃，但只有一个人实际偷窃，则所有人仍会受到偷窃的惩罚。同样，如果他们偷窃的物品的总价值超过 5 摩沙迦，但在分配时所获得的份额每人价值低于 5 摩沙迦，则所有人都犯《波罗夷》。根据《义注》，任何在诈欺案件中协助比丘的比丘也会招致与他所犯的同样的罪行：如果他赢了，则为《波罗夷》，如果他输了，则为《偷兰遮》。然而，这项判断必须受到限制，因为协助者只有在察觉到案件具有欺诈性时才会受到这些惩罚。

Special cases	特别案例
As mentioned above, the notion of stealing covers a wide range of actions. To delineate this range, the texts discuss a variety of actions that border on stealing, some of them coming under this rule, some of them not.	如上所述，偷窃的概念涵盖了广泛的行为。为了界定这个范围，文本讨论了各种接近偷窃的行为，其中一些属于这一戒条，有些则不属于这一戒条。
Belongings of the Saṅgha. According to the Commentary to NP 30, an item belongs to the Saṅgha when donors, intending for it to be Saṅgha property, offer it to one or more bhikkhus representing the Saṅgha, and those bhikkhus receive it, although not necessarily into their hands. Saṅgha property thus counts as “what is not given” as far as individual bhikkhus are concerned, for it has an owner—the Saṅgha of all times and places—and is guarded by the individual Community of bhikkhus.	僧伽的财物。根据《舍堕》三十的《义注》，当施主打算将某件物品作为僧团财产，将其供养给代表僧团的一名或多名比丘时，该物品就属于僧团，而那些比丘收到它，尽管不一定在他们手中。因此，就比丘个人而言，僧伽财产被视为「未给予的东西」，因为它有一个所有者—一切时间和地点的僧伽—并由个别比丘僧体守护。
The Canon divides Saṅgha property into two sorts: light/inexpensive (lahu-bhaṇḍa) and heavy/expensive (garu-bhaṇḍa). Light property includes such things as robes, bowls, medicine, and food; heavy property, such things as monastery land, buildings, and furnishings (see BMC2, Chapter 7). The Buddha gave permission for individual Communities to appoint officials to be responsible for the proper use of Saṅgha property. The officials responsible for light property are to distribute it among the members of the Community, following set procedures to ensure that the distribution is fair (see BMC2, Chapter 18). Once an individual member has received such property, he may regard it as his own and use it as he sees fit.	《圣典》将僧伽财产分为两类：轻的/便宜的（lahu-bhaṇḍa）和重的/昂贵的（garu-bhaṇḍa）。轻财产包括袈裟、钵、药、食等；重财产，例如寺院土地、建筑物和家具等（参见《佛教修道准则第二册》第七章）。佛陀允许各僧团任命执事负责僧伽财产的适当使用。负责轻财产的执事应按照既定程序将其分配给僧团成员，以确保分配公平（请参阅《佛教修道准则第二册》第十八章）。个别成员收到该财产后，可以将其视为自己的财产并按照自己的意愿使用。
In the case of heavy property, though, the officials are responsible for seeing that it is allotted for proper use in the Community, but the individual bhikkhus allowed to use it may not regard it as their own personal property. This is an important point. At most, such items may be taken on loan or exchanged—with the approval of the Community—for other heavy property of equal value. A bhikkhu who gives such items away to anyone—ordained or not—perceiving it as his to give, incurs a thullaccaya no matter what the value of the object (Cv.VI.15.2—see BMC2, Chapter 7). Of course, if he knows that it is not his to give or take, then in appropriating it as his own he incurs the penalty for stealing.	然而，就重财产而言，执事有责任确保其在僧团内分配得当，但被允许使用的比丘个人不可将其视为自己的个人财产。这是很重要的一点。最多，这些物品可以借出，或在僧团的批准下交换为其他同等价值的重财产。比丘将这些物品给予任何人—出家与否—认为这是他的而给予，无论该物品的价值如何，犯《偷兰遮》（《小品》.六.15.2—见《佛教修道准则第二册》第七章）。当然，如果他知道给予或拿取的东西不是他的，那么在将其据为己有时，他就会受到偷窃的惩罚。
The Buddha was highly critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy property of the Saṅgha. In the origin story to Pr 4, he cites the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to find favor with a lay person, gives that person some of the Saṅgha’s heavy property. Such a bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the world.	佛陀严厉批评任何给予僧伽重财产的比丘。在《波罗夷》四的起源故事中，他引用了一位比丘的例子，该比丘希望得到在家人的青睐，并给予该在家人一些僧伽的重财产。他说，这样的比丘是世间五大盗贼之一。
However, the Vinīta-vatthu includes a case where bhikkhus visiting a monastery arrange for a lay person to pick and give them some of the fruit growing in the monastery. The Buddha, in judging the case, states that they committed no offense as they were taking the fruit just for their own consumption. This implies that if they were to take the fruit for other purposes—to have it sold, for instance—they would be guilty of an offense. The Commentary adds that visiting bhikkhus have this right only if the resident bhikkhus are not caring for the fruit trees, if the trees had not been donated to provide funds for a particular purpose in the monastery, or if the resident bhikkhus eat from the trees as if they alone were the owners and are not willing to share. In other words, the visiting bhikkhus, as a matter of courtesy, should ask the residents first. If the residents share, one may take what they offer. If they don’t, and the trees are not dedicated to another purpose, one may take just enough for one’s own consumption. The Commentary also adds that if the monastery is vacant, one may go ahead and take the fruit, for it is meant for all bhikkhus who come.	然而，《Vinīta-vatthu》中提到了一个例子，比丘们参观寺院时，会安排一位居士采摘寺院里生长的一些水果，送给他们。佛陀在审判此案时指出，他们并没有犯任何戒，因为他们只是为了自己食用而摘取水果。这意味著，如果他们将这些水果用于其他目的（例如出售），他们就会犯戒。《义注》补充说，只有当常住比丘不照管果树、或者当这些果树没有被布施来为寺院的特定目的提供资金、或者当常住比丘以果树为食，就好像他们是唯一的所有者并且不愿意分享，来访的比丘才享有这项权利。换句话说，来访的比丘，出于礼貌，应该先询问居住者。如果居住者愿意分享，可以接受他们提供的东西。如果他们不分享，而这些树也没有专门用于其他目的，那么可拿走只足够自己食用的东西。《义注》还补充说，如果寺院空著，可以直接去拿水果，因为它是为所有前来的比丘准备的。
The Vinīta-vatthu also notes that a bhikkhu who takes heavy property of the Saṅgha donated for use in a particular monastery and uses it elsewhere incurs a dukkaṭa. If he takes it on loan, he commits no offense.	《Vinīta-vatthu》也指出，比丘将被布施于特定寺院使用的僧伽重财产用于其他地方，犯《突吉罗》。如果他借用它，他并没有犯戒。
Deceit. If a bhikkhu uses a deliberate lie to deceive another person into giving an item to him, the transgression is treated not as a case of stealing—because, after all, the item is given to him—but rather as a case of lying. If the lie involves making false claims to superior meditative attainments, it is treated under Pr 4. If not, it is treated under Pc 1. The Vinīta-vatthu gives seven examples: five cases where, during a distribution of requisites in the Community, a bhikkhu asks for and is given an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu; and two where a bhikkhunī approaches her teacher’s lay supporter and asks for medicines, saying that they will be for her teacher, although she actually ends up using them herself. In all of these cases, the penalty is a pācittiya for lying under Pc 1.	欺诈。如果比丘故意撒谎，欺骗他人给他某样东西，那么这种犯戒行为就不会被视为偷窃—因为毕竟该物品是被给予他的—而是被视为撒谎。如果谎言涉及虚假声称具有卓越的修行成就，则根据《波罗夷》四进行处理。如果不是，则根据《波逸提》一进行处理。《Vinīta-vatthu》给出了七个案例：五个案例中，在僧团中分发必需品期间，比丘为不存在的比丘索取额外的一份，并得到了额外的一份；另两个案例，一位比丘尼接近她老师的在家供养者并索取药物，并说这些药物是给她老师的，尽管最终她自己使用了这些药物。在所有这些案例下，根据《波逸提》一，说谎的惩罚是《波逸提》。
The Commentary, in its discussion of the bhikkhus taking an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu, insists that the penalty for lying applies only to cases where donors have already given the requisites to the Community. If, prior to their giving the requisites to the Community, a bhikkhu asks them directly for a portion for a non-existent bhikkhu, the Commentary says that he has committed a theft under this rule. This, however, contradicts the ruling in the two cases involving the bhikkhunī, who asks directly from the donor. Thus it would appear that in any case where a bhikkhu obtains an article from a donor through deceit, the penalty would be the pācittiya for lying.	《义注》在讨论比丘为一个不存在的比丘收取额外的份额时，坚持认为撒谎的惩罚只适用于布施者已经向僧团给予必需品的情况。如果在向僧团给予必需品之前，一位比丘直接向他们索取一位不存在的比丘的份额，《义注》说根据这条戒条，他犯了偷窃。然而，这与涉及直接向施主索取的比丘尼的两起案例的裁决相矛盾。因此，在任何情况下看来，当比丘透过欺诈手段从施主那里获得物品时，惩罚是因说谎的《波逸提》。
The question arises, what about a bhikkhu who, given an item to take to someone else, originally plans to take it to the intended recipient but later changes his mind? It does not seem right to impose a heavier penalty on him than on a person who uses deceit to get the item to begin with, so it seems best to impose on him the dukkaṭa for a broken promise (Mv.III.14.1-14—see the discussion under Pc 1). For the principles surrounding the courier’s right to take an item on trust in the donor or the recipient, see the discussion of trust under the non-offense clauses.	那么问题来了，一位比丘，被给予一件物品要拿给别人，原本打算把它拿给指定的接受者，但后来又改变了主意，该怎么处置？对他施加比对一开始就使用欺诈手段获得物品的人更重的惩罚似乎是不正确的，因此似乎最好对他施加《突吉罗》来惩罚他的失信（《大品》.三.14.1-14—请参阅《波逸提》一下的讨论）。有关递送者基于施主或接受者的信任而收取物品的权利的原则，请参阅不犯条款下对信任的讨论。
Receiving stolen goods. Accepting a gift of goods or purchasing them very cheaply, knowing that they were stolen, would in Western criminal law result in a penalty similar to stealing itself. However, neither the Canon nor the commentaries mention this case. The closest they come is in the Vinīta-vatthu, where a groundskeeper gives bhikkhus fruit from the orchard under his care, even though it was not his to give, and there was no offense for the bhikkhus. From this it can be inferred that there is no offense for receiving stolen goods, even knowingly, although a bhikkhu who does so would not be exempt from the civil law and the consequent proceedings, in the course of which the Community would probably urge him to disrobe.	收受赃物。在西方刑法中，接受商品礼物或以非常便宜的价格购买商品，而且明知这些商品是被偷的，将导致与偷窃本身类似的惩罚。然而，《圣典》和注释均未提及此种情况。最接近的地方是在《Vinīta-vatthu》，园丁从他照管的果园里给予比丘们水果，尽管这不是他的，却仍给予比丘们，而比丘们并没有犯戒。由此可以推断，收受赃物并不构成犯戒，即使在知情的情况下，尽管这样做的比丘不能免于民法和随后的诉讼，在此过程中，僧团可能会敦促他还俗。
Compensation owed. The Commentary introduces the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, or compensation owed, to cover cases where a bhikkhu is responsible for the loss or destruction of another person’s property. It defines this concept by saying that the bhikkhu must pay the price of the object to the owner or give the owner another object of equal value to the one lost or destroyed; if the bhikkhu does not give compensation, and the owner gives up his/her efforts to receive compensation, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika. The Commentary applies this concept not only to cases where the bhikkhu knowingly and intentionally destroys the object, but also to cases where he borrows or agrees to look after something that then gets lost, stolen, or destroyed through his negligence; or where he takes an item mistakenly thinking that it was discarded or that he was in a position to take it on trust.	所欠赔偿。《义注》引入了 bhaṇḍadeyya （所欠赔偿）的概念，以涵盖比丘对他人财产的损失或毁坏负责的情况。它定义了这个概念，说比丘必须向所有者支付该物品的价格，或向所有者提供与丢失或毁坏的物品价值相同的另一件物品；如果比丘不给予补偿，并且所有者放弃了获得补偿的努力，那么比丘就会犯《波罗夷》。《义注》不仅将这个概念应用于比丘明知而故意毁坏物品的情况，也适用于他借用或同意看管某物，但由于他的疏忽而丢失、被盗或毁坏的情况；或者他拿走一件物品时，误认为该物品已被丢弃，或他可以基于信任拿走该物品。
To cite a few examples: A bhikkhu breaks another person’s jar of oil or places excrement in the oil to spoil it. A bhikkhu charged with guarding the Community storeroom lets a group of other bhikkhus into the storeroom to fetch belongings they have left there; they forget to close the door and, before he remembers to check it, thieves slip in to steal things. A group of thieves steal a bundle of mangoes but, being chased by the owners, drop it and run; a bhikkhu sees the mangoes, thinks that they have been thrown away, and so eats them after getting someone to present them to him. A bhikkhu sees a wild boar caught in a trap and, out of compassion, sets it free but cannot reconcile the owner of the trap to what he has done. In each of these cases, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu in question owes compensation to the owner of the goods. (In the case of the mangoes, he must compensate not only the owners but also the thieves if it turns out that they had planned to come back and fetch the fruit.) If he abandons his responsibility to the owner(s), he incurs a pārājika.	举几个例子：一位比丘打碎了别人的油罐，或是把排泄物放入油中，毁掉了油。一位负责看守僧团储藏室的比丘让一群其他比丘进入储藏室取回他们留在那里的所有物；他们忘记关门，在他记得检查之前，小偷就溜进来偷东西了。一群小偷偷了一捆芒果，但被所有者追赶，丢下逃跑；一位比丘看到芒果，以为它们已被丢掉，于是请人将芒果手授给他后吃掉它们。一位比丘看到一头野猪被困在陷阱中，出于慈悲，将其释放，但无法让陷阱的主人接受他的所作所为。《义注》说，在上述每一种情况下，相关比丘都欠货物所有者赔偿。（就芒果而言，他不仅必须赔偿所有者，而且如果发现窃贼计划回来取芒果，他也必须赔偿窃贼。）如果他放弃对所有者（们）的责任，他就会犯《波罗夷》。
In making these judgments, the Commentary is probably following the civil law of its day, for the Canon contains no reference at all to the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, and some of its judgments contradict the Commentary’s. As we noted above, the Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the Vinīta-vatthu discusses cases where a bhikkhu takes an item on mistaken assumptions, or where he feels compassion for an animal caught in a trap and so sets it free, it says that there is no offense. Thus it seems strange for the Commentary to assign a pārājika to an action that, according to the Canon, carries a dukkaṭa or no penalty at all. Of course, it would be a generous policy to offer the owner reasonable compensation, but it is by no means certain that a bhikkhu would have the wherewithal or liberty to do so. Because the Canon does not allow a bhikkhu to ask his supporters for donations to pay to another lay person—except for his parents (Mv.VIII.22; see BMC2, Chapter 10)—there is no way a bhikkhu could raise the needed funds. The Canon places only one responsibility on a bhikkhu who causes material loss to a lay person: The Community, if it sees fit, can force him to apologize to the owner (Cv.I.20; see BMC2, Chapter 20). Beyond that, the Canon does not require that he make material compensation of any kind. Thus, as the Commentary’s concept of bhaṇḍadeyya is clearly foreign to the Canon, there seems no reason to adopt it.	在做出这些判断时，《义注》可能遵循了当时的民法，因为《圣典》根本没有提到 bhaṇḍadeyya 的概念，而且它的一些判断与《义注》的判断相矛盾。正如我们上面提到的，《经分别》指出，如果比丘破坏、散落、焚烧或以其他方式使他人的财产无法使用，他犯《突吉罗》。当《Vinīta-vatthu》讨论比丘因错误的假设而拿走一件物品，或者他对被困在陷阱中的动物感到同情并因此将其释放的情况时，它说没有犯戒。因此，根据《圣典》，《义注》为一项犯《突吉罗》或根本没有犯戒的行为指定了《波罗夷》的惩罚，这似乎很奇怪。当然，为所有者提供合理的补偿是一项慷慨之举，但无法确定比丘是否有足够的资金或自由这样做。因为《圣典》不允许比丘向他的支持者索要捐款来支付给另一个在家人——除了他的父母（《大品》.八.22；见《佛教修道准则第二册》第十章）——所以比丘不可能筹集到所需的资金。《圣典》只规定对在家人造成物质损失的比丘承担一项责任：如果僧团认为合适，可以强迫他向所有者道歉（《小品》.一.20；参见《佛教修道准则第二册》第二十章）。除此之外，《圣典》并没有要求他做出任何形式的物质补偿。因此，由于《义注》中的 bhaṇḍadeyya 概念对于正典来说显然是不相干的，似乎没有理由采用它。
Enforcement of rules. There is one important area in which even the Commentary does not require compensation, and that is when a bhikkhu sees another bhikkhu using an inappropriate object and arranges to have it destroyed. Here the Commentary draws its argument from the origin story to this rule, in which the Buddha orders the bhikkhus to destroy an inappropriately made hut—a “potter’s hut,” which was made from earth and then fired like a pot. From this example, the Commentary draws the following judgment: If a bhikkhu starts to build an inappropriate hut in a certain territory, the “owners” of the territory (i.e., the resident senior bhikkhus) should tell him to stop. If he does not heed their decision and actually builds the hut there, then when they are able to assemble a sufficient number of righteous bhikkhus, the resident senior bhikkhus can send him an order to remove it. If, after the order has been sent three times, the hut is still not removed, the bhikkhus are to dismantle it in such a way that the materials can be reused. The original builder is then to be told to remove the materials. If he doesn’t, then the resident bhikkhus are not responsible for any loss or damage they may undergo.	戒条的执行。有一个重要的领域，在该领域甚至连《义注》也不要求赔偿，那就是当一位比丘看到另一位比丘使用不适当的物品并安排将其销毁时。在此，《义注》从这一戒条起源故事推引出论据，其中佛陀命令比丘摧毁一座不恰当建造的小屋（孤邸）——一座“陶工的小屋”，它是用泥土制成的，然后像锅一样烧制。从这个例子，《义注》得出如下判断：如果一个比丘开始在某个地区建造不合适的小屋，该地区的「主人」（即常住的长老）应该叫他停止。如果他不听从他们的决定，真的在那里建造了小屋，那么当他们能够聚集足够数量的正直比丘时，常住的长老就可以命令他拆除它。如果命令发出三次后，小屋仍未拆除，比丘们应将其拆除，以便材料可以重新使用。然后，原建筑者将被告知移除这些材料。如果他不这样做，那么居住的比丘们对可能遭受的任何损失或损害不负有责任。
The Commentary then derives a further principle from this example to say that if Bhikkhu X, who is knowledgeable in the Vinaya, sees Bhikkhu Y using inappropriate requisites of any sort, he is entitled to get them destroyed or reduced to an appropriate form. He is also not obligated to compensate Y for any loss or inconvenience incurred.	然后，《义注》从这个例子中得出进一步的原则，即如果精通戒律的 X 比丘看到 Y 比丘使用任何种类的不适当的必需品，他有权将它们销毁或简化为适当的形式。他也没有义务赔偿 Y 所遭受的任何损失或不便。
Court actions. As stated above, if a bhikkhu knowingly starts an unfair court case against someone else and then wins it in the final court to which the accused makes appeal, he incurs a pārājika. The Commentary to the Bhikkhunīs’ Sg 1, however, states that even if a bhikkhu is actually mistreated by someone—defamed, physically injured, robbed, etc.—and then tries to take a just court action against the guilty party, he incurs a pārājika if he wins. Again, this is an instance where the Commentary has no support from the Canon and, as the Vinaya-mukha points out, its assertion cannot stand. However, the training of a bhikkhu requires that he view all losses in the light of kamma and focus on looking after the state of his mind rather than on seeking compensation in social or material terms.	法庭诉讼。如上所述，如果一个比丘故意向他人提起不公平的法庭诉讼，然后在被告提出上诉的最终法庭中胜诉，他犯《波罗夷》。然而，比丘尼《僧残》一的《义注》指出，即使比丘实际上受到某人的虐待——诽谤、身体伤害、抢劫等——然后试图对有罪方采取公正的法庭行动，如果他赢了，他犯《波罗夷》。再一次，这是《义注》没有得到《圣典》支持的例子，并且正如《戒律入口》所指出的那样，它的主张是站不住脚的。然而，比丘的训练要求他从业的角度看待所有损失，并专注于照顾自己的心态，而不是寻求社会或物质方面的补偿。
There is no question in any of the texts that if a bhikkhu is asked to give evidence in a courtroom and does so, speaking in accordance with the facts, he commits no offense no matter what the outcome for the others involved. However, Pc 9 would require that he first be authorized to do so by the Community if his testimony involves reporting the wrongdoing of others. See that rule for further details.	在任何文本中，毫无疑问的是，如果比丘被要求在法庭上提供证据，并且按照事实说话，那么无论其他相关人员的结果如何，他都没有犯戒。然而，如果他的证词涉及举报他人的不当行为，《波逸提》九将要求他首先获得僧团的授权。有关更多详细信息，请参阅该戒条。

Modern cases	现代案例
The modern world contains many forms of ownership and monetary exchange that did not exist in the time of the Buddha, and so contains many forms of stealing that did not exist then either. Here are a handful of cases that come to mind as examples of ways in which the standards of this rule might be applied to modern situations.	现代世界包含了佛陀时代不存在的多种形式的所有权和货币交换，因此也包含了当时也不存在的多种形式的偷窃。这里有一些想到的案例，作为该戒条的标准可应用于现代情况的范例。
Infringement of copyright. The international standards for copyright advocated by UNESCO state that infringement of copyright is tantamount to theft. However, in practice, an accusation of copyright infringement is judged not as a case of theft but as one of “fair use,” the issue being the extent to which a person in possession of an item may fairly copy that item for his/her own use or to give or sell to another person without compensating the copyright owner. Thus even a case of “unfair use” would not fulfill the factors of effort and object under this rule, in that—in creating a copy—one is not taking possession of an item that does not belong to one, and one is not depriving the owners of something already theirs. At most, the copyright owners might claim that they are being deprived of compensation owed to them, but as we have argued above, the principle of compensation owed does not rightly belong under this rule. In the terminology of the Canon, a case of unfair use would fall under either of two categories—acting for the material loss of the copyright owners or wrong livelihood—categories that entail a dukkaṭa under the general rule against misbehavior (Cv.V.36). They would also make one eligible for a disciplinary transaction, such as reconciliation or banishment (see BMC2, Chapter 20), which the Community could impose if it saw the infringement as serious enough to merit such a punishment.	侵犯版权。联合国教科文组织所倡导的版权国际标准规定，侵害著作权等同于偷窃。然而，在实践中，侵犯版权的指控不是被视为偷窃案件，而是被视为「合理使用」案件，问题在于拥有某项物品的人可以在多大程度上合理地为自己使用复制该物品，或在不补偿版权所有者的情况下赠送或出售给他人。因此，即使是「不合理使用」的情况也不能满足此戒条下的努力和对象因素，因为在建立拷贝时，并没有占有不属于自己的物品，并且也没有剥夺所有者已经属于他们的东西。至多，版权所有者可能声称自己被剥夺了应得的赔偿，但正如我们上面所论证的，所欠赔偿原则不属于本戒条的范畴。在《圣典》的术语中，不合理使用的案件属于两种类别中的任何一种—为版权所有者的物质损失而采取行动或邪命—根据禁止不当行为的一般戒条，这两种类别意味著《突吉罗》（《小品》.五.36）。它们还将使一个人符合接受治罪羯磨的条件，例如下意或驱出（参见《佛教修道准则第二册》第二十章），如果僧团认为侵犯严重到足以值得受到这样的惩罚，则可以实施之。
Copying computer software. The agreement made when installing software on a computer, by which one agrees not to give the software to anyone else, comes under contract law. As such, a breach of that contract would be treated under the category of “deceit,” described above, which means that a bhikkhu who gives software to a friend in defiance of this contract would incur the penalty for a broken promise. As for the friend—assuming that he is a bhikkhu—the act of receiving the software and putting it on his computer would be treated under the precedent, mentioned above, of the bhikkhus receiving fruit from an orchard groundkeeper not authorized to give it away: He would incur no offense. However, as he must agree to the contract before installing the software on his computer, he would incur a penalty for a broken promise if he then gave the software to someone else in defiance of the contract.	复制电脑软体。在电脑上安装软体时达成的协议，即同意不将该软体提供给其他任何人的协议，受合约法管辖。因此，违反该合约将被视为上述「欺诈」类别，这意味著违反该合约而向朋友提供软体的比丘将因违背承诺而受到惩罚。至于朋友——假设他是比丘——接收软体并将其放入他的电脑的行为将按照上述比丘从未经授权赠送水果的果园管理员那里接收水果的先例来处理：他不会犯任何戒。然而，由于他在电脑上安装软体之前必须同意合约，如果他随后违反合约将软体提供给其他人，他将面临违背承诺的惩罚。
Credit cards. The theft of a credit card would of course be an offense. Because the owner of the card, in most cases, would not be required to pay for the stolen card, the seriousness of a theft of this sort would be determined by how the thief used the card. NP 20 would forbid a bhikkhu from using a credit card to buy anything even if the card were his to use, although a bhikkhu who had gone to the extent of stealing a card would probably not be dissuaded by that rule from using it or having someone else use it for him. In any event, the use of the card would be equivalent to using a stolen key to open a safe. If the thief hands the credit card to a store clerk to make a purchase, that would count as a gesture telling the clerk to transfer funds from the account of the credit card company. Because such operations are automated, the clerk’s attempt to have the funds transferred would count not as an act of deceit but an act of taking. If the credit card company’s machines authorize the transaction, then the theft occurs as soon as funds are transferred from one account to another. The seriousness of the theft would be calculated in line with the principle of the “prior plan” mentioned above.	信用卡。偷窃信用卡当然是犯戒。由于在大多数情况下，卡片的所有者不需要为被盗的卡片付款，因此此类偷窃的严重性将取决于偷窃者如何使用卡片。《舍堕》二十禁止比丘使用信用卡购买任何东西，即使该卡是他自己的而使用它，尽管该戒条可能无法阻止一个已经达到偷卡程度的比丘使用它或让某人替他使用它。无论如何，使用该卡就相当于使用偷来的钥匙打开保险箱。如果偷窃者将信用卡交给店员进行购买，这将被视为一种告诉店员从信用卡公司帐户中转移资金的示意动作。由于此类操作是自动化的，因此店员试图转移资金的行为不会被视为欺诈行为，而是一种拿取行为。如果信用卡公司的机器授权交易，那么一旦资金从一个帐户转移到另一个帐户，偷窃就算发生。偷窃的严重程度将按照上述「先前计划」的原则进行计算。
In a situation where the funds, if transferred, would entail a pārājika, then if the machines do not authorize the transaction, the bhikkhu trying to use the card would incur a thullaccaya for getting the clerk to attempt the transfer. If the clerk, doubting the bhikkhu’s right to use the card, refuses to attempt the transfer, the bhikkhu would incur a dukkaṭa in making the gesture of command.	在这种情况下，如果资金转移，犯《波罗夷》，那么如果机器不授权交易，尝试使用该卡的比丘将因让店员尝试转帐而犯《偷兰遮》。如果店员怀疑比丘使用该卡的权利而拒绝尝试转帐，比丘做出命令的示意动作就犯《突吉罗》。
Similar considerations would apply to the unauthorized use of debit cards, ATM cards, phone cards, personal identification numbers, or any other means by which funds would be transferred from the owner’s account by automated means.	类似的考量也适用于未经授权使用签帐金融卡、ATM 卡、电话卡、个人识别号码或透过自动方式从所有者帐户转移资金的任何其他方式。
A forged check drawn on a bank where the scanning and approval of checks is fully automated would fall under this category. If drawn on a bank where an employee would be responsible for approving the check, the entire case would come under false dealing, discussed above.	从银行提款的伪造支票，如果支票的扫描和批准是完全自动化的，则属于此类。如果从银行提款，而银行的员工负责批准支票，则整个案件将属于虚假交易，如上所述。
Unauthorized telephone or Internet use would count as theft only if the charges were automatically transferred from the owner’s account. If the owner is simply billed for the charges, he/she could refuse to pay, and so no theft would have occurred. This would count, not as a theft, but as promise made in bad faith, which would incur a pācittiya. If, however, the case seemed serious enough, and the pācittiya too light a punishment, the Community could impose a disciplinary transaction on the offender.	未经授权的电话或网路使用，仅当费用自动从所有者的帐户转移时才算偷窃。如果所有者只是收到缴费帐单，他/她可以拒绝付款，因此不会发生偷窃。这不算偷窃，而是算恶意做出的承诺，这将犯《波逸提》。然而，如果案件看起来足够严重，并且《波逸提》惩罚太轻，僧团可以对犯戒者实行治罪羯磨。
Impounded items—such as a repaired automobile kept in a mechanic’s shop—would apparently be treated in a similar way to smuggled goods.	被扣押的物品——例如存放在机械店里的修理过的汽车——显然会以与走私货物类似的方式处理。

Non-offenses	不犯
In addition to the blanket exemptions mentioned under the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here list six exemptions to this rule. Two relate to the status of the object, two to the factor of perception, and two to the factor of intention.	除了上个戒条中提到的总括性豁免之外，《经分别》的不犯条款还列出了此戒条的六项豁免。其中两个与对象的状态有关，两个与感知因素有关，两个与意图因素有关。
Object	对象
There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object belonging (1) to a peta (§) or (2) to an animal (§). Thus there is no offense in taking the remains of a lion’s kill, regardless of how possessive the lion may feel, although the Commentary wisely advises waiting until the lion has eaten enough of its kill no longer to be hungry, for otherwise the bhikkhu may become lion’s kill himself.	若比丘拿走 (1) 亡者及鬼 (§) 或 (2) 动物 (§) 的物品，并不犯戒。因此，无论狮子的占有欲有多么强烈，拿走狮子猎物的残骸并没有犯戒，尽管《义注》明智地建议等到狮子吃完它的猎物后不再感到饥饿再拿走，否则比丘可能会变成狮子的猎物。
The term peta, as used in the Canon, includes not only hungry ghosts, but also human corpses. In the early days of the religion, bhikkhus were expected to make their robes from discarded cloth, one source being the cloths used to wrap corpses laid in charnel grounds. (The bhikkhus would wash and boil the cloth before using it themselves.) However, they were not to take cloth from undecomposed bodies, and here is why:	《圣典》中的「peta」一词不仅包括饿鬼，也包括人的尸体。在佛教的早期，比丘们被要求用废弃的布料制作袈裟，其中一个来源是用来包裹停放在停尸场的尸体的布料。（比丘们在使用布之前会先清洗并将布煮沸。）但是，他们不能从未腐烂的尸体上取布，原因如下：
“Now at that time a certain bhikkhu went to the charnel ground and took hold of discarded cloth on a body not yet decomposed. But the spirit of the dead one was (still) dwelling in that body. Then it said to the bhikkhu, ‘Venerable sir, don’t take hold of my cloak.’ The bhikkhu, disregarding it, went off (with the cloak). Then the body, rising up, followed right behind the bhikkhu. Then the bhikkhu, entering his dwelling, closed the door. Then the body fell down right there.”	「当时，有一位比丘来到停尸场，抓住覆盖在尚未腐烂的尸体上废弃的布料。但死者的灵魂（仍然）住在那个尸体里。然后它对比丘说：「尊者，不要抓住我的遮掩物。」比丘不理会它，（带著遮掩物）走了。然后，尸体站起来，紧跟在比丘身后。然后，比丘进入他的住处，关上了门。然后尸体就倒在了那里。」
The story gives no further details, and we are left to imagine for ourselves both the bhikkhu’s state of mind while being chased by the body and his friends’ reaction to the event. As is usual with the stories in the Vibhaṅga, the more outrageous the event, the more matter-of-fact is its telling, and the more its humor lies in the understatement.	故事没有提供更多细节，我们只能自己想像比丘被尸体追赶时的心态以及他的朋友们对此事件的反应。正如《经分别》中的故事一样，事件越离谱，它的叙述就越是实事求是，而其幽默感也越是在轻描淡写中体现。
At any rate, as a result of this incident the Buddha laid down a dukkaṭa for taking cloth from an undecomposed body—which, according to the Commentary, means one that is still warm.	无论如何，由于这起事件，佛陀为从未腐烂的尸体中拿取布料制定了犯《突吉罗》——根据《义注》，这意味著尸体仍然是温暖的。
The Commentary also classes devas under petas here and states that a bhikkhu may take a deva’s belongings with no penalty. It illustrates this point with two examples. In the first, a bhikkhu takes a piece of cloth left hanging on a tree as an offering to a deva. In the second, a bhikkhu with clairvoyant powers gains a vision of Sakka, the king of the devas, who is wearing an expensive cloth. The bhikkhu takes the cloth with the intention of making a robe for himself, even though Sakka keeps screaming, “Don’t take it! Don’t take it!” This latter example may have been included in the Commentary simply for its shock value in order to wake up sleepy students in the back of the room. Even if the Commentary is right in saying that the bhikkhu in question did not incur an offense, there’s no denying he’s a fool.	《义注》在此也将天神归类为亡者及鬼之下，并指出比丘可以拿走天神的所有物而不受惩罚。它用两个例子来说明这一点。在第一个例子中，比丘拿走一块挂在树上作为对天神的供养的布。在第二个例子中，一位具有天眼通的比丘看到身著昂贵衣服的天王帝释。比丘拿走这块布，打算为自己做一件袈裟，尽管帝释不断喊叫：「别拿走它！别拿走它！」后一个例子可能只是因为它的具震撼价值而被包含在《义注》中，以便唤醒教室后面昏昏欲睡的学生。即使《义注》说涉及的比丘没有犯戒是正确的，但不可否认他是个愚人。
Perception	感知
There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object perceiving it (1) to be his own or (2) to have been thrown away (§). The Commentary states that if the bhikkhu finds out that the object does indeed have an owner, he owes the owner compensation and would be guilty of an offense when the owner abandons his efforts to gain that compensation. As we have already noted, the concept of compensation owed has no basis in the Canon, but if the object still lies in the bhikkhu’s possession and he decides not to return it, that decision would count as a thieving intention. The theft of the object could then be treated under the category of a borrowed object, which in practice has the same effect as the Commentary’s notion of compensation owed: The theft would be accomplished when the owner abandons his/her efforts to regain possession. However, if the object no longer exists (it was consumed by the bhikkhu or destroyed) or is no longer in the bhikkhu’s possession (he lost it or gave it away), the resolution of the issue is purely an individual matter between the bhikkhu and the owner, although as we noted above, the Community, if it sees fit, could force the bhikkhu to apologize to the owner.	如果比丘认为该物品（1）是他自己的，或（2）被丢弃（§）而拿走它，则不犯戒。《义注》指出，如果比丘发现该物品确实有一个所有者，他就要赔偿所有者，并且当所有者放弃获得赔偿的努力时，他就会犯戒。正如我们已经指出的，所欠赔偿的概念在《圣典》中没有根据，但如果该物品仍然在比丘手中，而他决定不归还它，该决定将被视为偷窃的意图。那么，该物品的偷窃行为可以被视为借用物品的范畴，这实际上与《义注》中的所欠赔偿概念具有相同的效果：当所有者放弃重新拥有的努力时，偷窃行为就完成了。然而，如果该物品不再存在（它被比丘消耗或毁坏）或不再为比丘所有（他丢失或把它送走了），则问题的解决纯粹是比丘和所有者之间的个人问题。尽管正如我们上面所指出的，如果僧团认为合适，可以强迫比丘向所有者道歉。
Intention	意图
There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object (1) on trust or (2) temporarily.	如果比丘（1）基于信任，或（2）暂时地，拿走物品，则不犯戒。
To rightly take an object on trust, Mv.VIII.19.1 states that five conditions must be met:	为了正确地基于信任拿取物品，《大品》.八.19.1说必须满足五个条件：
a. The owner is an acquaintance.	a. 所有者是熟识的人。
b. He/she is an intimate.	b. 他/她是一个亲密的人。
c. He/she has spoken of the matter. (According to the Commentary, this means that he/she has said, “You may take any of my property you want.”)	c. 他/她已经谈到了此事。（根据《义注》，这意味著他/她说：「你可以拿走任何你想要的且属于我的财产。」）
d. He/she is still alive.	d. 他/她还活著。
e. One knows that he/she will be pleased at one’s taking it.	e. 知道他/她会因为拿走它而感到高兴。
The Commentary to this rule states that in practice only three of these conditions need to be met: the fourth, the fifth, and any one of the first three. As the Vinaya-mukha notes, there are good practical reasons for adopting the Commentary’s interpretation here. There is also the formal reason that otherwise the first two conditions would be redundant.	此戒条的《义注》指出，实际上只需要满足这些条件中的三个：第四个、第五个以及前三个条件中的任何一个。正如《戒律入口》所指出的，这里采用《义注》的解释有充分且实际的理由。还有否则前两个条件将是多余的正式理由。
Mv.VIII.31.2-3 discusses how an item can be rightly taken on trust if a bhikkhu, as courier, is conveying it from a donor to an intended recipient. The deciding factor is what the donor says while handing over the item, which apparently determines who exercises rights of ownership over the item while it is in transit. If the donor says, “Give this to so-and-so” (which means that ownership has not yet been transferred to the recipient), one may rightly take the item on trust in the donor but not in the recipient. If he/she says, “I give this to so-and-so” (which transfers ownership to the recipient), one may rightly take the item on trust in the recipient but not in the donor. If, before the courier can convey the item to the intended the recipient, he learns that the owner—as determined by the donor’s statement—happens to die, he may determine the item as an inheritance from the owner.	《大品》.八.31.2-3讨论如果比丘作为递送者，将物品从施主递送给预定的接受者，如何正确地基于信任拿走物品。决定因素是施主在移交物品时所说的话，这显然决定了谁在运输过程中行使该物品的所有权。如果施主说，「把这个给某某」（这意味著所有权尚未转移给接受者），人们可以基于对施主的信任而正确地拿取该物品，而非基于对接受者的信任。如果他/她说，「我把这个给某某」（这将所有权转移给接收者），人们可以基于对接受者的信任而正确地拿取该物品，而非基于对施主的信任。如果在递送者将物品递送给预定接受者之前，得知所有者碰巧去世，此所有者是根据施主的声明来确定的，他可以确定物品是该所有者的遗产。
In both cases where the item may be legitimately taken on trust, none of the texts discuss whether the factors listed in Mv.VIII.19.1 also have to be met or whether the allowances here are a special exemption to those factors granted specifically to couriers. However, because the allowances are so particular about who maintains ownership over the article while it is in transit, it would seem that the owner would have the right to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the courier’s taking the item on trust. This further suggests that the courier would have to take the owner’s perceived wishes into account, which implies that the factors listed in Mv.VIII.19.1 still hold here.	在这两种情况下，该物品可以合法地基于信任被拿走，没有任何文本讨论是否也必须满足《大品》.八.19.1中列出的因素，或者此处的开缘是否为特别同意授予递送者的那些因素的特殊豁免。然而，由于开缘对于物品在运输过程中的所有权归属有如此严格的规定，因此所有者似乎有权对递送者基于信任拿取物品表示满意或不满。这进一步表明，递送者必须考虑所有者的感知意愿，这意味著《大品》.八.19.1中列出的因素在这里仍然适用。
The Vinīta-vatthu treats the case of a bhikkhu who takes an item mistakenly thinking that he had the right to take it on trust; the Buddha termed this a “misconception as to trust” and did not impose a penalty. The Commentary to this rule adds that if the original owner informs one that he is displeased because he sincerely wanted to keep the item for another use, one should return it to him; but, in line with the Vinīta-vatthu, it does not indicate a penalty for not returning it. If the owner is displeased with one for other reasons, the Commentary says, there is no need to return the item.	《Vinīta-vatthu》处理了一个比丘的案例，他错误地认为他有权以基于信任的方式拿走一件物品；佛陀将此称为「对信任的误解」，并没有施加惩罚。此戒条的《义注》补充说，如果原所有者告知说他感到不高兴，因为他由衷地想保留该物品以作他用，则应将其归还给他；但是，根据《Vinīta-vatthu》，它没有表示会因为不归还而受到惩罚。《义注》称，如果所有者因其他原因而感到不高兴，则无需归还该物品。
As for taking an item temporarily, the Commentary says this means taking it with the intention that (a) “I’ll return it” or (b) “I’ll make compensation.” There is support in the Vibhaṅga for including (a) here, but none for (b). If the Commentary included (b) to cover cases where a bhikkhu borrows an object but then happens to lose or destroy it, there is no need to include it, for as we have already explained, a bhikkhu is under no compulsion to compensate people for items lost or destroyed. If the Commentary meant it to cover cases where a bhikkhu takes ownership of an object belonging to a person with whom he has not established trust and with whom he plans to discuss compensation later, it doesn’t really fit under this exemption, for one is taking permanent possession of the item. Given the strict conditions that the Canon places on the exemption for taking an item on trust, it seems unlikely that its compilers would have countenanced an exemption for a bhikkhu to go around imposing unilateral trades, taking possession of items on the unfounded assumption that the owners would gladly accept compensation at a later time. If there is any place for this sort of exemption in the Vibhaṅga’s framework, it would be as a variant on taking on trust. Thus it would have to meet the following factors: The owner is an acquaintance or an intimate or has spoken of the matter; he/she is still alive; and one knows that he/she would be pleased if one takes the item and gives compensation later.	至于暂时拿走一件物品，《义注》称，这意味著拿走它的意图是（a）「我将归还它」或（b）「我将给予补偿」。《经分别》中支持此处纳入（a），但没有（b）。如果《义注》中纳入（b）以涵盖比丘借用物品但随后丢失或毁坏的情况，则无需纳入它，因为正如我们已经解释过的，比丘没有义务向人们赔偿物品丢失或毁坏。如果《义注》的意思是涵盖这样的情况：比丘拿走属于他尚未建立信任的人的物品的所有权，并且他计划稍后与该人讨论赔偿，那么它实际上不适合这种豁免，因为是永久占有该物品。鉴于《圣典》对以信任方式拿取物品的豁免规定了严格的条件，其编纂者似乎不太可能会支持比丘的豁免，以进行单方面交易，以毫无根据地假设所有者会乐意在以后接受补偿为由占有物品。如果在《经分别》的框架中存在这种豁免的地方，那将是作为基于信任拿取的一种变体。因此，它必须满足以下因素：所有者是熟人、密友或谈过此事；他/她还活著；知道如果拿走该物品并随后给予补偿，他/她会很高兴。
In addition to the exemptions listed under the non-offense clauses, the Vinīta-vatthu contains ten other types of cases that involve no offense under this rule. Some of these have already been mentioned in the above discussions, but it is convenient to have them gathered in one place.	除了不犯条款中列出的豁免之外，《Vinīta-vatthu》还包含十种其他类型的案例，这些案例不涉及本戒条下的犯戒。其中一些已经在上面的讨论中提到过，但将它们集中在一个地方会很方便。
—A bhikkhu, seeing an expensive garment, feels a desire to steal it but does not act on the desire. The commentaries take this as a general principle for all rules, that the mere arising of a mind state does not constitute an offense.	—一位比丘看到一件昂贵的衣服，生起偷窃的欲望，但不按照欲望行动。注释将此作为所有戒条的一般原则，即只有心境生起并不构成犯戒。
—A bhikkhu, seeing a cloak blown up by a whirlwind, catches it to return it to the owners.	—一位比丘，看到一件衣服被旋风吹起，抓住它，把它还给主人。
—A bhikkhu takes an item on trust but later discovers that the trust is misconceived.	—一位比丘基于信任拿取了一件物品，但后来发现这信任被误解。
—A bhikkhu goes through a customs house, not knowing that a dutiable item is among his belongings.	—一位比丘穿过海关，不知道他的所有物中有一件应纳税的物品。
—Visiting bhikkhus, for the sake of food, take fruit from a tree belonging to the Saṅgha.	—来访的比丘们，为了食物，取属于僧伽的树上的果子。
—Bhikkhus receive fruit from the guardian of an orchard, even though the guardian is not entitled to give the fruit away.	—比丘们从果园的守护者那里得到水果，尽管守护者无权将水果送出。
—A bhikkhu, seeing an item left lying about, puts it away so that it won’t get lost. The owner comes looking for the item and asks, “Who stole it?” The bhikkhu, perhaps ironically, responds, “I stole it.” The owner then charges him with a theft. The case goes to the Buddha, who says that the bhikkhu committed no offense, in that his answer was just a manner of speaking and not an actual acknowledgement of a theft.	—一位比丘，看到一件物品被放在地上，就把它收起来，以免它丢失。失主来寻找物品并问道：「谁偷了它？」比丘也许是讽刺地回答：「我偷了它。」失主随后指控他偷窃。案件到了佛陀那边，佛陀说比丘没有犯戒，因为他的回答只是一种说话方式，而不是真正承认偷窃。
—A bhikkhu, out of compassion, releases an animal caught in a hunter’s snare.	—一位比丘出于慈悲，释放了被猎人网罗捕获的动物。
—Ven. Ajjuka points out a bequest to an heir in line with the original owner’s wishes.	—阿酬尊者按照原主人的意愿，指出对继承人的遗赠。
—Ven. Pilindavaccha uses his psychic powers to retrieve a pair of kidnapped children. The Buddha states that this entails no penalty because such a thing lies in the province of those with psychic power. The Vinaya-mukha, in discussing this case, takes it as a precedent for saying that if a bhikkhu returns a stolen article to its legal owner, there is no offense. The Buddha’s statement, though, was probably meant to discourage bhikkhus without psychic powers from getting directly involved in righting wrongs of this sort. If a bhikkhu without psychic powers happens to learn of the whereabouts of stolen goods, kidnapped children, etc., he may inform the authorities, if he sees fit, and let them handle the situation themselves. However, for safety’s sake, a bhikkhu living in a wilderness frequented by thieves would be wise not to be perceived as siding either with the thieves or the authorities.	—毕陵伽婆蹉尊者利用他的神通力找回了一对被绑架的孩子。佛陀指出，这不会带来任何惩罚，因为这种事属于具有神通力的人的范畴。《戒律入口》在讨论此案时，将此作为先例，说如果比丘将偷来的东西归还给其合法所有者，则没有犯戒。不过，佛陀的说法可能是为了阻止没有神通的比丘直接参与此类纠正错误的行为。如果没有神通的比丘碰巧得知赃物、被绑架的儿童等的下落，如果他认为合适，他可以通知当局，让他们自行处理。然而，为了安全起见，生活在盗贼经常出没的林野中的比丘最好不要被视为站在盗贼或当局一边。
Summary: The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a pārājika offense.	摘要：窃取任何价值 1/24 盎司或以上金衡黄金的物品是《波罗夷》罪。

* * *

3	三
Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive a human being of life, or search for an assassin for him, or praise the advantages of death, or incite him to die (saying): “My good man, what use is this evil, miserable life to you? Death would be better for you than life,” or with such an idea in mind, such a purpose in mind, should in various ways praise the advantages of death or incite him to die, he also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.	若有比丘故意夺人的生命，或为他寻找行凶者，或赞扬死亡的好处，或煽动他去死（说）：「我的善男子，这邪恶、悲惨的生命对你有何用？死比生好」，或怀著这样的想法，怀著这样的目的，用各种方式来赞扬死亡的好处，或者煽动他去死，也是波罗夷，不共住。
This rule against intentionally causing the death of a human being is best understood in terms of five factors, all of which must be present for there to be the full offense.	这条禁止故意造成人死亡的戒条最好从五个因素来理解，所有这些因素都必须存在才能构成完整的犯戒。
1) Object: a human being, which according to the Vibhaṅga includes human fetuses as well, counting from the time consciousness first arises in the womb immediately after conception up to the time of death.	1）对象：人类，根据《经分别》，也包括人类胎儿，从受孕后意识在子宫中首次出现的时间算起，直到死亡为止。
2) Intention: knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wanting to cause that person’s death. “Knowingly” also includes the factor of—	2）意图：明知、有意识、故意、有目的地想要导致该人死亡。「明知」还包括以下这一因素—
3) Perception: perceiving the person as a living being.	3）感知：察觉到该人是活人。
4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing that person to die.	4）努力：为了导致该人死亡而所做的任何事。
5) Result: The life-faculty of the person is cut as the result of one’s act.	5）结果：该人的命根因自己的行为而被切断。

Object	对象
The Vibhaṅga defines a human being as a person “from the time consciousness first becomes manifest in a mother’s womb, up to its death-time.” As DN 15 makes clear, the presence of the new being’s consciousness is necessary for the embryo to survive in the womb. Thus the survival of the embryo in the womb is a clear sign that consciousness is present. This means that consciousness is manifest from the moment of conception.	《经分别》将人类定义为「从意识首次在母亲子宫中显现出来，直至死亡」的人。正如《长部》15经所表明的那样，新生命意识的存在对于胚胎在子宫中生存是必要的。因此，胚胎在子宫中的存活是意识存在的明显标志。这意味著意识从受孕那一刻起就显现出来。
From this it follows that a bhikkhu who intentionally causes an abortion—by arranging for the operation, supplying the medicines, or advising a woman to get an abortion and she follows through—incurs a pārājika. A bhikkhu who encourages a woman to use a means of contraception that works after the point of conception would be guilty of a pārājika if she were to follow his advice.	由此可见，比丘故意造成堕胎—透过安排手术、提供药物或建议女人堕胎并且她照做了—犯《波罗夷》。比丘鼓励女人在受孕后使用有效的避孕方法，如果她听从了他的建议，比丘将会犯下《波罗夷》罪。
There is a series of cases in the Vinīta-vatthu in which bhikkhus provide medicines for women seeking an abortion, followed by two cases in which a bhikkhu provides medicines to a barren woman who wants to become fertile and to a fertile woman who wants to become barren. In neither of these two latter cases does anyone die or suffer pain, but in both cases the bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa. From this, the Commentary infers that bhikkhus are not to act as doctors to lay people, an inference supported by the Vibhaṅga to Sg 13. (The Commentary, though, gives a number of exceptions to this principle. See the discussion in BMC2, Chapter 5.)	《Vinīta-vatthu》中有一系列比丘为寻求堕胎的妇女提供药物的案例，随后还有两个案例，其中有一位比丘，为一位想要生育的不孕妇女，和一位想要避孕的生育妇女，提供药物。在后两个案例下，没有人死亡或遭受痛苦，但在这两个案例下，比丘都犯《突吉罗》。由此，《义注》推论出比丘不应充当在家人的医生，这一推论得到了《僧残》十三的《经分别》的支持。（不过，《义注》给出了这一原则的一些例外情况。参见《佛教修道准则第二册》第五章的讨论。)
The question arises as to whether one’s own life would qualify as “object” under this rule—in other words, the extent to which attempted suicides are covered here. The Vibhaṅga to this rule mentions three types of suicide, treating each of them differently.	问题是，根据这条戒条，自己的生命是否符合「对象」的资格—换句话说，这里涵盖了试图自杀的程度。这条戒条的《经分别》提到了三种类型的自杀，并对每种类型进行了不同的处理。
a) In the origin story, bhikkhus search for assassins, i.e., get other people to take their lives. That action is directly mentioned in the rule and explained in the Vibhaṅga, so it does come under the rule.	a) 在起源故事中，比丘寻找行凶者，也就是让其他人结束自己的生命。该行为在戒条中直接提及并在《经分别》中解释，因此它确实受本戒条管辖。
b) The Vinīta-vatthu includes a case in which a bhikkhu tries to commit suicide by throwing himself over a cliff, and the Buddha formulates a separate rule to cover that case. The penalty assigned by the rule, however, does not fit the pattern for derived offenses under this rule, which shows that an attempted suicide of that sort would not be treated here.	b) 《Vinīta-vatthu》包括一个比丘试图跳崖自杀的案例，佛陀制定了一个单独的戒条来涵盖这个案例。然而，该戒条所规定的惩罚并不符合本戒条下衍生违犯的模式，这表明此处不会处理此类试图自杀。
c) The origin story also tells of bhikkhus who take their own lives, but the main rule here does not mention that action, nor does the Vibhaṅga discuss it. The Commentary extrapolates from the rule in case (b) to cover almost all attempts at suicide, but there are reasons for questioning the Commentary’s reasoning on this issue. For a discussion, see “Special cases,” below.	c) 起源故事也讲述了比丘自杀的故事，但这里的主要戒条没有提到这一行为，《经分别》也没有讨论它。《义注》从情况（b）中的戒条推断涵盖了几乎所有的试图自杀，但有理由质疑《义注》对此问题的推断。有关讨论，请参阅下面的「特别案例」。
The Vibhaṅga states that a bhikkhu who kills a “non-human being”—a yakkha, nāga, or peta—incurs a thullaccaya. The Commentary adds a devatā to this list, and goes on to say that a spirit possessing a human being or an animal can be exorcised in either of two ways. The first is to command it to leave: This causes no injury to the spirit and results in no offense. The second is to make a doll out of flour paste or clay and then to cut off various of its parts (!). If one cuts off the hands and feet, the spirit loses its hands and feet. If one cuts off the head, the spirit dies, which is grounds for a thullaccaya.	《经分别》指出，杀死「非人」（夜叉、龙或鬼）的比丘犯《偷兰遮》。《义注》在这个清单中加入了天神，并接著说，附身于人类或动物的灵体可以透过两种方式中的任何一种来驱除。第一种是命令其离开：这样不伤害灵体，也不犯戒。第二种是用面粉糊或黏土制作一个娃娃，然后切掉它的各个部分（！）。如果砍掉手脚，灵体就失去了手脚。如果砍下头，灵体就会死亡，就犯《偷兰遮》。
A bhikkhu who intentionally kills a common animal is treated under Pc 61.	故意杀死普通动物的比丘将根据《波逸提》六一受到处置。

Intention & perception	意图和感知
The Vibhaṅga defines the factor of intention in three contexts—the word-analysis, the non-offense clauses, and the Vinīta-vatthu—analyzing it with one set of terms in the first context, and another set in the last two. There are two ways of interpreting the discrepancy: Either the two sets differ only in language but not in substance, or they actually differ in substance. The Commentary, without seeming to notice what it is doing, adopts the second interpretation. In other words, it defines the factors of intention in markedly different ways in the different contexts, yet does not assert that one set of terms is more authoritative than the other or even take note of the differences between them. In fact, it takes one of the terms common to the non-offense clauses and the Vinīta-vatthu and defines it in one way in one context and another in the other. All of this creates a great deal of confusion.	《经分别》在三种脉络中定义了意图因素－语句解说、不犯条款和《Vinīta-vatthu》－在第一种脉络中使用一组术语进行分析，在后两种脉络中使用另一组术语进行分析。有两种方法可以解释这种差异：要么这两组仅在语言上有所不同，而没有实质上的不同，要么它们的确在实质上有所不同。《义注》似乎没有注意到它在做什么，就采用了第二种解释。换句话说，它在不同的脉络中以明显不同的方式定义了意图因素，但并没有肯定地说一组术语比另一组术语更具权威性，甚至没有注意到它们之间的差异。事实上，它采用了不犯条款和《Vinīta-vatthu》所共用的术语之一，并在一种脉络中以一种方式定义它，而在另一种脉络中以另一种方式定义它。所有这些都造成了极大的混乱。
A more fruitful way of analyzing the two sets of terms, which we will adopt here, is to assume that they differ only in language but not in substance. We will take as our framework the set of terms used in the non-offense clauses and the Vinīta-vatthu, as it is clearer and more amply illustrated than the other set, and then refer to the other set, along with some of the explanations from the Commentary, when these help to give a more refined understanding of what the non-offense clauses and Vinīta-vatthu are saying.	我们将在这里采用的分析这两组术语的一种更有效的方法是，假设它们仅在语言上有所不同，而在实质上没有差异。我们将以不犯条款和《Vinīta-vatthu》中使用的该组术语作为我们的框架，因为它比另一组更清晰、更充分地说明，然后参考另一组以及一些来自《义注》的解释，当这些有助于更精确地理解不犯条款和《Vinīta-vatthu》的意思。
The non-offense clauses state that there is no offense for a bhikkhu who acts unintentionally, not knowing, or without aiming at death. In the Vinīta-vatthu, unintentionally is used to describe cases in which a bhikkhu acts accidentally, such as dropping a poorly held stone, brick, or adze; removing a pestle from a shelf and accidentally knocking off another one. Not knowing is used in cases in which the bhikkhu deliberately does an action but without knowing that his action could cause death. An example would be giving food to a friend not knowing that it is poisoned. Not aiming at death is used in cases where the bhikkhu deliberately does an action but does not intend that action to result in death. Relevant examples include trying to help a bhikkhu who is choking on food by slapping him on the back and inadvertently causing his death; telling a bhikkhu to stand on a piece of scaffolding while helping with construction work, only to see the scaffolding collapse; describing the joys of heaven to an audience, only to have a member of the audience decide to commit suicide in hopes of going there.	不犯条款说，比丘无意、不知、或不以死亡为目的的行为并不构成犯戒。在《Vinīta-vatthu》中，「无意」用来描述比丘意外地做出的行为的情况，例如，把拿不稳的石头、砖头或锛子掉在地上；从架子上取下一把研杵，不小心碰掉了另一把。「不知」用于比丘故意做某事但不知道他的行为可能导致死亡的情况。一个例子是给朋友食物，但他不知道食物有毒。「不以死亡为目的」用于比丘故意做某事但无意导致死亡的情况。相关的例子包括，试图拍打一位被食物噎住的比丘的背来帮助他，却无意中导致了他的死亡；告诉一位比丘在帮忙建筑时站在鹰架上，结果却看到鹰架倒塌；向听众描述天界的欢乐，结果却有一位听众决定自杀，希望能去那里。
Thus, to fulfill the factor of intention here, a bhikkhu must be acting intentionally, knowingly, and aiming at death.	因此，为了满足这里的意图因素，比丘必须有意地、明知地、以死亡为目的而行动。
The word-analysis covers all the same points—although it shuffles the terms around—when it defines intentionally as “having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously.” Without teasing out the differences in terminology, we may simply note the important point added in its analysis, which is that an act of manslaughter counts as intentional here only when the bhikkhu has made a clear decision to kill. Thus if he were to strike a person unthinkingly in a sudden fit of rage, without being clear about what his intention was, it would not qualify as “intentional” here. The Commentary seconds this point when it defines having made the decision as “having summoned up a reckless mind state, ‘crushing’ through the power of an attack.” The Sub-commentary does not explain crushing or attack here, but apparently they mean aggressively overcoming, through a brute act of will, any contrary or hesitant thoughts in the mind.	当语句解说将故意定义为「有意愿，明知且有意识地做出决定」时，语句解说涵盖了所有相同的要点，尽管它对术语进行了重新排列。在不梳理出术语差异的情况下，我们可以简单地注意到其分析中添加的重点，即只有当比丘明确决定杀人时，过失杀人行为才算故意杀人。因此，如果他在没有明确意图的情况下，突然发怒，不假思索地打人，这里就不算是「故意」。《义注》支持这一点，将做出决定定义为「唤起鲁莽的精神状态，透过攻击的力量『粉碎』」。这里的《复注》并没有解释粉碎或攻击，但显然它们的意思是透过意志的残酷行为，积极地克服心中任何相反或犹豫的想法。
The Vinīta-vatthu contains a few cases where bhikkhus kill people in situations where they did not even know that there was a person there: throwing a stone over a precipice, not knowing that there was a person standing below; sitting down on a pile of cloth on a chair, not knowing that a child was underneath the cloth; and setting fire to a grove, not knowing that there were people in the grove. The Buddha dismisses the first two cases without explanation as not coming under this rule. The last he classifies as an example of not aiming at death. We can conclude from this example that aiming at death must include the perception that there was someone there who could die. The Commentary seconds this conclusion in its analysis of the phrase knowingly and consciously in the word-analysis’s definition of intentionally. Although it again shuffles the terms around—using consciously to describe what the Vinīta-vatthu describes as knowingly—the important point in its conclusion is that an essential element in the factor of intention is the factor of perception: In its words, one must be aware that, “This is a living being.”	《Vinīta-vatthu》中记载了一些比丘在他们甚至不知道有人在那里的情况下杀人的例子：在悬崖上扔石头，却不知道下面站著一个人；坐在椅子上的一堆布上，不知道布下有个孩子；放火烧了一座小树林，却不知道树林里还有人。佛陀对前两种情况不予理会，没有做出任何解释，因为不属于这条戒条。他将最后一个归类为不以死亡为目的的例子。从这个例子我们可以得出结论，以死亡为目的必须包括感知：那里有人可能会死。《义注》在语句解说的「故意」定义中的明知且有意识地一词的分析中，支持了这一结论。尽管它再次重新排列了术语－用有意识来描述《Vinīta-vatthu》所描述的明知－其结论中的重点是，意图因素中的一个基本要素是感知因素：用它的话说，必须是意识到：「这是一个活著的众生。」
Note that, given this definition, one need not know that the living being is a human being for the factor of perception to be fulfilled. The Commentary illustrates this point with an example in which a bhikkhu who, seeing a goat lying down in a certain spot during the day, decides to return to that spot to kill the goat that night. In the meantime, however, the goat gets up and a man comes to lie down in its place. The bhikkhu approaches the man in the dark, still thinking him to be a goat, and kills him. The verdict: a pārājika.	请注意，根据此定义，无需知道活著的众生是人类即可满足感知因素。《义注》中用一个例子来说明这一点：一位比丘白天看到一只山羊躺在某个地方，决定当天晚上回到那个地方杀死这只山羊。然而同时，山羊站了起来，一个人在它的位置上躺了下来。比丘在黑暗中接近这个人，仍然认为他是一只山羊，并杀死了他。结论：《波罗夷》。
Although this judgment may seem strange, there is nothing in the Canon to contradict it. The closest case in the Vinīta-vatthu concerns a bhikkhu who digs a pitfall with the intention that whatever living beings fall into it will perish. The penalty, if an animal dies as a result, is a pācittiya; if a human being, a pārājika. In this case, the intention/perception of killing a living being is broad enough to include a human being, and so fulfills the relevant factors here.	虽然这个判断看起来很奇怪，但《圣典》中没有任何内容与之相矛盾。《Vinīta-vatthu》中最接近的例子涉及一位比丘，他挖了一个陷阱，意图让任何掉入其中的生物都会死亡。若动物因此死亡，则惩罚为《波逸提》；如果是人类，则为《波罗夷》。在这种情况下，杀死生物的意图/感知足够广泛，广泛到足以包括人类，因此满足这里的相关因素。
In discussing this last case, the Commentary notes that if one digs the pitfall but then renounces one’s intention to cause death, one has to completely fill in the pitfall in such a way that it cannot cause injury—even to the extent of causing someone to stumble—if one wants to avoid the penalty coming from any injury the pitfall might cause. If the pitfall is only partially filled in and a person stumbles into it and later dies from his injuries, the bhikkhu incurs the full offense under this rule. The same judgment applies to any other attempt to kill not aimed at a particular victim. For instance, if a bhikkhu harboring this sort of general intention builds a trap but then changes his mind, he has to destroy the trap so thoroughly that it cannot be reassembled. Similarly, when a bhikkhu writes a passage describing the advantages of dying (see below) with the thought that anyone who reads it might decide to commit suicide, if he then changes his mind he has to destroy the writing so thoroughly that it cannot be pieced together. If, instead of writing the passage himself, he simply picks up a pre-existing written passage of this sort and then—with a similar intention—puts it in a place where it might be easily seen, he can avoid any penalty simply by returning the passage to the place where he found it.	在讨论最后一个案例时，《义注》指出，如果一个人挖了陷阱，但随后又放弃了致人死亡的意图，如果想避免因陷阱可能造成的伤害而受到惩罚，必须以一种不会造成伤害的方式完全填满陷阱－甚至不会造成某人绊倒。如果陷阱只被部分填满，而某人跌入其中并随后因受伤而死亡，则根据此戒条，比丘将完全违犯。同样的判决也适用于任何其他不针对特定受害者的杀害企图。例如，如果一位比丘怀有这种普遍意图，建造了一个陷阱，但后来又改变了主意，他必须彻底摧毁这个陷阱，使其无法重新组装起来。同样地，当一位比丘写了一篇描述死亡好处的文章（见下文），并认为任何读过它的人都可能决定自杀时，如果他随后改变主意，他就必须彻底毁掉这篇文章，以至于无法将其拼凑起来。如果他不是自己写这篇文章，而是仅仅拿起已有的此类书面文章，然后以类似的意图将其放在容易看到的地方，他只需将文章放回到他发现它的地方就可以避免任何惩罚。
In discussing the topic of pitfalls, the Commentary also treats the issue of how much of an intention counts when setting up a situation that might cause death. Specifically, it asks whether—while one is digging a hole for another purpose—a passing thought that “this hole could kill anyone who fell into it” would fulfill the factor of intention under this rule, or whether this factor would be fulfilled only if the original purpose for digging the hole was to cause death. The Commentary notes that opinions are divided on this point, but it sides with the latter position.	在讨论陷阱这个主题时，《义注》还讨论了在造成可能导致死亡的情况时意图的重要性的问题。具体来说，它询问－当一个人为了另一个目的而挖洞时－一闪而过的想法「这个洞可能会杀死掉进去的任何人」会满足本戒条下的意图因素，或者这个因素只有在挖这个洞的最初目的是为了致人死亡的情况下才会被满足。《义注》说，在这一点上意见分歧，但它支持后一种立场。
The Vinīta-vatthu contains an unusual case of a bhikkhu who uses a friend as a guinea pig for testing poison. The friend dies, and the bhikkhu incurs only a thullaccaya. The Commentary explains this by distinguishing two types of test: one to see if a particular poison is strong enough to kill a person; the other, to see if a particular person is strong enough to survive the poison. In either of these cases, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya regardless of whether the victim dies. If, though, the bhikkhu gives poison to a person with the desire that it cause that person’s death, he incurs a pārājika if the victim dies, and a thullaccaya if not.	《Vinīta-vatthu》中有一个不寻常的例子，一位比丘用朋友作为试验毒药的小白鼠。朋友死了，比丘只犯《偷兰遮》。《义注》透过区分两种类型的试验来解释这一点：一种是看看某种特定的毒药是否足以杀死一个人；另一种是看某个特定的人是否够强壮能在毒药中幸存下来。在这两种情况下，无论受害者是否死亡，比丘都会犯《偷兰遮》。然而，如果比丘对某人下毒，想要导致该人死亡，那么如果受害者死亡，他就会犯《波罗夷》，如果没有死，他就会犯《偷兰遮》。
The Vinīta-vatthu also includes a case in which bhikkhus, out of compassion for an ill friend, hasten his death and thus incur the full offense under this rule. This shows that impulse and motive are irrelevant in defining the factor of intention here.	《Vinīta-vatthu》还记载了一个例子，比丘们出于对生病朋友的同情，加速了他的死亡，从而完全违犯了本戒条。这表明冲动和动机与定义此处的意图因素无关。

Effort	努力
This factor covers four types of action: taking life, arranging an assassin, describing the advantages of dying, and inciting a person to die.	这个因素涵盖了四种行为：夺取生命、安排行凶者、描述死亡的好处、煽动他人死亡。
a) Taking life	a) 夺取生命
The Vibhaṅga defines taking life as “the cutting off, the ending, of the life faculty; interrupting the continuity.” The Vibhaṅga lists a variety of means by which one might try to do this, which the Commentary divides into four categories:	《经分别》将夺取生命定义为「命根的切断、终止；中断连续。」《经分别》列出了可以尝试做到这一点的各种方法，《义注》将其分为四类：
—One’s own person: hitting with one’s hands or feet; using weapons such as knives, sticks, clubs, etc.; handing poison to a person; giving a pregnant woman medicine that would cause an abortion; moving an ill person.	—自身：用手或脚击打；使用刀、棍、棒等武器；将毒药给人；给孕妇服用会导致流产的药物；移动病人。
—Throwing: hurling a stone, shooting an arrow. At present, shooting a gun or hurling a grenade would come under this category.	—投掷：投掷石头、射箭。目前，开枪或投掷手榴弹都属于这一类。
—Stationary devices: setting a trap, digging a pitfall, placing a weapon in a place where a victim may fall, sit, or lie down on it; placing poison in food, etc. At present, setting out a land mine would come under this category.	—固定装置：设置陷阱、挖陷阱、将武器放置在受害者可能跌倒、坐或躺的地方；在食物中投毒等等。目前，埋设地雷属于此类。
—Commanding: telling another person to commit a murder. This category includes recommendations expressed in the imperative as well as express commands. A few examples:	—命令：命令另一个人去杀人。此类别包括祈使句中表达的建议，和表达命令。举几个例子：
TELLING B TO KILL C. The way in which a bhikkhu is penalized for getting another person to commit a murder—through sign or verbal command—can be inferred from the discussion of accomplices under the preceding rule. The Vibhaṅga here, as under that rule, states that if one’s accomplice does not follow one’s instructions precisely, one is absolved of an offense. In discussing this point, the Commentary goes into great detail concerning the six ways the command to kill can be specified: the object [the person to be killed], the time, the place, the weapon to use, the action by which the weapon is to be used [e.g., “Stab him in the neck”], and the position the victim should be in [sitting, standing, lying down] when the act is to be done. If the instigator specifies any of these things and yet his accomplice does not carry them out to the letter, the instigator does not incur the penalty for the actual murder. For instance, Bhikkhu A tells his student B to kill C while C is sitting in meditation at midnight. The student gets into C’s room at midnight, only to find C asleep in bed, which is where he kills him. Bhikkhu A thus incurs only the thullaccaya for convincing his student to accept the command.	叫 B 去杀 C。比丘因唆使他人去谋杀而受到惩罚的方式－透过示意动作或口头命令－可以从前一个戒条下共犯的讨论中推断出来。根据该戒条，《经分别》在此说，如果共犯没有完全遵循指示，那么就可以免于犯戒。《义注》在论述这一点时，详细阐述了杀人命令的六种措辞方式：对象[要被杀的人]、时间、地点、使用的武器、使用武器的动作[例如，「刺他的脖子」]，以及受害者在进行该行动时应采取的姿势[坐著、站立、躺著]。如果教唆者指定了其中任何一项，但他的共犯没有严格执行，则教唆者不会因实际谋杀而受到惩罚。例如，比丘 A 告诉他的学生 B ，在半夜 C 打坐的时候，杀了 C 。学生半夜进入 C 的房间，发现 C 睡在床上，于是他在那里杀死了他。因此，比丘 A 只因说服他的学生接受命令而犯《偷兰遮》。
As under the preceding rule, the Commentary tries to argue that if B will certainly succeed in killing C in line with A’s command, A incurs a pārājika when giving the command, but again, this opinion does not conform with the Vibhaṅga.	正如前一个戒条一样，《义注》试图争辩说，如果 B 按照 A 的命令肯定会成功杀死 C ，则 A 在发出命令时犯《波罗夷》，但同样地，这种观点不符合《经分别》。
The case of the innocent accomplice—one who does not know that the action he is being told to do will result in death—also seems relevant here, as in the case where a bhikkhu prepares a syringe of poison and tells his accomplice, who thinks the syringe contains medicine, to inject it into a patient. There seems every reason to impose a pārājika on the bhikkhu if the patient then dies, but the accomplice would incur no offense.	无辜共犯的案例－一个不知道他被告知要做的行为会导致死亡的人－似乎也与这里有关，就像一位比丘准备一筒注射器毒药并告诉他的共犯的情况一样，他的共犯认为注射器含有药物，用于将其注射到病人体内。如果病人死了，似乎有充分的理由对比丘施加《波罗夷》，但共犯没有犯戒。
RECOMMENDING MEANS OF ABORTION.	推荐堕胎方式。
RECOMMENDING MEANS OF EUTHANASIA. The Vinīta-vatthu includes a case of a criminal who has just been punished by having his hands and feet cut off. A bhikkhu asks the man’s relatives, “Do you want him to die? Then make him drink buttermilk (§) (!).” The relatives follow the bhikkhu’s recommendation, the man dies, and the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.	推荐安乐死的方法。《Vinīta-vatthu》中记载了一名罪犯刚接受了被砍掉手脚的惩罚。一位比丘问该罪犯的亲戚们：「你们想让他死吗？那就让他喝酪浆(§)(!)。」亲戚们听从了比丘的推荐，这个人死了，比丘犯《波罗夷》。
RECOMMENDING MEANS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Again from the Vinīta-vatthu: A bhikkhu tells an executioner to kill his victims mercifully with a single blow, rather than torturing them. The executioner follows his advice and the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika, for the recommendation to kill mercifully is still a recommendation to kill. According to the Vinīta-vatthu, if the executioner says that he will not follow the bhikkhu’s advice and then kills his victims as he pleases, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The Commentary adds that if the executioner tries to follow the bhikkhu’s advice and yet needs more than one blow to do the job, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya.	建议死刑手段。再次来自《Vinīta-vatthu》：一位比丘告诉刽子手，要仁慈地一击杀死受害者，而不是折磨他们。刽子手听从了他的建议，比丘犯《波罗夷》，因为仁慈地杀人的建议仍然是杀人的建议。根据《Vinīta-vatthu》，如果刽子手说他不会听从比丘的建议，然后随心所欲地杀死受害者，那么比丘不会受到惩罚。《义注》补充说，如果刽子手试图听从比丘的建议，但需要不止一击才能完成这项工作，比丘犯《偷兰遮》。
INDIRECT STATEMENTS. The Canon and Commentary differ as to whether indirect statements that are not imperatives would also qualify as commands or recommendations under this rule. The Commentary maintains that a bhikkhu cannot get around a penalty by phrasing his wish for a murder in more roundabout ways, and gives an example in which a bhikkhu tells people, “In such-and-such a place a bandit is staying. Whoever cuts off his head will receive great honor from the King.” If any of the bhikkhu’s listeners kills the bandit as a result of his instigation, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.	间接陈述。对于非命令性的间接陈述是否也符合本戒条下的命令或建议的问题，《圣典》和《义注》存在分歧。《义注》认为，比丘不能以更迂回的方式表达他想要谋杀的愿望来逃避惩罚，并举了一个比丘告诉人们的例子：「在某某地方，有一个强盗居住。谁砍下他的头，谁就会受到国王的极大荣耀。」《义注》说，如果比丘的任何听众在他的怂恿下杀死了强盗，比丘犯《波罗夷》。
Examples of commands and recommendations in the Canon, however, are all expressed as imperatives: “Do this!” “If you want him to die, do this.” The only examples of indirect statements are those in which a bhikkhu expresses a wish, “O, if only so-and-so were murdered.” According to the Vibhaṅga, this statement incurs a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it is made in public or private, and regardless of whether one knows that anyone else is overhearing it or not. There is no discussion, however, of what one’s intention might be in making the statement, nor of the consequences for the speaker if anyone, inspired by his remark, actually kills the person in question. This implies that the authors of the Vibhaṅga did not regard statements of this sort as fulfilling the factor of effort under this rule. This may seem unduly lenient, but given that a bhikkhu whose express command to kill is followed but not to the letter would also incur only a thullaccaya, this judgment seems consistent with the Vibhaṅga’s pattern of assigning penalties.	然而，《圣典》中的命令和建议的例子都以祈使语气表达：「这样做！」「如果你想让他死，就这么做吧。」间接陈述的唯一例子是那些比丘表达愿望的例子：「噢，如果某某被谋杀就好了。」根据《经分别》，这种陈述会犯《突吉罗》，无论它是公开说还是私下说，也无论一个人是否知道其他人正在无意中听到它。然而，没有讨论发表陈述的意图是什么，也没有讨论如果有人受到他的言论的启发，实际上杀死了有关的人，那么他将面临什么后果。这暗示《经分别》的作者并不认为此类陈述满足了本戒条下的努力因素。这可能显得过于宽松，但考虑到比丘如果遵守明示的杀戮命令，但不严格执行，也只会犯《偷兰遮》，这一判决似乎与《经分别》的惩罚模式一致。
In addition to the four above categories of means of killing, the Commentary includes two of its own:	除了上述四类杀人手段外，《义注》还包括自己的两类：
—Magical formulae: reciting passages that call on malevolent spirits to bring about a person’s death, using voodoo, etc.	—魔咒：背诵召唤恶灵导致人死亡的经文、使用巫术等。
—Psychic powers: using the “evil eye” or other similar innate powers.	—神通：使用「邪眼」或其他类似的先天力量。
The Canon contains a number of passages—MN 56 is one example—describing people who, “developed in mind,” use their powers to kill. The Commentary notes the existence of these passages and of “some teachers” who cite them as proof that meditative powers can be used in this way, but it dismisses the idea on the grounds that meditative powers are skillful and based on pleasant mental states, whereas the act of killing is unskillful and based on painful mental states. The Sub-commentary adds that the powers described in the Canon are actually based on magical formulae. Still, because the success of these formulae depends on a certain level of concentration, it would seem that using one’s powers of concentration to kill would fulfill the factor of effort here.	《圣典》包含许多段落（《中部》56经就是一个例子），描述那些「心智发达」的人，利用自己的力量杀人。《义注》指出了这些段落的存在以及「一些老师」的存在，这些老师引用它们作为冥想力量可以以这种方式使用的证据，但它驳回了这个想法，因为冥想力量是善巧的并且基于愉快的精神状态，而杀戮行为是不善巧的并且基于痛苦的精神状态。《复注》补充说，《圣典》中描述的力量实际上是基于魔咒的。不过，因为这些咒语的成功取决于某种程度的定，所以用定力杀人似乎就满足了这里的努力因素。

b) Arranging an assassin	b) 安排行凶者
As the rule indicates, a bhikkhu may commit an offense under this rule not only by using any of the six above-mentioned means of taking life but also by “searching for an assassin.” The Vibhaṅga explains this phrase in the rule simply with a list of weapons: a sword, a spear, a harpoon (§—BD omits this item), a skewer/stake, a club, a stone, a knife, poison, or a rope. There are two ways of making sense of this list. One is that, because the Pali word for assassin is literally “knife-carrier” (satthahāraka), the Vibhaṅga is taking pains to explain that an assassin might also use other weapons aside from a knife. The other way of interpreting the list, favored by the Commentary, is to view the Vibhaṅga’s list as an attempt to define the word satthahāraka—which, according to the Commentary, is a general term for a murderous weapon. The Commentary then goes on to say that the entire phrase searching for an assassin means setting up a stationary device, as described above. There are two problems with this interpretation, the first being that the word satthahāraka clearly means “assassin” in other parts of the Canon (see, for example, MN 145); the second being that this interpretation makes the phrase entirely superfluous: setting up a stationary device is already covered by another part of the rule. Thus we will follow the first interpretation of the Vibhaṅga’s explanation of the phrase: It is indicating that an assassin may use any weapon at all.	正如戒条所表明的，比丘不仅可以使用上述六种夺取生命方式中的任何一种，而且还可以透过「寻找行凶者」来犯戒。《经分别》仅仅用一张武器清单解释了戒条中的这句话：剑、矛、鱼叉（§—《戒律书》省略了此项）、串子/木桩、棍棒、石头、刀、毒药或绳索。有两种方法可以理解这个清单。一是，因为巴利单字中行凶者的字面意思是「持刀者」（satthahāraka），所以《经分别》煞费苦心地解释行凶者除了刀之外还可能使用其他武器。理解该清单的另一种方式，受到《义注》的青睐，是将《经分别》的清单视为试图定义 satthahāraka 此单字－根据《义注》，此单字是杀人武器的通用术语。《义注》接著说，寻找行凶者整句话意思是设置固定装置，如上所述。这个理解有两个问题，第一个是 satthahāraka 此单字在《圣典》的其他部分中明确表示「行凶者」（参见，例如，《中部》145经）；第二个是，这种理解使该句话完全多余：戒条的另一部分已经涵盖了设置固定装置。因此，我们将遵循《经分别》对这句话的解释的第一个理解：它表明行凶者可以使用任何武器。
The question remains, however, as to how this interpretation is not redundant with commanding under the explanation of the ways of taking life. The answer appears to be this: The word satthahāraka is most commonly used in the Canon in the context of an assisted suicide, in which a person who wants to die but cannot bring himself to commit suicide arranges for someone else, a satthahāraka, to kill him. Thus the inclusion of this phrase in the rule means that a bhikkhu intent on dying who arranges for someone else to do the job for him would incur all the derived offenses leading up to the actual death. At present, this would rule out trying to get a doctor to arrange an assisted suicide for oneself. If one were to help arrange an assisted suicide for someone else, the case would come under commanding, above, as would the case of arranging an assassin for someone else not at that person’s request.	然而，问题仍然在于，在解释夺取生命的方式时，这种理解如何与命令并存而不显得多余。答案似乎是这样的：「satthahāraka」这个单字在《圣典》中最常用于协助自杀，即一个想要死但又无法自杀的人安排其他人（satthahāraka）杀死他。因此，在戒条中包含这句话意味著，一个想要死亡的比丘如果安排其他人为他做这项工作，将会犯下导致实际死亡的所有衍生违犯。目前，这将排除试图让医生为自己安排协助自杀的可能性。如果要帮助他人安排协助自杀，那么该情况属于上述的命令，就像在未经他人请求下，为该人安排行凶者的情况一样。
As we will see below, cases where one tries to kill oneself without arranging for someone else to do the job would not come under this rule. The apparent reason for making a distinction and including the act of “searching for an assassin” to kill oneself under this rule is that, in doing so, one would be asking another person to take on the seriously unskillful kamma of taking a human life.	正如我们将在下面看到的，一个人试图自杀而不安排其他人来完成这项工作的情况不属于这一戒条。做出区分并将「寻找行凶者」自杀行为纳入这项戒条的明显原因是，这样做时，会要求另一个人承担夺人生命的严重不善业。
The Commentary’s most useful comment in this context is its assertion that searching here must mean actually arranging, because the simple act of looking for an assassin without actually finding one would not incur any of the offenses under this rule.	在这种情况下，《义注》中最有用的评论是它断言这里的寻找必须意味著实际安排，因为仅仅只有寻找行凶者而没有实际找到，不会招致本戒条下的任何罪行。

c) Describing the advantages of dying	c) 描述死亡的好处
This, the third type of act covered by this rule, can include berating a sick person (“Why do you keep hanging on to life like this? Don’t you realize what a burden you are to others?”) or simply telling a person of the miseries of life or the bliss of dying and going to heaven in such a way that he/she might feel inspired to commit suicide or simply pine away to death. The Vinīta-vatthu also includes under this type of act any statements that a nurse might make out of compassion to shorten the miseries of an illness by encouraging a patient to let go of life so as not to dawdle in the face of death. Thus, the Commentary notes, a bhikkhu talking to a dying patient should be very circumspect in how he chooses his words, focusing not on how to speed up the dying process but on how to inspire the patient with the following thoughts: “The attainment of the paths and fruitions is not out of the ordinary for a virtuous person. So, having formed no attachment for such things as your dwelling, and establishing mindfulness in the Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha, or the body, you should be heedful in your attention.” The Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 4 contains a number of stories in which bhikkhus comfort a dying bhikkhu by asking him to reflect on what he has attained through the practice, which was apparently a common way of encouraging a dying bhikkhu to focus his thoughts on the best object possible. The suttas also contain advice on how to encourage patients facing death. See, for example, MN 143, SN 36:7, SN 55:54, and AN 6:16. In all of these cases, the advice is aimed not at precipitating death but at inspiring calm and insight.	这是这个戒条涵盖的第三种行为，可以包括斥责病人（「你为什么要这样坚持生命？难道你没有意识到你给别人带来了多大的负担吗？」）或只是告诉一个人，生命的苦难，或死亡并进入天界的幸福，以至于他/她可能会受到启发而自杀或干脆憔悴而死。《Vinīta-vatthu》还包括属于此类的行为：护士出于同情心可能做出的任何陈述，鼓励患者放弃生命，以免在死亡面前拖磨，以缩短疾病的痛苦。因此，《义注》指出，比丘在与临终病人交谈时，应该非常谨慎地选择措辞，不要关注如何加速临终过程，而应关注如何启发病人产生以下想法：「对于有戒行的人来说，道与果的成就并非不寻常的。因此，当你对住所等事物不产生执著，并在佛、法、僧、或身中建立正念时，你应该在你的注意力上保持警觉。」《波罗夷》四的《Vinīta-vatthu》包含了许多故事，在这些故事中，比丘安慰一位临终的比丘，要他反思自己透过修行所获得的成就，这显然是鼓励临终的比丘将念头集中在尽可能好的所缘上的常见方法。经文也包含如何鼓励面临死亡的患者的建议。例如，请参阅《中部》143经、《相应部》36:7经、《相应部》55:54经和《增支部》6:16经。在所有这些情况下，建议的目的不是加速死亡，而是激发冷静和内观。
The Vibhaṅga notes that a statement describing the advantages of dying would fulfill the factor of effort regardless of whether delivered by gesture, by voice, by writing, or by means of a messenger. The same holds true for any statements under the next type of act.	《经分别》指出，描述死亡好处的陈述将满足努力的因素，无论是透过手势、声音、书写或透过使者传达。这同样适用于下一个类型的行为之下的任何陈述。

d) Inciting a person to die	d) 煽动他人死亡
Inciting a person to die, the fourth type of act, covers:	煽动他人死亡是第四种行为，包括：
—Recommending suicide. This includes not only telling a person to commit suicide but also giving advice—whether requested or not—on the best ways to commit the act.	—建议自杀。这不仅包括告诉一个人自杀，还包括无论是否要求，都提供有关实施该行为的最佳方式的建议。
—Telling a person to go to a dangerous place where he/she might die of the dangers.	—告诉一个人去一个危险的地方，在那里他/她可能会因危险而死亡。
—Arranging a terrible sight, sound, etc., to frighten a person to death, or a beautiful, “heart-stirring” one to attract a person who will then pine away to death when it fades.	—安排一种可怕的景象、声音等，把人吓死，或者安排一种美丽的、「令人心旷神怡」的景象、声音等来吸引人，等它消失后，人就会憔悴而死。
Four issues arise in relation to the above ways of killing:	上述杀害方式有四个问题：
Command. Giving a command or recommendation to get another person to perform any of these last three types of action—arranging an assassin, describing the advantages of dying, or inciting another person to die—would also fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.	命令。发出命令或建议让另一个人执行最后三种类型的行动中的任何一种－安排行凶者、描述死亡的好处或煽动另一个人死亡－也符合本戒条下的努力因素。
Inaction. Given the Vibhaṅga’s definition of taking life, we can infer that inaction does not fulfill the factor of effort here, for it does not cut off the life faculty. Thus if a bhikkhu sits idly when seeing a flood sweep a person downstream, he commits no offense—regardless of his feelings about the person’s death—even if the person then drowns. Recommending that another person sit idly as well would also not fulfill the factor of effort here, because the category of command covers only the act of inciting the listener to do any of the four actions that would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.	不作为（见死不救）。根据《经分别》对夺取生命的定义，我们可以推断，不作为在这里并不能满足努力因素，因为它不会切断命根。因此，如果比丘看到洪水把人冲到下游时，无所事事地坐著，那么无论他对这个人的死亡有什么感受，即使这个人随后被淹死，他也不会犯任何戒。建议另一个人也无所事事地坐著也不会满足这里的努力因素，因为命令类别仅涵盖煽动听者执行本戒条下满足努力因素的四种行动中的任何一种。
Medical care and life-support. The same holds true if a bhikkhu decides not to give a patient a treatment—or to discontinue treatment—that might conceivably extend the patient’s life: It does not fulfill the factor of effort, for such acts do not cut off the life faculty. At most they simply allow it to end on its own. The Canon supports this inference by treating such actions not under this rule but under Mv.VIII.26.3-4, where it imposes only a dukkaṭa on the act of refusing to give any treatment at all to an ill bhikkhu, or of discontinuing all care for an ill bhikkhu prior to his recovery or death. This shows that the compilers of the Canon did not regard these acts as cutting off the life faculty. (Mv.VIII.26.8 lists the ideal characteristics of a bhikkhu who tends to the sick, but does not impose a penalty on a bhikkhu who cares for the sick but lacks the ideal qualities; at no point does the Canon impose a required level of care for the sick. The compilers’ refusal to mandate a level of care is wise. If there were a case in which the bhikkhus did not feel that that level of care was appropriate for their patient, they would have only one option: to abandon the patient, so as to incur only a dukkaṭa and not the potentially higher penalty for not measuring up to the mandated care. Thus, instead of protecting the patient, a higher level of mandated care would expose the patient to abandonment.) For this reason, deciding to withhold or discontinue a particular treatment—while still continuing otherwise to care for the patient—would not be grounds for an offense.	医疗护理和生命维持。如果比丘决定不提供患者可以延长患者生命的治疗，或停止治疗，同样的情况也适用：它不满足努力因素，因为这样的行为不会切断命根。最多只是允许生命自行结束。《圣典》支持这一推论，不是根据本戒条而是根据《大品》.八.26.3-4来处理此类行为，其中拒绝对生病的比丘进行任何治疗，或在生病的比丘康复或死亡之前停止对他的所有护理的行为，仅只犯《突吉罗》。由此可见，《圣典》的编纂者并不认为这些行为是切断命根的行为。（《大品》.八.26.8列出了照顾病人的比丘的理想特质，但没有对照顾病人但缺乏理想特质的比丘施加惩罚；《圣典》在任何时候都没有规定病人所需的护理水平。编译者拒绝强制规定护理水平是明智的。如果出现比丘们认为该水平的护理不适合他们的病人的情况，他们只有一个选择：放弃患者，这样只会犯《突吉罗》，而不是因为未达到强制规定的护理水平而受到潜在的更高惩罚。因此，更高水平的强制护理不但不能保护患者，反而会使患者面临被遗弃的风险。）因此，决定拒绝或停止特定治疗－同时仍继续以其他方式护理患者－不会成为犯戒的理由。
If, however, a bhikkhu caring for a patient acts in a way to cut off the patient’s life faculty, that would fulfill the factor of effort here. The Vinīta-vatthu makes this point with a set of cases in which bhikkhus give patients treatments that are actually harmful for the patients. In the instances where the other factors for an offense are present—the bhikkhus mean to kill the patient, and the patient dies—the bhikkhus incur the full offense. In another set of cases, a bhikkhu feeling pity for a friend in severe pain praises the pleasures that await him after death. Again, in the instances where the bhikkhu intends to bring about the patient’s death and the patient dies, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.	然而，如果一位比丘照顾病人时以切断病人命根的方式行事，那就满足了这里的努力因素。《Vinīta-vatthu》透过一组比丘为病人提供实际上对病人有害的治疗的案例来阐述这一点。在有其他犯戒因素的情况下－比丘意图杀死病人，而病人死亡－比丘则完全违犯此戒。在另一组案例中，一位比丘对一位遭受剧烈痛苦的朋友感到怜悯，并称赞死后等待著他的快乐。再者，当比丘意图导致病人死亡而病人死亡时，比丘犯《波罗夷》。
For more on the topic of medical care, see BMC2, Chapter 5.	有关医疗护理主题的更多信息，请参阅《佛教修道准则第二册》第五章。
Shared responsibility. Unlike the Vibhaṅga to the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga here does not explicitly discuss the issue of how to allot penalties when a group of bhikkhus acts together to commit a murder but only one of them delivers the fatal blow. However, the Vinīta-vatthu contains a series of cases in which bhikkhus act as a group to give a treatment to a sick bhikkhu with the aim of ending his life. When the bhikkhu dies, all of them incur a pārājika. In one of the cases the bhikkhu dies from a medical treatment to the nose, in another he dies from eating food. None of the texts discuss whether all the bhikkhus in question took turns giving the fatal dosage, or if only one of the bhikkhus did while the others helped to prepare it. Given that arranging an assassin would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule, it seems reasonable to infer that actively assisting in a murder would also fulfill the factor, even if one does not deliver the fatal blow. From this inference we can conclude that the discussion of shared responsibility under the preceding rule would also apply here.	共同责任。与前一个戒条的《经分别》不同的是，这里的《经分别》并没有明确讨论当一群比丘共同实施谋杀但只有一个人造成致命一击时如何分配惩罚的问题。然而，《Vinīta-vatthu》包含一系列比丘们以团体的方式治疗生病的比丘，并打算结束他的生命的案例。当比丘去世时，他们都犯《波罗夷》。在其中一例中，比丘因鼻子接受治疗而死亡，在另一例中，他则因进食而死亡。没有任何文本讨论是否所有相关的比丘轮流给予致命的剂量，或者是只有一名比丘这样做，而其他比丘则帮助准备。鉴于安排一名行凶者就满足了本戒条下的努力因素，似乎可以合理地推断，即使没有造成致命一击，积极协助谋杀也满足了这一因素。由此推论，我们可以得出结论，前一个戒条中关于共同责任的讨论也适用于此处。

Result	结果
This factor is fulfilled if, as a result of the bhikkhu’s action, the victim dies through the cutting of his/her life-faculty. Because the life-faculty is something that inevitably ends, there is a need to define clearly how far the influences of a bhikkhu’s actions should be traced for him to be considered responsible for a death.	如果比丘的行动导致受害者因命根切断而死亡，那么这一因素就会被满足。因为命根是不可避免会结束的，因此有必要明确定义比丘行动的影响程度，追溯到他被认定为死亡负责。
The Commentary treats this issue by posing two scenarios under its discussion of pitfalls. In the first, an intended victim survives a fall into a pitfall, manages to climb out, but later dies of a disease incurred from the fall. In this case, the Commentary says, the factor of result is fulfilled. The same holds true if the disease goes into remission only to return and take the victim’s life many years later. If complications arise from the disease, however, and the victim dies from a combination of the disease and its complications, then if the original disease was the predominant factor in the death, the bhikkhu would be responsible for the victim’s death; if the complications were the predominant factor, he would not.	《义注》透过在陷阱讨论中提出两种情境来处理这个问题。第一种情况是，一名预定的受害者跌入陷阱后幸存下来，并设法爬出来，但后来死于跌倒引起的疾病。《义注》说，在这种情况下，结果因素就被满足。如果疾病得到缓解，但多年后又复发并夺走受害者的生命，情况也是如此。然而，如果并发症是由疾病引起的，而受害者因疾病及其并发症的结合而死亡，那么如果原本的疾病是死亡的主要因素，比丘就要对受害者的死亡负责；如果并发症是主要因素，他就不必负责。
In the second scenario, an intended victim falls into the pitfall while being chased by thieves but does not die in the fall. Instead, the thieves catch up with him, drag him out of the pitfall, and kill him. In this case, the bhikkhu is still responsible for the victim’s death because his pitfall was instrumental in enabling the thieves to catch and kill the victim.	在第二种情况下，预定的受害者在被小偷追赶时掉入陷阱，但并未死亡。相反，小偷追上了他，将他从陷阱中拖了出来，并杀死了他。在这种情况下，比丘仍然对受害者的死亡负有责任，因为他的陷阱有助于小偷抓住并杀死受害者。
The Commentary also considers a different sort of case related to the factor of result: If a bhikkhu means to cause the death of a group of people, then when any member of the group dies as a result of his efforts, the Commentary says that he incurs a pārājika. In other words, he does not have to fulfill his intention of killing the whole group in order to fulfill the factor of result here.	《义注》也考虑了与结果因素相关的另一种情况：如果一个比丘有意造成一群人的死亡，那么当该群体的任何成员由于他的努力而死亡时，《义注》说，他犯《波罗夷》。也就是说，他并不需要实现杀死整个群体的意图，才能满足这里的结果因素。

Derived penalties	衍生惩罚
The Canon assigns lesser penalties in cases where a bhikkhu tries to cause a person’s death through any of the four means mentioned in this rule and yet the person does not die. If the person experiences pain or injury as a result of the bhikkhu’s efforts, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the bhikkhu’s efforts result in neither pain nor death, the penalty is a dukkaṭa for each separate action involved in the attempt.	如果比丘试图透过本戒条中提到的四种方法中的任何一种导致某人死亡，但这个人并未死亡，则《圣典》会给予较轻的惩罚。如果因为比丘的努力而使人感到疼痛或受伤，惩罚是《偷兰遮》。如果比丘的努力既没有导致痛苦，也没有导致死亡，则对尝试中涉及的每一个单独行为的惩罚是《突吉罗》。
If a bhikkhu intends simply to injure the victim or cause him/her pain, and yet the victim dies as a result of the bhikkhu’s actions, the case is treated under Pc 74.	如果比丘只是意图伤害受害者或给他/她带来痛苦，但受害者却因比丘的行为而死亡，则该情况按《波逸提》七四来处理。
There is an apparent contradiction in the Vinīta-vatthu concerning the penalty for a bhikkhu who tries to kill one person but ends up killing another instead. In one case it says that a bhikkhu who means to kill X but kills Y instead incurs a pārājika. In another case it tells of a bhikkhu who gives medicine to a woman who wants to commit an abortion near the end of a full-term pregnancy. The woman takes the medicine but, instead of the fetus’ aborting, the woman dies and the infant survives. In this case, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya, presumably for the pain he caused the infant.	《Vinīta-vatthu》中关于对试图杀某人但最终却杀了另一个人的比丘的惩罚有一个明显的矛盾。在某个案例中，它说一位比丘想要杀死 X ，但却杀死了 Y ，犯《波罗夷》。在另一个案例中，讲述了一位比丘为想要在完全足月妊娠即将结束时堕胎的妇女提供药物。妇女服用了药物，但胎儿并没有流产，而是妇女死亡，胎儿幸存。在这种情况下，比丘犯《偷兰遮》，大概是因为他带给胎儿的痛苦。
The Commentary tries to resolve this contradiction with an illustration: A bhikkhu with a grudge against A decides to ambush him. He sees B coming down the road and, mistaking him for A, shoots him dead on the spot. Because his intention was to kill the person he was aiming at, he incurs a pārājika. We can call this a case of mistaken identity. In cases of this sort, whether the “right” or the “wrong” person dies is of no consequence to the offense.	《义注》试图用一个例子来解决这个矛盾：一位对 A 怀有怨恨的比丘决定伏击他。他看到 B 沿著路过来，误认为他是 A ，当场开枪打死了他。因为他的意图是杀死他所瞄准的人，所以他犯《波罗夷》。我们可以称之为身份误认的情况。在这种情况下，无论是「正确」的人还是「错误」的人死亡，对于犯戒都没有影响。
If, however, the bhikkhu is a poor shot, takes aim at B but misses him, and inadvertently kills C instead, he does not incur a pārājika, for he did not intend to kill C during any part of his action. His only penalties are the dukkaṭas he incurs while preparing for B’s murder.	然而，如果比丘射击技术不佳，瞄准 B 但没有击中他，并且无意中杀死了 C ，那么他就不会犯《波罗夷》，因为他在行动的任何部分都无意杀死 C 。他唯一受到的惩罚是在准备谋杀 B 时犯《突吉罗》。

Special cases	特别案例
The Vinīta-vatthu includes three special cases that touch on this rule but inspired the Buddha to formulate separate rules to deal specifically with them:	《Vinīta-vatthu》包括三个特殊情况，它们涉及到本戒条，但启发佛陀制定单独的戒条来专门处理它们：
1) A bhikkhu, sitting down hard in a chair without first checking it carefully, kills a child lying in the chair and covered with a blanket—no penalty for the death, but a dukkaṭa for sitting down without first checking carefully.	1）一位比丘，在没有仔细检查的情况下重重地坐在椅子上，杀死了一个躺在椅子里并盖著毯子的孩子－并没有因该死亡事故受到惩罚，但由于没有先仔细检查而坐下而犯《突吉罗》。
2) Some group-of-six bhikkhus, for the fun of it, throw a rock from a mountaintop and accidentally kill a young cowherd standing below—again, no penalty for the death, but a dukkaṭa for throwing a rock in fun. (The Commentary states that rock here also covers sticks, bricks, and other similar objects; and that throwing also includes rolling. It also states that if a bhikkhu has a valid reason for throwing or rolling a rock not in fun—for example, he is engaged in construction work and rolls a piece of rock to someone else on the job; he is eating his meal and throws a piece of wood to chase away crows or dogs—he incurs no offense.)	2）某六群比丘为了好玩，从山顶扔石头，不小心杀死了站在山下的一位年轻牧牛者－同样，并没有因该死亡事故受到惩罚，但因为好玩扔石头而犯《突吉罗》。（《义注》指出，这里的石头也包括棍棒、砖块和其他类似的物体；投掷也包括滚动。它还指出，如果比丘有正当理由投掷或滚动石头而非除为了好玩－例如，他从事建筑工作，滚动石头给正在工作的其他人；他正在吃饭，扔一块木头来赶走乌鸦或狗－他不犯戒。）
3) A bhikkhu, feeling oppressed and discontented, throws himself over a cliff. Instead of dying, he lands on and kills a hapless basket-maker standing at the foot of the cliff—again, no offense for the death, but a dukkaṭa for throwing oneself from a high place. This rule shows that attempts to kill oneself—aside from searching for an assassin, as mentioned above—would not come under the main rule here, because the bhikkhu would have apparently felt pain when landing on the basket-maker, and yet the penalty is only a dukkaṭa. If the case had been treated under the main rule, he would have been penalized with a thullaccaya instead.	3）一位比丘感到压抑和不满，跳崖自杀。他没有死，而是压死了站在悬崖脚下的一个倒霉的编篮人－同样，并没有因该死亡事故受到惩罚，但因为从高处跳下自杀而犯《突吉罗》。这条戒条表明，除了如上所述寻找行凶者之外，企图自杀不属于这里的主要戒条，因为比丘压在编篮人身上时显然会感到疼痛，但惩罚只是《突吉罗》。如果按照主要戒条处理此案，他会犯《偷兰遮》。
The Commentary extrapolates from this case to apply the dukkaṭa to all attempts at suicide, including even the decision not to take food when motivated by a desire to die. However, it then runs into the question of how far this penalty applies to a bhikkhu who is ill. Its verdict: As long as medicine and attendants are available to him, the penalty would still apply. But then it lists two cases where the penalty would not apply: (a) A bhikkhu is suffering from a long and serious illness, and the attendant bhikkhus are fed up with caring for him, thinking, “When will we be free of this sick one?” If the bhikkhu reflects that, even with medical care, his body won’t last and that the bhikkhus are being put to difficulties, he incurs no penalty in refusing food and medicine. (b) A bhikkhu—reflecting that his illness is harsh, the forces of life are running out, and yet the noble attainments appear to be within his reach—may refuse food and medicine without penalty.	《义注》从这个案例中推断，将《突吉罗》应用于所有自杀企图，甚至包括出于求死的动机而决定不吃东西。然而，接下来的问题是，这种惩罚对于生病的比丘适用到什么程度。其判决是：只要他有药物和护理人员，惩罚仍然适用。但随后它列出了两种不适用惩罚的情况： (a) 一位比丘患有长期而严重的疾病，护理的比丘厌倦了照顾他，心想：「我们什么时候才能摆脱这个病人？」如果比丘反思，即使有医疗护理，他的身体也无法长久，而比丘们正面临困难，那么他不会因拒绝食物和药物而受到惩罚。 (b) 比丘－反思他的病情很严重，生命力正在耗尽，且圣果看起来是在他力所能及的范围内－可以拒绝食物和药物，而不受惩罚。
The Commentary’s deliberations here show how difficult it is to legislate in this area, and there are reasons to question the way it applies the Great Standards here. Case (b) is apparently derived from SN 4:23, where Ven. Godhika takes his life and gains arahantship just moments before death; and from SN 35:87, where the Buddha says that one who puts down this body without taking up another body dies blamelessly. However, in arriving at its verdict in this case, the Commentary has to add the factors of motivation and perception to the equation, factors that are absent from the rule on which the judgment is based. It also leaves unanswered the question of how harsh the disease has to be, and how near the anticipated attainments, to qualify for this exemption.	《义注》中的审议显示了在这一领域制定律法是多么困难，并且有理由质疑其在此应用《四大教示》的方式。情况 (b) 显然源自《相应部》4:23经，其中瞿提迦尊者在临终前自杀并证得阿罗汉果。从《相应部》35:87经，佛陀说，放下此身而不取他身的人，死时无可指责。然而，在对本情况做出判决时，《义注》必须将动机和感知添加到因素中，而这些因素是判决所依据的戒条中所没有的。它也没有回答这样的问题：疾病必须有多严重，以及预期的成就有多接近，才有资格获得这种豁免。
This same holds true for case (a), which entails even more dubious reasoning. The Commentary’s judgment here has no clear precedent in the Canon; there is no clear line for deciding exactly how bad the illness and how fed up the attendants have to be for this case to apply; and why should the feelings of other people determine when it is or is not allowable to refuse food?	对于情况（a）也是如此，它的推理更加暧昧可疑。《义注》此处的判断在《圣典》中没有明确的先例；对于这种情况的适用，没有明确的界线来确定病情的严重程度以及护理人员必须有多厌倦；而且为什么要根据别人的感受来决定何时允许或不允许拒绝食物？
It is worth noting that the origin story to the original rule here gave the Buddha the opportunity, had he wanted it, to formulate a general rule against attempted suicides, but he chose not to. He later formulated this subsidiary rule only when a bhikkhu attempted a suicide in a way that endangered the life and safety of another person. Thus a more appropriate way of applying the Great Standards to this subsidiary rule would be to extend it only to cases of that sort: where a bhikkhu’s attempts at suicide would bring danger to another person’s life and limb.	值得注意的是，这里原始戒条的起源故事给了佛陀机会，如果他愿意的话，可以制定禁止试图自杀的一般戒条，但他选择不这样做。后来，只有当比丘试图以会危害他人生命和安全的方式自杀时，他才制定了这条辅助戒条。因此，将《四大教示》应用于这条辅助戒条的一个更合适的方法是仅将其扩展到此类情况：比丘的试图自杀会给另一个人的生命和肢体带来危险。
As for ways of attempting suicide that do not endanger others, it seems better to follow the Buddha’s wisdom in not legislating about this issue at all, and to treat it as a matter of Dhamma rather than Vinaya. In other words, one should keep in mind his comment in SN 35:87 that the only blameless death is an arahant’s. If, lacking that attainment, one chooses to refuse food when ill to speed up one’s death, one should be heedful of the risks that death and rebirth can involve.	至于试图自杀而不危及他人的方式，似乎最好遵循佛陀的智慧，根本不对此议题制定律法，并将其视为「法」而不是「律」的问题。换句话说，人们应该记住他在《相应部》35:87经中的评论，即唯一无可指责的死亡是阿罗汉的死亡。如果缺乏这种成就，在生病时选择拒绝食物以加速死亡，则应该警惕死亡和重生可能涉及的风险。

Non-offenses	不犯
As stated above, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who kills a person unintentionally, not knowing, or not aiming at death.	如上所述，比丘无意、不知、或不以死亡为目的而杀死人，并无犯戒。
As for the standard exemptions, the Thai edition lists all four under this rule: a bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, and the first offenders (in this case, some group-of-six bhikkhus who, in a follow-up to the origin story, described the advantages of death to a man with a beautiful wife, in hopes that he would commit suicide so that she could be theirs; he did commit suicide, but she denounced them). Other editions of the Canon omit exemptions for a bhikkhu possessed by spirits or delirious with pain. The Commentary refers to the standard exemptions as a set simply with the word, “insane, etc.” There is reason to believe that if these two exemptions were missing in the time of the Commentary, it would have noted their absence.	至于标准豁免，泰文版列出了本戒条下的所有四种：精神错乱，被灵体附身，因疼痛而狂乱，以及第一个犯此戒的比丘（在这个案例中，某六群比丘，他们在起源故事的后续，向一个拥有美丽妻子的男人描述了死亡的好处，希望他自杀，这样她就可以属于他们；他确实自杀了，但她谴责了他们）。其他版本的《圣典》省略了对被灵体附身，或因痛苦而狂乱的比丘的豁免。《义注》将标准豁免视为一组，仅用“精神错乱等”一词来提及。有理由相信，如果在《义注》的时代缺少这两项豁免，那么它会指出它们不存在。
Summary: Intentionally bringing about the death of a human being, even if it is still an embryo—whether by killing the person, arranging for an assassin to kill the person, inciting the person to die, or describing the advantages of death—is a pārājika offense.	摘要：故意造成一个人的死亡，即使它还是一个胚胎－无论是杀人、安排行凶者杀人、煽动人去死，还是描述死亡的好处－都是《波罗夷》罪。

* * *

4	四
Should any bhikkhu, without direct knowledge, claim a superior human state, a truly noble knowledge and vision, as present in himself, saying, “Thus do I know; thus do I see,” such that regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, he—being remorseful and desirous of purification—might say, “Friends, not knowing, I said I know; not seeing, I said I see—vainly, falsely, idly,” unless it was from over-estimation, he also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.	如果任何比丘在没有证知的情况下，宣称自己具有上人法、真正圣智见，他说：「我如是知；我如是见，」以至于无论以后是否受到盘问，他在悔恨欲清净的情况下，可能会说：「朋友们，不知，我说我知；不见，我说我见。──徒劳、虚假、无益。」除非是因为高估，否则也是波罗夷，不共住。
All conscious lies are forbidden by the first pācittiya rule, but knowingly to make a false claim to a superior human state is one of the most heinous lies a bhikkhu can tell, so here it receives its own rule and the heaviest possible penalty.	所有有意识的谎言都是第一条《波逸提》戒条所禁止的，但故意谎称有上人法是比丘所能说出的最令人发指的谎言之一，因此在这里它有自己的戒条和最重的可能惩罚。
The seriousness with which the Buddha regarded a breach of this training rule is indicated by his statements to the original instigators:	佛陀对违反这项学处的行为的严肃态度可以从他对最初犯戒者的陈述中看出：
“You worthless men, how can you for the sake of your stomachs speak praise of one another’s superior human states to householders? It would be better for you that your bellies be slashed open with a sharp butcher’s knife than that you should for the sake of your stomachs speak praise of one another’s superior human states to householders. Why is that? For that reason you would undergo death or death-like suffering, but you would not on that account, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. But for this reason you would, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell…. Bhikkhus, in this world with its devas, māras, and brahmās, its generations with brahmans and contemplatives, princes and men, this is the ultimate great thief: he who claims an unfactual, non-existent superior human state. Why is that? You have consumed the nation’s almsfood through theft.”	「你们这些无用之人，怎能为了自己的口腹，对诸居士互相赞叹上人法呢？与其为了自己的口腹而对诸居士互相赞叹上人法，不如用一把锋利的屠刀把自己的肚子剖开。所以者何？因彼，你会经历死亡或类死的痛苦，但你不会因此而在身坏命终后，堕入恶处、恶趣、恶生、地狱。但以是故，身坏命终后，堕于恶处、恶趣、恶生、地狱……。诸比丘们，在这个有天神、魔罗、梵天的世界，以及有婆罗门和沙门、王子和人类的世间，这是最大之贼：他声称有一个不真实的、不存在的上人法。所以者何？你们通过盗窃食国家施与之食故。」
The full offense under this rule has four factors.	本戒条下的完整犯戒有四个因素。
1) Object: a superior human state.	1）对象：上人法。
Perception: One perceives it as not present in oneself.	2）感知：知道它不存在于自己身上。
Effort: One addresses a human being, mentioning that state in connection with oneself—either the state as within oneself, or oneself as in the state.	3）努力：对一个人说话，提到与自己有关的状态－若不是自己内在的状态，就是状态中的自己。
4) Intention: with the intent to misrepresent the truth, motivated by an evil desire.	4）意图：出于邪恶的欲望，意图扭曲事实。
The commentaries add a fifth factor—result—saying that one’s listener must understand what one is saying for there to be the full offense, but as we will see below, this factor appears to be based on a misreading of the Vibhaṅga.	注释加入了第五个因素－结果－说听者必须理解在说什么，才能构成完整的犯戒，但正如我们将在下面看到的，这个因素看起来是基于对《经分别》的误读。

Object	对象
The Vibhaṅga lists many superior human states, defining them as follows:	《经分别》列出了许多上人法，定义如下：
meditative absorption (jhāna): the four jhānas;	禅定（jhāna）：四种禅那；
emancipation (vimokkha): the emptiness (suññatā) emancipation, the theme-less (animitta) emancipation, and the non-directed (appaṇihita) emancipation;	解脱（vimokkha）：空（suññatā）解脱、无相（animitta）解脱、无愿（appaṇihita）解脱；
concentration (samādhi): the emptiness concentration, the theme-less concentration, and the non-directed concentration;	三昧（samādhi）：空三昧、无相三昧、无所有三昧；
meditative attainments (samāpatti): the emptiness attainment, the theme-less attainment, and the non-directed attainment;	正受（samāpatti）：空正受、无相正受、无所有正受；
knowledge-and-vision (ñāṇa-dassanā): knowledge of past lives, knowledge of the passing away and arising of beings, and knowledge of the ending of mental effluents (āsava);	智见（nāṇa-dassanā）：宿住随念智、有情死生智、漏尽智（āsava）；
path-development (magga-bhāvanā): the 37 Wings to Awakening (bodhipakkhiya-dhamma)—the four establishings of mindfulness, the four right exertions, the four bases of power, the five faculties, the five strengths, the seven factors for Awakening, and the noble eightfold path;	修道（magga-bhāvanā）：三十七菩提分法（bodhipakkhiya-dhamma）－四念处、四正勤、四神足、五根、五力、七觉支、及八正道；
the realization of the noble fruits (phala-sacchikiriya): the fruit of stream-entry, the fruit of once-returning, the fruit of non-returning, and the fruit of arahantship;	证得圣果（phala-sacchikiriya）：入流果、一来果、不还果、阿罗汉果；
the abandoning of defilements (kilesappahāna): the abandoning of passion, aversion, and delusion;	断烦恼（kilesappahāna）：断贪、瞋、痴；
the mind’s freedom from hindrance (vinīvaraṇatā cittassa): the mind unhindered by passion, aversion, and delusion; and	心离盖（vinīvaraṇatā cittassa）：心不受贪、瞋、痴的阻碍；和
delight in an empty dwelling (suññāgāre abhirati): the delight in an empty dwelling stemming from the four jhānas.	乐静处（suññāgāre abhirati）：从四种禅那而生的乐静处。
The Commentary classifies these states into two broad categories: mahaggata dhamma—“enlarged” or “expanded” states—related to the practice of meditative absorption; and lokuttara dhamma—transcendent states—related to the absolute eradication of the mental fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth.	《义注》将这些状态分为两大类：mahaggata dhamma－「广大的」或「扩展的」状态－与禅那修行有关；和lokuttara dhamma－出世间的状态－与彻底根除将心束缚于轮回的结使有关。
a. Mahaggata dhamma	广大法
The discourses describe the four jhānas as follows:	经文对四种禅那的描述如下：
“There is the case where a bhikkhu—quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities—enters and remains in the first jhāna: rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought and evaluation. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion….	「有一种情况，一位比丘－离欲、离不善法－进入并安住于初禅：由远离而生的喜与乐，伴随著定向思惟（寻，觉）和评估（伺，观）。他用远离所产生的喜和乐来渗透、遍及、布满、充满这个身体……。
“And furthermore, with the stilling of directed thoughts and evaluations, he enters and remains in the second jhāna: rapture and pleasure born of concentration, unity of awareness free from directed thought and evaluation—internal assurance. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of concentration….	「再者，随著定向思惟和评估的止息，他进入并安住于二禅：由定而生的喜与乐、内心安住一境，没有定向思惟和评估－内在的确信。他用定而生的喜和乐渗透、遍及、布满、充满这个身体……。
“And furthermore, with the fading of rapture, he remains equanimous, mindful, and alert, and senses pleasure with the body. He enters and remains in the third jhāna, and of him the noble ones declare, ‘Equanimous and mindful, he has a pleasant abiding.’ He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the pleasure divested of rapture….	「再者，随著喜的消退，他保持舍、正念、警觉，并感受身体的快乐。他进入并安住于三禅，圣者们对他宣称：「他有舍心和正念，他安住在乐之中。」他以离喜的乐来渗透、遍及、布满、充满这个身体……。
“And furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain—as with the earlier disappearance of elation and distress—he enters and remains in the fourth jhāna: purity of equanimity and mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. He sits permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness, so that nothing of his entire body is unpervaded by pure, bright awareness.”—DN 2; MN 119; AN 5:28	「再者，随著乐与苦的舍弃——正如先前喜悦与苦恼的消失一样——他进入并安住于四禅：舍与正念的清净，无乐亦无苦。他以清净、光明的觉知遍及全身而坐，因此他整个身体的一切都被清净、光明的觉知所遍及。」—《长部》2经；《中部》119经；《增支部》5:28经
The Commentary notes that four formless states—what the Canon calls “formlessnesses beyond form,” and the Commentary calls “formless jhānas”—are based on the fourth jhāna, and so would count as superior human states as well. The Canon describes them as follows:	《义注》指出，四种无色境界——《圣典》称之为「超越色之无色」，《义注》称之为「无色禅那」——是基于四禅，因此也算上人法。《圣典》对它们的描述如下：
“With the complete transcending of perceptions of form, and the passing away of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space….	「随著对色想的彻底超越，以及有对想的消失，以及不作意种种想，（感知）「空无边」，进入并安住于空无边处……。
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness….	「随著彻底超越空无边处，（感知）「识无边」，进入并安住于识无边处…。
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness….	「随著彻底超越识无边处，（感知）「无所有」，进入并安住于无所有处…。
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.”—DN 15	「随著彻底超越无所有处，进入并安住于非想非非想处。」——《长部》15经
A fifth state, the cessation of perception and feeling, is reached by transcending the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, and all who reach it become either non-returners or arahants. The Commentary argues that this state does not count as a superior human state, on the technical grounds that it is neither worldly (lokiya) nor transcendent, but nothing in the Canon indicates that a superior human state has to be clearly one or the other. Using the Commentary’s own reasoning with regard to the four formless states—that they are based on the fourth jhāna—the same argument can be used to include the cessation of perception and feeling as a superior human state as well.	第五种境界，是想与受的灭尽，是超越非想非非想处而达到的，所有达到此境界的人，要么成为不来者，要么成为阿罗汉。《义注》认为，这种境界不算是上人法，因为它既不是世间的（lokiya）也不是超越的，但《圣典》中没有任何内容表明上人法必须明确是其中之一。使用《义注》本身关于四种无色境界的推理──它们是基于第四禅──同样的论点也可以用来包括作为上人法的想和受的灭尽。
From the inclusion of the three knowledges in the Vibhaṅga’s list, the Commentary takes up the issue of whether the remaining five of the eight knowledges should be included as well. The three knowledges, as described in DN 2, are:	《义注》从将三明列入《经分别》列表开始，就讨论了是否应该将八种智见中的其余五种也包括在内的问题。《长部》2经中所描述的三明是：
Recollection of past lives (pubbenivāsānusati-ñāṇa): “He recollects his manifold past lives, i.e., one birth, two births, three births, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, one hundred, one thousand, one hundred thousand, many eons of cosmic contraction, many eons of cosmic expansion, many eons of cosmic contraction and expansion, (recollecting,) ‘There I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance. Such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such the end of my life. Passing away from that state, I re-arose there. There too I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance. Such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such the end of my life. Passing away from that state, I re-arose here.’ Thus he recollects his manifold past lives in their modes and details.”	宿住随念智（pubbenivāsānusati-ñāṇa）：「随念彼于宿世之种种住处，犹如一生、二生、三生、四生、五生、十生、二十生、三十生、四十生、五十生、百生、千生、十万生、几坏劫、几成劫、几成坏劫：『于彼处，我有如是名、生于如是种族、如是阶级、取如是食、享受如是苦乐、有如是寿量。我由其处死而生于他处，于此我有如是名、生如是种族、如是之阶级、取如是食、享受如是苦乐、有如是寿量。而我由彼处殁，生来此处。』具如是形相、境遇，随念种种宿世之住处。」
Knowledge of the passing away and reappearing of beings (cutūpapāta-ñāṇa): “He sees—by means of the divine eye, purified and surpassing the human—beings passing away and re-appearing, and he discerns how they are inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate in accordance with their kamma: ‘These beings—who were endowed with bad conduct of body, speech, and mind, who reviled the noble ones, who held wrong views and undertook actions under the influence of wrong views—with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared in a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. But these beings—who were endowed with good conduct of body, speech, and mind, who did not revile the noble ones, who held right views and undertook actions under the influence of right views—with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared in a good destination, a heavenly world.’ Thus—by means of the divine eye, purified and surpassing the human—he sees beings passing away and re-appearing, and he discerns how they are inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate in accordance with their kamma.”	有情死生智（cutūpapāta-ñāṇa）：「彼以超越人界之天眼，观察众生，见众生之死而又生；证知众生应其所为之业，〔而有〕贵贱、美丑、幸福、不幸福。即：『诸贤！此等众生具身、语、意之恶业，诽谤圣者，以怀邪见，得邪见业；彼等于身坏死后，生于恶生、恶趣、地狱。诸贤！此等众生具身、语、意之善业，不诽谤圣者，以怀正见，得正见业；彼等身坏死后，生于善趣、天界。』如是，彼以清净超越人界之天眼，观察众生，见众生死而又生；证知众生应其所为之业，〔而有〕贵贱、美丑、幸福、不幸福。」
Knowledge of the ending of mental effluents (āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa): “He discerns, as it has actually come to be, that ‘This is stress…. This is the origination of stress…. This is the cessation of stress…. This is the way leading to the cessation of stress…. These are (mental) effluents…. This is the origination of effluents…. This is the cessation of effluents…. This is the way leading to the cessation of effluents.’ His heart, thus knowing, thus seeing, is released from the effluent of sensuality, the effluent of becoming, the effluent of ignorance. With release, there is the knowledge, ‘Released.’ He discerns that ‘Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.’”	漏尽智（āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa）：「彼如实证知：『此是苦』，如实证知：『此是苦之集』，如实证知：『此是苦之灭』，如实证知：『此是到达苦灭之道』。如实证知：『此是漏之灭』，如实证知：『此是到达漏灭之道』。如是知、如是见故，其心解脱欲漏、解脱有漏、解脱无明漏，而『于解脱，解脱』之智慧生，证知：『生已尽，梵行已立，所作已办，不受后有。』」
The first two of these knowledges, even though they comprised part of the Buddha’s Awakening, are mundane, in that people may develop them without necessarily attaining any of the transcendent paths and fruitions. Thus they belong under the category of mahaggata dhamma, as they are based on the attainment of jhāna either in this or in a previous life. The third knowledge, however—because it describes the arising of the transcendent paths and fruitions—comes under the category of lokuttara dhamma, and is the only one of the eight knowledges to do so.	前两种智见，尽管它们是佛陀觉醒的一部分，但它们是世间的，因为人们可以修习它们，而不必获得任何超越的道果。因此，它们属于广大法的范畴，因为它们是基于今生或前世证得禅那。然而，第三种智见──因为它描述了超越的道果的生起──属于出世间法的范畴，并且是八种智见中唯一具有这种性质。
DN 2 describes the remaining five knowledges as:	《长部》2经将其余五种智见描述为：
Insight knowledge (vipassanā-ñāṇa): “He discerns: ‘This body of mine is endowed with form, composed of the four primary elements, born from mother and father, nourished with rice and porridge, subject to inconstancy, rubbing, pressing, dissolution, and dispersion. And this consciousness of mine is supported here and bound up here.’”	观智（vipassanā-ñāṇa）：「彼如次知：『我此身是由色所成、四大种所成、父母之所生，饭粥所长养者，是无常、破坏、粉碎、断绝、坏灭之法。我之识与此相关连、依此而存在者。』」
Mind-made body (manomayiddhi): “From this body he creates another body, endowed with form, made of the mind, complete in all its parts, not inferior in its faculties, just as if a man were to draw a reed from its sheath.”	意所成身（manomayiddhi）：「彼由其色身，化作意所成，而有一切〔大〕肢小肢及不异其自己之身，犹如有人，由文奢草，取拔其茎。」
Supranormal powers (iddhividhī): “He wields manifold supranormal powers. Having been one he becomes many; having been many he becomes one. He appears. He vanishes. He goes unimpeded through walls, ramparts, and mountains as if through space. He dives in and out of the earth as if it were water. He walks on water without sinking as if it were dry land. Sitting cross-legged he flies through the air like a winged bird. With his hand he touches and strokes even the sun and moon, so mighty and powerful. He exercises influence with his body even as far as the Brahmā worlds.”	种种神变（iddhividhī）：「彼证得种种神变。一身而〔化为〕多身，多身而〔合为〕一身，或现身、或隐身；通过壁、透过墙，穿过山无有障碍，犹如于空中；出没于大地，犹如于水；行于水上不沈，犹如于地上；趺坐、经行于空中，犹如有翼之鸟；有如是大威德，能以手扪摸日月，以身到达梵天界。」
Clairaudience (dibba-sota): “He hears—by means of the divine ear-property, purified and surpassing the human—both kinds of sounds: divine and human, whether near or far.”	天耳通（dibba-sota）：「彼清净超越人间〔耳界〕，以天耳界，闻人天两界远近双方之音声。」
Mind-reading (cetopariya-ñāṇa): “He knows the awareness of other beings, other individuals, having encompassed it with his own awareness. He discerns a mind with passion as a mind with passion, and a mind without passion as a mind without passion (etc.).”	他心通（cetopariya-ñāṇa）：「以自己之心，彻〔见〕其他众生及他人之心。如次证知之：证知有贪欲心，为有贪欲心。证知离贪欲心，为离贪欲心（等等）。」
The Commentary argues that all of these knowledges except vipassanā-ñāṇa count as superior human states. It does not explain why it excludes vipassanā-ñāṇa from the list, although it is probably following the belief current in its time, that vipassanā-ñāṇa does not require jhāna as a basis, even though the Canon clearly lists this ñāṇa—as distinct from vipassanā as a more general mental quality of clear-seeing—as dependent on jhāna.	《义注》认为，除了观智之外，所有这些智见都算是上人法。它并没有解释为什么它将观智从列表中排除，尽管它可能遵循当时流行的信念，即观智不需要禅那作为基础，尽管《圣典》明确列出了此智——与毘婆舍那不同，毘婆舍那是一种更普遍的明见的心理品质——依赖于禅那。
There are other occult abilities that are not based on jhāna and for this reason do not count as mahaggata dhamma: such things as divination, giving protective charms, casting malevolent spells, psychic healing, practicing as a medium, etc. The discourses list these and other similar activities as tiracchāna-vijjā, animal knowledge, which—as the name implies—is far removed from superior human states. (See BMC2, Chapter 10.)	还有其他一些不以禅那为基础的神秘能力，因此不算作广大法：如占卜、给予护身符、施放恶意咒语、通灵治疗、修行媒介等。经文列出了这些和其他类似的行为，称为 tiracchāna-vijjā （畜生明），顾名思义，与上人法相去甚远。（参见《佛教修道准则第二册》第十章。）

b. Lokuttara dhamma	b. 出世间法
Lokuttara dhamma in its fullest sense, refers to the series of mental states, called paths and fruitions, in which the fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth are eradicated; and to the ultimate state of nibbāna, or liberation.	出世间法的最完整的意义是指一系列的心境界，称为道果，其中束缚心于轮回的结使被根除；并达到涅槃（或称解脱）的终极境界。
The paths and fruitions occur in four pairs. In the first pair, the path to and fruition of stream-entry, three fetters are abandoned: self-identity views (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), uncertainty (vicikicchā), and grasping at habits and practices (silabbata-parāmāsa). In the second pair—the path to and fruition of once-returning—passion, aversion, and delusion are weakened, but no additional fetters are cut. In the third pair, the path to and fruition of non-returning, two additional fetters are abandoned: sensual passion (kāma-rāga) and irritation (paṭigha); and in the fourth pair, the path to and fruition of arahantship, five: rūpa-rāga—passion for forms (e.g., the objects of rūpa jhāna); arūpa-rāga—passion for formless phenomena (e.g., the objects of arūpa jhāna); māna—conceit; uddhacca—restlessness; and avijjā—ignorance. With the cutting of this last set of fetters, all bonds with the cycle of rebirth are cut for good, and the mind attains nibbāna.	道果成四对出现。在第一对，即入流道果中，三种结使被断除：身见（sakkāya-diṭṭhi）、疑（vicikicchā）以及戒禁取（silabbata-parāmāsa）。在第二对──一来道果──中，贪、瞋、痴被削弱，但没有额外的结使被断除。在第三对，即不还道果中，另外两个结使被断除：欲贪（kāma-rāga）和瞋恚（paṭigha）；第四对是阿罗汉道果，其中有五个：rūpa-rāga－色贪（例如色界禅那所缘）；arūpa-rāga－无色贪（例如无色界禅那所缘）；māna－慢；uddhacca－掉举；和avijjā－无明。随著这最后一组结使的断除，所有与轮回的束缚都被永久断除，心证得涅槃。
The term nibbāna literally means extinguishing, as of a fire. The commentarial explanation of this term that best fits the way it is used in the Canon is found at Vism.VIII,247, where Buddhaghosa derives it etymologically from nir, a negative prefix, and vāna, binding: thus, unbinding or liberation. In the physics of the Buddha’s time, fire as it burned was said to be in a state of agitation, dependence, attachment, and entrapment—both clinging to and being trapped by its sustenance. Extinguished, it was said to become calm, independent, and unattached. It let go of its sustenance and was released. In the mind’s extinguishing, or unbinding, a parallel change occurs.	涅槃 nibbāna 一词的字面意思是熄灭，如火一样。这个术语最适合它在《圣典》中的使用方式的注释解释，可以在《清净道论》.八,247 中找到，其中佛音在词源学上从 nir （否定前缀）和 vāna （束缚）衍生出这个术语：因此，意思是解除束缚或解脱。在佛陀时代的物理学中，火在燃烧时被认为处于一种激动、依赖、执著和束缚的状态——既执著于它的维持物，又被它的维持物所束缚。据说，熄灭后，它会变得平静、独立、不执著。它放下了它的维持物并被释放了。当心熄灭，或解脱时，会发生相似的变化。
Nibbāna is one; the paths and their fruitions, eight. Thus there are nine lokuttara dhammas. Although the Vibhaṅga explicitly mentions only the four transcendent fruitions in its list of superior human states, the Commentary argues that the remaining five implicitly qualify as well. There is support for the Commentary’s argument in that the Vibhaṅga includes the noble eightfold path in its list, and SN 55:5 equates this path with the stream.	涅槃是一种；道及其果，八种。因此，有九种出世间法。虽然《经分别》在其上人法的列表中只明确提到了四种出世间果，但《义注》认为其余五种也隐含地符合资格。《义注》的论点得到了支持，因为《经分别》在其列表中包括了八圣道，而《相应部》55:5经将这条道等同于流。
The Commentary classifies the three types of concentration and emancipation in the Vibhaṅga’s list—emptiness, theme-less, and non-directed—as equivalent to the transcendent paths, and the three corresponding attainments as transcendent fruitions. A passage in MN 121, however, indicates that at least the theme-less concentration would count as a mahaggata dhamma because it can be attained without full insight into its fabricated nature, and the same classification might hold for all three of these concentrations and emancipations. Regardless of which class they fall into, however, they are all superior human states. As for the Wings to Awakening, the Commentary maintains that they count as superior human states only when developed to the level of any of the transcendent paths. It also adds that any other attainment equivalent to a lokuttara dhamma—such as complete comprehension of the four noble truths—would fulfill the factor of object here as well.	《义注》将《经分别》中的三种三昧、解脱──空、无相、无所有──归类为与出世间道相同，而相应的三种成就则为出世间果。然而，《中部》121经中的一段文字表明，至少无相的三昧可以算作广大法，因为它可以在没有完全洞察其捏造本质的情况下获得，并且相同的分类可能适用于所有这三种三昧和解脱。但无论属于哪一类，都是上人法。至于菩提分法，《义注》认为，只有当它们发展到任何出世间道的层次时，才算得上人法。它还补充说，任何其他等同于出世法的成就——例如对四圣谛的完全理解——也将满足这里的对象因素。

Perception	感知
Claiming a superior human state that one mistakenly thinks one has achieved is no offense under this rule, although if addressed to a lay person the claim would come under Pc 8. The same holds for a claim that is actually true.	根据本戒条，误以为自己已经成就并声称上人法，不构成犯戒，尽管如果是针对在家人声称，将受到《波逸提》八的管辖。对于实际上真实的声称也是如此。
There is the question, however, of what offense there would be for a bhikkhu who has attained a superior human state—such as the first jhāna—without realizing the fact, and then claims to have attained it, thinking his statement to be false. The Vibhaṅga defines non-existent as “not to be found; not knowing, not seeing a skillful state within oneself, (yet saying,) ‘There is a skillful state within me.’” Also, under the factor of intention, it states that misrepresenting one’s view or opinion would fulfill that factor. This implies that a superior human state would count as non-existent if one did not see it as existent. If one then misrepresented one’s view to another person, claiming the state to be existent, one would fulfill the factors of the full offense here.	然而，问题是，如果一位比丘已经证得了上人法——例如初禅——却没有意识到这一事实，然后声称自己证得了，并认为自己的说法是错误的，那么这犯什么罪呢？《经分别》将不存在定义为「没被发现；不知道，看不到自己内在的善法，（而说）『我内在有善法。』」此外，在意图因素下，它指出歪曲自己的观点或意见就满足了该因素。这意味著，如果看不到上人法存在，那么它就被视为不存在。如果向另一个人歪曲自己的观点，声称上人法存在，那么就满足了这里的完全违犯的要素。
Unlike the Vibhaṅga to Pc 1, the Vibhaṅga to this rule does not consider the case where a bhikkhu, doubtful of his attainment, states it as an undoubted fact. This suggests that the compilers of the Vibhaṅga saw the full offense here as applying only to cases where a bhikkhu knows without a doubt that his claim to a superior human state is untrue. From this it would follow that if one is in doubt about one’s attainment of such a state and yet makes a definite claim to it, one would incur a pācittiya under Pc 1.	与《波逸提》一的《经分别》不同，本戒条的《经分别》不考虑这样的情况：一位比丘怀疑自己的成就，却将其陈述为不容置疑的事实。这表明，《经分别》的编撰者认为这里的完全违犯只适用于比丘毫无疑问地知道他对上人法的声称是不真实的情况。由此可见，如果对自己是否达到这样一种境界有疑问，但又明确声称达到这种境界，那么就会在《波逸提》一戒条下犯《波逸提》。

Effort	努力
According to the Vibhaṅga, a statement mentioning oneself in connection with a superior human state is one indicating either that the state is present in oneself or that one is present in the state. Such a statement fulfills this factor only if it explicitly mentions oneself, although the reference to the state may be either explicit or implicit. Explicit mention of the state would include saying such things as, “I have attained the first jhāna,” “I have seen the heavenly realms,” “I know my previous lifetimes.” The Vibhaṅga’s example of an implicit mention of a state is the statement, “I delight in an empty dwelling,” the implication being that one’s delight comes from the attainment of jhāna. At present, many meditation communities have developed their own idioms for describing superior human attainments—one being “I have no doubts about the Buddha’s teaching” as a way of claiming stream-entry—and, in the context of such communities, idioms of this sort would count as implicit mention as well. As we will see under the discussion of intention, this sort of statement would incur an offense only if one intended the implicit meaning.	根据《经分别》，将自己与上人法联系起来的陈述为：表明该境界存在于自己之中或自己处在于该境界中。尽管对境界的提及可以是明确的或隐含的，但这样的陈述只有在明确提及自己时才满足本因素。明确提及境界包括说诸如「我已证得初禅」、「我已见天界」、「我知道我的前世」之类的话。《经分别》中隐含地提及境界的例子是这样一句话：「我乐于空居」，该含义是其喜悦来自于禅那的成就。目前，许多禅修团体已经发展出自己的惯用语来描述上人法成就，其中之一是「我对佛陀的教义毫不怀疑」，以此作为宣称入流的一种方式，并且在这些团体的背景脉络下，这种惯用语也算是隐含的提及。正如我们将在讨论意图时看到的那样，只有当人们意图表达隐含的含义时，这种陈述才会招致犯戒。
A statement in which one mentions oneself—rather than the state—implicitly in connection with a superior human state is not grounds for a pārājika. If it is a deliberate lie, it constitutes either a thullaccaya or a dukkaṭa. Because the grounds for determining the offense in this case are a matter of controversy, we will discuss them separately, under Understanding, below.	如果某人在陈述中提及自己（而不是境界），并隐含地与上人法联系在一起，则不能成为《波罗夷》的根据。如果是故意的谎言，则构成《偷兰遮》或《突吉罗》其中之一。由于本案例中确定犯戒的根据存在争议，因此我们将在下面的理解部分中单独讨论。
The word statement here covers not only spoken statements but also written statements and physical gestures. An example of a claim by gesture occurs in the Vibhaṅga: A group of bhikkhus makes an agreement that the first to set out from their dwelling would, by that very gesture, be known to the rest as an arahant. One of the group, who was not an arahant but wanted to be regarded as one, set out first from the dwelling and in so doing committed a pārājika. At present, a claim made in writing would also fulfill the factor of effort here.	这里的陈述一词不仅包括口头陈述，还包括书面陈述和肢体示意动作。《经分别》中有一个透过手势陈述的例子：一群比丘达成协议，第一个从他们的住所出发的人将透过这个示意动作被其他人认为是阿罗汉。其中一位虽然不是阿罗汉，但想被视为阿罗汉，他首先从住处出发，这样做就犯了《波罗夷》。目前，以书面形式提出的陈述也将满足此处的努力因素。
The Vibhaṅga specifies that the statement fulfills this factor whether it is addressed to a man or a woman, lay or ordained. The Vinīta-vatthu contains two cases in which bhikkhus, sitting in private, make false statements laying claim to superior human states. In the first case, the offender is rebuked by another bhikkhu who could read minds; in the second, the offender is rebuked by a devatā. In both cases, the Buddha imposes a dukkaṭa on the offenders. Thus the Commentary and K/Commentary conclude that a statement mentioning oneself in connection with a superior human state must be directed at a human listener for it to fulfill the factor of effort here. If one makes such a statement in private or directs it to a common animal or a deva, one incurs only a dukkaṭa.	《经分别》明确指出，无论是针对男性或女性、在家人或出家人陈述，都满足本因素。《Vinīta-vatthu》包含两个案例，其中比丘们私下坐著，做出虚假陈述，声称拥有上人法。在第一个案例中，犯戒者受到另一位有他心通的比丘的斥责；在第二个案例中，犯戒者受到一位天神斥责。在这两种情况下，佛陀都会对犯戒者施加《突吉罗》。因此，《义注》和 K/《义注》的结论是，提及自己与上人法有关的陈述必须针对人类听众，才能满足此处的努力因素。如果私下发表这样的言论，或是针对普通的动物或天神，他只会犯《突吉罗》。
The original instigators of this rule, instead of each making claims about his own attainments, made false claims about one another’s attainments. This case is not mentioned in the rule, the Vibhaṅga, or the commentaries, and so is not an offense under this rule, but it would come under Pc 1.	本戒条的最初犯戒者不是每个人都声称自己的成就，而是对彼此的成就做出虚假的声称。这种情况在戒条、《经分别》或注释中都没有提到，因此根据本戒条不构成犯戒，但它属于《波逸提》一。
The Commentary raises a question not addressed in the Vibhaṅga: Does mentioning a state in connection with oneself include claims about attainments in one’s previous lives? Without explaining its reasoning, it simply says No: In connection with oneself applies only to the present aggregates and not to past ones. With regard to the mahaggata dhammas, it would be possible to make a claim about an attainment in a past life that would not apply to one’s present state, because the simple fact that one may have attained jhāna in a previous lifetime has no implications bearing on the present lifetime. That sort of attainment doesn’t necessarily carry over from one lifetime to the next. With regard to lokuttara dhammas, however, the fact that one may have achieved stream-entry in a previous lifetime would have implications for the present lifetime: One is destined to achieve at least stream-entry again at some point before death, which puts one on the level of a faith-follower or a Dhamma-follower, “one who has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill” (SN 25:1). This is equivalent to the path to stream-entry. So it would seem reasonable to say that a claim to a mahaggata dhamma attained in a previous lifetime would not fulfill the factor of effort here, whereas a claim to a lokuttara dhamma attained in a previous lifetime would. And, of course, if a bhikkhu falsely claims present knowledge of previous lifetimes, that would unequivocally fulfill this factor.	《义注》提出了《经分别》中未提及的问题：提及与自己有关的境界是否包括宣称自己前世的成就？它没有解释其推理，只是简单地说「不」：与自己相关仅适用于现在的五蕴，而不适用于过去的五蕴。就广大法而言，可以宣称前世的成就不适用于现在的状态，因为一个人可能在前世证得禅那的这一简单事实并不代表会持续到今生。这种成就不一定会从一世延续到下一世。然而，就出世法而言，一个人在前世可能已证得入流这一事实，会对今生产生持续影响：一个人注定至少会在死前的某个时刻再次证得入流，这使得他在信仰追随者或佛法追随者的层面上，「进入正确的道路，进入善人之地，超越凡夫之地」（《相应部》25:1经）。这相当于入流道。因此，如果说前世证得的广大法不能满足这里努力的因素，而说前世证得的出世间法则可以，这似乎是合理的。当然，如果比丘虚假地声称拥有前世的现时知识，那就明确地满足了本因素。

Intention	意图
To incur an offense under this rule, the statement must be (1) meant to misrepresent the truth and (2) motivated by evil desire.	要根据本戒条构成犯戒，该陈述必须 (1) 意图歪曲事实，并且 (2) 出于邪恶的欲望。
According to the Vibhaṅga a statement meant to misrepresent the truth can be characterized in any of seven ways (§): Before making it, one knows that it is a lie; while making it, one knows that it is a lie; after making it, one knows that it was a lie; one misrepresents one’s view; one misrepresents one’s opinion; one misrepresents one’s approval; and one misrepresents one’s state. The Commentary focuses on the first of these characteristics as essential: One must know before making the statement that it will be a lie. If one doesn’t realize it beforehand but notices it only while making it or just after making it, it would count simply as a slip of the tongue, and thus—as discussed under Pc 1—not as a deliberate lie. When the intention to misrepresent the truth is absent, the statement does not come under this rule. For example, if one means to say one thing that does not bear on a superior human state but accidentally says something else that comes out as a claim to such a state, one commits no offense.	根据《经分别》，旨在歪曲事实的陈述可以透过七种方式中的任何一种来表征（§）：在做出陈述之前，知道它是谎言；做的时候，知道这是谎言；做了之后，知道是谎言；不如实地叙述自己的观点；不如实地叙述自己的意见；不如实地叙述自己的认可；不如实地叙述自己的状态。《义注》重点关注这些表征中的第一个表征：在发表声明之前必须知道这将是一个谎言。如果事先没有意识到这一点，只是在做的时候或做了之后才注意到它，那么这将被仅仅算做失言，因此——正如《波逸提》一中所讨论的——不属于故意的谎言。当不存在歪曲事实的意图时，该陈述不属于本戒条的范围。例如，如果一个人想说一件与上人法无关的事情，但无意中说出了其他一些陈述该境界的事情，那么这个人并没有犯戒。
Other examples of not intending to misrepresent the truth appear in a series of cases in the Vinīta-vatthu where bhikkhus are absolved of an offense under this rule because they “did not intend to boast.” The Vibhaṅga gives no precise definition of this phrase, but the cases in question give a fair idea of what it means. They all involve statements where the reference to a superior human state is only implicit. In some of them, ill bhikkhus are asked—as was common in the time of the Buddha—“Do you have any superior human states (§)?” the purpose being—if they had such an attainment—to focus their minds on it; and if not, to direct their efforts to gaining such an attainment before their illness worsened. The ill bhikkhus respond in a variety of ways which, on the surface, look like equivocation. They don’t have any superior human attainments, yet don’t want to give the impression that they’ve achieved nothing at all, so they say such things as, “A state to be aroused through the arousing of energy,” or, “A state to be aroused through committed commitment.” In other cases, the ill bhikkhus are told not to fear death and they respond, “I’m not afraid of death,” or, “He who has remorse might be afraid of death.” In still other cases, ill bhikkhus are asked how they are bearing up under their illnesses and they respond, “This could not be borne by any old person (§),” or, “This could not be borne by an ordinary person (§).” There are also cases where bhikkhus are being pressured by their relatives to disrobe and they respond with such statements as, “It’s impossible for a person like me to live in a house,” or, “I have blocked off sensual passions.”	其他无意歪曲事实的例子出现在《Vinīta-vatthu》的一系列案例中，根据本戒条，比丘们免于犯戒，因为他们「无意夸耀」。《经分别》没有给出这个用语的精确定义，但所讨论的案例很好地说明了它的含义。它们都涉及仅隐含地提及上人法的陈述。在其中一些中，生病的比丘被问到——这在佛陀时代很常见——「你有没有上人法（§）？」目的是──如果他们有这样的成就──将他们的心集中于其上；如果没有，就让他们努力在病情恶化之前获得这样的成就。生病的比丘们以各种各样的方式回应，表面上看起来像是模棱两可的。他们没有任何上人法成就，但又不想给人留下他们一事无成的印象，所以他们会说「法依精进而得」，或者，「法依专念修持而成就。」在其他案例中，生病的比丘被告知不要害怕死亡，他们回答说：「我不怕死」，或者「有悔恨的人可能会害怕死亡」。还有一些情况，生病的比丘被问及他们如何忍受疾病时，他们回答说：「这是任何老人都无法承受的（§）」，或者，「这是普通人无法承受的（§）」。也有这样的情况，比丘受到亲戚的压力，要求还俗，而他们的回应是，「像我这样的人不可能住家里」，或者「我已经断绝了欲乐」。
In each of these cases, the bhikkhus later felt conscience-stricken that their words might be construed as a boast, and so went to the Buddha, who stated that, because their purpose was not to boast—apparently, they were simply trying to avoid difficult situations, and the Commentary shows how they could easily have been thinking of something beside superior human states—they incurred no penalty.	在每一个案例中，比丘们后来都感到良心不安，因为他们的话可能会被理解为夸耀，于是他们去找佛陀，佛陀说，因为他们的目的不是夸耀——显然，他们只是试图避免困难的情况。《义注》表明他们如何很容易地想到除了上人法之外的其他东西——他们没有受到惩罚。
Strangely enough—given its explanations of these cases—when the Commentary discusses the factor of “not intending to boast” under the non-offense clauses, it defines it as applying to a bhikkhu who, not motivated by desire, makes a non-deceptive claim of knowledge to his fellow bhikkhus. The Sub-commentary, however, notes that the Commentary’s definition does not fit the Vinīta-vatthu cases and so gives its own definition of “not intending to boast”: saying something that would fulfill the factor of effort yet without desiring to speak of a superior human state, and without being aware that one’s words imply such a state. Drawing on the examples in the Vinīta-vatthu, we can qualify the Sub-commentary’s explanation by noting that this exemption applies even if the reference to oneself is explicit, but not if the reference to the superior human state is.	奇怪的是，考虑到对这些情况的解释，当《义注》讨论不犯条款中「无意夸耀」的因素时，它将其定义为适用于不为欲望所驱使、向他的比丘同侪做出非欺骗性的知识宣称的比丘。然而，《复注》指出，《义注》的定义与《Vinīta-vatthu》的案例不符，因此给出了自己的「无意夸耀」的定义：说一些可以满足努力因素的事情，但不想谈论上人法，且没有意识到自己的言语暗示著这样的境界。借鉴《Vinīta-vatthu》中的例子，我们可以指出即使明确提及自己，该豁免也适用，来限定《复注》的解释，但明确提及上人法则不适用。
Thus, if one makes an innocent statement that could be construed as implying a claim to a superior human state without explicitly mentioning such as state, then regardless of how other people might interpret it, if one’s purpose is not to boast or lay claim to that state then there is no offense. However, if the inference was intended—and a deliberate misrepresentation—the factor of intention here would be fulfilled. As for untrue statements that make explicit reference to a superior human state—e.g., “I have reached the fourth jhāna”—the inference is obviously intended, and so these automatically fulfill the factor of “intending to misrepresent the truth.”	因此，如果一个人发表了一个单纯无恶意的声明，可以被解释为暗示对上人法的主张，而没有明确提及这样的境界，那么无论其他人如何解释它，如果一个人的目的不是吹嘘或声称该境界，那就没有犯戒。然而，如果这个推论是有意的──而且是故意的扭曲──那么这里的意图因素就会得到满足。至于那些明确提及上人法的不实陈述，例如「我已证得第四禅」，显然是有意图的推论，因此这些自然就满足了「意图歪曲事实」的因素。
As for evil desire: The Commentary—citing a passage from an Abhidhamma text, the Vibhaṅga, which in turn is based on MN 5—defines evil desire here as the wish to have others believe that skillful states not present within oneself are actually there. In other words, one must want one’s statement to be taken seriously. This means that motive is an essential part of this factor. To make a self-deprecating, sarcastic joke referring to one’s non-existent superior human attainments as if they were existent, but not intending to be taken seriously, would not fulfill the factor of intention here, regardless of how one’s listeners took the remark. However, because such a remark is a falsehood, it would fall under Pc 1, even though made in jest. For this reason, cases of this sort are not mentioned in the non-offense clauses under this rule because they do carry a pācittiya offense. However, even though the penalty they carry is relatively minor, jokes of this sort should not be viewed lightly. Not only can they lead to serious misunderstandings among one’s listeners, but they also betray an off-handed disrespect for the Dhamma, and in particular for the attainments that a bhikkhu should view as among the highest means and ends of his training.	至于邪恶的欲望：《义注》引用阿毘达摩文献《经分别》中的一段话，而该文又以《中部》5经为基础——在这里将邪恶的欲望定义为希望让别人相信自己不存在的善法实际上存在。换句话说，一个人必须希望自己的言论能被认真对待。这意味著动机是这个因素的必要组成部分。开一个自嘲、讽刺的玩笑，指的是一个人不存在的上人法，就好像它们确实存在一样，但不打算被认真对待，无论听众如何看待这句话，都不能满足这里的意图。然而，由于这样的言论是谎言，因此即使是开玩笑，它也属于《波逸提》一。因此，此类案例在本戒条的不犯条款中并未提及，因为它们确实犯《波逸提》。不过，尽管惩罚相对较小，但此类玩笑也不应掉以轻心。它们不仅会导致听者产生严重的误解，而且还会表现出对佛法的不尊重，尤其是对比丘应该视为修行最高手段和目的的成就的不尊重。

Understanding	理解
The Vibhaṅga discusses two sets of cases in which the factor of understanding plays a role in determining the offense. In the first set, bhikkhus intend to lie about attaining one superior human state (such as the second jhāna) but actually lie about attaining another one (such as the third). In the second set, they make claims about attainments, explicitly mentioning an attainment but not explicitly mentioning themselves (e.g., a bhikkhu, referring to the dwelling in which he lives, says, “Those who live in this dwelling are arahants”). Given that understanding plays a role here, the question is: Whose understanding is at issue here, the speaker’s or the listener’s? The Commentary assumes the listener’s understanding to be at issue. Furthermore—despite the Vibhaṅga’s applying this factor only to these two sets—the Commentary extrapolates from them to say that this condition applies to all cases covered by this rule: The listener must understand what the bhikkhu is saying for there to be a full offense.	《经分别》讨论了两组情况，其中理解因素在确定犯戒时发挥了作用。在第一组中，比丘意图谎称证得一种上人法（如第二禅），但实际上却谎称证得另一种上人法（如第三禅）。在第二组中，他们宣称自己的成就，明确提及成就，但没有明确提及自己（例如，一位比丘，指他所居住的住所，说：「居住在该住所的人是阿罗汉」）。鉴于理解在这里发挥著作用，问题是：谁的理解是这里争议中的问题，是说者的还是听者的？《义注》假设涉及听众的理解。此外，尽管《经分别》仅将此因素应用于这两组，但《义注》从它们推断出，这一状况适用于本戒条所涵盖的所有情况：听者必须理解比丘所说的内容，才能构成完全的违犯。
This interpretation, however, appears to be based on a misreading of the Canon. Under other rules where the question of the listener’s understanding is a factor—such as the rules for disrobing and Saṅghādisesa 3—the pattern in the Vibhaṅga is to state explicitly, “If he understands,” “If he doesn’t understand,” “She didn’t understand,” with the “he” or “she” in a different case than that of the participles describing the bhikkhu. Here, however, when the Vibhaṅga mentions the factor of understanding, it uses a present participle in the same case as the participle describing the person speaking: sampajāna-musā bhaṇantassa paṭivijānantassa āpatti pārājikassa—“For the one speaking a deliberate lie and understanding (it as such), an offense of defeat” and so forth. (Some have suggested that the paṭivijānantassa in this phrase is an example of the genitive absolute, which would apply to a different agent than the main agent of the sentence. However, the syntax of the sentence and the placement of the word do not follow the pattern for the genitive absolute, which has to be composed of a noun and a participle set apart from the rest of the sentence.) This means that the participle for “understanding” refers to the same person referred to as “speaking”: In other words, it refers to the bhikkhu, and not to the listener, who is nowhere mentioned in the passage.	然而，这种解释似乎是基于对《圣典》的误读。在其他戒条中，听者的理解问题是一个因素，例如还俗和《僧残》三的戒条，《经分别》中的模式是明确叙述，「如果他理解」，「如果他不理解」，「她不理解」，「他」或「她」的情况与描述比丘的分词不同。然而，在这里，当《经分别》提到理解因素时，它使用了现在分词，其情况与描述说者的分词相同：sampajāna-musā bhaṇantassa paṭivijānantassa āpatti pārājikassa——「对于那些故意说谎和理解的人（就其本身而言），《波罗夷》罪」等等。（有些人认为这个措辞中的 paṭivijānantassa 是所有格独立句的一个例子，它适用于与句子的主要动作发出者不同的动作发出者。但是，句子的语法和单字的位置并不遵循所有格独立句的模式，它必须由一个名词和一个与句子其余部分分开的分词组成。）这意味著「理解」的分词指的是与「说话」相同的人：换句话说，它指的是比丘，而不是指听者，这段经文中没有提到听者。
This, of course, raises the question of why the speaker’s understanding of his own statement would be an issue, and the answer is this:	当然，这产生了一个问题：为什么发言者对自己发言的理解会成为一个问题，答案是这样的：
In the first set of cases—where the bhikkhu means to lay false claim to one superior human state but actually lays false claim to another—if he does not realize that he has made a slip of the tongue, the statement would not normally count as a conscious lie, as he is not aware of what he is saying at the moment he is saying it. Because he is not paying attention to his words, he should not receive the full penalty. However, if he is alert enough to know what he is saying, then—as the Commentary points out—all the factors of an offense are present. Because both his intended and his actual statements are corrupt, he should not be allowed to avoid the penalty simply because of a brief slip of the tongue. Thus, the Vibhaṅga assigns a pārājika in cases of this sort if the bhikkhu is aware of what he is saying, and a thullaccaya if not.	在第一组情况下，比丘本意对一个上人法提出虚假主张，但实际上却对另一个上人法提出虚假主张，如果他没有意识到自己失言了，那么该陈述通常不会被视为是有意识的谎言，因为他当时并不知道自己在说什么。因为他没有注意自己的言论，所以他不应该受到全额惩罚。然而，如果他足够警觉，知道自己在说什么，那么——正如《义注》所指出的——犯戒的所有因素都存在。由于他的意图和实际陈述都是堕落的，因此不应允许他仅仅因为短暂的失言而逃避惩罚。因此，如果比丘知道自己在说什么，《经分别》在这种情况下会指派《波罗夷》罪，如果不知道，则指派《偷兰遮》罪。
In the second set of cases, where the bhikkhu’s remarks concern a superior human state explicitly but himself only implicitly, he deserves a heavier penalty if he is aware of the implicit connection than if he is not. Thus the Vibhaṅga assigns a thullaccaya if he is, and a dukkaṭa if not.	在第二组情况下，比丘的言论明确地涉及上人法，但只是隐含地涉及他自己，如果他意识到这种隐含的联系，那么他应该比没有意识到而受到更重的惩罚。因此，如果他意识到，《经分别》指派《偷兰遮》罪，如果没意识到，则指派《突吉罗》罪。
For those interested in the Commentary’s interpretation—that the understanding is the duty of the listener, and that it must be present in all cases for there to be the full offense under this rule—here it is:	对于那些对《义注》的解释感兴趣的人——理解是听者的义务，并且它必须出现在所有情况下，才能构成本戒条下的完全违犯——这里是《义注》的解释：
Understanding, according to the Commentary, means simply that the listener hears the statement clearly enough to know that it is a claim. Whether he/she understands the names for the states claimed—jhāna, clairvoyance, clairaudience, or whatever—is not an issue. The same is true of whether he/she believes the statement to be true or false. If the listener to whom an explicit claim to a superior human state is directed does not understand it, but a passer-by does, the penalty is still a pārājika.	根据《义注》，理解仅仅意味著听者足够清楚地听到该陈述，从而知道它是一个主张。他/她是否理解所声称的境界名称——禅那、天眼、天耳或其他什么——都不是问题。无论他/她相信该陈述是真是假，情况也是如此。如果听闻明确主张上人法的听众不理解，但路人理解，则惩罚仍然是《波罗夷》。
The Commentary adds that if the listener does not hear the bhikkhu clearly enough to catch all he says, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the listener at first has some doubt as to what the bhikkhu said but later realizes that it was a claim to a superior human state, the offense is still a thullaccaya. If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu at all, the Commentary—probably extrapolating from the Vinīta-vatthu cases concerning bhikkhus speaking in private—gives the bhikkhu a dukkaṭa.	《义注》补充说，如果听者没有听清比丘的声音，无法听清他所说的一切，则惩罚是《偷兰遮》。如果听者起初对比丘所说的话有一些疑问，但后来意识到这是声称上人法，仍然是犯《偷兰遮》罪。如果听者根本没有听到比丘的声音，《义注》——可能是从有关比丘私下讲话的《Vinīta-vatthu》案例中推断出来的——就会给予比丘《突吉罗》。
If the bhikkhu makes a claim to a superior human state in which he mentions himself only implicitly—e.g., “The bhikkhus you support are non-returners”—the Commentary follows a similar pattern in assigning offenses: a thullaccaya if the listener understands, a dukkaṭa if he/she doesn’t, a dukkaṭa if he/she doesn’t even hear the claim.	如果比丘声称上人法，而他只是含蓄地提到自己——例如，「你所供养的比丘是不还者」——《义注》则遵循类似的模式来指派违犯：如果听者理解，则为《偷兰遮》；如果他/她不理解，则为《突吉罗》；如果他/她甚至没有听到该声称，则为《突吉罗》。
As noted above, however, the Commentary’s judgments on this issue appear to be based on a misreading of the Vibhaṅga.	然而，如上所述，《义注》对这个问题的判断似乎是基于对《经分别》的误读。

Special cases	特别案例
Special cases in the Vinīta-vatthu:	《Vinīta-vatthu》里的特别案例：
1) Brahmans speaking with exaggerated faith or politeness address bhikkhus of no particular attainments as if they were arahants (“May the arahants come…. May the arahants be seated”). This puts the bhikkhus in a quandary and so they ask the Buddha how to behave in such a situation. His response: There is no offense in accepting invitations such as these from a “speaker with faith”—the point being that there is no offense in coming, sitting, etc., as long as the intention is just to accept the invitation and not to imply a claim.	1）婆罗门以夸张的信心或礼貌说话，称呼没有特殊成就的比丘，就好像他们是阿罗汉一样（「愿阿罗汉来…愿阿罗汉入座」）。这让比丘们陷入了进退两难的境地，所以他们向佛陀请教在这种情况下该如何行事。他的回应是：接受来自「有信心的说者」的邀请并没有犯戒——重点是，来参加、坐下等等就没有犯戒，只要意图只是接受邀请非而暗示声称。
2) Bhikkhus, hoping that people will esteem them, engage in special practices—the examples given in the Vinīta-vatthu include living in the jungle, going for alms, sitting, standing, walking, and lying down (apparently in meditation for long periods of time), but from them we can extrapolate to other practices such as any of the ascetic (dhutaṅga) practices or vegetarianism, etc., followed so as to impress others. The penalty: a dukkaṭa. Because this ruling might give the mistaken impression that one should not adopt the dhutaṅga practices or engage in long periods of sitting, etc., the Commentary includes a list of blameless reasons for living in the wilderness: seeing that village-dwelling makes one’s mind restless, desiring seclusion, desiring to attain arahantship, reflecting that the Buddha praised living in the wilderness, anticipating that one will be a good example to one’s fellows in the holy life. A bhikkhu who undertakes any of the dhutaṅga practices for these or similar reasons would incur no offense.	2）比丘们希望人们尊重他们，进行特殊的修行－《Vinīta-vatthu》中给出的例子包括住在丛林中、托钵、坐、站、行、卧（显然是在长时间的禅修中），但从中我们可以推断出其他修行，例如任何苦行（头陀行）修行或素食主义等等，以便给他人留下深刻的印象，也算在内。惩罚：《突吉罗》。因为这个规定可能会给人一种不应该修头陀行或长时间打坐等等的错误印象，所以《义注》列举了一系列生活在林野中无可指责的理由：看到村居使人心掉举，渴望隐居，渴望证得阿罗汉果，反思佛陀对林野生活的赞叹，期盼自己能成为梵行生活同侪的榜样。因这些或类似原因而进行任何头陀行修行的比丘不会招致任何犯戒。

Non-offenses	不犯
In addition to the standard non-offenses, the Vibhaṅga lists two that we have already covered in connection with perception and intention: There is no offense if one makes a claim out of a mistaken and exaggerated understanding of one’s attainment; and no offense if one is not intending to boast, i.e., one makes a claim that may sound like an implicit reference to a superior human state but is not intended as such.	除了标准的不犯之外，《经分别》还列出了我们已经讨论过的与感知和意图相关的两项：如果一个人基于对自己成就的错误和夸大的理解而声称，则不构成犯戒；如果一个人无意自吹自擂，也就是说，一个人声称可能听起来像是在隐含地提到上人法，但他的本意并非如此，那么也没有犯戒。
Summary: Deliberately lying to another person that one has attained a superior human state is a pārājika offense.	摘要：故意向他人说谎，声称自己已证得上人法是《波罗夷》罪。

* * *

A bhikkhu who violates any of these four pārājika rules is automatically no longer a bhikkhu. There is no need for him to go through a formal ceremony of disrobing, for the act of violating the rule is an act of disrobing in and of itself. As each of the rules states, he is no longer in affiliation, which the word-analysis defines as no longer having a single transaction (i.e., he can no longer participate in any Community meetings), no longer having a single recitation (i.e., he can no longer participate in the uposatha (see BMC2, Chapter 15)), no longer having a training in common with the bhikkhus.	比丘违反这四种《波罗夷》戒条中的任何一个，就自动不再是比丘。他不需要经过正式的还俗仪式，因为违反戒条的行为本身就是还俗行为。正如每条戒条所述，他不再具有从属关系，语句解说将其定义为不再进行一次僧伽羯磨（即，他不能再参加任何僧团集会），不再进行一次诵戒（即，他不能再参加布萨（见《佛教修道准则第二册》第十五章）），也不能再与比丘们共同受训。
Even if a bhikkhu who has violated any of these rules continues to pretend to be a bhikkhu, he does not really count as one; as soon as the facts are known he must be expelled from the Saṅgha. He can never again properly ordain as a bhikkhu in this life. If he tries to ordain in a Community that does not know of his offense, his ordination is invalid, and he must be expelled as soon as the truth is found out.	即使一个比丘违反了这些戒条中的任何一条，他仍然假装是比丘，他也不算真正的比丘；一旦真相大白，就必须将他逐出僧团。他此生再也不能正式出家为比丘了。如果他试图在一个不知道他的罪行的僧团中受具足戒，他的受戒是无效的，一旦发现真相，他必须立即被逐出。
The Commentary to Pr 1 maintains that he is allowed to “go forth” as a novice, but because the Vibhaṅga does not clearly support this position, not all Communities accept it.	《波罗夷》一的《义注》认为，他被允许作为沙弥「出家」，但由于《经分别》没有明确支持这一立场，因此并非所有僧团都接受它。
Ignorance of these rules does not exempt an offender from the penalty, which is why the Buddha ordered that they be taught to each new bhikkhu as soon as possible after ordination (Mv.I.78.2-5). Because the rules cover a number of cases that are legal in present-day society (e.g., recommending abortion, proving to oneself how supple one has become through yoga by inserting one’s penis in one’s mouth) or that are common practice among people who see nothing wrong with flirting with the edges of the law (e.g., hiding an article subject to customs duties when entering a country), it is especially important to inform each new bhikkhu of the rules’ full implications from the very start.	对这些戒条的无知并不能免除犯戒者的惩罚，这就是为什么佛陀下令在出家后尽快向每位新比丘传授这些戒条（《大品》.一.78.2-5）。因为这些戒条涵盖了当今社会合法的许多情况（例如，建议堕胎、通过将阴茎插入嘴里的瑜伽来证明自己变得多么柔软）或者是人们常见的做法，他们认为游走法律的边缘并没有什么错（例如，在进入一个国家时隐藏需要缴纳关税的物品），从一开始就告知每个新比丘戒条的全部含义尤为重要。
If a bhikkhu suspects that he has committed a pārājika, he should immediately inform a senior bhikkhu well versed in the rules. The way the senior bhikkhu should handle the case is well-illustrated by an incident reported in the Commentary to Pr 2: A king together with an enormous crowd once went to worship the Great Stūpa at a certain monastery in Sri Lanka. Among the crowd was a visiting bhikkhu from the South of the country who was carrying an expensive roll of cloth. The commotion of the event was so great that he dropped the cloth, was unable to retrieve it, and soon gave it up for lost. One of the resident bhikkhus happened to come across it and, desiring to steal it, quickly put it away before the owner might see it. Eventually, of course, he became tormented by guilt and went to the resident Vinaya expert to admit a pārājika and disrobe.	如果比丘怀疑自己犯了《波罗夷》，他应该立刻通知熟悉戒律的长老比丘。《波罗夷》二的《义注》中所记述的一件事很好地说明了长老比丘应当的处理方式：有一次，一位国王带著一大群人去斯里兰卡的某座寺院朝拜大佛塔。人群中有一位来自国家南方的来访比丘，他手里拿著一卷昂贵的布。事件引起的骚动如此之大，以至于他把布掉在地上，无法取回，很快就因遗失将之放弃了。一位常住的比丘碰巧发现了它，想要偷走它，并在主人看到它之前赶紧把它收起来。最终，当然，他受到了愧疚的折磨，并去找常住的戒律专家承认犯了《波罗夷》并还俗。
The Vinaya expert, though, wouldn’t let him disrobe until he had found the owner of the cloth and inquired about it more fully. Eventually, after a long search, the bhikkhu was able to track down the original owner at a monastery back South, who told him that at the time of the theft he had given the cloth up for lost and had abandoned all mental attachment for it. Thus, as the cloth was ownerless, the resident bhikkhu had incurred not a pārājika, but simply some dukkaṭas for the preliminary efforts with intention to steal.	然而，戒律专家在找到布的主人并更详细地询问之前，不让他还俗。最终，经过长时间的寻找，这位比丘在南方的一座寺院找到了原主人，原主人告诉他，在被盗时，他已经因遗失把这块布放弃了，并放弃了对它的所有心理执著。因此，由于布料是无主的，常住的比丘并没有犯《波罗夷》，而只是为了偷窃的初步努力而犯了一些《突吉罗》。
This example shows several things: the great thoroughness with which a senior bhikkhu should investigate a possible pārājika, the compassion he should show to the offender, and the fact that the offender should be given the benefit of the doubt wherever possible: He is to be considered innocent until the facts prove him guilty.	这个例子说明了几件事：长老比丘应该非常彻底地调查可能的《波罗夷》，他应该对犯戒者表现出慈悲，以及只要有可能，就应该对犯戒者给予无罪推定：他应该在事实证明他有罪之前，被认为是无罪的。
There are, however, cases of another sort, in which a bhikkhu commits a pārājika and refuses to acknowledge the fact. If his fellow bhikkhus see, hear, or have any suspicions that this has happened, they are duty-bound to bring up the issue with him. If they are not satisfied with his assertions of his innocence, the case becomes an accusation issue, which must be resolved in line with the procedures outlined in Sg 8 and Chapter 11.	然而，也有另一种情况，比丘犯了《波罗夷》，并且拒绝承认这一事实。如果他的比丘同侪看到、听到或怀疑这件事发生，他们有责任向他提出这个问题。如果他们对他的无罪断言不满意，该案件将成为指控问题，必须根据《僧残》八和第十一章中概述的程序解决。
Finally, the Commentary concludes its discussion of the pārājikas by noticing that there are altogether 24—eight actual, twelve equivalent, and four derived—pārājikas for bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs.	最后，《义注》总结了对《波罗夷》的讨论，指出比丘和比丘尼共有 24 种《波罗夷》——八种实际的、十二种等同的，和四种衍生的《波罗夷》。
The eight actual pārājikas are:	八个实际的《波罗夷》是：
the four for bhikkhus (also observed by the bhikkhunīs), and	比丘四种（比丘尼也遵守），以及
the four additional pārājikas for bhikkhunīs alone.	只有比丘尼遵守的四种额外的《波罗夷》。
The twelve equivalent pārājikas include the eleven disqualified types who should not be ordained as bhikkhus in the first place. If they happen to be ordained, their ordination is invalid; once they are found out they must be expelled for life (Mv.I.61-68; see BMC2, Chapter 14 for details). They are—	十二种等同的《波罗夷》包括十一种不合格的类型，他们从一开始就不应该受具足戒为比丘。若已受戒，其受戒无效；一旦被发现，必须终身摈出（《大品》.一.61-68；详情请参阅《佛教修道准则第二册》第十四章）。他们是-
a paṇḍaka (essentially, a eunuch or a person born neuter—see Saṅghādisesa 2),	黄门（本质上是太监或生来中性的人－见《僧残》二），
a “non-human” being, (this includes nāgas, petas, devas, and yakkhas),	「非人类」众生（包括龙、饿鬼、天神和夜叉），
a hermaphrodite,	雌雄同体，
a person who poses as a bhikkhu without having been ordained,	未经受具足戒而冒充比丘的人，
a bhikkhu who has ordained in another religion without first giving up his status as a bhikkhu,	未先放弃比丘身分而在另一宗教出家的比丘，
a person who has murdered his father,	杀死自己父亲的人，
a person who has murdered his mother,	杀死自己母亲的人，
a person who has murdered an arahant,	杀死阿罗汉的人
a person who has sexually molested a bhikkhunī,	玷污比丘尼的人，
a person who has maliciously injured a Buddha to the point of causing him to bleed, and	恶意伤害佛陀以致流血者（出佛身血），
a person who has dishonestly caused a schism in the Saṅgha, knowing or suspecting that his position was contrary to the Dhamma-Vinaya.	明知或怀疑自己的立场违反法与律，不诚实地造成僧团分裂的人（破和合僧）。
These eleven equivalent pārājikas apply to bhikkhunīs as well.	这十一种等同的《波罗夷》也适用于比丘尼。
The twelfth equivalent pārājika, which applies only to bhikkhunīs, is the case where a bhikkhunī leaves the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha and takes up the role of a lay woman (Cv.X.26.1). Unlike the bhikkhus, the bhikkhunīs have no formal procedure for disrobing. If they leave the Saṅgha, they are not allowed to reordain for the rest of this lifetime.	第十二种等同的《波罗夷》仅适用于比丘尼，是比丘尼离开比丘尼僧团并担任在家女居士角色的情况（《小品》.十.26.1）。与比丘不同，比丘尼没有正式的还俗程序。若离开僧团，此生不得再受具足戒。
In addition to the twenty actual and equivalent pārājikas, the Commentary gives separate listing to the four anulomika (derived) pārājikas, which are actually four cases included under Pr 1: the bhikkhu with a supple back who sticks his penis in his mouth, the bhikkhu with a long penis who inserts it into his anus, the bhikkhu who performs oral intercourse with someone else, and the bhikkhu who receives anal intercourse. Of these, three can be extrapolated to apply to bhikkhunīs, too. Why the Commentary lists these cases as separate pārājikas is hard to tell, unless it’s simply to ensure that these permutations of Pr 1 don’t get overlooked. Still, the entire list of 24 is important, for under the rules dealing with falsely accusing another bhikkhu of having committed a pārājika (Sg 8 & 9) or the rule dealing with concealing another bhikkhu’s pārājika offense (Pc 64), the Commentary defines pārājika as including equivalent and derived pārājikas as well.	除了二十种实际的和等同的《波罗夷》之外，《义注》还单独列出了四种 anulomika （衍生的）《波罗夷》，这实际上是《波罗夷》一中包含的四种状况：背部柔软的比丘，将阴茎插入嘴里的比丘，阴茎较长的比丘插入自己的肛门、与他人进行口交的比丘、以及接受肛交的比丘。其中三种也可以推论适用于比丘尼。为什么《义注》将这些案例列为单独的《波罗夷》很难说，除非只是为了确保《波罗夷》一的这些排列不会被忽视。尽管如此，24 种完整的清单仍然很重要，因为根据处理虚假指控另一比丘犯有《波罗夷》的戒条（《僧残》八和《僧残》九）或处理隐瞒另一比丘的《波罗夷》罪行的戒条（《波逸提》六四），《义注》定义了《波罗夷》也包括等同的和衍生的《波罗夷》。